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FOREWORD 
 
 
 
 
 
Within the EGP Project “The Capacity Building of Environmental 
Justice and Guarding Environmental Rights in Western China”, the scholars of 
the University of Bologna, partner of the China University of Political Science 
and Law (CUPL) and its Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims 
(CLAPV), have worked on an Environmental Law Survey so as to provide to 
the interested public – in particular, Chinese judges, lawyers, academics, and 
civil society as a whole – with the most interesting and recent judicial decisions 
or pieces of Environmental Law legislations developed in the most relevant 
legal fields. The choice has fallen on the scientific juridical disciplines of 
Administrative Law, Civil Procedural Law, Comparative Law, Criminal 
Procedural Law, EU Law and International Law, since these disciplines express 
highly relevant perspectives for the promotion of an effective environmental 
protection within the European Union, European Countries, and the 
International Community. We hope that the carefully selected rulings and 
pieces of legislation may provide the Chinese interpreter, practitioner or judge 
involved in Environmental Law issues in China or concerning China, with legal 
reasoning and innovative juridical solutions which may inspire their extremely 
demanding daily activities, constantly involving a balance between the right to 
a clean and healthy environment of the citizens and the rights of economic 
operators and undertakings. 
 
The Editor in Chief and the Scientific Committee of the University of Bologna 
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JOINING THE MARKET: STATE AID AND 
RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE EU 
 
Francesco Alongi 
 
 
 
CONTENTS: 1. – Introduction. 2. – The New Guidelines: an Overview.  
3. – State Aid and Renewable Energy. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
According to a study recently released by the European Commission, 
in 2012 the total value of public funding of the energy sector in the EU was 
around 120 - 140 billion euro and the largest share of these subsidies went to 
renewable energy production1. 
While hardly surprising, these results offer a clearer picture of the 
profound impact that State funding had on the European energy markets and 
of the key role it played in the development of the European renewable energy 
industry.  
On 9th April 2014, after a round of stakeholder consultations begun a 
few months earlier2, the Commission adopted the new Guidelines on State aid 
for environmental protection and energy for the period 2014- 20203.  
                                                   
1 S. ALBERICI, S. BOEVE, P. VAN BREEVOORT et al., Subsidies and costs of EU 
energy – An interim report, European Commission, Directorate General for Energy, 
available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/studies/doc/20141013_subsidies_costs_eu_energy.pdf, 
10th October 2014 (last visited October 2014), p. 9. 
2 European Commission, Press Release, State aid: Commission consults on draft rules 
for state support in energy and environmental field, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-1282_en.htm, 18th December 2013 (last visited August 2014).  
3 European Commission, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020, OJ 2014/C, 200/01, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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The stated goal of the new State aid regulatory framework is to 
contribute to the achievement of the EU’s ambitious climate objectives for 
2020, while «ensuring that European companies and consumers have access to 
more affordable energy» and «avoiding any waste of taxpayers’ money and 
distortions of competition in the EU internal market»4.  
The most significant feature of the new Guidelines, which entered into 
force on 1st July 2014, is certainly the full integration of climate policy with the 
rules governing public financing of the energy sector5.  
 
2. The New Guidelines: an Overview. 
 
The new Guidelines, which replaced the Commission’s 2008 
Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection, are an integral part of 
the Commission’s State Aid Modernisation initiative6. 
The purpose of the Guidelines is to help Member States to design State 
aid measures and policies in order to achieve the Union’s 2020 climate targets7 
and to foster smart, inclusive and sustainable growth without causing 
distortions of competition or a fragmentation of the internal market. 
The Guidelines set out the criteria that the Commission will employ to 
assess which environmental and energy financing measures amount to State aid 
                                                                                                                                 
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014XC0628(01)&from=EN, 9 April 2014 
(last visited August 2014).  
4 European Commission, Press Release, State aid: Commission consults on draft rules 
for state support in energy and environmental field, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-1282_en.htm, 18th December 2013 (last visited August 2014). 
5 Linklaters, European Commission adopts  environmental and energy State aid guidelines for 
2014-2020, available at: http://www.linklaters.com/Insights/Pages/European-
Commission-adopts-environmental-energy-State-aid.aspx, April 2014 (last visited 
August 2014).  
6 European Commission, Press Release, State Aid: Commission launches major 
initiative to modernise state aid control, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-12-458_en.htm., 8th May 2012 (last visited September 2014).  
7 The 2020 Strategy provides for a 20% reduction in EU greenhouse gas 
emissions from 1990 levels, raising the share of EU energy consumption produced 
from renewable resources to 20% and a 20% improvement in the EU's energy 
efficiency.  
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and must therefore be notified under Article 108 (3) TFEU.  
Under EU Law, Member States must notify all measures deemed to 
constitute State aid and which do not benefit from a block exemption to the 
European Commission for approval. Any aid granted without prior 
authorization is incompatible with EU Law and the Commission may therefore 
order Member States to recover it from the beneficiaries.  
While the Guidelines do not spell out which measures amount to State 
aid, the Commission has tabled a draft Notice to this effect, listing the 
constitutive elements of the notion of State aid, such as the presence of an 
economic activity, the imputability of the measure to the State, the financing of 
said aid through State resources, the presence of an economic advantage for 
the beneficiary, the selectivity of the measure and its effect on trade and 
competition8. 
The fact that a measure fulfills all the above mentioned conditions, 
does not however necessarily entails that it needs to be notified. Measures that 
are block exempted or which do not exceed the threshold of 200.000 Euro per 
company over three years are not considered notifiable aid (the so-called de 
minimis rule).  
The Commission recently intervened to redefine the scope of the block 
exemption, with a Regulation which came into force on 1st July 20149. 
While the 2008 Guidelines already addressed certain energy issues 
which where inextricably linked with environmental policy, the scope of the 
                                                   
8 European Commission, Press Release, State aid: Commission consults on draft 
guidance on notion of aid, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-
30_en.htm, 17th January 2014 (last visited September 2014). «As with any measure 
imputable to public authorities, an environmental support measure is considered to be 
a state aid measure as defined under Article 107 (1) TFEU if it fulfills all the following 
four criteria: (1) Transfer of state resources; (2) Advantage for the undertakings; (3) 
Selectivity; and (4) Distortion to competition and effect on trade between Member 
States», L. HANCHER, T. OTTERVANGER, P.J. SLOT, EU State Aids, Sweet & Maxwell, 
Fourth Edition, 2012, p. 813.  
9 Commission Regulation n. 651/2014 of 17th June 2014 declaring certain 
categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 
108 of the Treaty, OJ L 187, 26.06.2014, p. 1–78, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0651&from=EN 
(last visited September 2014).  
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new Guidelines is considerably wider, and it includes aid measures for energy 
infrastructure projects, generation adequacy and carbon capture and storage.  
Moreover, the 2014-2020 Guidelines considerably simplified the 
assessment criteria of matters which were already covered by the previous 
Guidelines, such as energy efficiency and cogeneration of heat and power.  
Significantly, the text of the Guidelines adopted by the Commission on 
April 2014 left out the question of State aid to nuclear energy sources, which 
will therefore be assessed by the Commission on a case-by-case basis.  
In its assessment of the compatibility of a notified aid measure with the 
internal market, the Commission seeks to determine whether the positive 
impact of the aid (on an objective of common interest, such as the protection 
of the environment) exceeds its potentially detrimental effects on trade and 
competition10. 
According to the new Guidelines, State aid measures can be considered 
compatible with the internal market only if they satisfy certain criteria:  
(a)  the measure must contribute to a well-defined objective of 
common interest in accordance with Article 107 (3) TFEU;  
(b)  it must be necessary to bring about a material improvement that 
the market alone cannot deliver, for example by remedying a market failure;  
(c) the measure must be the appropriate policy instrument to address 
the objective of common interest; 
(d) it must constitute an incentive for the undertakings concerned to 
change their behavior; 
(e)  it must be proportionate;  
(f) it must avoid any undue negative effects on competition and trade 
between Member States; 
(g) it must be transparent. 
The assessment principles adopted by the Commission therefore 
recognize the important role which State aid measures can play in correcting 
market failures – such as externalities, asymmetric information and 
                                                   
10 European Commission, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020, OJ 2014/C, 200/01, p. 11.  
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coordination failures - and achieving objectives of common interest. State aid 
should therefore «be targeted towards situations where aid can bring a material 
improvement that the market cannot alone deliver»11. 
The 2014 Guidelines apply the assessment principles to several 
categories of environmental and energy aid measures (some of which had 
already been addressed by the previous Guidelines). 
As regards State aid to renewable energy sources12, the Guidelines tried 
to deal with some of the concerns raised by the inefficient functioning of the 
market13 . Pursuant to the new Guidelines, the implementation of market 
instruments should ensure that subsidies are reduced to a minimum as a step 
towards a complete phasing out.  
However, for the transitional period, the Guidelines state that aid 
should be granted as a premium in addition to the market price and that the aid 
recipients should be subject to standard balancing responsibilities.  
Moreover, aid should be granted in a competitive bidding process and 
on the basis of clear, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria.  
Finally, the Commission will authorize aid schemes for periods up to 
10 years, after which Member States will have to re-notify the measure, if they 
do not intend to discontinue it. 
The Guidelines further address energy efficiency measures, stating that 
«in order to ensure that aid contributes to a higher level of environmental 
protection, aid for district heating and district cooling and cogeneration of heat 
                                                   
11 European Commission, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020, OJ 2014/C, 200/01, p. 13.  
12 «Renewable energy sources means the following renewable non-fossil energy 
sources: wind, solar aerothermal, geothermal, hydrothermal and ocean energy, 
hydropower, biomass, landfill gas, sewage treatment plant gas and biogases», 
European Commission, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-
2020, OJ 2014/C, 200/01, p. 6. 
13 «[...] in recent years there has also been an increasing awareness that heavy 
public support of [renewable energy sources] may lead to overcompensation, 
increased consumer prices, and thus ultimately to inefficiently functioning energy 
markets», Linklaters, European Commission adopts environmental and energy State aid 
Guidelines for 2014-2020, April 2014, available at 
http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/Pages/European-Commission-adopts-
environmental-energy-State-aid.aspx (last visited in September 2014).  
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and electricity (“CHP”) will only be considered compatible with the internal 
market if granted for investment […] to high-efficient CHP and energy-
efficient district heating and district cooling»14.  
The new Guidelines also make specific reference to the fact that State 
aid to waste management plants can make a positive contribution to 
environmental protection. The Commission therefore states that it will 
consider State aid for waste management to serve a common interest provided 
that the investment is aimed at reducing waste generated by other undertakings 
and does not extend to waste generated by the beneficiary of the aid, that the 
aid does not – directly or indirectly – relieve polluters from their burdens 
under EU or national law and provided that the materials treated would 
otherwise be processed in a less environmentally friendly manner.  
Similarly, the Commission considers aid for carbon capture and storage 
to be instrumental in solving negative externalities with serious implications for 
the environment.  
With regard to aid given in the form of reductions or exemption from 
environmental taxes, the Commission argues that these measures may be 
considered necessary where the beneficiaries would otherwise be placed at 
such a competitive disadvantage that it would not be economically feasible to 
introduce the environmental tax in the first place15.  
Moreover, the 2014 Guidelines make a distinction between harmonised 
and non-harmonised environmental taxes. With regard to the former, the 
Commission will consider aid in the form of tax reductions necessary and 
                                                   
14   European Commission, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020, OJ 2014/C, 200/01, p. 28.  
15 «Indeed, granting a more favourable tax treatment to some undertakings may 
facilitate a higher general level of environmental taxes. Accordingly, reductions in or 
exemptions from environmental taxes, including tax refunds can at least indirectly 
contribute to a higher level of environmental protection. However, the overall 
objective of the environmental tax to discourage environmentally harmful behaviour 
should not be undermined. The tax reductions should be necessary and based on 
objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria, and the undertakings concerned 
should make a contribution towards increasing environmental protection», European 
Commission, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020, OJ 
2014/C, 200/01, p. 32.  
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proportional provided that its beneficiaries pay at least the EU minimum tax 
level set by the relevant Directive, that the choice of beneficiaries is based on 
objective and transparent criteria and that the aid is granted in the same way 
for all competitors in the same sector (if their respective situations are 
comparable)16.  
With regard to non-harmonised taxes, the Commission will assess the 
necessity and proportionality of each measure according to the criteria set out 
in the Guidelines17.  
The Commission further acknowledges that «a modern energy 
infrastructure is crucial for an integrated energy market, which is key to 
ensuring energy security in the Union, and to enable the Union to meet its 
broader climate and energy goals»18.  
According to the Commission's own estimate, the investment in energy 
infrastructures of European significance needed to achieve the 2020 targets 
amounts to about 200 billion Euro. Where market operators are unable to 
provide funding for the infrastructure needed, State aid may therefore be 
essential in order to solve market failures.  
As regards infrastructure projects as defined by Regulation (EC) 
237/2013, smart grids and infrastructure investments in assisted areas, the 
Commission will carry out a case-by-case assessment of the need for State 
aid19. 
                                                   
16  European Commission, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020, OJ 2014/C, 200/01, p. 32.  
17   Linklaters, European Commission adopts environmental and energy State aid 
Guidelines for 2014-2020, April 2014, available at:  
http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/Pages/European-Commission-adopts-
environmental-energy-State-aid.aspx (last visited in September 2014).  
18  European Commission, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020, OJ 2014/C, 200/01, p. 36.  
19  «In its assessment, the Commission will consider the following factors: (i) to 
what extent a market failure leads to a sub-optimal provision of the necessary 
infrastructure; (ii) to what extent the infrastructure is open to third party access and 
subject to tariff regulations; and (iii) to what extent the project contributes to the 
Union's security of energy supply». European Commission, Guidelines on State aid for 
environmental protection and energy 2014-2020, OJ 2014/C, 200/01, p. 37.  
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With the rapid increase of the share of renewable energy sources, 
electricity generation is in many Member States «shifting from a system of 
relatively stable and continuous supply towards a system with more numerous 
and small-scale supply of variable sources»20.  
Such a shift raises considerable challenges to ensure generation 
adequacy. Several Member States have therefore put in place measures to 
ensure generation adequacy by granting support to generators on the basis of 
the mere availability of generation capacity.  
Finally, the Guidelines address the issue of aid given in the form of 
tradable permits issued by public authorities. The Commission will consider 
tradable permits schemes to be compatible with the Internal Market provided 
they are set up « in such a way as to achieve environmental objectives beyond 
those intended to be achieved on the basis of Union standards that are 
mandatory for the undertakings concerned », that the allocation is carried out 
in a transparent way and according to objective criteria, that the allocation 
methodology does not unduly favour certain undertakings or sector and that 
new entrants are not to receive permits on more favourable conditions than 
incumbent beneficiaries operating on the same markets21.  
 
3. State Aid and Renewable Energy.  
 
The new Guidelines require Member States to take into account 
competition and market distortions in designing renewable energy support 
schemes (while leaving considerable discretion to national legislators).  
Moreover, pursuant to the Guidelines, from 1st January 2016 market-
based support schemes will replace feed-in tariffs for all installations with an 
electricity capacity in excess of 500 kW, while, as we have seen, eligibility for 
funding will be determined on the basis of competitive, transparent and non-
                                                   
20 European Commission, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020, OJ 2014/C, 200/01, p. 38.  
21 European Commission, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020, OJ 2014/C, 200/01, p. 41.  
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discriminatory bidding processes22.  
While in principle these bidding processes should be open to all 
operators producing electricity from renewable sources on a non-
discriminatory basis, the Commission accepts that they can be limited to 
specific technologies where a process open to all generators would lead to 
suboptimal results23. 
Several energy intensive industries will therefore be allowed to receive 
some state support even under the new Guidelines.  
The rationale behind this gradual move to market-based support 
schemes for renewable energy is the need to meet the ambitious climate policy 
goals «at the least possible cost for taxpayers and without undue distortions of 
competition in the Single market».24 
The Commission’s decision to emphasize market-based instruments 
and to let price signals drive the allocation of public funds was prompted by 
concerns that the high energy prices might be seriously harming the EU’s 
competitiveness.  
The Guidelines came into force on 1st July 2014, and are therefore 
applicable to all notified aid measures on which the Commission had yet to 
                                                   
22 European Commission, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020, OJ 2014/C, 200/01, p. 26. See also Baker & McKenzie, New EU Guidelines 
on environmental and energy state aid – Implications for the renewable energy industry, available at: 
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Publication/7eea4b32-c7b8-4ea5-8c20-
7f4f16b9a792/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5bb902bd-c655-437a-b090-
80f6fd6cb69f/ALGermanyEnergy9Apr2014.pdf, April 2014 (last visited September 
2014).  
23 «The bidding process can be limited to specific technologies where a process 
open to all generators would lead to a suboptimal result which cannot be addressed in 
the process design in view of, in particular: (a) the longer-term potential of a given 
new and innovative technology; or (b) the need to achieve diversification; or (c) 
network constraints and grid stability; or (d) system (integration) costs; or (e) the need 
to avoid distortions on the raw material markets from biomass support»,  European 
Commission, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020, OJ 
2014/C, 200/01, p. 26. 
24 European Commission, Press Release, State aid: Commission adopts new rules on 
public support for environmental protection and energy, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-400_en.htm  9th April 2014 (last visited 
October 2014).  
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rule as of that day.  
Indeed, only a few weeks after their entry into force, the Commission 
assessed Germany’s 2014 Renewable Energy Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, 
“EEG”) under the new Guidelines and found it to be in compliance with EU 
State aid rules.  The new scheme – with an annual budget of approximately 20 
billion Euro – entered into force last August25.  
Under to the 2014 EEG, all producers of renewable electricity – with 
the exception of small installations (i.e. below 100 kW), who will benefit from 
feed-in tariffs – will be obliged to sell their output on the market, and support 
will be provided in the form of market premiums paid in addition to the 
market price for electricity.  
The Commission will also apply the new Guidelines in the pending 
investigation on the 2012 German Renewable Energy Act to assess whether 
the reduction granted to energy-intensive companies on a surcharge levied to 
finance renewable energy sources is compatible with EU State Aid rules26.  
According to the Commission, the surcharge reductions for energy 
intensive companies appear to be financed from State resources and seem to 
give the beneficiaries a selective advantage which is likely to distort 
competition within the Internal Market. However, the 2014 Guidelines admit – 
under certain conditions - this kind of reduction in order to prevent carbon 
                                                   
25  European Commission, Press Release, State aid: Commission approves German 
renewable energy law EEG 2014, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
14-867_en.htm, 23rd July 2014 (last visited September 2014).  
26  European Commission, Press Release, State aid: Commission opens in-depth inquiry 
into support for energy-intensive companies benefitting from a reduced renewables surcharge, available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1283_en.htm, 18th December 2013 
(last visited September 2014). The 1998 scheme was based on a purchase obligation 
and the Court of Justice (in the Case C-379/99, 13th March 2001, PreussenElektra AG v 
Schleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2099) ruled that it did not amount to State aid. «In the 
PreussenElektra case, the Court of Justice decided that no transfer of state resources is 
involved where private electricity distributors have to pay a higher feed-in price for 
electricity generated from renewable sources. This landmark decision by the Court 
opened the door for the establishment of advantageous financial systems to support 
the local green electricity production, without the restraints of state aid control and 
procedures», L. HANCHER, T. OTTERVANGER, P.J. SLOT, EU State Aids, Sweet & 
Maxwell, Fourth Edition, 2012, p. 814. 
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leakage27.  
The pending investigation will also focus on the so-called “green 
electricity privilege”, granted by the 2012 EEG, that is the reduction on the 
surcharge granted when a supplier draws 50% of his electricity portfolio from 
domestic renewable electricity produced in plants that have not been in 
operation for more than 20 years 28 . According to the Commission, this 
provision could result in discriminatory taxation between domestic and 
imported electricity.29  
These investigations will play a very important role in clarifying in what 
way the decisional practices of the Commission will be shaped by the 
Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy for the period 
2014 -2020.  
However, the impact of the new Guidelines on the European energy 
market is likely to be seriously limited not only by the considerable leeway still 
enjoyed by the Member States in designing their aid measures, but – much 
more importantly – by the exclusion of nuclear energy from their scope of 
application.  
Rather controversially, the exclusion of State aid to nuclear energy 
producers from the scope of application of the Guidelines came only a few 
months before the Commission approved the aid provided by the United 
Kingdom to the Hinkley Point nuclear power plant, one of the largest such 
projects in years30.  
                                                   
27 European Commission, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020, OJ 2014/C, 200/01, p. 34. See also Linklaters, European Commission adopts  
environmental and energy State aid guidelines for 2014-2020, available at: 
http://www.linklaters.com/Insights/Pages/European-Commission-adopts-
environmental-energy-State-aid.aspx, April 2014 (last visited August 2014). 
28 European Commission, Press Release, State aid: Commission opens in-depth inquiry 
into support for energy-intensive companies benefitting from a reduced renewables surcharge, 
IP/13/1283, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1283_en.htm, 
18th December 2013 (last visited September 2014).  
29 European Commission, Press Release, State aid: Commission opens in-depth inquiry 
into support for energy-intensive companies benefitting from a reduced renewables surcharge, 
IP/13/1283, 18th December 2013. 
30 Commission Decision A.34947 Support to Hinkley Point C Nuclear Power Station, 
8th October 2014, JOCE C/69/2014.  
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Perhaps in view of this renewed interest for nuclear energy, it would 
have been advisable for the Commission to clarify the role which public funds 
can play in the development of one of the most important – and controversial 
– low carbon energy sources.  
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GETTING GREENER, NOT CLOSER: THE ÅLANDS VINDKRAFT  
AND ESSENT BELGIUM  JUDGMENTS 
 
Francesco Alongi 
 
 
 
CONTENTS: 1. – Introduction. 2. – The Ålands Vindkraft Ruling. 3. – The 
Public Interest Justification. 4. – The National Renewable Support Schemes. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
Over the last few months, the Court of Justice of the EU handed down 
two landmark judgments1 on two strikingly similar cases where it had the 
chance to confirm the compatibility of national renewable energy support 
schemes with the Treaty provisions on free movement of goods.  
According to the Court, the restrictions to the free movement of goods 
across the Union entailed by the discriminatory nature of green certificate 
schemes (which generally privilege domestic producers) are fully justifiable on 
public interest grounds under Article 36 TFEU, since their purpose is to 
support the European renewable energy industry and achieve the Union's 
ambitious environmental targets for 2020.  
However, in spite of their significance – especially from a policy 
perspective – these rulings represent another missed opportunity to clarify the 
role of environmental protection as a justification for discriminatory measures 
which hinder free movement of goods.  
  
 
                                                   
1 Case C-573/12, 1st July 2014, Ålands Vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten, [2014]; 
Joined Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12, 11th September 2014, Essent Belgium NV v 
Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits-en Gasmarkt, [2014]. 
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2. The Ålands Vindkraft Ruling. 
 
The Finnish company Ålands Vindkraft AB operates on the Ålands 
archipelago in Finland wind farms which are connected to the Swedish 
electricity grid.  
In 2009 the company applied to the competent Swedish authority for 
green electricity certificates. The Swedish electricity certificate scheme required 
domestic electricity suppliers and certain users to purchase certificates 
corresponding to a share of their supplies or use, without any requirement to 
also purchase electricity from the same source. The electricity certificates 
granted by the competent Swedish authority are proof that a certain volume of 
electricity has been produced from renewable energy sources.  
Through the sale of these certificates, green electricity producers 
receive additional income beside the revenue deriving from the sale of 
electricity.  
The application filed by the Finnish company was however turned 
down on the grounds that under Swedish law electricity certificates could be 
awarded exclusively to green electricity plants located in Sweden.  
Ålands Vindkraft AB therefore brought an action before the 
Förvaltningsrätten (Administrative Court) of Linköping for the annulment of 
the decision, alleging an infringement of Article 34 TFEU2.  
According to the plaintiff, the electricity certificate scheme 
implemented by Sweden was discriminatory, since it reserved a significant 
proportion of the Swedish electricity market to electricity producers located in 
Sweden, to the detriment of their competitors operating in other Member 
States.  
The plaintiff further argued that such a barrier to transnational trade 
could not be justified by environmental concerns, since green electricity 
consumption in Sweden could be equally well promoted by awarding 
                                                   
2 Article 34 TFEU (former Article 28 TEC), «Quantitative restrictions on 
imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between 
Member States». 
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certificates for electricity produced in other Member States.   
The first question submitted by the referring Court concerned 
therefore the admissibility, under Article 3(3) of Directive 2009/28/EC (the 
“Renewables Directive”)3, of a national support scheme from which only 
domestic electricity producers may benefit.  
If such a scheme were to be regarded as constituting a quantitative 
restriction on imports or a measure having equivalent effect, the Court would 
have to determine whether such a restriction might be compatible with Article 
34 TFEU in light of its objective of promoting green electricity production.  
In their attempt to strike a balance between the principle of the free 
movement of goods and environmental protection, the Court of Justice and 
the Advocate General took radically different views.  
According to Advocate General Bot 4 , while the Swedish support 
scheme can be considered compatible with the Renewables Directive, it is 
Article 3 (3) of said Directive that should be considered invalid since it confers 
on Member States the power to exclude from their support schemes producers 
whose green electricity production plants are located in another Member State. 
In his Opinion, Mr. Bot argued that national legislation constituting a 
measure having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions may potentially be 
justified by the overriding requirement of environmental protection even if it is 
discriminatory, subject to a rigorous (or “reinforced”) proportionality test5.  
However, he went on to argue that – in the case at issue - the risk that 
national support schemes would be disrupted by being made accessible to 
electricity producers located in other Member States had not been satisfactorily 
                                                   
3 «Without prejudice to Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty, Member States shall 
have the right to decide, in accordance with Article 5 to 11 of this Directive, to which 
extent they support energy from renewable sources which is produced in a different 
Member State» (Article 3 (3), Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC 
and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 05.06.2009, p. 16–62). 
4 Case C-573/12, Opinion of Mr Advocate General Bot of 28th January 2014, 
Ålands Vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten, [2014]. 
5 Case C-573/12, Opinion of Mr Advocate General Bot of 28th January 2014, 
Ålands Vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten, [2014], para. 79. 
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demonstrated6. 
In its ruling, the Court took the view that Article 3 (3) of the 
Renewables Directive must indeed be interpreted as allowing Member States to 
set up support schemes which provide for the award of tradable certificates 
only to domestic producers. 
Such a scheme is certainly capable of «hindering – at least indirectly and 
potentially – imports of electricity, especially green electricity, from other 
Member States»7 and can therefore be considered – according to the Dassonville 
case-law8 - a measure having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on 
imports and in principle incompatible with Article 34 TFEU. 
However, these measures might be justified on one of the public 
interest grounds listed by Article 36 TFEU 9  or by other overriding 
requirements, provided that such measures are proportional and appropriate 
for the attainment of the objective pursued10. 
The Court of Justice emphasized, in line with its own case law11 and 
with recital 1 of Directive 2009/28/EC, that the increase in the use of 
renewable energy sources represents one of the key components of the 
Union's climate policy and plays a key role in protecting «the health and life of 
humans, animals and plants, which are among the public interest grounds listed 
                                                   
6          Case C-573/12, Opinion of Mr Advocate General Bot of 28th January 2014, 
Ålands Vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten, [2014], para. 97. 
7 Case C-573/12,1st July 2014, Ålands Vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten, [2014], 
para. 67. 
8 Case 8/74, 11 July 1974, Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville, [1974] 
ECR 00837. 
9 Article 36 TFEU (former Article 30 TEC): «The provisions of Articles 34 and 
35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in 
transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the 
protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national 
treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of 
industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, 
however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
trade between Member States». 
10 Case C-524/07, 11th December 2008, European Commission v Austria [2008] ECR 
I-00187, para. 54. 
11 Case C-379/99, 13th March 2001, PreussenElektra AG v Schleswag AG [2001] 
ECR I-2099, para. 73.  
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in Article 36 TFEU»12.  
Having established that the public interest objective of promoting the 
use of renewable energy sources is in principle capable of justifying barriers to 
the free movement of goods within the Internal Market, the Court went on to 
determine that the territorial limitation of the Swedish green energy support 
scheme can be regarded as necessary and proportional to its objective13. 
The Court, deviating from the Advocate General's Opinion, therefore 
ruled that Article 34 TFEU should be interpreted as not precluding Member 
States from awarding tradable certificates exclusively to domestic green 
electricity producers and placing suppliers under a legal obligation to surrender 
a certain number of certificates corresponding to a proportion of the total 
volume of the electricity supplied.   
 
3. The Public Interest Justification.  
 
Only a few months after the Ålands Vindkraft ruling, the Court 
confirmed its stance on national renewable energy support schemes in a 
preliminary ruling concerning a similar measure implemented by the Belgian 
legislator14.  
In his assessment of the Essent Belgium case, Advocate General Bot 
raised serious doubts about the actual risk which green electricity imported 
from abroad represented for the achievement of national environmental 
targets.  
In his Opinion, Mr Bot emphasized that, according to the Commission, 
national targets are defined in terms of the consumption of renewable 
electricity from renewable energy sources as a percentage of total national 
electricity consumption, and that electricity consumption should be defined as 
                                                   
12 Case C-573/12,1st July 2014, Ålands Vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten, [2014], 
para. 80. 
13 Case C-573/12,1st July 2014, Ålands Vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten, [2014], 
para. 104. 
14 Joined Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12, 11th September 2014, Essent Belgium NV v 
Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits-en Gasmarkt, [2014]. 
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national production plus imports, minus exports (in order to avoid double 
counting)15.  
He then went on to argue that since environmental protection is a EU 
concern, «it is therefore necessary to take into account also the advantages that 
may arise from trade in green electricity within the European Union»16. The 
advantages of a more rational allocation of resources and power plants might 
indeed offset the possibility that some Member States may not meet their 
targets.  
In a ruling which largely mirrors the Ålands Vindkraft case, the Court 
tipped the balance of the competing policy interests of removing barriers to 
free movement of goods and fostering the fledgling European renewable 
energy industry decidedly in favour of the latter. 
It should be noted that while in the Essent Belgium case the Court was 
asked to assess the legality of the Belgian support scheme under Articles 3 and 
5 of Directive 2001/77/EC (which  has been repealed but was nonetheless 
applicable, ratione temporis, to the matter at issue), the same provisions can be 
found (to some extent) in Directive 2009/28/EC.  
In the Essent Belgium ruling the Court held that a renewable energy 
support scheme which, much like the Swedish scheme, did not allow electricity 
suppliers to fulfil their obligation to surrender a certain number of green 
certificates to the competent national authority by using guarantees of origin 
originating from other Member States, might be justified under Article 36 
TFEU, provided that mechanisms are put in place to ensure that it is possible 
for suppliers to obtain certificates under fair terms17. 
                                                   
15 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament, Commission Report in accordance with Article 3 of 
Directive 2001/77/EC, evaluation of the effect of legislative instruments and other 
Community policies on the development of the contribution of renewable energy 
sources in the EU and proposals for concrete action, 25th June 2004, COM(2004) 366 
final, page 17. 
16 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Joined Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12, 8th 
May 2013, Essent Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits-en 
Gasmarkt, [2014], para. 109. 
17 «It is therefore important that mechanisms be established which ensure the 
creation of a genuine market for certificates in which supply can match demand, 
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In its judgement, the Court emphasized the difference, under Directive 
2001/77/EC, between tradable green certificates and guarantees of origin, 
underlining that the latter do not imply a right to benefit from national support 
mechanisms in other Member States and that their purpose is simply to 
indicate the country in which the electricity producer operates18.  
As we have explained, while both the Swedish and the Belgian support 
scheme were openly discriminatory and had the potential to seriously hinder 
the free movement of goods between Member States, the Court found a 
justification for these measures on public interest grounds.  
The undeniable discriminatory and distinctly applicable nature of the 
scheme under discussion is perhaps the most significant feature of the Ålands 
Vindkraft ruling, since it forced the Court to seek a justification for these 
measures under Article 36 TFEU rather than under its mandatory 
requirements doctrine (which encompass other justifications which find their 
legal basis in the Court's own case-law).  
The main difference in scope between the derogations listed by Article 
36 TFEU and mandatory (or imperative) requirements is that «only measures 
which are applicable to goods or services without distinction, whatever their 
origin, can be justified on grounds of imperative requirements relating to the 
public interest»19. 
If however a measure is discriminatory, then it can be justified only by 
one of the derogations expressly listed under Article 36 TFEU. 
Since environmental protection is not mentioned by Article 36 TFEU, 
the Court has recognized it as an imperative public interest capable of 
justifying only non-discriminatory measures.  
                                                                                                                                 
reaching some kind of balance, so that it is actually possible for the relevant suppliers 
to obtain certificates under fair terms (see, to that effect, Ålands Vindkraft, 
EU:C:2014:2037, paragraph 114)», Joined Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12, 11th 
September 2014, Essent Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits-en 
Gasmarkt, [2014], para. 112.  
18  Joined Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12, 11th September 2014, Essent Belgium NV v 
Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits-en Gasmarkt, [2014], para. 63.  
19 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Joined Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12, 8th 
May 2013, Essent Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits-en 
Gasmarkt, [2014], para. 87. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SURVEY 2014 22 
In its case-law, the Court has attempted to extend the possibility to rely 
on environmental protection objectives to derogate to Article 34 TFEU either 
by denying the discriminatory nature of a national measure or by avoiding a 
close examination of whether or not the measure is discriminatory20.  
In the Walloon waste case21, which concerned the prohibition to treat in 
Wallonia waste originating in another Member State or in another region of 
Belgium, the Court held that the measure adopted by the Belgian legislator 
could not be regarded as discriminatory in view of the specific characteristics 
of waste, which must be disposed of as close as possible to the place of 
production. 
A different solution was found in the PreussenElektra case22, where the 
Court, instead of neutralizing the discriminatory nature of the measure (which 
would have been extremely difficult to do, since the measure in question 
clearly favoured domestic green electricity producers), ruled that it was justified 
on public interest grounds, since its objective was to protect the health and life 
of humans, animals and plants (one of the grounds listed by Article 36 TFEU), 
and in light of the specific features of electricity23. 
In its Opinion on the Essent Belgium case, Advocate General Bot regrets 
that « the exception to the rule that only express derogating provisions can 
justify a discriminatory measure does not appear expressly in the case-law of 
the Court, but rather emerges, surreptitiously, from case-by-case reasoning 
along different lines »24 and expresses the need to clarify the situation by giving 
                                                   
20 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Joined Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12, 8th 
May 2013, Essent Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits-en 
Gasmarkt, [2014], para. 91. 
21 Case C-2/90, 9th July 1992, European Commission v Belgium [1992] ECLI 310. 
22 Case C-379/99, 13th March 2001, PreussenElektra AG v Schleswag AG [2001] 
ECR I-2099. 
23 According to the Court, « once [electricity] has been allowed into the 
transmission or distribution system, it is difficult to determine its origin and in 
particular the source of energy from which it was produced » Case C-379/99, 13th 
March 2001, PreussenElektra AG v Schleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2099, para 79. 
24 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Joined Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12, 8th 
May 2013, Essent Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits-en 
Gasmarkt, [2014], para. 92. 
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formal recognition to the possibility of invoking environmental protection as a 
justification for discriminatory measures which hinder free movement of 
goods25. 
From this point of view, the Ålands Vindkraft ruling represents a lost 
opportunity, since in it the Court, instead of addressing the limitations of its 
own imperative requirements doctrine, reverted to the arguments put forward 
in the PreussenElektra case, ruling that the measures under scrutiny were 
designed to protect the health and life of humans, animals and plants26. 
The main flaw of this argument is that by adopting such a broad 
interpretation of one of the derogations listed under Article 36 TFEU, the 
Court is not just muddying the waters as regards the distinction between these 
derogations and mandatory requirements, but it is effectively amending the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
Indeed, it could be argued that by choosing to interpret the public 
interest to «protect the health and life of humans, animals and plants» as 
encompassing the climate policy pursued by the Union, the Court acted ultra 
vires, disregarding the exhaustive character of the list set out by Article 36 
TFEU.  
However, such a broad interpretation of the provision of a treaty in 
order to extend its scope to cover environmental concerns is not entirely 
without precedents in Europe.  
The European Court of Human Rights, in a case concerning leakage 
from a waste disposal plant, justified the application of Article 8 ECHR27 by 
                                                   
25 «[S]uch recognition appears to me to be dictated by a concern for legal 
certainty, since it offers the advantage of removing any doubts that may subsist 
regarding the possibility of invoking environmental protection as an imperative 
requirement relating to the public interest in order to justify a discriminatory measure» 
(Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Joined Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12, 8th May 
2013, Essent Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits-en Gasmarkt, 
[2014], para. 93). 
26 Case C-573/12,1st July 2014, Ålands Vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten, [2014], 
para. 80. 
27 Article 8 ECHR: «1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a 
public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the 
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arguing that severe environmental pollution may indeed affect the individuals’ 
well-being and «prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way as to 
affect their private and family life adversely without however seriously 
endangering their health»28. 
 
4. The National Renewable Support Schemes. 
 
From a policy perspective, these rulings represent an important 
confirmation of the compatibility of national renewable support schemes with 
EU Law. Moreover, by upholding these schemes the Court ensured their 
viability, since an obligation to open up national support schemes to foreign 
energy producers would have entailed a considerable financial burden for 
national budgets.  
However, the provisions on free movement of goods are not the only 
ones which come into play where national support schemes are concerned.  
In the Essent Netwerk judgment29, on a case which concerned a price 
surcharge imposed by a national legislator on transmitted electricity, the Court 
stressed the need to assess the legality of national support schemes under 
Articles 3030 and 110 TFEU31. 
In his Opinion on the Essent Netwerk case, Advocate General Mengozzi 
                                                                                                                                 
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others». 
28 ECHR Case of Lopez Ostra v Spain, 9th December 1994, 41/1993/436/515. 
29 Case C-206/06, 17th July 2008, Essent Netwerk Noord BV and others, [2008] ECR 
I-05497.  
30 Article 30 (ex Article 25 TFEU): «Customs duties on imports and exports and 
charges having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States. This 
prohibition shall also apply to customs duties of a fiscal nature». 
31 Article 110 (ex Article 90 TFEU): «No Member State shall impose, directly or 
indirectly, on the products of other Member State any internal taxation of any kind in 
excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products. 
Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on the products of other Member States 
any internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other 
products». 
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argued that «a price surcharge, such as the surcharge at issue in the main 
proceedings, which is imposed, without discrimination and subject to the same 
conditions, on the transmission of both national and imported electricity, 
constitutes a charge having equivalent effect to a customs duty, prohibited by 
Article 25 EC [now Article 30 TFEU], where the revenue from that surcharge 
is intended to finance activities for the benefit of the domestic product alone, 
and the resulting advantages offset in full the financial burden on that product. 
If the advantages offset the financial burden on that product in part only, then 
that surcharge constitutes discriminatory internal taxation, which is prohibited 
under Article 90 EC [now Article 110 TFEU]»32. 
The issue of the compatibility of renewable energy support schemes 
with Articles 30 and 110 TFEU was recently raised by the European 
Commission in connection to a surcharge for the financing of renewable 
energy sources applied pursuant to the German 2012 Renewable Energy Act 
(Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, «EEG»).  
According to the European Commission, the EEG may have a 
discriminatory effect, since it provides for a reduced rate of the surcharge in 
the case of electricity purchased from domestic renewable energy producers33, 
and would therefore represent, prima facie, a measure having an effect 
equivalent to customs duties or a form of discriminatory taxation, in breach of 
Article 30 or Article 110 TFEU.  
While it failed to find a satisfactory solution to the problems posed by 
the national renewable energy support schemes, the recent case-law of the 
Court of Justice contributed to shed light on the shortcomings of EU policy in 
the field of renewable energy.  
From a policy perspective, the only solution to the problem of the 
compatibility of national support schemes with the rules governing the Internal 
Market is the implementation of a coherent and comprehensive policy at EU 
                                                   
32 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, Case C-206/06, 24th January 2008, 
Essent Netwerk Noord BV and others, [2008] ECR I-05497, para. 74.  
33 European Commission, Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 
108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, State aid – Germany 
– State aid SA.33995 (2013/C), OJ 2014/C, 37/07.  
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level to support renewable energy production.  
So long as the support of green energy production remains largely the 
province of Member States, the Court will have to struggle with the difficulties 
of striking a balance between the competing interests of achieving the Union’s 
environmental targets and protecting the Internal Market, or, in other words, 
between a greener and a closer Union.  
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1. Introduction.  
 
Public administration in European legal systems makes decisions 
through a decision-making procedure, which consists of a sequence of 
preparatory acts right up until the final decision (the act that has legal impact 
upon third parties). 
The main preparatory steps are those of the “preliminary examination”. 
This is a phase in which public administration learns about the factual situation 
and interests of the persons and public bodies involved – who may present 
observations and documents that the administration is bound to consider – 
and evaluates them for the final decision. 
Compliance with this procedure is important when the law allows 
public administration to choose what decision to take. In this case the decision 
is called “discretionary”. Decisions on environmental matters are mostly 
discretionary. Thus, the environmental interest may be sacrificed in the name 
of other interests considered more important by public administration. As a 
result, the decision-making proceeding may conclude with a positive evaluation 
of projects even if they have a negative impact on the environment. 
The large degree of administrative discretion conferred by 
environmental legislation means that courts occupy an extremely important 
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role in ensuring that discretion is not exercised in an arbitrary or capricious 
manner1.  
In general, the object of judicial review, however, is the lawfulness of 
an administrative decision, not its merits. In point of fact, in European legal 
systems there is the principle of the separation of powers, according to which 
the administrative power is to be exercised exclusively by public 
administration, excepting some cases provided by law2. Hence, though the 
degree of supervision exercised by the judicial review of administrative action 
is different in each Member State, generally courts cannot exercise power or 
discretion themselves; they cannot substitute their own decision for that of the 
public administration 3 . Courts are required to balance between allowing 
decision-makers discretionary freedom and upholding the principle of legality4. 
                                                   
1 R. MOULES, Environmental judicial review, Hart Publishing, Oxford-Portland, 2011, 39. 
2 J. SCHWARZE noted that the judicial review of administrative action touches on a 
matter of principle, namely the interrelationship which prevails among state 
authorities, and «the fact that administrative discretion is so strongly rooted in the 
individual constitutional systems sets clearly defined limits to any future 
approximation of the various national rules governing the use and control of 
discretion. It is to be expected that the constitutional separation and balance of 
powers among the Parliament, the administration and the courts […] will prove 
resistant to change and will hamper efforts to achieve convergence among the various 
administrative law rules» (J. SCHWARZE, European Administrative Law, London, Sweet 
and Maxwell, 2006, 294). 
The degree of supervision exercised by the judicial review of administrative action is 
different in each Member State. See J. SCHWARZE, European Administrative Law, cit., 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, part 3, section 1; S. GALERA (editor), Judicial review. A 
comparative analysis inside the European legal system, Council of Europe Publishing, 
Strasbourg, 2010. 
3 And the same happens within the European Union legal system, in which the Courts 
reduce the intensity of their review to application of manifest error, misuse of powers, 
or clear excess of discretion: cf. P. CRAIG, EU Administrative law, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2012, chapter 13. Nevertheless, when the European Union 
Institutions have a margin of appreciation in establishing and evaluating the relevant 
facts, in particular in the area of competition law and risk regulation, a more searching 
review is applied: see A.H. TÜRK, Judicial Review in EU Law, Cheltenham, 
Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar, 2009, 145 ff. 
4 R. MOULES, op. cit., p. 39. 
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According to European Union law5, which implemented the Århus 
Convention6, Member States shall ensure that, in accordance with the relevant 
national legal system, members of the public concerned (a) having a sufficient 
interest, or alternatively, (b) claiming the impairment of a right (where 
administrative procedural law of a Member State requires this as a 
precondition) have access to a review proceeding to challenge the substantive 
or procedural legality of environmental decisions open to public participation, 
i.e. assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the 
                                                   
5 Starting from Directive 2003/35, whose objective is to contribute to implementation 
of the obligations arising under the Århus Convention and the amended Directive 
85/337 on assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the 
environment (repealed and replaced by Directive 2011/92, amended by Directive 
2014/52), and Directive 96/61 concerning integrated pollution prevention and 
control (repealed and replaced by Directive 2010/75). 
6 Convention of 25 June 1998 on access to information, public participation in 
decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters, approved on behalf of 
the European Community by Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005.  
Article 9 stipulates that «each Party shall, within the framework of its national 
legislation, ensure that members of the public concerned (a) having a sufficient 
interest or, alternatively, (b) maintaining impairment of a right, where the 
administrative procedural law of a Party requires this as a precondition, have access to 
a review procedure before a court of law and/or another independent and impartial 
body established by law, to challenge the substantive and procedural legality of any 
decision, act or omission subject to the provisions of Article 6 [a) “decisions on 
whether to permit proposed activities listed in annex I”; b) decisions “on proposed 
activities not listed in annex I which may have a significant effect on the 
environment” to which each Party “shall, in accordance with its national law, also 
apply the provisions of this article”; c) excluding decisions on proposed activities 
serving national defence purposes, to which each Party “may decide, on a case-by-case 
basis if so provided under national law, not to apply the provisions of this article […] 
if that Party deems that such application would have an adverse effect on these 
purposes”] and, where so provided for under national law […] of other relevant 
provisions of this Convention. 
What constitutes a sufficient interest and impairment of a right shall be determined in 
accordance with the requirements of national law and consistently with the objective 
of giving the public concerned wide access to justice within the scope of this 
Convention […]. 
In addition […] each Party shall ensure that, where they meet the criteria, if any, laid 
down in its national law, members of the public have access to administrative or 
judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public 
authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relating to the 
environment». 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SURVEY 2014 30 
environment (Article 11 of Directive 2011/92) and permits for installations 
(Art. 25 of Directive 2010/75/EU). 
Thus, according to European Union law, the grounds for challenging 
such decisions, which have to be recognized by Member States, are illegality of 
substance and illegality of procedure. 
According to case-law at the European Court of Justice, in 
implementing the above provisions Member States in principle have discretion, 
due to their procedural autonomy. 
The detailed procedural rules applicable are a matter for domestic legal 
regulation by each Member State, under the principle of procedural autonomy 
of Member States, provided that they are not less favourable than those 
governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they 
do not render it impossible in practice or excessively difficult to exercise rights 
conferred by the Community legal system (principle of effectiveness)7. 
Moreover, European Union law does not prescribe in detail the scope 
of the judicial review, nor are the exact grounds of environmental judicial 
review clearly defined.  
There is substantive illegality whenever the content of the decision is 
unlawful. Procedural illegality, on the other hand, consists of the infringement 
of procedural requirements. 
In this regard, since they express a sort of vision common to the 
Member States of the Union, the criteria developed by the European Court of 
Justice upon Article 263 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European 
Union may serve as a guide. This Article states that the «infringement of an 
essential procedural requirement» is ground for judicial review of acts of 
European Union institutions and bodies (legislative acts, acts of the Council, of 
the Commission and of the European Central Bank, other than 
recommendations and opinions, acts of the European Parliament and of the 
European Council, acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union). 
                                                   
7 See, inter alia, European Court of Justice, 14 December 1995, C-312/93; 16 May 
2000, C-78/98; 7 January 2004, C-201/02; 18 October 2011, C-128/09; 12 May 2011, 
C-115/09. 
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According to the European Court of Justice, an infringement of very 
important procedural requirements makes the act void8, whereas infringement 
of less important procedural requirements makes it invalid if the violation had 
an effect on the content of the act9. 
These procedural requirements may be stated in Treaties, in secondary 
legislation, or, in the absence of statutory provisions, developed on the basis of 
general principles of law10. They are of even more fundamental importance 
where the European Union institutions have discretion or power of appraisal. 
And, according to the European Court of Justice, they include a duty by the 
competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant 
                                                   
8 For example, «due consultation of the Parliament in the cases provided for by the 
Treaty therefore constitutes an essential formality, disregard of which means that the 
measure concerned is void» (European Court of Justice, 29 October 1980, C-138/79). 
9 «The procedural irregularity would involve the annulment in whole or in part of the 
decision only if it were shown that in the absence of such irregularity the contested 
decision might have been different» (European Court of Justice, 29 October 1980, C-
209/78). But the applicant does not have to demonstrate that the decision would have 
been different in content, «but rather that it would have been better able to ensure its 
defence if had there been no error, for example because it would have been able to 
use for its defence documents to which it was denied access during the administrative 
procedure» (European Court of Justice, 2 October 2003,C-194/99; 15 October 2002, 
C-238/99; 8 July 1999, Case C-51/92). 
10 Cf. A.H. TÜRK, op.cit., p. 113, 117 and ff. 
The right to a hearing, according to European Court of Justice case-law, is a general 
principle of law. See, for example, European Court of Justice, 21 November 1991, C-
269/90, about the power of appraisal in the procedure where the Commission, on a 
decision establishing that the conditions for duty-free importation of an apparatus are 
not met, consults the Member States and, if necessary, a group of experts: «it must be 
stated that Regulation No 2784/79 does not provide any opportunity for the person 
concerned, the importer of scientific apparatus, to explain his position to the group of 
experts or to comment on the information before the group or to take a position on 
the group’s recommendation. However, it is the importing institution which is best 
aware of the technical characteristics which the scientific apparatus must have in view 
of the work for which it is intended. The comparison between the imported apparatus 
and the instruments originating in the Community must, consequently, be made 
according to the information about the intended research projects and the actual 
intended use of the apparatus provided by the person concerned. The right to be 
heard in such an administrative procedure requires that the person concerned should 
be able, during the actual procedure before the Commission, to put his own case and 
properly make his views known on the relevant circumstances and, where necessary, 
on the documents taken into account by the Community institution». 
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aspects of the individual case, the right of the person concerned to make 
his/her views known and to have an adequately reasoned decision11, as well as 
the right of the institutions or the administrations which form part of the 
decision-making (in having to submit a proposal or an opinion) to participate12.  
According to the European Court of Justice, therefore, a defect in the 
preliminary examination of decision-making is a case of procedural illegality, 
because public administration has infringed its obligation to examine all the 
relevant aspects of the case in point carefully and impartially.  
And likewise with the statement of reasons, which is an obligation of 
national administrations in reaching their decisions, under Art. 41 of the 
Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union: according to the 
European Court of Justice13, it is a procedural requirement. The statement of 
reasons discloses the reasoning followed by public administration in adopting 
the decision, and has two aims. One aim is to make the persons concerned 
aware of the reasons for the decision and thus able to defend their rights. 
Another aim is to enable courts to exercise their supervisory jurisdiction14: in 
point of fact, only in this way can the Court verify whether the factual and legal 
elements upon which the exercise of the power of appraisal depends were 
present. 
It is noted15 that there is an interrelationship between procedural and 
substantive review: procedural duty ensures that the final decision is not 
substantively arbitrary, hence procedural rights can facilitate substantive review 
                                                   
11 See European Court of Justice, 21 November 1991, C-269/90. 
12 See European Court of Justice, 23 February 1988, C-68/86; 29 October 1980, C-
138/79; 30 March 1995, C-65/93; 7 July 1982, C-119/81. 
13 See, inter alia, European Court of Justice, 30 March 2000, C-265/97, according to 
which infringement of Art. 296 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European 
Union - which states that legal acts shall state the reasons on which they are based - is 
an “infringement of an essential procedural requirement” under Article 263 of the 
Treaty. 
14 This is settled case-law: see, inter alia, European Court of Justice, 10 April 2014, C-
269/13; 8 May 2013, C-508/11; 19 July 2012, C-628/10; 29 September 2011, C-
521/09; 1 July 2008, C-341/06; 15 July 2004, C-501/00; 2 April 1998, C-367/95; 
European Court of First Instance 25 June 1998, T-394/94. 
15 P. CRAIG, op.cit., 353 and ff. 
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(for example, the requirement of scientific advice with a view to ensuring that 
the resultant regulation is not substantively arbitrary16, and the obligation to 
give reasons enables courts to determine whether the administration acted for 
improper purposes17), and procedural rights can be a means to consider the 
substance of the case (for example, if the administration has not accorded full 
rights of access to the file, courts may consider whether the document was 
relevant for the individual’s case and whether disclosure of it might have made 
a difference to the decision reached18). 
 
2. European Court of Justice, 7 November 2013, C-72/12: the Case. 
 
In terms of disciplining procedural illegality German law provides the 
most important model of European legal systems. Under that discipline in no 
case may a formally or procedurally illegal decision be annulled by a court, if it 
is plain that the infringement did not affect the contents of the decision. 
In this context, German Law on Environmental Impact Assessments 
stipulates that an application for annulment of a decision on the lawfulness of 
a project may be made if an environmental impact assessment has not been 
carried out and the omission has not been made good. But this law doesn’t 
provide that an action may be brought in the case of a procedural illegality of 
the assessment. 
Recently, an action was brought for the annulment of a regional 
authority’s decision to approve plans for the construction of a flood retention 
scheme covering over 300 hectares of a former Rhine floodplain. In 
challenging that decision, they claimed that the environmental impact 
assessment carried out was inadequate.  
The administrative courts dismissed the action, taking the view that 
German law only allows an action to be brought in the case of pure and simple 
                                                   
16 See European Court of First Instance, 11 September 2002, T-13/99. 
17 See European Court of First Instance, 24 January 1992, T-44/90; 29 June 1993, T-
7/92; 26 November 2002, T-74/00. Cf. J. SCHWARZE, op. cit., 1402 ff. 
18 European Court of Justice, 7 January 2004, C-204/00. 
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failure to carry out an environmental assessment and this would not therefore 
apply to a mere irregularity in the environmental assessment. 
The Federal Administrative Court referred to the European Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling as to whether German law correctly implements 
the Directive on environmental impact assessments, which requires that there 
be a right to challenge the legality of decisions vitiated by procedural 
irregularities.  
 
3. The Judgment. 
 
The European Court of Justice, 7 November 2013, C-72/12 stated that 
Article 10a of Directive 337 of 1985, as amended by Directive 35 of 2003, 
regarding public participation and access to justice, must be interpreted as 
precluding Member States from carrying out such a limitation. If we exclude 
the possibility of legal remedy in cases where, though carried out, an 
environmental impact assessment is found to be vitiated by even serious 
defects, that would render the provisions of Directive virtually meaningless.  
In point of fact, one of the objectives of that directive is to create 
procedural guarantees to ensure the public is better informed of, and more able 
to participate in, environmental impact assessments relating to public and 
private projects likely to have a significant effect on the environment. For this 
reason, it is particularly important to ascertain whether the procedural rules 
governing that area have been complied with. 
As observed by the Advocate General Pedro Cruz Villalon in giving his 
opinion on this case, since Article 10a of Directive 337 of 1985 implements the 
Århus Convention, that Convention provides useful references for interpreting 
it. Under Article 1, the Convention is deemed «to contribute to the protection 
of the right of every person of present and future generations to live in an 
environment adequate to his or her health and well-being». For this purpose, 
the Convention provided certain procedural rules (access to information, 
public participation in decision-making) and effective access to justice. 
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Recitals 7 and 8 of the Convention clarify the context of the right of 
access to justice in environmental matters. Citizens must have access to justice 
in environmental matters to be able to assert the right to live in an 
environment adequate to their health and well-being and observe the duty, 
both individually and in association with others, of protecting and improving 
the environment for the benefit of present and future generations. 
From this, said the Advocate General, it follows that «the procedural 
rules and their respect play a substantial role for the protection of rights 
conferred. This explains the growing importance of rights to participate in 
decision-making in environmental law. These rights are seen today not only as 
a factor of legitimacy of decisions, but also as a means of improving the 
protection of the environment. This concept of the decision-making 
proceeding also clarifies the value of the proper conduct of an EIA. In this 
context, it becomes clear why Article 10a of Directive 337 of 1985 cites jointly 
the review of the procedural and substantive legality». 
On the other hand, the Århus Convention does not recommend that 
protection of the environment be a specific function of non-governmental 
organizations created for this purpose, but considers the individual to hold the 
right and the obligation to pursue environmental issues (Recital 7 and 8 of the 
Århus Convention). Such provisions by the Århus Convention leave it to the 
citizenry itself as a “body” to ensure implementation of environmental 
protection19. 
Nevertheless, the Directive stipulates two conditions where action is 
admissible: “a sufficient interest in bringing the action” or “the impairment of 
a right”, depending on which of these conditions is adopted in national 
legislation. 
The Directive states that what constitutes impairment of a right is to be 
determined by Member States; on the other hand, procedural rules of Member 
                                                   
19 See European Court of Justice, 5 February 1963, C-26/62: «The vigilance of 
individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in 
addition to the supervision entrusted by Articles 169 and 170 to the diligence of the 
Commission and of the Member States». 
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States, in accordance with the principle of effectiveness, must not make it 
impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by Union law20. 
Under German law it is in general incumbent on the applicant to prove 
that the contested decision suffers from the procedural defect in question (“the 
condition of causality”).  
According to the European Court of Justice, that shifting of the burden 
of proof onto the person bringing the action makes the exercise of rights 
excessively difficult, especially because environmental impact assessments are 
complex and technical. 
Thus, the European Court of Justice stated that the Directive does not 
preclude national courts from refusing to recognise impairment of a right if it 
is established that the contested decision would not have been different 
without the procedural defect alleged by the applicant.  
Nonetheless, that will only be the case if the court makes its ruling on 
the basis of the evidence provided by the developer or the authorities and, 
more generally, on the basis of all documents submitted to it. In making that 
assessment, «it is for the court of law or body concerned to take into account, 
inter alia, the seriousness of the defect invoked and to ascertain, in particular, 
whether that defect has deprived the public concerned of one of the 
guarantees introduced with a view to allowing that public to have access to 
information and to be empowered to participate in decision-making in 
accordance with the objectives of Directive 85/337». 
 
4. Conclusion.  
 
This ruling by the European Court of Justice is significant in that it 
bears on a situation where Member States are diversified as to identification of 
procedural defects and their relevance concerning the validity of administrative 
decisions21. 
                                                   
20 See European Court of Justice, 12 May 2011, C-115/09. 
21 See J.H. JANS, R. MACRORY, A.M. MORENO MOLINA (ed.), National Courts and EU 
Environmental Law, Europa Law Publishing, Groningen, 2013, 21-33. 
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According to the Court, such procedural defects can remove the 
standing, even in the case of discretional decisions, but never in the case where 
the procedural defect consists in violation of procedural rules that allow 
participation in the procedure. 
In this way great power still attaches to the court required to verify the 
validity of an environmental decision submitted to it; a power that constitutes 
an exception to the principle of separation of powers, since the judge, in 
reviewing the decision and the procedure leading to it in order to see if in 
practice that might have been the only practicable course, takes on the role of 
public administration. 
This great power has the constraint that it respect the guarantee of 
participation in proceedings for the persons concerned: the judge cannot 
deprive this procedural rule of effectiveness – it being a cardinal principle in 
environmental law – by ruling that the administrative decision could not have 
been different if the persons concerned had participated. 
This conclusion by the European judge seems most acceptable and 
balanced, because, in addition to ensuring the right of persons concerned to 
participate in the procedure for adoption of an environmental decision, it 
recognizes that one cannot predict the outcome of the procedure following the 
contribution of the person participating, which may involve not only items of 
interest, but also elements of knowledge of the facts, in addition to increasing 
«the accountability and transparency of the decision-making process and 
contributing to public awareness of environmental issues and support for the 
decisions taken» (third recital in the preamble to Directive 2003/35 / EC). 
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1. Introduction. 
 
 
Directive 2003/4/CE, which brings European law in line (fifth recital in 
the preamble to the Directive) with the “Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters” (“Aarhus Convention”), signed by the European Community on 25 June 
1998, recognizes the right of access to environmental information1 held by or on 
behalf of the public authorities, without showing an interest. 
This right was recognized in order to allow widespread social control over 
administrative environmental decisions, and hence in order to protect the 
environment, which is an object of general interest: «the administration is not the 
                                                   
1 This means information in every form concerning the state of the environment, on 
factors, measures or activities affecting or likely to affect the environment or designed to 
protect it, concerning cost-benefit and economic analyses used within the framework of 
such measures or activities and also information on the state of human health and safety, 
including contamination of the food chain, human living conditions, cultural sites and 
buildings in so far as they are, or may be, affected by any such matters (tenth recital in the 
preamble to Directive 2003/4/CE, and Art. 2 (1). 
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owner of the environment and it is therefore reasonable that such information is 
shared»2. The purpose is not that of satisfying personal claims, and hence a specific 
legitimacy, as the possession of a particular interest in having access to 
environmental information is not required. 
The Aarhus Convention recognizes that, «in the field of the environment, 
improved access to information and public participation in decision-making 
enhance the quality and the implementation of decisions»; likewise, the first recital 
in the preamble to Directive 2003/4/CE states that «increased public access to 
environmental information and the dissemination of such information contribute 
to a greater awareness of environmental matters, a free exchange of views, more 
effective participation by the public in environmental decision-making and, 
eventually, to a better environment». 
Access to environmental information is therefore tied to participation by 
the public in the decision-making procedure on environmental matters, whose 
purpose is to allow the public «to express, and the decision-maker to take account 
                                                   
2 L. KRA ̈MER, Access to Environmental Information in an Open European Society - Directive 
2003/4, in Research papers in law of College of Europe, 5, 2003, 12, available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/39391/ (last visited December 2014). According to the Author, 
«though in all EC Member States, the task to protect the environment is given to the 
administration, it is obvious that the administration is not the owner of the environment. 
The environment is everybody’s. It is for this reason that administrative decisions that 
affect the environment must be transparent, open and must strike a balance between the 
general interest to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment on the 
one hand, the satisfying of specific private or public interests on the other hand. In order 
to allow at least a certain control of whether the administration strikes the right balance 
between the need to protect the environment and other legitimate or less legitimate needs, 
it appears normal and self-evident that information on the environment which is in the 
hands of public authorities, be also made available to the public and to citizens»; and «the 
concept of open decision-making presupposes that public authorities lay open the facts 
and data, studies and findings, research and monitoring results on which they intend to 
base their decisions - including their decisions to remain passive. As neither the 
environment nor future generations have a voice, such an openness enables citizens and 
organisations to participate in the decision- making on the environment which means to 
discuss the facts, the necessity as well as the opportunity to take this or that decision and 
to give, if any possible, a voice to the environment and to future generations». 
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of, opinions and concerns which may be relevant to those decisions, thereby 
increasing the accountability and transparency of the decision-making process and 
contributing to public awareness of environmental issues and support for the 
decisions taken» (third recital in the preamble to Directive 2003/35/CE). 
In the definitions given by the Aarhus Convention and Directive 2003/4, 
we can distinguish three categories of “public authorities”, that is, entities which 
have to make environmental information available to the public: the “structural 
authorities”, the “functional authorities with powers”, and the “controlled 
authorities”3. 
In Article 2(2), the Aarhus Convention, actually identifies four categories 
of “public authority”, but the last is assimilable to the first. The first category 
(subparagraph a) is constituted by the «government at national, regional and other 
level». The fourth category (d) is represented by «the institutions of any regional 
economic integration organisation referred to in Article 17» (constituted by 
sovereign States members of the Economic Commission for Europe to which 
their member States have transferred competence over matters governed by the 
Convention, including the competence to enter into treaties in respect of these 
matters), «which is a Party to this Convention»; thus inevitably an administrative 
authority strictly speaking (a “structural authority”). 
Likewise, within the European Union Law, Article 2(2) of Directive 
2003/4 identifies, as a first category of public authority (subparagraph a), 
«government or other public administration, including public advisory bodies, at 
national, regional or local level». 
This first category includes Entities which, organically, are administrative 
authorities, namely those which form part of the public administration or the 
executive of the State, that is legal persons governed by public law which have 
been set up by the State and which it alone can decide to dissolve. 
                                                   
3 A. GRATANI, Quando le imprese sono “autorità pubbliche”?, in Rivista giuridica dell’ambiente, 
2014, 2, 205. 
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These are entities that may not have specific responsibilities for the 
environment, to take account of the principle in Article 6 of the Treaty, that 
environmental protection requirements should be integrated into the definition 
and implementation of Community policies and activities. 
The Aarhus Convention includes in the second category (subparagraph b) 
«natural or legal persons performing public administrative functions under national 
law, including specific duties, activities or services in relation to the environment».  
Likewise, Directive 2003/4 includes in the second category (subparagraph 
b) «any natural or legal person performing public administrative functions under 
national law, including specific duties, activities or services in relation to the 
environment».  
These are the administrative authorities defined in functional terms, 
namely entities, be they legal persons governed by public law or by private law, 
which are entrusted, under the legal regime which is applicable to them, with 
performing services of public interest, inter alia in the environmental field. 
The third category identified by the Aarhus Convention, subparagraph c), 
consists of «any other natural or legal persons having public responsibilities or 
functions, or providing public services, in relation to the environment, under the 
control of a body or person falling within subparagraphs (a) or (b) above».  
In a similar way, subparagraph c of the European Directive identifies this 
third category as «any natural or legal person having public responsibilities or 
functions, or providing public services, relating to the environment under the 
control of a body or person falling within (a) or (b)». 
The Aarhus Convention excludes tout court from its scope bodies or 
institutions acting in a judicial or legislative capacity. 
This exclusion is justified by the need to allow Member States to ensure 
the smooth running of the legislative process as provided for by national 
constitutional rules, with the result that, since this need is no longer present once 
that process has come to an end, the exclusion may be applied only before the end 
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of the process4. 
The European Directive, otherwise, states that Member States may decide 
that the definition given by the Directive does not include bodies or institutions 
acting in a judicial or legislative capacity, in such a way that they may not provide 
for this exclusion in the legislation transposing the Directive5. 
                                                   
4 The purpose of the first sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 2(2) of Directive 
2003/4 is to allow Member States to lay down appropriate rules to ensure that the process 
for the adoption of legislation runs smoothly, taking into account the fact that, in the 
various Member States, the provision of information to citizens is, usually, adequately 
ensured in the legislative process (European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, 14 
February 2012, C-204/09, Para. 43). 
5 In Italy, Legislative Decree no. 19 August 2005, n. 195, “Implementation of Directive 
2003/4 / EC on public access to environmental information” defines public authority as 
«the state government, the regional government, the local government, state corporations 
and public corporations, public bodies and concessionaires of public services, and any 
natural or legal person who performs public functions related to environmental issues or 
exercises administrative responsibilities under the control of a public body» without 
excluding the bodies or institutions acting in a judicial or legislative capacity (art. 2 co. 1, 
letter. b). However, Art. 5 among the cases of exclusion from the right of access, in 
accordance with Article 4 of the Aarhus Convention, cites the case in which disclosure of 
environmental information would adversely affect the confidentiality of the proceedings 
of public authorities, according to the provisions in force on the subject (Art. 5, Para. 2, 
letter a), or the course of justice or the ability of the public authority to conduct 
investigations to ascertain illicit acts (Art. 5, Para. 2, letter c ); in these cases there is not a 
total exclusion of the right, as the same article states that the public authority shall apply 
the provisions which establish the exclusion of the right «in a restrictive manner, carrying 
out, in relation to each access request, an evaluation weighted between the public interest 
in environmental information and the interest protected by the exclusion from access» 
(art. 5, Para. 3). 
In general, the Court stated that the provision which permits Member States to depart 
from the general rules laid down by that directive, may not be interpreted in such a way as 
to extend its effects beyond what is necessary to safeguard the interests which it seeks to 
secure, and the scope of any derogation which it adopts must be determined in the light of 
the aims pursued by the Directive (European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, 14 
February 2012, C-204/09, Para. 38).  
According to the case law of the European Court of Justice, moreover, in order to ensure 
the effectiveness of the first sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 2(2) of 
Directive 2003/4, a broad interpretation of “legislative process” needs to be adopted, 
including the different stages of that process until promulgation of any law that may be 
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2. European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), 19 December 2013, C-
279/12: the Case. 
 
 
The dispute from which the pronouncement of the Court arises stems 
from a refusal of requests for access to certain information relating to sewerage 
and water supply made by Fish Legal and Mrs Shirley to United Utilities Water 
plc., Yorkshire Water Services Ltd and Southern Water Services Ltd. 
Since Fish Legal and Mrs Shirley had not received the information 
requested from the water companies concerned within the periods prescribed by 
the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (the “EIR”, which are designed 
to transpose Directive 2003/4 into United Kingdom law), they both complained 
to the Information Commissioner.  
According to Fish Legal and Mrs Shirley, the water companies concerned 
must be classified as “public authorities” within the meaning of Article 2(2)(b) or 
(c) of Directive 2003/4 since they perform public administrative functions and are, 
in any event, closely controlled by a State body. 
The Information Commissioner held that the water companies concerned 
were not public authorities for the purposes of the EIR 2004 and that he hence 
could not adjudicate on their complaints. 
According to the Information Commissioner, the water companies do not 
carry out functions of public administration, and the control to which the water 
companies are subject is insufficient since it concerns only the functions associated 
with regulation: the concept of “control” concerns command or even compulsion, 
                                                                                                                                       
adopted in that process, with the result that one can exclude from the definition of public 
authority required to allow access to environmental information «ministries which, 
pursuant to national law, are responsible for tabling draft laws, presenting them to 
Parliament and participating in the legislative process, in particular by formulating 
opinions» (European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, 14 February 2012, C-204/09, 
Para. 49); but not when these ministries formulate and adopt regulations having a lower 
rank than a law (European Court of Justice, sec. II, 18 July 2013, C-515/11). 
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and the power to determine not just ends but the means to achieve those ends. 
Fish Legal and Mrs Shirley then appealed against the decision to the First-
tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chambers, Information Rights), which 
dismissed the appeals; they thus appealed to the Upper Tribunal (Administrative 
Appeals Chamber). 
 
 
3. The Judgement. 
 
 
The Upper Tribunal decided to stay the proceedings and to refer certain 
questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling as to the interpretation of Article 
2(2) of Directive 2003/4/EC. 
The pronouncement of the court consisted of four statements. 
 
3.1. Preliminarily, the Court clarified the criteria for interpreting the notion 
of public authority required to allow access to environmental information, stating 
that for the purposes of interpreting Directive 2003/4, account should be taken of 
the wording and aim of the Aarhus Convention, which that directive is designed to 
implement in European Union law. In point of fact, by becoming a party to the 
Aarhus Convention, the European Union undertook to ensure, within the scope 
of European Union law, a general principle of access to environmental 
information held by or for public authorities, and, as recital 5 in the preamble to 
Directive 2003/4 confirms, in adopting that directive the European Union 
legislature intended to ensure the consistency of European Union law with the 
Aarhus Convention. 
The Court of Justice referred to these criteria, at the time when it dealt 
with the problem of whether the phrase “under national law” contained in Art. 
2(2) subparagraph b) of the Directive (according to which a public authority is 
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«any natural or legal person performing public administrative functions under 
national law […]») is to be construed as an express reference to national law – 
here, to United Kingdom law – for the purpose of interpreting the concept of 
“public administrative functions”.  
The Court noted in this respect that the objective set out in the seventh 
recital of Directive 2003/4, is to prevent disparities between the laws in force 
concerning access to environmental information and inequalities within the 
European Union as regards access to such information or as regards conditions of 
competition. This objective requires that determination of the persons obliged to 
grant access to environmental information to the public be subject to the same 
conditions throughout the European Union, and therefore the concept of “public 
administrative functions”, within the meaning of Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 
2003/4, cannot vary according to the applicable national law. 
The phrase “under national law” means, according to the Court, «that 
there needs to be a legal basis for the performance of the functions under [Article 
2(2)(b)]», this subparagraph covering «[a]ny person authorised by law to perform a 
public function». It follows that only entities which, by virtue of a legal basis 
specifically defined in the national legislation that is applicable to them, are 
empowered to perform public administrative functions, are capable of falling 
within the category of public authorities that is referred to in Article 2(2)(b) of 
Directive 2003/4. On the other hand, the question whether the functions vested in 
such entities under national law constitute “public administrative functions” within 
the meaning of that provision must be examined in the light of European Union 
law and of the relevant interpretative criteria provided by the Aarhus Convention 
for establishing an autonomous and uniform definition of that concept. 
 
 
3.2. Secondly, the Court dealt with the question of whether the water 
companies concerned fall under the second category of public authorities, defined 
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in Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2003/4: according to the Court, these are entities, be 
they legal persons governed by public law or by private law, that are entrusted, 
under the legal regime which is applicable to them, with the performance of 
services of public interest, inter alia in the environmental field, «and which are, for 
this purpose, vested with special powers beyond those which result from the 
normal rules applicable in relations between persons governed by private law» 
(paragraph 52). 
In the United Kingdom, particularly, by enactment of the Water Act 1989, 
the water supply and sewerage sector was privatised: the functions, powers, 
property and other assets of the water authorities were divided between, first, the 
National Rivers Authority (now, since the entry into force of the Environment Act 
1995, called the Environment Agency), and second, water companies providing 
water supply and sewerage services as commercial undertakings.  
Under the legislation in force, in particular the Water Industry Act 1991, 
water companies are appointed as the sewerage undertaker and/or water 
undertaker for a given area of England and Wales by the Water Services 
Regulatory Authority (OFWAT). That authority is also, by itself or, in certain 
circumstances, jointly with the Secretary of State (the minister responsible for 
environmental matters), the authority with primary responsibility for supervising 
those companies. The water companies are set up as a public limited company or a 
limited company. They are run by a board of directors responsible to shareholders 
and are operated on normal commercial principles, as set out in their 
memorandum and articles of association, with the aim of generating profits for 
distribution to shareholders as dividends and for reinvestment in the business. 
They also hold certain statutory powers, which include powers of compulsory 
purchase, the right to make byelaws relating to waterways and land in their 
ownership, the power to discharge water, including into private watercourses, the 
right to impose temporary hosepipe bans and the power to decide, in relation to 
certain customers and subject to strict conditions, to cut off the supply of water. 
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These duties and powers are set out in the instrument of appointment (“licence”) 
of each company. The licence may also include other conditions, such as a 
condition requiring payment of a fee to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of 
State and/or OFWAT ensure that the terms of the licence are complied with. The 
companies may be required to carry out specific actions or measures. The licence 
can only be terminated on 25 years’ notice, with stated reasons. It may be modified 
by OFWAT with the company’s consent or after a Competition Commission 
report. Finally, the legal regime to which the water companies are subject also 
provides for the possibility of financial penalties being imposed upon them and 
partly takes them outside the ordinary provisions for the dissolution of companies. 
The European Court of Justice in this regard notes that the water 
companies concerned are entrusted, under the applicable national law, in particular 
WIA 1991, with services of public interest, namely maintenance and development 
of the water and sewerage infrastructure as well as water supply and sewage 
treatment. It is also clear from the information provided by the reporting tribunal 
that, in order to perform those functions and provide those services, the water 
companies concerned have certain powers under the applicable national law, such 
as the power of compulsory purchase, the power to make byelaws relating to 
waterways and land in their ownership, the power to discharge water in certain 
circumstances, including into private watercourses, the right to impose temporary 
hosepipe bans and the power to decide, in relation to certain customers and 
subject to strict conditions, to cut off the supply of water. 
According to the Court, however, it is for the referring tribunal to 
determine whether, having regard to the specific rules attaching to them in the 
applicable national legislation, these rights and powers accorded to the water 
companies concerned can be classified as special powers. 
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3.3. The third consideration of the Court concerns the criteria for 
determining whether entities such as the water companies concerned - which, it is 
not disputed, provide public services relating to the environment - are under the 
control of a body or person falling within Article 2(2)(a) or (b) of Directive 
2003/4, and should therefore be classified as ‘public authorities’ by virtue of 
Article 2(2)(c) of that directive.  
The question is whether the existence of a regime such as that laid down 
by WIA 1991, inasmuch as it places supervision of the water companies concerned 
in the hands of the Secretary of State and OFWAT - bodies which, it is not 
disputed, are public authorities referred to in Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2003/4 - 
means that those companies are ‘under the control’ of those bodies, within the 
meaning of Article 2(2)(c) of the directive.  
In their written observations, the Information Commissioner, the water 
companies concerned and the United Kingdom Government submit that the fact 
that the water companies concerned are subject to an, admittedly relatively strict, 
system of regulation does not mean that they are subject to “control” within the 
meaning of Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2003/4. They submit that a fundamental 
difference exists between a system of “regulation”, which includes only the power 
for the regulator to determine the objectives that must be pursued by the regulated 
entity, and a system of ‘control’, which enables the regulator additionally to 
determine the way in which those objectives must be attained by the entity 
concerned.  
The European Court of Justice stated by contrast that control may also be 
regulatory control. 
The precise meaning of the concept of control in Article 2(2)(c) of 
Directive 2003/4 must also be sought, however, with reference to that Directive’s 
own objectives.  
It is apparent from Article 1(a) and (b) of Directive 2003/4 that its 
objectives are, in particular, to guarantee the right of access to environmental 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SURVEY 2014 49 
information held by or for public authorities, to set out the basic terms and 
conditions of, and practical arrangements for, exercise of that right and to achieve 
the widest possible systematic availability and dissemination to the public of such 
information. 
Hence, in defining three categories of public authorities, Article 2(2) of 
Directive 2003/4 is intended to cover a set of entities, whatever their legal form, 
that must be regarded as constituting public authority, be it the State itself, an 
entity empowered by the State to act on its behalf or an entity controlled by the 
State. 
Those factors lead to the adoption of an interpretation of “control”, within 
the meaning of Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2003/4, under which this third, 
residual, category of public authorities covers any entity which does not determine 
in a genuinely autonomous manner the way in which it performs the functions in 
the environmental field which are vested in it, since a public authority covered by 
Article 2(2)(a) or (b) of the Directive is in a position to exert decisive influence on 
the entity’s action in that field.  
Exactly how such a public authority may exert decisive influence pursuant 
to the powers that it has been allotted by the national legislature is irrelevant in this 
connection. It may take the form of, inter alia, a power to issue directions to the 
entities concerned, whether or not by exercising rights as a shareholder, the power 
to suspend, annul after the event or require prior authorisation for decisions taken 
by those entities, the power to appoint or remove from office the members of 
their management bodies or the majority of them, or the power wholly or partly to 
deny the entities financing to an extent that jeopardises their existence. 
The mere fact that the entity in question is, like the water companies 
concerned, a commercial company subject to a specific system of regulation for 
the sector in question cannot exclude control within the meaning of Article 2(2)(c) 
of Directive 2003/4 if there are these conditions. 
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In point of fact, if the system concerned involves a particularly precise legal 
framework which lays down a set of rules determining the way in which such 
companies must perform the public functions related to environmental 
management with which they are entrusted, and which, as the case may be, 
includes administrative supervision intended to ensure that those rules are in fact 
complied with, where appropriate by means of issuing orders or imposing fines, it 
may follow that those entities do not have genuine autonomy vis-à-vis the State, 
even though the latter is no longer, following privatisation of the sector in 
question, able to determine their day-to-day management.  
According to the Court, it is for the referring tribunal to decide whether, in 
the cases in the main proceedings, the system laid down by WIA 1991 means that 
the water companies concerned do not have genuine autonomy vis-à-vis the 
supervisory authorities, in this instance the Secretary of State and OFWAT.  
 
 
3.4. Another issue raised by the court regards the question of whether 
Article 2(2)(b) and (c) of Directive 2003/4 must be interpreted as meaning that, 
where a person falls within that provision in respect of some of its functions, 
responsibilities or services, that person constitutes a public authority only in 
respect of the environmental information which it holds in the context of those 
functions, responsibilities and services, the result being that it would be obliged to 
disclose only environmental information held by them in the performance of those 
functions.  
According to the Court, persons covered by Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 
2003/4 must be regarded, for the purposes of the Directive, as public authorities 
in respect of all the environmental information that they hold. 
The Court argued that, apart from the fact that a hybrid interpretation of 
the concept of a public authority is liable to give rise to significant uncertainty and 
practical problems in the effective implementation of Directive 2003/4, that 
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approach does not, as such, find support in the wording or the scheme of that 
Directive or of the Aarhus Convention. On the contrary, such an approach 
conflicts with the foundations of both Directive 2003/4 and the Aarhus 
Convention as regards the way in which the scope of the access regime laid down 
by them is set out, a regime which is designed to achieve the widest possible 
systematic availability and dissemination to the public of environmental 
information held by or for public authorities. As is clear from Article 3(1) of 
Directive 2003/4 (the Directive’s central provision which is essentially identical 
with Article 4(1) of the Aarhus Convention), if an entity is classified as a public 
authority for the purposes of one of the three categories referred to in Article 2(2) 
of that Directive, it is obliged to disclose to any applicant all the environmental 
information that is held by or for it. 
On the other hand, the Court adopted a hybrid solution for public 
authorities “under control”, i.e. those referred to in Article 2 (2) subparagraph c) 
of Directive 2003/4, which are required to provide only the environmental 
information held carrying out an activity under public control. 
In this case, commercial companies such as the water companies 
concerned are capable of being a public authority by virtue of that provision only 
in so far as, when they provide public services in the environmental field, they are 
under the control of a body or person falling within Article 2(2)(a) or (b) of 
Directive 2003/4, and thus are required to disclose only environmental 
information which they hold in the context of supplying those public services. On 
the other hand, those companies are not required to provide environmental 
information if it is not disputed that the information does not relate to the 
provision of those public services. If it remains uncertain that that is the case, 
according to the Court the information in question must be provided. 
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4. Conclusions. 
 
 
This judgment confirms the consolidated case law of the Court, which 
adopts a substantive notion of public administration whenever necessary to ensure 
the effectiveness of European legislation, that is to pursue the objectives of 
European legislation beyond the formal qualifications varying within individual 
Member States. This substantive notion is used in the field of direct applicability 
of European directives not transposed. In this context, the Court stated that, 
where a person is able to rely on a directive as against the State, he may do so 
regardless of the capacity in which the latter is acting, whether as employer or as 
public authority, because in either case it is necessary to prevent the State from 
taking advantage of its own failure to comply with Community law6. The Court 
subsequently extended this substantial notion of State to organizations or bodies 
which were subject to the authority or control of the State or had special powers 
beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable to relations between 
individuals: tax authorities 7 , local or regional authorities 8 , constitutionally 
independent authorities responsible for the maintenance of public order and 
safety9, public authorities providing public health services10, and bodies which, 
whatever their legal form, have been made responsible, pursuant to a measure 
adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the State 
and  for that purpose have special powers beyond those resulting from the normal 
rules applicable in relations between individuals11. 
                                                   
6 European Court of Justice, 26 February 1986, C-152/84. 
7 European Court of Justice, 19 January 1982, C-8/81, and 22 February 1990, C-221/88. 
8 European Court of Justice, 22 June 1989, C-103/88. 
9 European Court of Justice, 15 May 1986, C-222/84. 
10 European Court of Justice, 26 February 1986, C-152/84. 
11 European Court of Justice, 12 July 1990, C-188/89. 
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This substantive notion, is echoed by the legislation on public 
procurement, for which there was developed the concept of a body governed by 
public law, subject to whatever legal form falls within the scope of the Directives 
on public procurement as a contracting authority (art. 2, Para. 1, No. 4, Directive 
2014/24/EU on public procurement)12. 
By this judgement the European Court of Justice interprets the concept of 
“public administrative functions” (under Art. 2(2)(b) of the Directive) to include 
all activities, including the task of providing services in the public interest, carried 
out exercising special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules 
applicable in relations between persons governed by private law. And it clarifies 
the notion of entities under the control of a “public authorities” (under Article 
2(2)(c) of the Directive): this means entities that do not determine in a genuinely 
autonomous manner the way in which they perform the functions which are 
vested in them, because there are rules determining how they should perform 
them and providing direct administrative supervision to ensure that those rules are 
effectively respected, possibly giving orders or imposing penalties. Finally, the last 
                                                   
12 These are entities that are established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the 
general interest, not having an industrial or commercial character, that have legal 
personality, and that are financed, for the most part, by the State, regional or local 
authorities, or by other bodies governed by public law or that are subject to management 
supervision by those authorities or bodies or that have an administrative, managerial or 
supervisory board, more than half of whose members are appointed by the State, regional 
or local authorities, or by other bodies governed by public law. 
As the tenth recital of this Directive states, the notion of “bodies governed by public law” 
has been examined repeatedly in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, which has explained that a body which operates in normal market conditions, aims 
to make a profit, and bears the losses resulting from the exercise of its activity should not 
be considered as being a “body governed by public law” since the needs in the general 
interest that it has been set up to meet or been given the task of meeting, can be deemed 
to have an industrial or commercial character. Moreover, the Court has also examined the 
condition relating to the origin of the funding of the body considered, and has clarified 
inter alia that being financed for “the most part” means for more than half, and that such 
financing may include payments from users which are imposed, calculated and collected in 
accordance with rules of public law. 
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consideration of the Court is that only the entities referred to in Article 2(2)(b) of 
the Directive must, for the purposes of this Directive, be treated as public 
authorities in relation to all the environmental information they hold, while public 
authorities “controlled”, that is those in Article 2(2)(c) of the Directive, are 
required to provide only the environmental information held carrying out an 
activity under public control. This is because outside this activity such entities 
cannot be qualified as a public authority, and the “special” regime of accessibility is 
only applicable at the time when they act as a public authority.  
It can be concluded, by way of comment on this judgment, that the 
implementation of access to environmental information remains controversial 
especially as concerns interpretation of the scope of access to environmental 
information. There are in point of fact no clearly defined exceptions13, and 
identification of the notion of public authority is approached with caution by the 
Court, which remits to the national court how it should verify its autonomy, 
indicating parameters that are not sufficiently precise or unambiguous.  
The objective pursued by the Court in this judgment, however, needs to be 
contextualized within a “closed society” 14, and gives an answer of great impact, 
                                                   
13 M. LEE, EU Environmental Law, governance and decision-making, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2014, 197-198, which also notes that access to environmental information is designed to 
interest groups, rather than for individuals (201-201). 
14 L. KRA ̈MER, The EU, access to environmental information and the open society, in Environmental 
Law Network International, 2013, 38-43. According to the Author, «public administrations 
need a space, where they can reflect, discuss among themselves and reach decisions 
without too much interference from outside. There will therefore always be a tension 
between the request for more openness and transparency and the concern for 
administrative efficiency and effectiveness. However, at present, the balance at EU level 
is, in the environmental sector, clearly biased in favour of confidentiality, secrecy and non-
transparency»; «administrative inertia, professional or commercial secrets, the power 
which is given to superior knowledge, all these contribute to the present “mafia of 
silence”»; and in «this situation it is all the more unacceptable that access to information 
and participation in decision-making in the environmental field is much easier for vested 
interest groups - car and chemicals industries, agricultural groups, transport and energy 
industries, etc. - than for citizens and civil society». 
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tending in the direction of extending the scope of the discipline. Indeed, as a result 
of that judgment, within the definition of public authority referred to in 
subparagraph c, national courts may consider all providers of public services, just 
as the European Commission had tried to insert among the public authorities 
during its revision of Directive 90/313 as Directive 2003/4/EC, only at the time 
this proposal was not accepted15.  
 
                                                   
15 L. KRA ̈MER, Access to Environmental Information in an Open European Society, cit., 12: «The 
Commission had suggested to include in the notion of “public authorities” any person 
that was entrusted by law, or under arrangements with a public authority «services of 
general economic interest which affect or are likely to affect the state of elements of the 
environment». It had explained that some services, such as gas, electricity, water or 
transport, were in some Member States performed by public authorities or utilities while 
in other member States, they were performed by private bodies. An unequal treatment of 
access to information was, however, not justified as these services were essentially the 
same, all the more as such differentiation between private and public services could occur 
within the same Member State. The Commission therefore considered it necessary to go 
beyond the wording of the Aarhus Convention and to include all bodies which provided 
general interest services in the definition of “public authorities”». 
The Author agrees with the decision not to follow the proposal, because «there should be 
a differentiation between public administration and private bodies»: «public bodies have 
general interests to take care of, while private bodies have in principle their own interests 
to consider. Obliging private bodies to grant access to information on the environment 
would just create new difficulties between private bodies which act in the general 
economic interest and private bodies which do not - and this differentiation is even less 
easy to operate». 
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1. The Transposition of the ELD in Italy: the Main Steps. 
 
The Environmental Liability Directive (Directive no. 2004/35/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of 
environmental damage or, simply, ELD) aims to ensure that operators focus 
on the environmental effects of their activities, by encouraging them to avoid 
causing environmental damage and to proactively remediate such damage once 
it occurs. It is based on the polluter-pays principle, which means that the 
original polluter pays for remediation of the environmental damage, and not 
the taxpayer. For these purposes, the ELD aims to establish a common liability 
framework throughout the EU for environmental damage, to prevent 
businesses taking advantage of less stringent environmental protection 
legislation by relocating to another Member State. 
The main objective of the ELD is to prevent and remedy 
‘environmental damage’. This is defined as damage to protected species and 
natural habitats (nature), damage to water and damage to land (soil). The liable 
party is in principle the ‘operator’ who carries out occupational activities. 
Operators who carry out certain dangerous activities, as listed in Annex III of 
the ELD, are strictly liable (without fault) for environmental damage. 
Operators carrying out other occupational activities are liable for any fault-
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based damage they cause to nature. The establishment of a causal link between 
the activity and the damage is always required1. Operators may benefit directly 
from certain exceptions and defences (for example force majeure, armed 
conflict, third party intervention) and defences introduced via transposition 
(for example permit defence, state of the art defense). Operators have to take 
preventive action if there is an imminent threat of environmental damage2. 
They are likewise under an obligation to remedy environmental damage once it 
has occurred and to bear the costs (according to the ‘polluter pays’ principle)3. 
In specific cases where the operators fail to do so, or are not identifiable, or 
have invoked defences, the competent authority may step in and carry out the 
necessary preventive or remedial measures. Affected natural or legal persons 
and environmental NGOs have the right to request the competent authority to 
take remedial action if they deem it necessary4. 
Prior to the transposition of the ELD, Italian law imposed liability for 
preventing and remediating damage to land, water and general environment. 
The article no. 18 of law no. 349/1986 of 8 July 1986 imposed fault based 
liability on a person who willfully or negligently breached the Italian law 
resulting in damage to the terrestrial or marine environment  (also called 
environmental damage or ecological damage) for remediating the damage if 
possible, or for paying a compensation if not. The article no. 17 of law no. 
                                                   
1 European Union Court of Justice stated that Directive 2004/35 precludes liability 
for environmental damage irrespective of any causal contribution only in so far as 
such liability would affect the primary liability of the polluting operator (in C-308/08, 
Raffinerie Mediterranee SpA (ERG), Polimeri Europa SpA, Syndial SpA v. Ministero 
dello Sviluppo Economico and Others).  
2 Where environmental damage has not yet occurred but there is an imminent threat 
of such damage occurring, the operator shall, without delay, take the necessary 
preventive measures and, in certain cases, inform the competent authority of all 
relevant aspects of the situation, as soon as possible. 
3 Where environmental damage has occurred, the operator shall, without delay, inform 
the competent authority of all relevant  aspects of the situation and take:  (a) all 
practicable steps to I immediately control, contain, remove or otherwise manage the  
relevant contaminants and/or any other damage factors in order to limit or to prevent 
further environmental damage and adverse effects on human health or further 
impairment of services, and  (b) the necessary remedial measures, in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of the ELD. 
4 L. KRAMER, Environmental Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2012, 7th edition, 173 ss.  
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22/1997 of 5 February 1997 (also known as Waste Management Act  or the 
Ronchi Decree) imposed strict liability on a person who caused an imminent 
threat of, or actual, damage to soil, surface water or ground water that 
exceeded specified limits  for contaminants or that resulted in a significant risk 
to human health.   
The ELD had to be transposed by 2007. However, many Member 
States did not meet the deadline (i.e. U.K.). The Italian Government 
transposed it about one year ahead of the deadline, and was one of the first 
Member States to complete harmonization of its national legislation with the 
EU rules, with the enactment of the legislative decree no. 152/2006 of 3 April 
2006, which introduced the Environmental Code. The specific regulation that 
transposed the directive is set out in Part VI of the Code, which is entitled 
provisions related to compensatory protection against environmental damages. 
Despite that, looking more closely, the process of effectively implementing the 
ELD has been tortuous, inasmuch influenced by the existing national 
provisions on environmental liability for the remedying of environmental 
damage, and by the technical requirements established by the Directive which, 
on implementation, were found to be particularly burdensome from the 
technical, institutional and financial viewpoint. 
What has been said before is confirmed by the fact that, in 2008, the 
European Commission opened an infringement procedure no. 2007/4679 to 
point out the non-compliance of the Italian rules on environmental liability 
with the provisions contained in the ELD.  For this reason, in the subsequent 
year, the Italian environmental liability discipline was subjected to an attempt 
to reform, contained in the decree no. 135/2009 of 25 September 2009, 
converted in law no. 166/2009 of 20 November 2009, with the clear aim to 
close the infringement procedure5. Despite of the objective, the reform of 2009 
was not considered enough by the European Commission: in 2009 e 2012, the 
                                                   
5 Italian Government answered with two remarks on the 1st and the 2nd of December 
2009 and a remark in remark on the 2nd of February 2010. 
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European Commission sent two opinions6 which clearly explained the reasons 
why Italy still did not comply with the European regulation.  
Only in 2013, Italy substantially modified the environmental liability 
discipline contained in the Environmental Code. The law no. 97/2013 of 6 
August 2013, “European Law 2013” fulfills the provisions of the Directive no. 
2004/34/EC, finally obtaining the infringement procedure to be closed.  
 
2. The Infringement Procedure No. 2007/4679 and the Reform of 2009. 
 
Although many provisions of the ELD have been correctly transposed, 
according to the European Commission some of the rules contained in the 
Environmental Code were not entirely compatible with the European 
regulation. The infringement procedure and the following opinions evidenced 
that: 1) the Italian environmental liability was always a fault – based liability, 
while the directive provides for two distinct but complementary liability 
regimes (strict liability 7  and fault-based liability 8  regimes); 2) the Italian 
legislation (article no. 311(2)) established a monetary compensation for 
environmental damage, while the directive sets only compensation in kind 
(identifying primary, complementary and compensatory remediation as the 
only possible remedial measures when an environmental damage occurs); 3) 
Italian legislation admitted exceptions not contemplated by the ELD: i.e. 
exclusion of forms of compensation of the environmental damage in the cases 
                                                   
6 Opinion dated 23 November 2009 and opinion (C-2012/228 final). 
7 The first liability regime applies to operators who professionally conduct risky or 
potentially risky activities listed in Annex III: these activities include, among others, 
industrial and agricultural activities requiring permits under the 1996 Integrated 
Pollution Prevention and Control Directive, waste management operations, the release 
of pollutants into water or into the air, the production, storage, use and release of 
dangerous chemicals, and the transport, use and release of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs). Under this regime, an operator can be held liable even of he has 
not committed any fault, though there are a few cases in which he can be exempted 
from liability 
8 The second liability regime applies to all professional activities, including those 
outside Annex III, but an operator will only be held liable if s/he was at fault or 
negligent and if s/he has caused damage to species and natural habitats protected at 
EU level under the 1992 Habitats and 1979 Birds Directives. 
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in which cleaning up procedures have been initiated or in which a cleaning up 
procedure has been initiated or completed according to the laws in force, with 
the exception of the case in which there were environmental damages left after 
the cleaning up procedure. 
The reform of 2009 tried to give a partial solution to the reported 
problems, but without success. It focused, in particular, on the article no. 
311(2) of the Environmental Code. The norm was modified establishing that 
any person, who performs an unlawful act, or who omits mandatory activities 
or behaviors, in breach of law, regulations or administrative provisions, with 
negligence, lack of skill, carelessness or breach of technical standards, causes 
damages to the environment by altering, impairing or destroying it, in whole or 
in part,  shall be obliged to the actual restoration of the situation which existed 
previously and failing that to the adoption of complementary and 
compensatory remediation measures under ELD, in accordance to that 
provided under Annex II of the Directive, within the deadline  set out by 
article no. 314(2) of this Decree. When the actual restoration or the adoption 
of complementary and compensatory remediation measures turns out to be 
totally or partially omitted, impossible or excessively onerous within the 
meaning of the article no. 2058 Civil Code, or implemented partially or in a 
different way from the one prescribed, the operator shall alternatively pay 
compensation to the State by way of the proprietary equivalent determined 
under section 3 of the article, in order to finance operations ex article no. 
315(5)9.  
The European Commission criticized the Italian reform for three 
orders of reasons : 1) the violation of the general rule of the strict liability: the 
Directive doesn’t allow a fault-based liability when the damage is connected to 
one of the activities listed in Annex III, while Italian regulation still admitted a 
fault-based liability for that kind of activities; 2) even if there are some 
improvements, there was still the possibility for an operator to compensate the 
                                                   
9 G.D. COMPORTI, Il danno ambientale e l’operazione rimediale, in Dir.Amm., 2013, 2-3, 117 
ff.: A. D’ADDA, Danno ambientale e tecniche rimediali, in Nuova Giur. Civ., 2013, 7-8, 407 
ff.; M. BENOZZO, La responsabilità oggettiva del danno ambientale nel codice dell’ambiente, in 
Ambiente e Sviluppo, 2011, 10, 860 ff.  
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environmental damage with money; 3) the reform did not clarify the 
relationship between the environmental damage discipline and the cleaning up 
procedure.  
 
3. The Article 25 of the Law No. 97 of 2013. 
 
Italy definitively faced the problems raised by the infringement 
procedure in 2013. The article no. 25 of the law no. 97/2013 considerably 
changed the environmental damage discipline in force, taking action on liability 
regime, criteria of compensation of the environmental damage, relationship 
between cleaning up discipline and environmental damage discipline, and also 
on other relevant aspects which have determined interpretative issues10.    
First of all, the new regulation modified the liability regime, which has 
definitely aligned with the Directive regime. The new article no. 298-bis, 
introduced by the article 25, provides the strict liability as general regime for all 
the professional activities listed in the Annex III of the Directive. Similarly to 
the Directive, the article no. 298-bis specifies that the discipline of the 
environmental liability is applicable: 1) to the environmental damage, or to an 
imminent threat, caused by one of the professional activities listed in the 
Annex V of the Sixth Part; 2) to the environmental damage caused, or to an 
imminent threat, caused by an activity different from those listed in the Annex 
V,  as a consequence of a guilty behavior. 
The same regulation modified also the article no. 311, eliminating any 
reference to compensation by money. The new article no. 311 now establishes 
that, when there is an environmental damage, whether it is caused by operators 
whose activities are listed in Annex 5 (which corresponds to the Annex III of 
the Directive), whether it is caused also by anyone else who causes 
environmental damage with intent or gross negligence, the responsible is 
obliged primarily: to adopt remedial measures set out in Annex 3 to the Sixth 
                                                   
10 F. GIAMPIETRO, Danno ambientale e bonifica dopo la legge europea 97/2013, in Ambiente e 
Sviluppo, 2013, 12, 973 ff.; A. QUARANTA, Danno ambientale. La nuova normativa e quella 
che verrà, in Ambiente e Sicurezza sul lavoro, 2014, 6, 57 ff. 
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Part of the Code, according to the criteria laid down therein. Only in the event 
that the adoption of the aforementioned remedial measures results in whole or 
in part omitted, or at least made in an incomplete or dissimilar way to the 
terms and conditions prescribed, the Minister of the Environment and 
Protection of Natural Resources determines the costs of activities necessary to 
fulfilling the full and correct implementation, and acts against the party 
responsible for the payment of the corresponding sums. In other words, the 
operator may be asked to pay not for a compensation by money but the costs 
of the measures requested to fully repair the environment. In this sense, the 
regulation can be deemed to be in accordance with the European discipline.  
The prescription about the exclusion of forms of compensation of the 
environmental damage in case the cleaning up procedure is already started or 
completed (article no 303, par. 1, let. i) has been finally eliminated. It has been 
also clarified the relationship between the environmental damage discipline and 
the cleaning up discipline, specifying that the interventions to clean up polluted 
soils and subsoil and to repair  ground waters are entirely subjected to the rules 
of the cleaning up procedures. 
In January 2014, the European Commission has finally closed the 
infringement procedure against Italy, positively assessing the changes described 
above to the discipline of environmental damage. 
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WHAT HAS CHANGED ON ITALIAN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LIABILITY AFTER THE 2013 EUROPEAN LAW? 
 
Wu Lan 
 
 
 
CONTENTS: 1. – A brief overview on the 2013 European Law. 2. – The 
Environmental Liability Directive and implementation in Italy. 2.1 – The 
Directive 2004/35/EC in the European environmental law. 2.2. – Selected 
implementation in Italy before the 2013 European law. 2.3. – Infringement 
procedure against Italy. 3. – Liability for environmental damage after the 2013 
European Law. 3.1. – General principles of environmental liability. 3.2. – The 
criteria of imputation of environmental liability. 3.3. – Compensation for 
environmental damage. 4. – Conclusion. 
 
 
 
1. A Brief Overview on the 2013 European Law. 
 
On 6 August 2013, the Italian parliament passed a new law, known as the 
“2013 European Law” 1 , in order to fulfill the duties deriving from the 
belonging of Italy to the European Union. The 2013 European Law, effective 
on 4 September 2013, is composed by six chapters and 34 articles involving the 
laws in the fields of environment, tax, public health, labor and other affairs. In 
the field of environmental law, there are 9 articles in total which has 
significantly modified the Legislative Decree No 152/2006 2  (the so-called 
Environmental Code) and promoted the Italian environmental law in 
accordance to the EU environmental law, particularly the EU directive ELD3.  
                                                   
1  Legge 6 Agosto 2013, n. 97, “Disposizioni per l'adempimento degli obblighi 
derivanti dall'appartenenza dell'Italia all'Unione europea - Legge europea 2013”.  
2 Decreto Legislativo 3 aprile 2006, n. 152 “Norme in materia ambientale”. 
3 The ELD is the abbreviation of EU Directive on “Environmental Liability with 
regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage”, 2004/35/CE, 
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The evident changes brought into the Italian environmental law through 
the 2013 European Law are: (1) first of all, it has finally transposed the strict 
liability for environmental damage4 provided in Article 3 (1) and Article 6 of 
the Directive 2004/35/EC in the Italian environmental law; (2) the L. 97/2013 
has eliminated the application of pecuniary compensation that has been 
provided together with the remediation in the Article 311 of the L.D. 
152/2006; (3) it has been introduced the Article 298-bis which stipulates the 
general principles applied in the VI part of L. D. 152/2006; (4) the 
Environmental Ministry is entitled to enact a decree providing the adequate 
measures adopted to repair the environmental damage in 60 days,  cooperating 
with the Ministry of Economical Development5. These changes in the field of 
environmental damage, to a certain extent, rectify the Italian environmental law 
back to the correct orbit.     
 
2. The Environmental Liability Directive and Implementation in 
Italy.  
 
For many years Italy has falled to regularly and promptly apply European 
environmental law 6 . The European Commission has adopted many legal 
actions against Italy because of its bad performance on implementing the EU 
environmental law 7 . Regarding the rules on environmental liability, the 
                                                                                                                                 
passed by the European Parliament and the Council, which is the most important 
statute of EU in the field of the liability for environmental damage in recent years. 
4 Second the Article 3, paragraph 1 of the ELD, strict liability is provided to remedy 
the damage caused by EC regulated dangerous and the fault-based liability is only 
offered to remedy the damage caused by non-dangerous activities. 
5 The environmental liability amended by the L. 97/2013 will be discussed in the last 
part of this article.  
6 G. DI COSIMO, L’Italia Inadempiente: La difficile attuazione del diritto europeo in materia 
ambientale, Milano, CEDAM, 2012, p. 13.  
7 In 2006, The European Commission adopted legal action in five cases where Italy is 
breaching EU laws to protect the environment and human health. In 2010, the EU 
decided to take Italy back to Court and to ask the fines imposed because of non-
implementation of the 2004 Judgment. In September 2011, the EC sent a letter of 
formal notice in order to remind Italy of its obligations in the field of implementing 
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transposition of ELD in Italy was incorrect and incomplete before the 2013 
European Law8. 
 
2.1. The Directive 2004/35/EC in the European Environmental Law. 
 
To establish a European environmental liability regime9, the European 
Parliament and the Council of the EU finally adopted an Environmental 
                                                                                                                                 
the relative directive on the waste and the 2010 Judgment made by the European 
Court of Justice. In the next November, another letter of formal notice was sent to 
indicate that Italy did not transpose the relative directive on waste. The similar 
infringement cases concerning the implementation of EU environmental law also 
appeared in 2013 and 2014. The last case is that the European Commission opened 
infringement proceedings against Italy for its failure to ensure that water intended for 
human consumption meets European standards on 10 July 2014. These cases are 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/press_en.htm (last visited 
December 2014).  
8  In 2012, the European Commission was attended that Italy had incorrectly 
implemented EU legislation on environmental liability, leading to insufficient 
protection for Italian citizens; therefore the EC sent Italy an additional reasoned 
opinion to ask it to adjust its national legislation accordingly.  
9 In fact, prior to the development phase of the ELD, the very first impulse behind 
the EC interest in giving birth to the idea of creating a harmonized civil liability regime 
for environmental damage can be traced back to the early 1970s. The first attempt of 
the EC is the first Environmental Action Programme that adopted the EC 
environmental principles - the Polluter pays principle and the Principle of Prevention, 
as guiding EC Principles. The ambitious of EC on the civil liability for environmental 
damage began from the single sector of waste. However until 1991 the EC had to face 
the failure of its attempts to create a harmonized civil liability regime for 
environmental damage in the waste sector. At the same time, this idea was still “alive” 
but reformed toward a more general and gradual approach in creating a harmonized 
environmental civil liability regime under the same mechanism. On these 
considerations, the so called Lugano Convention (Convention on Civil Liability for 
Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment) was approved by 
the Council of Europe in June 1993. Even through the Convention is based on tort 
law: it was a very innovative and advanced piece of legal text for that time, even 
though it has not yet entered into force. At the beginning of the 1990s, the design of 
civil liability as a consequence of environmental damage was different in the systems 
so-called Civil law and Common law (such as the UK) which could cause obstacles to the 
functioning of the EU internal market. For which reason, the Commission published 
the “Green Paper on Compensation for Environmental Harm” on the 17 March 
1993. However, the next “White Paper” in the year of 2000 reshaped really the design 
of the EU liability rules and pushed the legislation of EU on the civil liability for 
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Liability Directive on 21 April 2004 that is famous Directive 2004/35/EC on 
Environmental Liability with regard to the Prevention and Remedying of 
Environmental Damage. The ELD is concerned with the prevention of, and 
remedying of, environmental damage, and the overall ambitious objective of 
the ELD is to establish a common European framework of environmental 
liability for environmental damage to air, water, land and protected species and 
natural resources10. 
The ELD is based on the principle of Polluter-pays and must respect, at 
the same time, the Subsidiarity principle. In contrast to the White Paper11, the 
environmental damage covered by the ELD is really restricted which includes 
three types of natural resources: (1) damage to protected species and habitats; 
                                                                                                                                 
environmental damage into a new and quick stage. In order to realize the EU civil 
liability regime, the Commission enacted the 2002 Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Environmental liability with regards to 
the prevention and remedying of environmental damage which is considered a clear 
step back compared to the Lugano Convention and the White Paper, but its goal was 
to find common solutions attracting the consensus of all Member States rather than 
the willingness to design an effective environmental liability regime. The ambitious of 
the EU on establishing a framework of civil liability regime was achieved finally 
through the ELD of 2004 that was characterized by both Green and White Papers. 
See L. KRÄMER, Focus on European environmental law, Sweet & Maxwell, 1992, 143 and 
ff.; M. LARSSON, The Law of Environmental Damage: Liability and Reparation, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1999, 222 and ff.; B. POZZO, La Nuova Direttiva sulla Prevenzione e il 
Risarcimento del Danno all’Ambiente, in Quaderni della Rivista Giuridica dell’Ambiente, 2002, 
273-292; L. BERGKAMP, The Proposed Environmental Liability Directive, in European 
Environmental Law Review, November 2002, 204-214; S. CASSOTTA, Environmental 
Damage and Liability Problems in a Multilevel Context, Wolters Kluwer, 2012, 51-107.  
10 See S. CASSOTTA, Environmental Damage and Liability Problems in a Multilevel Context, 
142.  
11 The White Paper on Liability for Environmental Damage, passed by the EU 
Community in the year 2000, which offers the four different options in order to 
establish a European environmental liability regime and to harmonize the statutes of 
Member States in the field of the environmental liability. Concerning the four options, 
the EU Commission has presented advantages and disadvantages and concluded that 
the most appropriate option would be a framework directive that was a strong impulse 
in law-making process of the birth of the ELD. The White Paper, 
COM (2000) 66 final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0066 (last visited December 2014).  
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(2) damage to water; (3) damage to land12, and does not cover the damage to 
goods or individuals that is called traditional damage in the White Paper, nor 
the damage to such as “the environment”. Particularly, the ELD underlines 
that «…this directive shall not give private parties a right of compensation as a 
consequence of environmental damage or of an imminent treaty of such 
damage» 13 . Hence, these damages are difficult to regulate through the 
mechanism of civil liability.  
Regarding the liability for environmental damage defined by the ELD, the 
Article 3 provides for a dual system of liability based on fault based liability and 
strict liability. Generally speaking, the EU legislator has chosen the strict 
liability as the consequence of environmental damage caused by occupational 
activities 14 indicated in Annex III15 ; in contrast, the fault based (fault or 
negligent) liability is provided to the biodiversity damage caused by the 
activities other than those listed in Annex III16. To achieve the functions of 
preventing and remedying the environmental damage, the ELD prescribes that 
competent authorities and operator undertake all the measures of prevention17 
and reparation18 as a consequence of environmental damage. In the case of the 
ELD, the competent authorities are called “active claimants” in contrast to the 
                                                   
12 Article 2, paragraph 1 of the ELD defines the conception of environmental damage 
in this Directive.   
13 Article 3, paragraph 3 of the Directive.  
14 At the same time, the ELD defines the “occupational activity” as any activity carried 
out in the course of an economic activity, a business or an undertaking, irrespectively 
of its private or public, profit or non-profit character in the Article 2, Paragraph 7.  
15 The Article 3, Paragraph 1 (a) provides that strict liability for environmental damage 
is also applied to «any imminent threat of such damage occurring by reason of any of 
those activities».  
16 The same paragraph 1 (b) stipulates that: «damage to protected species and natural 
habitats caused by any occupational activities other than those listed in Annex III, and 
to any imminent threat of such damage occurring by reason of any of those activities, 
whenever the operator has been at fault or negligent», that is the liability in the case of 
damage to biodiversity is extended to “any” kind of professional activities.  
17 Article 5 of the ELD. 
18 Article 6 of the ELD. 
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operators19 - “passive subjects” who must bear the costs of reparation as a 
consequence of environmental harm. 
According to the ELD, the operators have to adopt all of the measures for 
reparations after the environmental damage has been occurred20. Annex II 
separates the remedial measures according to the different types of remediation 
(Primary, Secondary (or Complementary in the ELD) and Compensatory) in 
order to repair environmental damage correctly and completely. The Primary 
Remediation indicates that any measure adopted to return the damaged natural 
resources and/or impaired services to baseline conditions21, in case of the 
damage to land, the operator should also adopt minimum necessary measures 
to guarantee the polluting substances are removed or controlled or decreased 
in a way which the land does not present a significant risk to human health22. 
Where the Primary Remediation cannot return the damaged natural resources 
to the baseline conditions, the Secondary Remediation that aims to provide a 
similar level of natural resources and/or services, as appropriate, at an 
alternative site will be undertaken23. The Compensatory Remediation has to be 
understood as a compensation for “interim losses” of natural resources which 
is just a temporary compensation24. Based on the European reparation scheme, 
the ELD offers a structured liability system for environmental damage to 
natural resources and land, even though it is sometime not clear which needs 
to be followed between the Secondary and Compensatory Remediation25. 
 
 
                                                   
19 According to the definition of the ELD, the “operator” means any natural or legal, 
private or public person who operates or controls the occupational activity, that is 
who must bear the environmental liability.   
20 Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the ELD. 
21 Annex II, Title 1 of the ELD.  
22 In Annex II, “Remediation of Land Damage” of the ELD.  
23 Annex II, Purpose of Complementary Remediation (1.2.1) of the ELD.  
24 See S. CASSOTTA, op. cit., p. 174.  
25 The ELD does not outline clearly when the environmental damage is compensable, 
that is the Secondary Remediation, compared to the Compensatory Remediation, is 
also aimed at compensating. B. POZZO, La Responsabilità Ambientale, in Diritto ed 
Economica dell’Ambiente, 2005. 
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2.2. Selected Implementation in Italy Before the 2013 European Law. 
 
To transpose the ELD in Italy and to re-organize the national legislation, 
new provisions regulating the environmental liability were gathered into a 
single law in 2006: Legislative Decree No. 152/2006, as known as the 
Environmental Code26, in which the Part VI (Provisions on compensation for 
environmental damage) introduces the rules of liability for environmental damage 
stipulated by the ELD. According to the Italian report27 presented to the EC, 
the Italy was the one of the first Member States to complete harmonization of 
its national legislation with the EU rules. However, the implementation of the 
ELD in Italy was selected and incomplete, further speaking, the 
implementation concerning the imputation of liability was incorrect.   
According to the Italian report, the national choices made when 
transposing the ELD have overall produced a more extensive framework than 
the EU one. The Article 300 of the Code defines the environmental damage as 
«any significant and measurable, direct or indirect impairment of a natural 
resource or of its potential for use», which is broader than the definition 
provided in the Directive 2004/35/EC28. Therefore the Polluter-pays principle 
underlined in the Directive could be applied to more types of environmental 
damages, particularly the damage to air and to groundwater. Indeed, the Article 
300 reproduced the definition of environmental damage furnished by the 
ELD, except that in the Italian law the environmental damage has to be 
“significant” that was present in the 2002 Environmental liability proposal but 
was dropped out in the final text of the ELD. In contrast to the ELD, the 
Italian definition excludes the damage caused by airborne that is composed in 
                                                   
26  Decreto Legislativo 3 aprile 2006, n. 152 “Norme in materia ambientale”, 
pubblicato nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 88 del 14 aprile 2006-Supplemento Ordinario n. 
96.  
27 With the reference to the Article 18 of the ELD, Member States shall report to the 
Commission on the experience gained in the application of this Directive. The report 
of Italian was presented on 29 July 2013.  
28 The definition in Article 2 (1) of the Directive 2004/35/EC has been transposed 
into Italian law by Article 300 (2) of Legislative Decree No 152/2006.  
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the ELD. Obviously, the implementation of the European provision in Italy 
“shrinks” the extent of environmental damage protected by the ELD29.  
Regarding the passive subject (the operator in the ELD) who must to bear 
the liability for environmental damage and the imputable activities, the Italian 
Environmental Code quoted the definition of “the operators” furnished by the 
ELD30 but dropped to enumerate the activities determining environmental 
damage, specifically, the absence of the technical Annex III of the ELD. 
Therefore, the Italian law, indeed, partially implemented the ELD: the missing 
of specific activities means that all the activities of operators will be taken into 
consideration without differentiating in the process of compensation that is 
one of the basic conditions for the fault based liability in the Italian 
environmental law.  
Article 311, Paragraph 231 of the Italian law of implementation introduced 
the fault based liability for environmental damage that was the same choice as 
the Article 18 of the law 349/198632 which is the very first law of Italy 
                                                   
29 B. POZZO, La Direttiva 2004/35/CE e Il suo Recepimento in Italia, in Rivista Giuridica 
dell’Ambiente, n. 1, 2010, p. 62.  
30 The Article 302 (5) of the Decreto Legge 152/2006 defines the operators as «any 
natural or legal, private or public person who operates or controls the occupational 
activity having environmental relevance, or to whom decisive economic power over 
the technical functioning of such an activity has been delegated, including the holder 
of a permit or authorization for such an activity», that is the transposition of the 
Article 2 (6) of the Directive.  
31 According to the Article 5-bis of the Decreto Legge n. 135/2009, the Article 311 (2) 
has been amended as: «Anyone, who carrys out an unlawful act, or an omitting activity 
or dutiful behavior, in violation of the law, regulations, or administrative provisions, 
with negligence, incompetence, recklessness or breaching the technical regulations, 
causes damage to the environment, altering, deteriorating or destroying it entirely or in 
part, is obliged to return it to the baseline condition and, if failing that, to compensate 
it with equivalent asset in front of the State». We can see from this new article 
introducing the environmental liability is very similar with the following Article 18 of 
Legge n. 349/1986. The fault based liability for the environmental damage was 
persisted by the Italian legislators until the 2013 European Law.  
32 Article 18 of Legge n. 349/1986 provided that: «Any act committed with fault or 
negligence, in violation of provisions of the law or measures adopted based on the law 
which compromises the environment, causing damage to it, altering, deteriorating or 
destroying it entirely or in part, obliges the responsible party to compensate for it in 
front of the State».  
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furnishing the civil liability for environmental damage33. The type of liability 
chosen by the Italian law of implementation was a serious violation of the 
ELD that, in contrast, establishes the strict liability for environmental damage 
caused by the activities described in the Annex III of the Directive. However, 
in the case of Italy, the operators cannot assume the liability if it is not proved 
that he/she/it was at fault or the environmental damaging event is caused by 
an emission or an event expressly permitted by authorization. In addition, the 
operators cannot be imputable for environmental damage caused by an 
emission or activity or any manner of use of a product in the course of an 
activity which the operators demonstrate that was not considered likely to 
cause environmental damage according to the state of scientific and technical 
knowledge34.        
From Article 305 to Article 307 are the criteria for reparation as a 
consequence of environmental damage in the Italian law of implementation. 
However, the Italian law of implementation did not correctly transpose the 
“hierarchy” of remediation provided in the technical Annex II of the ELD35. 
According to Article 305-307 and 311 (Azione risarcitoria in forma specifica e per 
equivalente patrimoniale) of the Italian Environmental Law (152/2006), the 
operator should adopt the measures of Primary Remediation to return the 
                                                   
33 Legge 8 Luglio 1986, n. 349, “Istituzione del Ministero dell’ambiente e norme in 
materia di danno ambientale”, for the very first time, introduced in Italy a Ministry of 
the Environment which was non-existent before. At the same time, this law is 
considered a “futurist law”, recognized the compensability of environmental damage 
which, as an object protected by law, was independent from the damages to health 
and property. Therefore, the Italian legislator adopted a broad and unitary notion of 
the environment, not only as a whole notion including in the biodiversity, 
environmental property, but also as in conceiving the environment an essential 
element for the well being of general public. The article 18 of the law, setting up the 
civil liability for environmental damage, to a certain extent has even changed the 
structure of tort established by the article 2043 of civil code. See M. ALBERTON, Dalla 
Definizione di Danno Ambientale alla Costruzione di Un Sistema di Responsabilità: Riflessioni sui 
Recenti Sviluppi del Diritto Europeo, in Rivista Giuridica dell’Ambiente, 2006, p. 622; S. 
CASSOTTA, op. cit., p. 95.  
34 See S. CASSOTTA, op. cit., p. 230.  
35 The ELD comprehends the Primary Remediation (baseline condition), Secondary 
Remediation (the replaced natural resources) and Compensatory Remediation 
(equivalent pecuniary) for environmental damage that we have discussed before.  
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resources to the baseline conditions, and when the environmental damage 
cannot be repaired by Primary Remediation, the pecuniary (equivalent) 
compensation will be asked by the Ministry of the Environment. Obviously, 
this arrangement was considered that the Italian legislators did not furnish 
sufficient remediation to repair the environmental damage and certainly, did 
not meet the requirement of the ELD36. This was another motive why the EC 
adopted the infringement procedures against Italy.  
 
2.3. Infringement Procedure Against Italy.   
 
Since the bad performance of Italy in implementing of the ELD, 
particularly, the persistence of the fault based liability for environmental 
damage and insufficient remediation adopted to repair the environmental 
damage, on various occasions, the EU Commission expressed its 
disappointment and concerned about the way Italy implemented the ELD into 
domestic law. On 31 January 2008 the European Commission initiated the 
infringement procedure 2007/4679 against the Italian government because of 
its incorrect implementation of the Directive 2004/35/EC37. The Commission 
indicated that the Part IV (“Measures of compensation as a consequence of 
environmental damage”), Title V (“Restoration of contaminated sites”) and the 
Part VI (“Measures on waste management and restoration of contaminated 
sites”) did not correctly transpose the ELD38.  
                                                   
36 The Commission admitted that the provisions of the Italian law of implementation 
in its original version permitted the measures of reparation to be achieved with 
monetary remediation through the equivalent method, even though measures of 
Primary Remediation were not previously adopted.  
37 The infringement procedure, called also “action against Member State”, regards the 
proceeding of a direct legal action in response to a breach of duties provided by the 
EU Treaty.   
38 According to the Commission, the main motives of infringement procedure are: (1) 
the Italian provisions of implementation breach article 3 and 6 of the ELD which 
provide the strict liability as the consequence of environmental damage caused by the 
professional activities described in the Annex III (art. 3) and the measures that should 
be adopted by the operators and the competent authorities to repair the 
environmental damage (art. 6); (2) the Article 303 of D. L. 152/2006 breaches the 
Article 4 of the ELD, since the exception of imputation was not accepted by the 
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   To respond the criticisms from the EU Commission and to get rid of 
the infringement procedure, the Italian Government introduced some changes 
through the Article 5-bis of the Law 166/200939. The Article 5-bis provided (1) 
new criteria for the reparation of environmental damage which are more in line 
with those contained in the ELD40; (2) re-introduction of individual-liability on 
the obligation of the passive subject that has to restore the environmental 
damage; and (3) the plan to set-up future enactments for criteria to quality 
environmental damage41.  
However, in the Commission’s view Italy did not solve the major 
breaches of the Directive: the Law 166/2009 did not change the preference of 
Italian law to the fault-based liability that, indeed, restricted the application of 
environmental liability determined by the ELD and reduced the effective 
remedies for environmental damage. Finally the EU Commission sent Italy a 
reasoned opinion on 23 November 2009 and an additional reasoned opinion 
                                                                                                                                 
ELD; (3) the Articles 311 and 313 breach the Article 1 and 7 and Annex II of the 
Directive, since several provisions of the Italian law of implementation allowed that 
the measures of Remediation could be substituted by pecuniary measure of 
compensation. See B. POZZO, La Direttiva 2004/35/CE e Il suo Recepimento in Italia, p. 
76-77.  
39 Legge 20 Novembre 2009, n. 166, “Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del 
decreto-legge 25 settembre 2009, n. 135, recante disposizioni urgenti per l'attuazione 
di obblighi comunitari e per l'esecuzione di sentenze della Corte di giustizia delle 
Comunità europee”, has converted the Decreto-Legge 25 settembre 2009.   
40 With regards to the new criteria of remediation, the Article 5-bis of law 166/2009 
underlines the application of Secondary and Compensatory Remediation and only if 
the Secondary and Compensatory Remediation turn out to be «in all or partly omitted, 
impossible or excessively expensive or carried out in an incomplete way or differently 
as to what prescribed, the polluter is obliged, subsidiarily, to compensate and bring 
about remedial actions that should be able to render natural resources of the same 
kind equivalent both in term of quality and quantity…». 
41 See S. CASSOTTA & C. VERDURE, Recent Developments Regarding the EU Environmental 
Liability for Enterprises: Lessons Learned from Italian’s Implementation With the “Raffinerie 
Mediterranee” Cases, Jean-Monnet Working Paper Series-Environment and Internal 
Market, Vol. 2012/2, available at 
http://www.tradevenvironment.eu/uploads/working_papers/6.cassotta-verdure-
working_paper-2012-2.pdf (last visited December 2014).     
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on 26 January 2012 to ask it to adjust its national legislation accordingly 42 
which is a very strong impulse for the enactment of new 2013 European Law.     
 
3. Liability for Environmental Damage After the 2013 European 
Law. 
 
Now we return to the beginning of this article. On 6 August 2013 the 
Italian legislator enacted the 2013 European Law, in which the Article 25 
amended considerably the rules of environmental liability in the Environmental 
Code (152/2006) and in the Law 166/2009. The main changes made by the 
2013 European Law have been mentioned in the first part of this article and 
the liability for environmental damage in Italy after the 2013 European Law 
will be discussed in this part.    
 
3.1 General Principles of Environmental Liability  
 
(1) Dual liability for environmental damage 
 
   The 2013 European Law introduced Article 298-bis that provides two 
general principles guiding the application of Part VI (Norme in materia di tutela 
risarcitoria contro i danni all'ambiente) of the Environmental Code43. According to 
this article, the provisions of Part VI are applied to (1) the environmental 
damage caused by one of the occupational activities listed in Annex 5 
pertaining to the same Part VI and to any imminent threat of such damage 
occurring by reason of any of those activities; and (2) the environmental 
                                                   
42 According to Supplementary Reasoned Opinion-Infringement 2007/4679 (C 2012) of the 
EU Commission, the Commission considered that Italy did non transpose correctly 
the articles 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 and the Annex II of the ELD into the national legislation 
of Italy. This document is available at 
http://www.mi.camcom.it/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=d28d28ba-0291-4e6e-
8efb-aedd6d562979&groupId=10157 (last visited December 2014).   
43 Parliamentary Report on the Law 97/2013, in Atti Parlamentari, N. 588, p. 30, 
available at 
http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/17/DDLPRES/700298/index.html?part=
ddlpres_ddlpres1-relpres_relpres1&spart=si&parse=si (last visited December 2014).  
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damage caused by activities other than those mentioned in Annex 5 relating to 
the same Part VI and to any imminent threat of such damage occurring by 
reason of any of those activities, in the event of fault or negligence. This is the 
first principle that finally introduces strict liability for environmental damage 
caused by dangerous activities into the Italian law; at the same time, it also 
provides the Annex 5 composed by the professional activities determining the 
environmental damage that are reproduced from the Annex III of the ELD.     
 
(2) Hierarchical scheme of remediation 
 
The Article 298-bis (2) provides that the reparation of environmental 
damage must be in compliance with the criteria established in the Annex 3 of 
Part VI (reproduced from the Annex II of the ELD), if necessary, through the 
procedural experiment, the resources covering the costs of remedial measures 
should taken and not implemented by the person who caused the damage, or 
the imminent threat of damage, is achieved from the same person. This 
principle underlines the criteria of reparation provided in the Annex II of the 
Directive (hierarchical scheme of Primary, Secondary and Compensatory 
Remediation) which was also reintroduced in the Law 166/2009.  
 
These two general principles provided in the Article 298-bis are also 
implemented in the following Article 311 (2), Article 314 (2) and (3) and 
Article 317 (5).  
 
3.2 The Criteria of Imputation of the Liability.  
 
The most important innovation in the so-called 2013 European Law is 
the strict liability for environmental damage caused by the professional 
activities exampled in the new Annex 5. Thanks to the infringement procedure 
2007/4679 and continuous urgings from the EU Commission, finally the 
Italian legislator gave up the fault based liability for environmental damage 
caused by the occupational activities and introduced the Annex 5 in order to 
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identity these dangerous activities. Under the strict liability, the psychological 
state of operator (fault or no) is not considered any more as a necessary 
condition to impute the environmental liability.  
Amended Article 311, Paragraph 2 of the Environmental Code44 is the 
legal basis of strict liability for environmental damage caused by occupational 
activities which provides that: «When the environmental damage is caused by 
operators who are involved in occupational activities listed in Annex 5 of this 
Part VI, they are obliged to adopt the necessary remedial measures set-out in 
Annex 3 of the same Part VI according to the criteria set forth therein, to be 
carried out within the time period established by Article 314, paragraph 2 of 
this Decree…». That means in the case of pollution, it only needs to be proved 
the causality between the damage caused and the professional activity 
conducted by the operator. The only way in which it could be possible to avoid 
the liability, is to satisfy the burden of proof required by Article 308 of the 
Environmental Code45. 
                                                   
44 The original Article 311 Paragraph 2 has been substituted by Article 25, Paragraph 7 
of the 2013 European Law with «2. Quando si verifica un danno ambientale cagionato 
dagli operatori le cui attività sono elencate nell'allegato 5 alla presente Parte sesta, gli 
stessi sono obbligati all'adozione delle misure di riparazione di cui all'allegato 3 alla 
medesima Parte sesta secondo i criteri ivi previsti, da effettuare entro il termine 
congruo di cui all'articolo 314, comma 2, del presente decreto. Ai medesimi obblighi è 
tenuto chiunque altro cagioni un danno ambientale con dolo o colpa. Solo quando 
l'adozione delle misure di riparazione anzidette risulti in tutto o in parte omessa, o 
comunque realizzata in modo incompleto o difforme dai termini e modalità prescritti, 
il Ministro dell'ambiente e della tutela del territorio e del mare determina i costi delle 
attività necessarie a conseguirne la completa e corretta attuazione e agisce nei 
confronti del soggetto obbligato per ottenere il pagamento delle somme 
corrispondenti».   
45 Article 308, Paragraph 4 and 5 (from Article 8 of the ELD) of the Environmental 
Code provide the particular circumstances in which the operators would avoid 
obligations. That is whenever it can be proved that the operator is not at fault or 
negligent and that the environmental damage was caused by: (1) the third party; (2) an 
emission or event expressly authorized by and in full accordance with the conditions 
of an authorization conferred by the relevant Authorities under the applicable laws 
and regulations; (3) an emission or activity which the operator demonstrates was not 
considered likely to cause environmental damage according to the state of scientific 
and technical knowledge at the time when the emission was released or the activity 
took place. 
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Under strict liability established by the new version of Article 311, the 
operator essentially pays a price for conducting a particular activity which is 
extremely likely to lead to environmental damage. In the view of social safety 
and the development in the technology and commerce industries, the operators 
should ultimately accept the risk and thus assume a role of responsibility 
regarding the prevention and remediation of said damage, because they possess 
the means to manage them. In fact, compared to fault based liability the strict 
liability is similar to a price-based instrument for pollution control and a 
perfect expression of the Polluter-pay Principle persisted by the ELD.           
    Article 311, Paragraph 2 also provides the fault-based liability for 
environmental damage caused by the other activities. In contrast to the strict 
rule, a polluter should be held liable for damages only if he/she/it were 
deemed to have been fault or negligence in conducting the activity. In absence 
of the fault or negligence, the operator should not be liable for the damage 
caused by his/her/its activities46. 
 
3.3 Compensation for Environmental Damage. 
 
In the view of the EU Commission, even if the Law 166/2009 has 
evidently amended and promoted the provisions regarding compensation for 
environmental damage in the Italian law of implementation through Article 5-
bis, the Italian Environmental Code, particularly Article 311, Paragraph 2 and 3, 
still breached the Directive 2004/35/CE47. In order to ultimately solve the 
                                                   
46 The other half of the new Article 311, Paragraph 2 is that: «ai medesimi obblighi è 
tenuto chiunque altro cagioni un danno ambientale con dolo o colpa. Solo quando 
l'adozione delle misure di riparazione anzidette risulti in tutto o in parte omessa, o 
comunque realizzata in modo incompleto o difforme dai termini e modalità prescritti, 
il Ministro dell'ambiente e della tutela del territorio e del mare determina i costi delle 
attività necessarie a conseguirne la completa e corretta attuazione e agisce nei 
confronti del soggetto obbligato per ottenere il pagamento delle somme 
corrispondenti».  
47  See Supplementary Reasoned Opinion-Infringement 2007/4679 (C 2012) of the EU 
Commission, available at 
http://www.mi.camcom.it/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=d28d28ba-0291-4e6e-
8efb-aedd6d562979&groupId=10157 (last visited December 2014).   
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infringement procedure started by the Commission against Italy Government, 
the 2013 European Law amended again the relative provisions in the 
Environmental Code in accordance to the ELD.   
In the new version of Article 311, all the references to the equivalent 
monetary compensation are cancelled including the title of this article that has 
been instead of «action for environmental damage in special form»48. The 
Paragraph 2 underlines the measures adopted by the operator to repair 
environmental damage should be in conformity with the criteria in the Annex 3 
of Part VI which provides the obligations to adopt measures of Primary, 
Secondary and Compensatory Remediation. Only in the circumstance that the 
adopted measures of remediation turn out to be «in all or partly omitted, or 
carried out in an incomplete way or differently as to what prescribed», the 
Ministry of Environment would decide and require the costs of the necessary 
activities to repair the environmental damage in the correct and complete way 
from the operator49. However, according to the Italian legislator, the costs for 
achieving the correct and complete reparation are not the monetary 
compensation that is prohibited by the Directive 2004/35/CE50. It means that 
                                                   
48 The original title of this article was «action for environmental damage in special 
form and in equivalent monetary form».  
49 The original context of Article 311, Paragraph 2 was that: «Chiunque realizzando un 
fatto illecito, o omettendo attività o comportamenti doverosi, con violazione di legge, 
di regolamento, o di provvedimento amministrativo, con negligenza, imperizia, 
imprudenza o violazione di norme tecniche, arrechi danno all'ambiente, alterandolo, 
deteriorandolo o distruggendolo in tutto o in parte, è obbligato all’effettivo ripristino a 
sue spese della precedente situazione e, in mancanza, all’adozione di misure di 
riparazione complementare e compensativa di cui alla direttiva 2004/35/CE del 
Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 21 aprile 2004, secondo le modalità prescritte 
dall’Allegato II alla medesima direttiva, da effettuare entro il termine congruo di cui 
all’articolo 314, comma 2, del presente decreto. Quando l’effettivo ripristino o 
l’adozione di misure di riparazione complementare o compensativa risultino in tutto o 
in parte omessi, impossibili o eccessivamente onerosi ai sensi dell’articolo 2058 del 
codice civile o comunque attuati in modo incompleto o difforme rispetto a quelli 
prescritti, il danneggiante è obbligato in via sostitutiva al risarcimento per equivalente 
patrimoniale nei confronti dello Stato, determinato conformemente al comma 3 del 
presente articolo, per finanziare gli interventi di cui all’articolo 317, comma 5».  
50 See F. BONELLI, Il Risarcimento del Danno all’Ambiente Dopo Le Modifiche del 2009 e del 
2013 al T.U. 152/2006, in Diritto del Commercio Internazional, n. 1, 2014, 9.  
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the monetary compensation in the Italian law of implementation has been 
definitively abolished through the 2013 European Law.  
Article 311, Paragraph 3 emphasizes that the Ministry of Environment 
decides and applies the measures of remediation in accordance with the criteria 
provided by Annex 3 and 4 of Part VI, in which the measures of reparation 
must be the Primary, Secondary and Compensatory Remediation while the 
monetary compensation is abolished at all. At the same time, in cooperation 
with the Ministry of Economical Development, the Ministry of Environment is 
entitled to enact a decree in which will be provided the criteria and methods 
for deciding the measures of reparation in the concrete cases. According to this 
paragraph, this decree has the so-called retroactive effect and is also applied to 
the cases already proposed but not sentenced before this decree. 51 In fact, this 
provision is going, essentially, to ascribe the retroactive effect to the amended 
Italian law of implementation52. Certainly, in the view of preventing and 
remedying the environmental damage, the retroactive effect of the 2013 
European Law is a good choice.          
     
4. Conclusion. 
 
Article 25 of the 2013 European Law has brought some evident 
innovations into the Italian Environmental Code (Law 152/2006), particularly 
in the field of implementation of the ELD (Directive 2004/35/CE on the 
                                                   
51 Article 311, Paragraph 3 provides that: «these criteria and methods are also applied 
to the cases that have been proposed but are not yet sentenced before this decree ». 
52 The new version of Article 303, Paragraph 6 provides that: «Part VI of this decree is 
not applied to the environmental damage caused by an emission, an event or an 
incident verified before the date of entry into force» which means that the monetary 
compensation could be still applied to substitute the obligation of reparation before 
the 2013 European Law entering into force. However the decree enacted by the 
Ministry of Environment that is asked to conform to the hierarchical scheme of 
remediation furnished by the Directive 2004/35/CE, should be applied to the cases 
already proposed but not yet sentenced. Hence, it means that the monetary 
compensation for environmental damage is prohibited to apply even to the cases 
proposed before the 2013 European Law. Essentially, the provisions regarding the 
hierarchical scheme of remediation are retroactive.      
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Environmental Liability). Since the 2013 European Law has amended the 
Italian law of implementation in conformity with the ELD, the European 
Commission closed the infringement procedure 2007/4679 against Italy 
Government on the 23/24 January 201453. According to the new rules, strict 
liability for the environmental damage caused by professional activities has 
been finally introduced into the Italian law, under which the care of operators 
is not considered any more in the process of imputing the liability. The 
monetary compensation that has been considered as a substitution of correct 
measures of reparation is abolished in the Italian law of implementation. All 
these amendments in the 2013 European Law rebuild our hope that 
environmental protection of Italy will be greatly improved.       
                                                   
53 The news is available at http://www.politicheeuropee.it/attivita/18806/infrazioni-
aggiornamento-del-23-gennaio-2014(last visited December 2014).  
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ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE AND LIABILITY: THE LATEST 
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CONTENTS: 1. – Council of State, Sec. IV, 10 March 2014, No. 1105: the 
Case. 2. – The Reasons of the Appeal. 3. Environment and Damage Liability.  
4. – Conclusions. 
 
 
 
1. Council of State, Sec. IV, 10 March 2014, No. 1105: the Case. 
 
The case brought to the attention of the Italian Council of State is 
based on the concept of “acquisitive occupation”, which was applied to a plot 
of land in the district of Moliterno, Basilicata, Italy, for the construction of a 
landfill. 
The applicant, owner of the plot of land, undergoes a forced 
expropriation, which gives the matter for the request.  
The case was firstly brought to the judgment of the regional Tribunal 
of Basilicata, also called TAR Basilicata, but the judge retained that the 
question of the private citizen was not founded on legitimate rights, for two 
specific reasons: first of all, since the “acquisitive occupation” already took 
place, and the land had been destined to a definitive different role, with no 
possibility of bringing it back to its original use, it would be impossible to 
return the object of the matter to its previous owner; secondly, the prescription 
of the right to a compensation, for the loss of the land, had already took place, 
because the five years long term had already expired. 
Therefore, the owner of the land filed the appeal, in front of the 
Appellate Body for the Italian jurisdiction, against the first instance judgment 
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with the goal of voiding the TAR’s decision and, finally, having its right to a 
compensation realized.  
The ruling of the Council of State, after a detailed analysis of the 
general case, was based on three main facts.  
The case was examined on a prospective underling the fact that the 
good (specifically, the land) had underwent a legal transformation and 
therefore it could not be returned to its previous occupation.   
Then, the prospective switched to the five-years statute limitation of 
the right to request compensation for damages arisen from illegitimate 
occupation, and the concern was based on the fact that, since the term was 
already expired, the limitation had been effective under all aspects. 
There also was a doubt about the placement of a landfill in that specific 
spot of land, because «the measure of localization of such a public service can 
be contested only after a secure demonstration of a peculiar prejudice that the 
landfill could cause». 
The decision was took in respect of the issues analyzed in the pleading 
and the Court reached the conclusion that the right to regain the land was 
effectively expired, specifically because of the permanent character of the 
expropriation, but the Court confirmed that the private owner had right of 
legitimate compensation. 
 
2. The Reasons of the Appeal.  
 
The Council of the State’s decision was funded on the following 
arguments.  
The first point of the appeal is based on the analysis od Article 1 of the 
Regional Law of Basilicata No. 22/1986, under which the appellant stated that 
the chosen collocation for the landfill was not rightful, because the city of 
Moliterno wasn’t equipped enough to host such a service, plus, contrary to 
Article 8, letter c), of the same law, the Rural Community Alto-Agri Villa 
d’Agri selected the land for the landfill trough a drawing system. 
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The Council of the State rejected this argument, since the disposition 
on the drawing method of selection was not an imperative one.  
The second circumstance brought by the appellant to reinforce its 
claim was based on Articles 7, 8 and 21-octies of the Law No. 241 of 1990, 
stating that the public power had to notify the expropriation, through a notice 
of initiation, to the private citizen. The appellant contested that, for this 
specific episode, the process was not conducted under the rules, and was not 
concluded successfully. 
But the Court, starting from Art. 10 of the Law No. 865 of 1971, 
confirmed that the process was conducted under the rules, especially because 
the expropriation was filed and published on the local strategic plan and was 
publicized in accordance to the law. 
In fact, the obligation to disclose the procedure, according to Art. 7 of 
the Law No. 241 of 1990, cannot be the only means on which it is possible to 
base the overruling of the decision of first instance. 
As a matter of fact, case law has highlighted that the communication is 
not relevant in specific cases like this one, since it does not produce any impact 
on the actions of the individual, who is, in any case, deprived of his property, 
and since this is an act of mere implementation of the measure declaring the 
public utility and the urgency of the action. This complaint is, therefor, 
considered illegitimate by Section IV of the State Council.  
Moreover, the prior notice regarding the beginning of the procedure is 
not required by Art. 7.1, Law No. 241/1990, because «there are reasons of 
impediment arising from particular requirements for speed of the 
proceedings»1, as therefore, in re ipsa in the case of emergency occupation. 
The urgency of the decision on the matter appears connected to the 
serious situation in which the wastes’ management was conducted: here laid 
the reason of the particular needs of rapidity of the procedure, as it is ruled by 
Art. 7 of the above mentioned Law.  
                                                   
1 Cons. St., Sec. IV, 15 July 2013, No. 3861.  
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Another point on which the appellant based its complaint was the 
incorrect declaration of the five-year prescription of the right of compensation 
for damages suffered as a result of the loss of soil. 
On this matter, case law has developed the concept of “appropriative 
occupation” characterized by an abnormal expropriation proceeding: the 
procedure, actually, lacks of a formal ablative act that justifies the 
transformation of the fund of private property for reasons of public utility. 
The European Court of Human Rights has ruled, in this regard, with 
the well-known judgment on 30 May 2000, No. 24.638, which declared the 
unconstitutionality of Art. 43 of Presidential Decree June 8, 2001, No. 327. 
The article states that in case of an acquisitive occupation, damages could be 
asked, in place of reinstatement, to the administrative court.  The European 
Court recalled this principle also in the Guiso-Gallisay v Italy case, in which 
reverse accession was declared to be contrary to the principles of legality of the 
ECHR. Therefore, the transfer of ownership from private to public cannot be 
legitimized, if a proper expropriation proceeding is absent.  
Given the elaboration of the new case law trends mentioned above, the 
irreversible transformation of the property unlawfully occupied is to be 
considered as an offense of permanent nature, therefore not susceptible to 
statute barred. It should also be considered that the occupation sine titulo by the 
Public Administration is a permanent offense2. 
Therefore, the argument of the appellant, in our case, was accepted. 
The proceeding of request of the compensation for damage could begin and 
the damage, for the area in question, was fixed in euro 8.607 for each hectar 
subject of occupation. 
                                                   
2 Court of Cassation, Joint Chambers, No. 8065/90 «the apprehension or maintenance 
without title of a soil property, needed for the implementation of walkway, for a plant 
of conduct, or other artifact involving a servitude of fact, no determines the 
constitution of a servitude, according to the scheme of the so-called occupation 
acquisitive, whose extremes are not discernible with regard to the rights of real alien 
king» but «configure an offense to permanent character that endures until come 
removed the artifact, or terminates your exercise, or is constituted regulating 
servitude».  
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Furthermore, the appellant contested some elements of geological, 
hydrological and lithological nature, that did not allow the location of the 
landfill in the site chosen by the local administration.  But this reason, based 
both on the legitimacy of the system by which the land was expropriated and 
on the fact that the landfill in this specific area could cause environmental 
damages, was rejected both by the Court of first instance and by the Council of 
the State, since the suitability of the site was challenged on the basis of 
investigations carried out by two qualified experts appointed by the Courts.  
As a matter of fact, the suitability of the site as a possible location of a 
landfill is recognized. 
The identification of a proper lot on which to build a landfill must be 
chosen following specific criteria. In fact, such a decision needs to take into 
consideration the environmental impact assessment, «[which] does not consist 
in a mere technical verification about the abstract environmental work», but is 
based on the comparison between «the imposed environmental sacrifice and 
the socio-economic utility» 3 . The environmental impact assessment must 
include the enactment of a measure that will ensure the proper use of the land 
and, moreover, the respect of the balance between conflicting public and 
private interests4. 
To strengthen this interpretation, Judgment No. 39 of January 9th 2014, 
of the Council of State, is examined. In fact, Section IV sets out that, in order 
to safeguard the environment, the most important fact is considering it as a 
primary and absolute good. The concept of nature in general has a rational 
value: in fact, it regards everything that surrounds us.  
The measure that rules over the location of a landfill can be challenged 
only if it causes a significant damage, not justified by production needs; this 
specific concept may challenge the logic of proportionality between the use of 
natural resources and the community’s benefit.  
 Competence in the field of waste management is devolved to the 
Administrative Court, which has the goal to preserve the public interest and 
                                                   
3 See Cons. St., Sec. V, 2 October 2014, No. 4928. 
4 Ibid. 
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needs to ensure that the proposed project does not cause unnecessary 
damages5. 
Therefore the plea is rejected, since the method used to elect the 
proper location of a landfill and the system of the draw is not contrary to law 
dispositions. 
 
3. Environment and Damage Liability. 
 
The last argument that was brought in front of the Court by the 
appellant, must be analyzed more deeply, especially because it regards the 
environmental damage, that could be caused by siting the landfill in the 
territory of Moliterno, Basilicata, Italy. 
The concept of environment has been discussed in international and 
European arenas and includes the conservation, rational management and 
improvement of natural conditions, like air, water, soil and all its components, 
and the need for the preservation of heritage land and sea, of all animal and 
plant species that live in it and ultimately the human being in all its outward 
expressions6. 
The environmental damage7 occurs with great frequency, causing many 
inconveniences, at times irreparable, as we have already said; this is why it is 
necessary to realize and make efficient a solid legal system in this field. 
                                                   
5 See Cons. St., A. P. No. 24/1979; recently Cons. St., sec. V, No. 1830/2007; see ex 
multis, Cons. St., sez. VI,  No. 4123/2001; T.A.R. Liguria, sec. I, No. 267/2004; Cons. 
St., sec. VI, No. 657/2002. 
6 For a deep study of the notion of “Environment” and “Environmental Damage” in 
EU sources, see B. POZZO, Environmental Protection in EU Law, in M. TIMOTEO (ed.), 
Environmental Law in Action. EU and China Perspectives, Bologna, Bononia University 
Press, 2012, 259 and ff.; see also A. CARPI, Environmental Liability within the European 
Context: Definitory Problems, in F. ANLING, W. CANFA, M. TIMOTEO (editors), Legislative 
and Judicial Remedies for Environmental Tort Victims. A Study in the Framework of EU-China 
Cooperation, Bologna, BUP, 2013, 41 and ff. 
7 The definition given in Art. 2 of Directive 2004/35 is «for the purpose of this 
Directive the following definitions shall apply: “environmental damage” means: a) 
damage to protected species and natural habitats, which is any damage that has 
significant adverse effects is to be assessed with reference to the baseline condition, 
taking account of the criteria set out in Annex I (…)». 
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In order to have an adequate answer, the standards of liability for 
environmental damage8 must be determined. This aspect causes a series of 
problems related to the circumstances that can result from different kind of 
facts, such as the following. First of all, the quantification of the damage, since 
the damage itself, especially for what concerns the environment, has as object 
water resources or the air, that are goods not available on the market, not 
subject to exchange and therefor whose loss is hardly possible to evaluate in 
economic terms. Nevertheless, the damage has an economic consequence on 
those responsible. Second of all, the formal aspect, that causes more problems 
as far as case law is concerned, is relevant in order to determine the 
voluntariness of the actor causing the damage and its consequences, but is not 
always foreseeable. In fact, evidence of intentionality in the making process of 
an act is unlikely to be investigated, since it could involve a complex set of 
technical production processes9. 
In the Italian law, the profile relating to damages is still complex and 
unclear, despite the succession, over the years, from 2006 to current times, of 
several provisions. 
Initially, it was highlighted an infringement of the EU directive by the 
national Italian legislation. The discipline of the European Union was therefore 
misunderstood, specifically its Directive 2004/35/CE, which had sought to put 
a common framework for harmonization of responsibility and liability in order 
to prevent damage to animals, plants, habitat in general and specific damages 
that could affect water and soils. 
The goal of the new EU directive was to implement the principles of 
prevention, precaution, correction and reduction of pollution, but, still, the 
directive remained vague on civil liability and other aspects that needed an 
implementation, especially speaking of the well-known principle of “polluter 
pays”, so that  «the operator whose activity had caused environmental damage 
or the imminent threat of such damage will be held financially responsible, and 
                                                   
8 “Environmental damage”, as defined in the italian Legislative Decree No. 152/2006, 
means any significant and measurable deterioration, direct or indirect, of a natural 
resource or a utility guaranteed to the latter. 
9 See S. RODOTÀ, Il problema della responsabilità civile, Milano, Giuffrè, 1964, 64. 
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in order to induce operators to adopt measures and develop practices to reduce 
the minimum the risk of environmental damage»10. 
Therefore, the EU Legislation provided two criteria in order to solve 
this problem: a solution with an objective character, the other with a subjective 
one, based on the fact that those options relate on the costs of the restoration 
and the prevention of damages; so professional operators were reconnected to 
the obligation of restoration and environmental prevention , while “everyone 
else” had to burden the damages. 
A dual responsibility of Italy has taken credits starting from the 
violation of the Community Directive, since the Italian legislation does not 
provide for liability, but it is only based on a subjective character.  
In this sense, Art. 311, paragraph 2, of Legislative Decree No. 
152/2006 (the Italian Environmental Code) defines responsible anyone that 
has caused the damage, in the exercise of a specific act or job, and, by contrast, 
it will not retain responsible public operators. This issue gives rise to the 
infringement proceedings for breach of the Directive on the issue of liability. 
Other charges brought by the Commission against the Italian law 
regarded the monetary compensation in place of reparation; therefore, 
repairing means, when it is possible, to implement the basic principle of 
“polluter pays”, whose actions would be greatly devitalized by the possible 
substitution of the damages.  
The legislator with the new Art. 5a of Law 166/2009, modified Art. 
311, paragraphs 2 and 3, of Legislative Decree 152/2006 and introduces the 
complementary and compensatory repair.  
On the other hand, keeping the clause as it was previously forecasted, 
imposing the obligation of a compensation for damages, means that a 
complementary or compensatory remedial would be impossible or 
prohibitively expensive. 
Following the obligations arising to Italy from the European Union, 
the new Law of 6 August 2013, No. 97, the so called European Law 2013, at 
Article 25, has made significant changes to Part VI of the Italian 
                                                   
10 Directive 2004/35/CE. 
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Environmental Code (Legislative Decree No. 152/2006); in particular, the 
changes focused on the type of environmental damage caused in the exercise 
of professional activity, due to a fault or a negligent action. This provision 
wanted to address the various infringement proceedings opened by the 
Commission against Italy11.  
The mentioned amendments have taken the concept of equivalent 
compensation for damage and reparation to a whole new level.  
The reformed Art. 25, letter i), scheduled in Article 313, is designed to 
eliminate the part where it was previously stated the possibility of claiming 
damages instead of the restoration as the latter resulted, entirely or in part, 
impossible or excessively expensive. 
The Italian Ministry of Environment has intervened in the matter, 
stating that if the person cannot provide all or part of the recovery, it is a duty 
of the Ministry to determine the costs necessary to achieve recovery, within 
sixty days of the communication of the damage. 
The amended Italian Legislation is driving many reforms in terms of 
environmental offense, no longer subject only to the tort system provided 
under Article 2043 of civil code12 , or to the Law of 198713 . The main 
arguments, at that time, were the liability of environmental damage to a public 
interest, the deterioration which had to be repaired, seeing its primary nature 
and its belonging to the community, and not seeing it in the same way as the 
lesion of property belonging to individuals. 
The actual conduct in terms of compensation has to be seen in a way 
that relies between the protection of private and the kind of public law, turning 
to a prospect of an almost exclusive state protection.  
                                                   
11 See C. BOVINO, La legge europea 2013 introduce la responsabilità oggettiva per danno 
ambientale, in Quotidiano giuridico, Milano, 2013. 
12 Art. 2043, Civil Code, “Punitive damages”: «any given malicious or unintentional 
fact, that causes to others an unjust damage, obliges who committed the fact to the 
reparation of the damage». 
13 Law July 8th 1989, No. 1986, sentenced «any given malicious or unintentional fact, 
committed in violation of law’s dispositions or arguments adopted following a specific 
environmental law, causing damages to the environment, altering it, deteriorating it, or 
destroying it, in part or totally, obliges the author of the fact to the reparation of the 
damage». The reparatory action will fall under the competence of the State. 
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It is an activity directly exercised by the State rather than by the person 
harmed and therefor, the environmental damage is introduced as an 
administrative offence, punishable by using the restore quo ante or through 
remedial measures. 
The changes made to Part VI of the Environmental Code give a 
definition of environmental offense, in terms administrative and criminal law, 
focusing on the presence of three carriers such as public, personal and social. 
There will then be criminal offense to the extent that this is a condicio sine qua 
non of the offense behavior of others. As expressly governed by article 2 of the 
Italian Constitution, the environment is one of the fundamental rights worthy 
of protection. 
There will be, in terms of compensation, a determination under Art. 
122614 and 2056, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code15 under which the judge will 
have the burden to counterbalance the presumptive evidence or circumstantial 
evidence, as a result of the injury. 
 
4. Conclusions. 
 
The case in words deals with the main problem of the rightful 
compensation whenever a property right has been expropriated and 
transformed for public utility reasons, specifically a landfill. The two Courts 
that we took in consideration, the TAR of Basilicata and the Council of State, 
gave different decisions. This is a sign that the case was controversial, for two 
reasons. As we already said, the acquisitive occupation produced a series of 
problems linked to its rightful application, the expropriation itself and the right 
of the private citizen to see, or not, restored its previous economic situation. 
The second reason, and the fundamental one for our scientific purposes, is 
about the environmental damage. As we have seen throughout the discussion, 
the concept was not always clear, and in the decision of first instance the point 
                                                   
14 Art. 1226, Civil Code, “valutazione equitativa”: «if the damage cannot be proven in 
its precise amount , is dismissed by the court with equitable evaluation». 
15 Art. 2056, Para. 2, Civil Code: «the loss of profit is assessed by the judge in equity of 
the circumstances of the case». 
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was not fully considered; differently, in the second instance judgment, the issue 
was brought to a higher level, being analyzed with more attention.  
Therefore, through this legal text, we can affirm that the definitions of 
environment and environmental liability are often crucial issues in 
administrative law cases and the environmental impact is relevant specially 
whenever it produces serious damages to the environment in general. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
In early 2000 European Environmental Agency (EEA) claims 
contamination of sites, regarding the soil as well as surface and underground 
water, as a Europe-wide problem posing a mayor risk for both human health 
and the environment in general. Due mostly to past industrialization policies 
and not sufficiently strict regulation on the handling of hazardous substances, 
all European Countries present today a huge number of contaminated sites1. 
Contamination of sites is surely one of many environmental protection 
and remedying issues, the importance of which is revealed by the potential 
risks both to human and animal health as stated in the same proposal for a 
directive on environmental liability in January 20022. 
                                                   
1 EEA, Management of contaminated sites in Western Europe, 2000, p. 15.  
2 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Proposal for a Directive of 
the European parliament and of the Council on Environmental Liability with Regard to the 
Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, COM (2002) 17 final, p. 4. In addition, 
land contamination is considered as a priority from an economic point of view: the 
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In response to that, European Union issues Directive 2004/35/EC on 
prevention and remedying of environmental damage. Public authorities are at 
the centre of the legal framework on environmental liability, having major 
powers for its effective implementation and enforcement.  
At first, in order to place the discussion in context, this contribution 
focuses on the environmental liability directive. In particular, it describes how 
the European directive shapes public authorities’ powers and duties in order to 
fulfil their primary mission. Afterwards, it analyses the implementation of 
Community law in Italy, the first Member State who notified complete 
transposition. Italy maintains a specific regulation for cleanup of contaminated 
sites, so that it is important to establish whether these special provisions fit 
within the European regulatory scheme. Eventually, this article focuses on the 
role of public authorities in the Italian cleanup regulatory scheme.   
 
2. The Competent Authority in EU Environmental Liability Regime. 
 
At European level, among special legislations on environmental matters 
Directive 2004/35 holds a peculiar place, since it is considered the main 
horizontal regulation regarding environmental protection today. 
At the root of the entire regulatory system set forth by the Directive is 
the concept that the environment is a public, not a private interest good3. The 
peculiar legal nature of environment characterizes the European law on the 
matter to such an extent environmental liability regime is generally considered 
as a public law regime rather than ordinary tort law regime4.  
First of all, the current directive fully implements the prevention 
principle bringing forward the protection moment to an early stage where the 
                                                                                                                                 
estimated economic effort for the clean-up of these sites arising between 0.6% and 
1.25% of the EU GDP.   
3 L. KRÄMER, EU Environmental Law, London, 2012, 174.  
4 K. DE SMEDT, The Implementation of the Environmental Liability Directive, [2009] European 
Energy and Environmental Law Review, p. 2 «the ELD does not offer a real civil liability 
regime, but a mainly public law regime to be enforced by competent authorities, 
combined with private law aspect as strict liability or fault-based liability». 
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damage has not yet occurred5. In particular, article 5 provides for a preventive 
action. The relevant operator is already obliged to act without significant delay, 
when it is aware of an imminent threat of environmental damage. This 
circumstance exposes the operator to a form of economic liability that would 
not be taken into consideration in a traditional tort liability scheme, due to the 
lack of effective damage.  
Moreover, according to Recital (18) and polluter-pays principle, the 
polluter should bear the cost of preventive or remedial measures. Polluter’s 
liability is not limited to damage suffered by people or properties – as in a 
traditional civil liability perspective – but it is extended to the whole process of 
restoring the imbalanced environment. The environment is thus regarded as a 
public good, worthy of legal protection by itself, irrespectively of other private 
interests involved. In fact Recital (11) clearly confirms that Community policy 
pursuits directly to prevent or remedy environmental damage, leaving to 
national legislation other forms of compensation traditionally granted by tort 
law liability schemes.     
In the light of the foregoing, public authorities are indeed the central 
figure upon which all the legal framework is based6. As recognized in Recital 
(16) public authorities play an essential part in ensuring its correct 
implementation and enforcement.  
At the same time, Community law endows them with a wide 
administrative discretion aimed to regulate effectively the entire process of 
restoration of potential or actual impairment. In this case a certain degree of 
administrative discretion appears necessary, given the complexity of the 
mission vested in public authorities. Nevertheless, in order to partially restrain 
such discretion, directive 2004/35 provides for a list of duties public 
authorities should comply with. In pursuance thereof article 11(2) sets on 
competent authorities three major duties. 
                                                   
5 Prevention principle is set by art. 191(2) TFEU. 
6 J. H. JANS – H. VEDDER, European Environmental Law, Gronigen, 2012, 387 «The 
current directive has opted for a system of public liability, with a competent authority 
being primarily responsible for making environmental liability work in practice».   
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Firstly, prior to any effective restoration or prevention of the 
impairment caused to a particular environment, public authorities should 
identify the relevant operator on a case-by-case basis.  
Directive 2004/35 proposes a functional definition of operator 
depending on the concrete relation between the hazardous activity and the 
subject legally bound to it7. Public authorities should therefore look at national 
law regulating the peculiar activity involved in order to verify which subjects 
are legally liable. This could lead to substantial differences in the application of 
the environmental liability regime within the European Community, since it 
depends mostly on property law as well as on contract law systems adopted by 
each Member State.  
Secondly, competent authorities are responsible for assessment of the 
magnitude of the damage. Articles 5 and 6 explicitly entitle competent 
authorities only to require information held by the operator or third persons. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the current duty implies more general powers 
of inquiry as an expression of the administrative discretion above mentioned. 
Environmental protection would be ineffective if we interpreted restrictively 
the powers vested in articles 5 and 6 on preventive and remedial actions. 
Again, the complete set of powers given to competent authorities has to be 
sought in combination with national law. Yet the lack of specificity 
theoretically opens to a wide gulf between national regimes, given to the 
discretion left to Member States in this matter.  
Thirdly, competent authorities should impose appropriate measures on 
the polluter. This task sets a typical command and control scheme. Public 
authorities hold a wide range of powers, going from a simple power of 
approval of the action about to be taken by the relevant operator up to the 
power to act as a substitute of the latter. In fact the liability scheme seems to 
seek a certain degree of cooperation between the two subjects in question. The 
                                                   
7 According to article 2(6), liability falls on the person who operates the occupational 
activity that caused the damage or on the person that holds economic or legal power 
over such an activity. Instead, no distinctions at all are made about the nature of the 
subject being private as well as public, natural or legal person. 
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ratio behind those provisions aims to involve the polluter in the protection 
process, in order to find shared solutions.  
Direct intervention by public authorities seems to be extrema ratio. 
According to the polluter-pays principle, the relevant operator itself should 
preferably bear the burden of the entire remediation, in addition to the cost of 
it. However, articles 5 and 6 entail a general power of intervention on the 
authorities. In two particular cases, article 5(4) and article 6(3) allow the 
competent authority to act in place of the subject held responsible. 
The earlier occurs each time the operator fails to comply with given 
directions. Yet the cost of the action shall not fall on taxpayers, since article 
8(2) permits to recover the costs incurred by the authority via security over 
property or other guarantees from the operator. 
The latter occurs instead in the event of so called diffuse or historical 
pollution, as to say in any case when it is impossible to identify a liable 
operator or it is impossible to determine a causal link. Recital (13) seems to 
exclude the application of the present liability mechanism in such cases, even if 
– as we see below – case law has been giving a quite restrictive interpretation 
of the circumstances.  
Contrary to article 5(4) on preventive action, article 6(3) on remedial 
action expressly defines the duty to act as a substitute as « a means of last 
resort ». This slight textual difference could lead to a problem of interpretation. 
Moving from this difference in respective provisions, some Authors come to 
the conclusion that in remedial actions the competent authority may just 
substitute for the relevant operator when it is a measure of last resort, opening 
to a general power of intervention in preventive actions8. Such a distinction, 
however, could lead again to an antinomy between article 5(3)(d) and article 
5(4). The first provision establishes that the authority may at any time « itself 
take the necessary preventive measures », whilst the following paragraph (4) 
submits intervention to three conditions, basically absence or inactivity by the 
operator. A provision similar to the first is found in article 6(2)(e). 
                                                   
8 J. H. JANS – H. VEDDER, European Environmental Law, Gronigen, 2012, 387.  
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By the way, a correct interpretation of the mentioned provisions might 
be given in the light of the cooperative approach pursued by the EU legislator. 
It follows that articles 5(2)(d) and 6(2)(e) provide for a form of complementary 
action. The public authority may not only act as a substitute of the inactive 
operator then, but also it may integrate those measures when it does not 
suffice. In consequence thereof, such provisions seek a balance between the 
need of effective protection and the polluter-pays principle. When a preventive 
action is requested, the urgency to avoid an environmental damage allows 
public authorities alternatively to integrate or to anticipate necessary measures. 
On the opposite, when a damage had already occurred, article 6 sets a list of 
priorities, leaving the public intervention as a means of last resort. 
Anyway, the competence of public authorities is not only shaped by 
their statutory powers. Further limitations may be found in the overall 
environmental liability regime indeed. On one hand, Directive 2004/35 
presents several limitations regarding both the scope and the actors involved. 
On the other, it provides for a minimum set of regulation, leaving each 
Member State the power to introduce further instruments of protection in 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. 
Having regard to limitations of the object, article 2 sets forth a narrow 
definition of environmental damage. At the same time article 3 explicitly limits 
the scope to occupational activities9. 
Furthermore, the competence of public authorities is limited in a 
temporal perspective to those damages originated by an event that takes place 
after the deadline for implementation10. 
 
3. Cleanup of Contaminated Sites in Italian Environmental Code. 
 
In order to adopt directive 2004/35/CE, Italy issued legislative decree 
no. 152 of 2006 – also known as the Environmental Code – updating all 
                                                   
9 J. H. JANS – H. VEDDER, European Environmental Law, Gronigen, 2012, p. 385 «This 
definition may be problematic with regard to public entities that are active in the field 
of environmental protection, as they may not be involved in an economic activity». 
10 That is to say 30 April 2007, according to article 17.  
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previous regulations on environmental liability in the light of the scheme 
provided by the directive. The Environmental Code is the central piece of 
legislation on environmental liability, since it gathers all existing regulations on 
environmental protection under one act of primary legislation. 
As the majority of national law systems in the Community, before 
European Institutions adopted the current directive Italian law already dealt 
with a proper form of environmental damage regulation. Italian law presented 
in the past a dual regulatory system. In particular, national rules on 
environmental liability were first introduced by article 18 of legge no. 349/1986, 
providing for a fault-based liability regime derived from a traditional tort law 
approach. Besides, legislative decree no. 22 of 1997 introduced a further form 
of environmental protection in case of contamination of sites.  
According to the EU Treaties and the same Directive, Member States’ 
competence to legislate on environmental matters does not cease after the 
adoption of an EU legislative act (11). In conformity with that, Italy maintains 
two different regimes on the matter of prevention and remediation of 
environmental damage. On one hand, Part VI of the Environmental Code 
(articles 299 to 318) sets a general framework for environmental liability; On 
the other, Part IV, Chapter V (articles 239 to 253) still holds a special 
framework regarding the peculiar case of cleanup of contaminated sites. 
As a result, such a duplicity of regulations raises two important 
questions. 
The first question is whether the latter regime falls within the scope of 
the directive.  
The 2006 Act inserts cleanup provisions in Part IV, concerning waste 
management and the cleanup of contaminated sites. At first, such positioning 
could lead to the conclusion that the provisions in question do not attaint to 
                                                   
11  Accordingly L. KRÄMER, EU Environmental Law, London, 2012, p. 113. In 
particular, when protective measures are adopted on environmental matters, article 
193 TFEU empowers Member States to maintain or to introduce more stringent 
measures on the condition that those measures are compatible with the Treaties. 
Under the same principle article 16 of directive 2004/35 regulates the relationship 
with national law. 
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environmental liability as regulated in Part VI of the same Code. In reality, 
such dissimilarity is likely caused by a miscalculation. Article 240 (1) (p) indeed 
defines cleanup as a combination of measures aimed to eliminate (or to contain 
at least) unspecified sources of pollution: it does not refer to contamination 
caused by waste disposal, but to all kinds of contaminants potentially able to 
deteriorate in a significant measure a particular site. 
Most of Italian Scholars agree that the inclusion in different Parts is 
essentially due to the multi-layered composition of the Code itself12.  
Anyway, no doubt comes from community law about the inclusion of 
the Italian cleanup regulation within the European environmental liability 
framework.  
Actually, contaminated sites hold a central position in the scope of 
directive 2004/35/CE. First of all, as we mentioned at the beginning, 
Community Institutions refer to them at Recital (1), claiming the 
contamination as one of the major environmental problems the Union has to 
face. In addition, since 2000 the White paper on environmental liability claims 
the harmonisation of the special law most Member States already possessed on 
the matter of land contamination and, subsequently, the implementation of a 
proper Community regime as essential for an effective environmental 
protection at Community level13. 
Moreover, in case C-378/08 ERG, the EU Court of Justice clearly 
recognizes Italian law on cleanup of contaminated sites as a specific 
implementation of the general scheme set by the mentioned directive. For that 
reason, it has to be interpreted in the light of those principles.  
                                                   
12 See ex multis P. DELL’ANNO, La bonifica dei siti contaminati, in Gazzetta Ambiente, 2006, 
16; U. SALANITRO, La bonifica dei siti contaminati nel sistema della responsabilità ambientale, in 
Giornale di diritto amministrativo, 2006, 1263; G. TADDEI, Il rapporto tra bonifica e 
risarcimento del danno ambientale, in Ambiente & Sviluppo, 2009, 417; F. GIAMPIETRO, 
Codice dell’ambiente: l’(incoerente) attuazione di principi ambientali in materia di bonifica e danno 
ambientale, in Ambiente & Sviluppo, 2009, 333. 
13 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, White paper on environmental liability, COM(2000) 66 
final, point 4.5.2.   
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In the light of the above, the second question arises. Having a dual 
regulatory regime on the matter of environmental liability the problem is what 
relationship may be found between Part IV and VI of Environmental Code.  
To that end a preliminary remark has to be made. Being part of the 
environmental liability system, the scope of the two regulations under 
consideration tends to overlap each time any environmental damages – or its 
immediate threats – result from a contamination caused by a polluting source. 
Actually, they do not overlap completely. In one way, cleanup regulation has 
got a wider scope, as it also applies in cases when contamination is not 
provoked by occupational activities hazardous to human health or to the 
environment. In another way, the scope here is narrower than the one of Part 
VI regulation, because Part VI applies even in case of damaging facts other 
than contamination by pollutants, for instance loss of bio-diversity or 
accidental explosions etc.… 14. 
Having said that, in the event of an environmental impairment due to 
pollutant factors, both regulations could theoretically apply, creating a 
coordination problem.  
It is possible to find a solution to this problem in article 303(1)(i). It 
establishes that Part VI should not apply in those circumstances of 
contamination where cleanup proceedings have already effectively started (or 
completed), with the exception of the so called residual damage. That is to say, 
the environmental liability scheme would thus apply limited to that damage not 
fully recovered once the cleanup proceeding has ended. 
Therefore, Environmental Code clearly sets up an order of priorities. 
This option appears perfectly in line with environmental liability principles. On 
one hand, it covers preventive measures; on the other, it entails a peculiar form 
of restitution in kind. In fact, pursuant to Annex II the remediation provided 
                                                   
14 See U. SALANITRO, La bonifica dei siti contaminati nel sistema della responsabilità ambientale, 
in Giornale di diritto amministrativo, 2006, 1265. On the other hand, F. GIAMPIETRO, 
La responsabilità per danno all’ambiente e bonifica dei siti contaminati. La linea evolutiva del testo 
approvato con il d. lgs. n. 152/2006 alla luce della direttiva n. 2004/35/CE, in F. 
GIAMPIETRO (ed.), La responsabilità per danno all’ambiente. 
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by the regulation at issue aims to restore the damaged natural resources toward 
the baseline condition. 
 
3.1. Cleanup of Contaminated Sites: the Actions. 
 
Under the expression « cleanup of contaminated sites » Part IV, 
Chapter V of the Environmental Code refers to a complex regulatory scheme 
both in a technical and a legal perspective. 
At the root of the cleanup proceeding is a preliminary two step 
assessment, specified in article 242 and relative annexes. Annex 5 to Part IV 
provides for the criteria concerning the so called “Contamination Threshold 
Concentrations” (CTCs). CTCs constitute tabular screening levels of the 
relevant environmental factors used for identification of potentially 
contaminated sites. When even one of those concentration levels exceeded a 
characterization of the site is necessary 15 . It follows a site-specific risk 
assessment in order to identify on a case-by-case basis the relevant Risk 
Threshold Concentrations (RTCs). Contrary to CTCs, RTCs are risk-based 
levels used as a reference for the definition of one particular site as 
contaminated and to target cleanup levels16. 
Alongside the cleanup proceeding in a strict sense, Chapter V regulates 
ancillary restoration actions as well as alternative containment actions17. Once 
the site-specific risk assessment has revealed a contamination, it presents three 
different categories of remedies. 
                                                   
15  Under Annex 2 to Chapter V characterization is defined as a set of actions 
consenting to recreate any contamination phenomenon in order to recollect all 
available information upon which to take decisions on clean-up or containment 
actions.   
16 See F. F. QUERCIA – D. VIDOJEVIC, Clean Soil and Safe Water, Dordrecht, 2012, 78.  
17 M. BENOZZO – F. BRUNO, Le regole dei siti inquinati tra Decreto Ronchi e nuovo Codice 
dell’Ambiente, in Contratto & Impresa, 2006, 761 point out that new rules of the 
Environmental Code provide for an autonomous series of proceedings involving the 
relevant operator – or other subject held responsible – and the owner of the site. This 
approach changes totally the single proceeding established by legislative decree no. 22 
of 1997.  
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 Firstly, the main and priority remedy is the cleanup proceeding in the 
strict sense. Environmental Code provides for an “operational” definition of 
cleanup18. Cleanup proceeding aims to bring the concentration level below 
RTCs and eventually to remedy the environmental impairment.  
Secondly, complementary to that is restoration proceeding. This 
particular action seeks to restore the current use or approved use of the 
contaminated site19.  
Thirdly, article 242 provides for containment actions. Although 
alternative, containment measures are nonetheless subordinated to cleanup 
measures. The reason for this minor role is that those measures do not target 
at the remediation of the environmental damage, but they are intended to 
restrain risks to human health or, in addition, the risk of an increase in existing 
damage.    
Hence article 240 defines three containment action. The first is the 
emergency containment. According to article 240(1)(m) it includes any 
measures taken in order to hinder accidental or unpredictable contaminations, 
in anticipation of further cleanup measures or other containment actions. 
Being urgent measures, this particular containment action entails at the same 
time a remedial measure or a preventive one. At a later stage article 240(1)(n) 
and article 240(1)(o) define respectively operational containment and 
permanent containment. Those actions are both remedial. The difference 
between the two is found in the peculiar condition of the contaminated site. If 
the site is still in use the operational containment ensures an appropriate level 
of protection to human health and the environment in anticipation of further 
                                                   
18 See S. LEONI, La bonifica dei siti contaminati, in A. PIEROBON (ed.), Nuovo manuale di 
diritto dell’ambiente, Rimini, p. 639. According to article 240(1)(p) it is defined as a 
sequence of actions aiming to eliminate any polluting substances or, alternatively as a 
minimum, to diminish the concentrations of them. 
19 This action appears in line with § 2 of Annex II (Remediation of land damage) of the 
current directive which precisely states « the necessary measures shall be taken to 
ensure, as a minimum, that the relevant contaminants are removed, controlled, 
contained or diminished so that the contaminated land, taking account of its current 
use or approved future use at the time of the damage, no longer poses any significant 
risk of adversely affecting human health ». 
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permanent containment or, if it is the case, clean-up measures once the 
productive activities are over.  
 Moreover, the regulatory scheme under consideration provides for 
preventive actions. Article 242(1) extends the protection to those events 
potentially capable of causing a contamination. In the face of such an event, 
the relevant operator should take all necessary preventive measure in order to 
avoid the impairment and give notice to the competent authority without any 
further delay.  
 
3.2. Clean-Up of Contaminated Sites: Procedural Aspects. 
 
Proceedings concerning the actions described above are entirely 
regulated by article 242 of the Environmental Code. 
When a potential contaminating event occurs, the relevant operator 
should take appropriate preventive measures within 24 hours. Contextually, it 
should give notice to the competent authority. Immediately afterwards, the 
operator should carry out a preliminary assessment in order to verify whether 
CTCs are exceeded or not. If CTCs are below risk level the operator makes a 
declaration to the competent authority. Otherwise, if the result is positive, even 
for one parameter, the operator should submit for approval a characterization 
plan to the competent authority within the next 30 days20. Then, the competent 
Region calls to an interdepartmental meeting for the purpose of approving 
such a characterization plan and the final regional authorization. 
According to case law on the point, the regional approval may impose 
further emergency containment measures to the relevant operator. In such an 
event, the competent Region is required to adequately justify them on the basis 
of the urgency, the risks to human health and, eventually, the inappropriateness 
of the measures already taken21.  
                                                   
20 According to article 240(1)(p) it is defined as a sequence of actions aiming to 
eliminate any polluting substances or, alternatively as a minimum, to diminish the 
concentrations of them.  
21 TAR Toscana, sec. II, 19 September 2012, no. 1551. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SURVEY 2014 
 104 
104 
Subsequently, the liable operator should carry out a site-specific risk 
assessment based on the approved characterization plan. Depending on the 
outcome of this site-specific risk assessment, article 242 provides for two 
different procedural solutions. If the assessment reveals that the concentration 
of contaminants is effectively below RTCs, the meeting then should approve 
the assessment report and it should declare the proceeding positively 
concluded 22 . On the opposite, the relevant operator should submit for 
approval this time an operational plan to the competent authority. Such a plan 
differs from the previous characterization plan because of the object. In fact 
the operational plan should indicate specifically what concrete measures the 
operator intends to take on the basis of the Best Available Technology Not 
Entailing Excessive Costs model (BATNEEC).  
As a result, article 242 puts upon the relevant operator the primary task 
to take such measures.  
The question now is what happens when no liable operator is properly 
identified by public authorities or the latter does not comply with the 
provisions under consideration. As a solution, article 244 provides for a 
complementary ex officio proceeding.  
In particular, according to article 244 in exercising their own mission 
any public authorities should give notice to the to the competent local 
authority as soon as they ascertain a contamination level higher than CTCs. 
The latter should thus carry out a proper investigation in order to establish 
which operator is susceptible of the cleanup operation. National case law on 
the point clearly states that the power of issuing orders rests on polluter-pays 
principle, so that it requires competent authorities to verify thoroughly on a 
case-by-case basis what person should be held liable23.  
At this point the competent authority may issue an order to comply 
with the regulation under consideration against the operator liable of the 
potential contamination. In this case article 244 entitles the competent local 
                                                   
22 In this case it may provide for a monitoring program on the site. 
23 TAR Lazio, Latina, sec. I, 18 June 2012, no. 494; TAR Puglia, Lecce, sec. I, 2 
November 2011, no. 1901; TAR Piemonte, Torino, sec. II, 29 October 2010, no. 
3933; TAR Calabria, sec. I, 20 October 2009, no. 1118.   
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authority with the power to issue an order imposing the relevant operator the 
specific cleanup measures it should undertake. At the same time, the local 
authority should also notify the order in question to the proprietor or occupant 
of the site.  
The critical point here is to better understand the exact position of the 
landowner within the proceeding we are about to describe. That is to say 
whether the provision should be interpreted as empowering public authorities 
to impose measures also to the landowner, because of its proprietary right on 
the contaminated site or not. 
Administrative Courts reckon that the competent authority has the 
duty to give notice to the owner of the site for the purpose of making it aware 
of possible restrictions on the site due to the cleanup operation. By no means, 
the competent authority may impose any cleanup measures without having 
proved that the landowner is liable along with the relevant operator24.  
For the same reason, case law considers as in breach of article 244 and 
polluter-pays principle an order issued against the proprietor, if the competent 
authorities fail to prove a causal link between the proprietor’s conduct and the 
potentially polluting event. More precisely, administrative courts consider in 
breach of the mentioned provisions an order based exclusively on the property 
right concerning the relevant site25. 
Nonetheless, according to the same administrative Courts the 
proprietor is involved in the cleanup proceeding anyway, although it is not held 
liable of the contamination26. Firstly, the landowner is under the obligation to 
take necessary preventive measures once it notices a potential contamination. 
The latter, by the way, may recover all the costs to the relevant operator. 
Secondly, the proprietor (or occupant) is allowed of the site to take itself the 
appropriate measures: it may at any time take voluntarily containment or 
                                                   
24 Consiglio di Stato, sec. II, 30 April 2012, no. 2263; TAR Friuli Venezia Giulia, sec. 
I, 13 June 2011, no. 6.  
25 TAR Sicilia, Catania, sec. I, 30 December 2011, no. 3235; TAR Calabria, Catanzaro, 
sec. I, 20 October 2009, no. 1118. 
26 Consiglio di Stato, sec. II, 30 April 2012, no. 2263; Consiglio di Stato, sec. VI, 18 
April 2011, no. 2376; TAR Liguria, sec. II, 9 May 2013, no. 773; TAR Toscana, sec. II, 
19 September 2012, no. 1551; TAR Lazio, Rome, sec. I, 3 July 2012, n. 6033.    
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cleanup measures when the relevant operator fails to do so. Thirdly, the 
landowner may be subject to a restriction on its property rights on the site, 
where public authorities bare the cost of the operation, as we discuss below. 
Finally, article 245(1) foresees a third proceeding. This provision 
entitles third persons to activate the proceedings at issue under two conditions: 
a) they should not be liable otherwise, and b) they should be vested with a 
qualified interest. In general, if third persons are interested in the restoration of 
the environmental impairment, article 246 allows them to enter into an 
agreement with the competent authority in cases where it is impossible to 
determine a liable operator or the latter fails to comply with its obligations. 
The ratio here is to allow third persons interested in an economic use of 
the site to take all necessary measures in place of the inactive operator.  
 
4. The Competent Authority in Italian Cleanup Regulatory Scheme. 
 
Article 11(1) of Directive 2004/35/CE leaves to national legislation the 
task to determine which administrative authority is competent. To that end 
Italian law on cleanup of contaminated sites opts for an implementation under 
two fundamental principles: principle of differentiation and principle of 
cooperation. 
Under the first principle, Part IV distinguishes the competence 
between authorities at different territorial level, depending on the relevance of 
the specific site.  
In general, article 242 of the Code gives to Region the primary 
competence on the matter. Each stage of the described cleanup proceeding 
should be submitted for approval to the Region where the specific 
contaminated site is placed27. Without any further provisions, though, the 
circumstances under consideration fall under the regional competence.  
On the other hand, article 252 regulates a special case where the state 
authority steps in. In particular, article 252 recognises a special category of so 
                                                   
27 The Italian Constitutional Court confirmed the central role played by Regions in the 
regulation at issue in arrêt 24 July 2009, no. 247.    
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called “sites of national interest”. Unlike the previous general category those 
sites are subject to the Minister for Environment’s competence. 
The main difference between the two categories just lies here, given 
that article 252(2) expressly refers to article 242 for proceedings28. 
Having said that, two alternative procedures may be followed in order 
to qualify a site as of “national interest”. The first method is to issue a special 
legal provision. In this case the legislation itself points out a specific site. On 
the opposite, the second method is by administrative act. More precisely, 
pursuant to article 252(2) by order the Minister for Environment may proceed 
with an operation named “perimeteration”, the relevant Region (or Regions) 
been consulted. It consists of defining the physical limits of the site. 
In addition, the same article 252(2) establishes a detailed list of 
principles and criteria for the ministerial order. In essence, the national 
relevance of the site may be found in three major aspects. Firstly, there are risk 
factors: it may depend then on particularly high risk for human health or 
environment in highly populated areas as well as it may depend on the 
extension of the same area. Secondly, there are economic and social factors, 
owing to the impact of pollution on economic activities, but also on 
population on-site and off-site. Thirdly, the relevance of the site may derive 
from the artistic or historical importance of it. 
To sum up, Environmental Code presents a clear distinction between 
regional competence and ministerial competence, depending on the 
importance of the site or the degree of the contamination.  
The experience so far, nonetheless, proved an insufficient application 
of the mentioned administrative method in order to identify a “site of national 
interest”. Up to date, almost every site of national interest has been identified 
by special legislative provisions. Being an evident exercise of legislative power, 
the present option not even avoids any administrative discretion on the matter, 
but also it nullifies the procedural fairness principles on which article 252 is 
ultimately based. In fact, before issuing the mentioned order, the Minister for 
                                                   
28 Article 252(4) though endows Minister for Environment with the same duties article 
242 puts on Regions. 
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Environment should take into consideration all positions expressed by 
interested persons by way of a hearing.  
The same conclusion is reached pursuant to the provisions of article 
242 on sites of regional interest. Based on general principles on administrative 
proceedings in Italy, even competent Regions should exercise their power after 
consulting with relevant public or private persons29.  
This kind of participation is of utmost importance in order to solve 
information asymmetry problems. It is apparent that in cases of pollution 
caused by contaminants used in production processes the operator could hold 
key data, essential for the purpose of selecting adequate measures. In other 
words, such participation is crucial to build up profitable relationships between 
regulator and regulated operators. 
 
4.1 Powers of Public Authorities within the Cleanup Regulatory Scheme. 
 
Public authorities are entitled with significant powers in order to ensure 
the enforcement of the current provisions.  
First of all, a general power of control on procedural aspects. It leads to 
a different range of specific powers depending on the precise stage of the 
proceeding. As soon as public authorities receive the notice of a likely 
contaminant event, competent authorities may alternatively: a) ask the operator 
to give further information, b) order it to take specific measures, and c) adopt 
themselves those measures in place of the operator. 
Thereafter competent authorities still hold significant conforming 
powers. Even in cases of remedying measures, they may give directions to the 
relevant operator about which measures are considered appropriate for the 
upcoming cleanup. All the prescribed acts made by the operator are submitted 
to the competent authority for approval. Therefore, by way of authorizing each 
measures the relevant operator proposes, public authorities may effectively 
direct the cleanup proceeding. 
                                                   
29 More precisely art. 7 s. legge no. 241/1990 on administrative proceeding.  
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Case law specifies to what extent this power of approval may condition 
the cleanup proceeding. As Consiglio di Stato 30  put it, the power under 
consideration obliges competent authorities to compare benefits and 
drawbacks of all the solutions likely to be taken. To do so administrations 
should also give adequate justification of that comparison, especially from a 
cost-benefit analysis point of view31. The operator’s proposal could thus be 
rejected, on the condition that competent authorities justify adequately the 
refusal.   
Moreover, according to article 242 cleanup proceedings generally start 
on operator own initiative, so that an environmental protection problem could 
arise in case of operator’s inactivity. Actually, this could be a likely critical point 
of the present regulatory scheme Environmental Code tries to overcome 
entrusting public authorities with the following powers. 
Furthermore, article 244 provides for a power of injunction. The local 
authority is thus allowed to exercise the current power at the very first stage of 
cleanup proceeding. It has important consequences in relation with the 
relevance of the site. In fact, it does not specify if the local authority is 
empowered to issue an order in cases where the Minister of the Environment 
is competent.  
The problem here is if an administrative act issued by a local 
government may be effective in circumstances shifted at national level. In an 
important case Consiglio di Stato claims definitively that the provision at issue 
applies with regards to sites of national interest as well32. The Court bases its 
reasoning on three points. First, article 244 does not make any distinction 
between sites of national interest and sites of regional interest. Second, 
Minister’s competence concerns the proper cleanup proceeding, that is a stage 
of the proceeding subsequent to the stage when the provision applies. In fact, 
article 244 is generally considered to regard preventive measure or, at least, 
containment measures due to avoid further contamination risks. Third, urgency 
                                                   
30 The Italian supreme administrative court. 
31 Lately, Consiglio di Stato, sec. VI, 9 January 2013, no. 56.  
32 Consiglio di Stato, sec. VI, 12 April 2011, no. 2249  
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reasons justify the intervention by the local authority, because it is the closest 
authority to the (potentially) contaminated land, so that it may assure a better 
and more rapid intervention. 
At last, according to article 250 public authorities are entrusted with the 
power to act as a substitute of the relevant operator. In particular, in cases 
where the relevant operator fails to comply with the provisions at issue or it 
cannot be identified, the competent authority should itself take the necessary 
measures. Hence, in line with article 6 of Directive 2004/35/CE, article 250 
provides for this power when all other options have been exhausted.  
On the other hand, the power does not apply just in case of remedial 
measures. In fact, on the base of precautionary principle administrative courts 
claim that competent authorities may exercise the power in question even 
when there is an imminent threat of contamination. In case of extreme urgency 
and contextual inactivity of the relevant operator competent authorities are 
required to take the necessary preventive measures, given that in this case 
public action is undoubtedly considered as last resort 33. 
Furthermore, article 250 leads to a distinction. Where public authorities 
take action, they may ask for compensation of the sum they spent from the 
polluter itself. Otherwise, if no person may be proved susceptible with the 
restoration obligation or rather it is insolvent, public authorities have the 
ultimate duty to restore the impairment at their own expense. The ratio is here 
evident. At the end of the day, public authorities are vested with the general 
interest to preserve and improve the quality of the environment.  
Likewise, the goal is to avoid that the cost of the action should lie on 
taxpayers. For that reason the regulatory scheme in question provides for two 
supplementary provisions. Firstly, under the same article 250 the competent 
authority may invite tenders for carrying out the cleanup34. As an alternative, it 
                                                   
33 Consiglio di Stato, sec. V, 16 June 2009, no. 3885. The Court builds up its legal 
reasoning directly on the basis of the Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and 
Development, June 1992, Principle 15.    
34 That competitive tendering procedure is more specifically regulated by legge no. 
179/2002 at article 18. In particular, public authority may carry through a public 
procurement procedure. 
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may award an exclusive right for economic utilisation of the site. Secondly, 
once the cleanup proceeding has successfully ended, in the light of article 253, 
the landowner is susceptible with compensation as – and within – unjust 
enrichment, if not liable otherwise. 
 
4.2. The Duty to Establish the Causal Link. 
 
In accordance with the polluter-pays principle, national Courts state 
that article 242 read in conjunction with article 244 imposes on competent 
authorities the duty to investigate and to identify the liable person35. 
Under the same principle is case C-378/08 ERG, in a preliminary 
ruling on interpretation of Italian provisions regarding cleanup of 
contaminated sites. The Court of Justice states that the authority should «carry 
out a prior investigation into the origin of the pollution found, and has a 
discretion as to the procedures, means to be employed and length of such an 
investigation»36. In order to fulfil this particular duty, the authority is entitled 
with wide discretionary powers to assess the significance of the impairment 
and the most appropriate measures to be taken37. Hence, « in exercising that 
discretion, the competent authority is nevertheless required, in such 
circumstances, to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of 
the individual case»38. 
  Seeing that public authority are empowered to identify the liable 
operator, preliminary question is to better understand which liability regime the 
regulation under consideration provides for. As a matter of fact, no provisions 
in Part IV set it forth expressly.  
Article 242 just refers to the liable operator, without thereof any further 
specification. Not to mention, Part VI on environmental liability. Manifestly in 
breach of Directive 2004/35 regulatory scheme, article 311(2) provides for a 
fault-based liability regime even in case of occupational activities listed in 
                                                   
35 Consiglio di Stato, sec. V, 16 June 2009, no. 3885, at point 4. 
36 EU Court of Justice, case C-380/08 ERG at point 65. 
37 EU Court of Justice joined cases C-379/08 and C-380/08 ERG and ENI, point 59. 
38 Ibidem, at point 61.  
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Annex III of the mentioned Directive. For this reason European Commission 
opened the ongoing infringement procedure no. 2007/467939. 
  In consequence thereof, immediately after the Environmental Code 
was issued, some Authors assert that cleanup of contaminated site regulation 
rested on fault-based liability as well40. Although other Authors considered 
later on that in this case European provisions should function as interpretative 
parameter for the purpose of qualifying the appropriate liability regime41. 
On the contrary, the aforementioned case C-378/08 ERG definitively 
includes Italian regulation on the matter within the general framework of 
Community environmental liability. That is to say it has to be interpreted as a 
strict liability regime, at least for those activities listed in Annex III42. 
Consistent with this interpretation, Italian administrative Courts go 
further in extending the current strict liability regime to all activities subject in 
principle to cleanup regulation43. After all, this position does not contrast with 
the scope of the aforementioned directive, since – as the same Court of Justice 
puts it - article 16(1) of Directive 2004/35 does not to prevent Member States 
from adopting more stringent measures. That provision also indicates that 
«such measures may include, inter alia, the identification of, first, additional 
                                                   
39 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, C(2012) 228 final.  
40 L. PRATI, Il danno ambientale e la bonifica dei siti inquinati, Milan, 2008, 52.  
41 U. SALANITRO, La bonifica dei siti contaminati nel sistema della responsabilità ambientale, in 
Giornale di diritto amministrativo, 2006, 1265. Accordingly, D. DIMA, Bonifica dei siti 
inquinati: criteri di imputazione e mezzi di accertamento della responsabilità, in Giornale di diritto 
amministrativo, 2009, 1331. On the other hand, F. GIAMPIETRO, La responsabilità per 
danno all’ambiente e bonifica dei siti contaminati. La linea evolutiva del testo approvato con il d. lgs. 
n. 152/2006 alla luce della direttiva n. 2004/35/CE, in F. GIAMPIETRO (ed.), La 
responsabilità per danno all’ambiente, Milan, 2006, 279 opts for a strict liability regime on 
the basis that art. 239 refers to community law principles – particularly polluter-pays 
principle – so that in the absence of an explicit national provision of implementation 
regarding a fault-based liability regime. 
42 EU Court of Justice, case C-380/08 ERG at point 65 states that «when deciding to 
impose remedial measures on operators whose activities fall within Annex III to the 
directive, the competent authority is not required to establish fault, negligence or 
intent on the part of operators whose activities are held to be responsible for the 
environmental damage». 
43 Consiglio di Stato, sec. V, 16 June 2009, no. 3885; Consiglio di Stato, sec. VI, 9 
January 2013, no. 56. 
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activities to be subject to the requirements of the directive and, second, 
additional responsible parties»44. 
As a result, for the strict liability mechanism to be effective, competent 
authorities need to establish a causal link between the activities carried out by 
one or more identifiable polluter and concrete and quantifiable environmental 
damage, in accordance with national rules on evidence45. 
At this point, the question that follows is to what extent burden of 
proof lies on public authorities. 
At first, Italian administrative Courts stressed the need of a thorough 
investigation supported by concrete evidence not mere presumption46. Such a 
position, by the way, poses a problem once again when there is information 
asymmetry between the competent authority and the relevant operator. It 
holds true especially in cases where public authorities carry out complex 
investigations hinging on data and facts known only by the uncooperative 
operator because of its own occupational activity. Later, in response to this 
problem Consiglio di Stato allows public authorities to base their assessment on 
presumptions in conformity with Italian rules on evidence. Their priority is to 
seek concrete evidence. In turn, moving from factual elements they may infer a 
plausible evidence that a contamination is attributable to an operator according 
to id quod plerumque accidit. In this way Consiglio di Stato opens up to a general use 
of presumption in order to establish the causal link in this matter. 
Consistent with this principle the aforementioned case C-378/08 ERG. 
In particular EU Court of Justice considers, as plausible evidence capable of 
justifying its presumption, the fact that the operator’s installation is located 
close to the pollution found and that there is a correlation between the 
pollutants identified and the substances used by the operator in connection 
with its activities47.   
                                                   
44 EU Court of Justice, case C-380/08 ERG at point 69. 
45 See EU Court of Justice, case C-380/08 ERG at points 52 and 65. 
46 Consiglio di Stato, sec. VI, 5 October 2005, no. 4525. Lately and in contrast with 
less recent but leading case law: Consiglio di Stato, sec. VI, 9 January 2013, no. 56.   
47 EU Court of Justice, case C-380/08 ERG at point 57. 
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Such conclusion is likely to have a major impact on the application of 
the examined provisions, since it expands the means competent authorities are 
empowered with in order to identify a connection between an occupational 
activity and a pollution, even in cases where a definitive evidence is hard to 
find because of a situation of historical or diffuse pollution. 
In fact, the case at issue concerns an industrial area where activities 
potentially hazardous to the environment come in succession for a long time. 
In cases like this it is very difficult to prove that excessive levels of pollutants 
may be attributed effectively to a single operator, leaving the impaired 
environment with virtually no legal protection, but to directly involve public 
authorities in cleanup operations.        
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COULD THE NON-LIABLE OWNER OF A POLLUTED LAND 
TO REMEDY BE OBLIGED TO ADOPT ANY USEFUL MEASURE 
TO PREVENT AN INCREASING CONTAMINATION? 
 
Gabriele Torelli 
 
 
 
CONTENTS: 1. – The Judicial Controversy. 2. – The Two Contrasting Case 
Laws. 3. – The Judicial Order. 
 
 
 
1. The Judicial Controversy. 
 
The Italian Environmental Department had previously forced some 
companies, owners of contaminated areas, to adopt all the necessary measures 
to prevent further risks and damages for the surroundings. No other options 
were taken into consideration because of the impossibility to identify a real 
responsible for the site pollution. For this reason the Department decided that 
the most appropriate and rapid solution would be to impose to land owners 
the urgent implementation of safety standards and soil remediation. The 
administrative decision was based on art. 240, d.lgs. No. 152 of 3 April 2006 
(Italian Environmental Code), which lists all the permitted interventions on a 
polluted land. In particular, art. 240 pt. 1 includes, on one side, in let. m) 
securing procedures to be applied immediately after the contamination 
detection in order to deal with the emergency; on the other in let. p) actions to 
eliminate the polluting sources and dangerous substances from soil.   
The administrative measure that ordered the rehabilitation of the area 
was clearly necessary, and the parts of the trial are not discussing about this 
specific profile of the issue, indeed. Much more uncertain is the question if the 
same imposition could legitimately be required to non-liable companies, 
owners of polluted lands. As a matter of fact art. 242 of the Italian 
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Environmental Code introduces the principle of liability, establishing that the 
adoption of all necessary measures to prevent further risks and damages can be 
demanded to the person who has caused the contamination or, eventually, to 
the land owner, in case of intentional or negligent behaviour. As a consequence, 
the owner of the contaminated area cannot be obliged to adopt remedies only 
because he/she has the assets property. 
The three private companies involved in the trial, which should have to 
adopt the recovery measures, contested the decision of the Environmental 
Department, underlining the statement of the previous rule. The Court of First 
Instance1 recognized its unlawfulness, establishing that public bodies cannot 
impose upon non-liable owners any emergency measure. For this reason, the 
Environmental Department appealed the sentence to the Consiglio di Stato, 
questioning several points of the judgement. First of all, the judicial decision 
obliges the Public Administration to eliminate the contamination effects and to 
restore the territories on its own, bearing all the costs of the operations and 
therefore committing a huge amount of public finances. Moreover, the 
Department asserted that the “polluter pays” principle is supposed to allow the 
imposition of any necessary urgent remedy for environmental safeguard due to 
the relation between the polluted site and the owner, regardless if the event has 
been caused by intentional or negligent behaviour. In particular, this kind of 
interpretation of the principle would be in line with the aspects of prevention 
and protection that are typical of the urgent securing procedures listed in art. 
240 pt. 1, let. m) of the Italian Environmental Code. Lastly, the Department 
contested the sentence underlining that the precautionary principle, that 
requires to the public bodies to realise preventive actions in order to reduce 
any predictable risk and damage, permits to impose such an administrative 
measure to the non-liable owner, so that the land contamination is limited as 
much as possible.   
 
 
 
                                                   
1 T.A.R. Toscana, sec. II, No. 1659 of 19 October 2012. 
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2. The Two Contrasting Case Laws. 
 
The Consiglio di Stato is aware that the whole issue is still uncertain: 
several judgements of Italian Administrative Courts show contrasting opinions. 
Specifically, sometimes judges have established that the non-liable owner is 
obliged to adopt any useful measure to prevent an increasing contamination2; 
but most of the times they rejected this idea, asserting that there is no reason 
to tolerate this imposition on anyone but the real responsible of 
contamination3. The former is certainly the minority opinion, while the latter is 
undoubtedly the main one, also because it is supported by one of the most 
important Italian experts in the subject4. Moreover, the same disposition could 
be assumed considering the previous legal regime of the issue (now totally 
repealed by the Environmental Code) and comparing it with the actual: art. 17, 
d.lgs. No. 22/1997, which allowed the Public Administration to establish any 
decision to limit contamination. Therefore, according to this rule, public bodies 
could provide important measures to prevent further risks and damages. As a 
consequence, it was reasonably believed that they could enforce anyone (even 
the non-liable owners) to adopt securing procedures. For this reason it was 
widely thought that art. 17 introduced a kind of objective responsibility, that 
could oblige the owner of a polluted land to be responsible also for unlawful 
actions committed by third parties. On the contrary, the Italian Environmental 
Code does not establish similar rules: this aspect is very important, because it is 
supposed that the lack of the same previsions included in art. 17 indicates the 
                                                   
2 It is possible to list some of these judgments of the Consiglio di Stato and T.A.R. 
(Administrative Regional Tribunal, i.e. the Court of First Instance, set in every Italian 
Region): Cons. St., sec. V, No. 6055 of 5 December 2008; Cons. St., sec. V, No. 6406 
of 16 November 2005; T.A.R. Lazio, sec. I, No. 2263 of 14 March 2011; T.A.R. Lazio, 
sec. II-bis, No. 4214 of 16 May 2011; T.A.R. Lazio, sec. II-bis No. 6251 of 10 July 
2012.  
3 Cons. St., sec. VI, No. 2736 of 18 April 2011; Cons. St., sec. VI, No. 56 of  9 January 
2013; Cons. St., sec. II, No. 2038 of 23 November 2012; Cons. St., sec. V, No. 1612 
of 19 March 2009; T.A.R. Lombardia, Milano, sec. IV, No. 791 of 2 April 2008; 
T.A.R. Lombardia, Milano, sec. IV, No. 5782 of 7 September 2007. 
4 P. DELL’ANNO, Diritto dell’ambiente, Padova, 2014, 296. 
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wish of Italian legislator to refuse objective liability in contamination issues, 
and connect it to a negligent or intentional behaviour.  
Beyond any consideration about the comparison between the previous 
and the current legal regime, the Consiglio di Stato analyses the main points of 
both opposite national case laws.  
The first case law strongly affirms that the non-liable owner of a 
polluted land can be obliged to adopt emergency measures, because the 
“polluter pays” principle demands that this imposition must be released from 
any kind of negligence and must be simply based on the property of the land. 
In other words, in a cost-benefit analysis, the owner is supposed to be granted 
for gains, but at the same time he/she should tolerate economic dangers and 
damages: this is a clear example of objective liability, similar to the previous 
one suggested by the repealed art. 17, d.lgs. No. 22/1997. Moreover, following 
this first opinion analysed by the Court, the owner should be considered 
responsible also according to art. 245 pt. 1 of the Italian Environmental Code: 
this rule allows his/her voluntary intervention in order to adopt both the 
urgent secure procedures and definitive remedies. Consequently, art. 245 could 
also suggest that the owner should be involved to prevent an increasing soil 
contamination as much as possible, no matter of his/her effective liability. 
On the contrary, the second case law considered by Consiglio di Stato 
firmly refuses the obligation for the non-liable owner to adopt the necessary 
measures to prevent further risks and damages, because of the lack of rules 
imposing this specific action. The opinion is strengthened with further 
considerations. First of all, it is reiterated that the “polluter pays” principle 
should implement a personal liability and at the same time exclude the 
objective one. Secondly, art. 244 pt. 3 of the Italian Environmental Code 
establishes that the administrative order to adopt emergency measures (listed in 
art. 240) must be notified not only to the responsible for pollution (if the 
person is known), but also to the owner of the polluted area. Nevertheless this 
order is communicated not to impose the adoption of the measures to the 
latter, but just to inform that, according to art. 253, the costs bore by the 
Public Administration to prevent contamination constitute a burden on the 
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land. This means the charges paid by the public body to restore the area must 
be registered in the intended-use-certificate of the field, so that they could 
represent a secured preferential claim for the creditor (i.e. Public 
Administration). Eventually, according to art. 253 pt. 3, the Public 
Administration is able to enforce in a second moment the original claim on the 
non-liable owner, under condition that the competent authority adopts a 
further administrative measure which declares the impossibility to identify the 
real responsible for pollution, or the unsuccessful attempts to bring an action 
for damages against him/her. Therefore, the Consiglio di Stato explains that, 
following this line, art. 244 pt. 3 in conjunction with art. 253 would not allow 
to impose with priority to the non-liable owner any adoption of emergency 
measures to prevent an increasing contamination.  
Finally, this case law motivates its position also focusing on art. 245 of 
the Italian Environmental Code, which lists the obligations for not liable 
people in case of contamination. Beyond the voluntary intervention allowed in 
art. 245 pt. 1 discussed above, art. 245 pt. 2 establishes that the non-liable 
owner must communicate to the competent authorities (the Region, the 
Province and the Municipality) the detected contamination and adopt the 
necessary prevention measures, listed in art. 304 of the Italian Environmental 
Code. These are different from those listed in art. 240: as a matter of fact, the 
prevention measures (art. 304) have to be adopted within 24 hours after the 
detection of a contamination risk, and the economic effort for the land owner 
is much less hard than the one requested for the adoption of emergency and 
restore remedies established in art. 240 let. m) and p). Consequently, by the law 
(i.e. Italian Environmental Code) the non-liable owner is requested to adopt the 
less hard obligations listed in art. 304, instead of those imposed by art. 240.  
 
3. The Judicial Order. 
 
After the brief summary of the main points of these contrasting case 
laws, the Consiglio di Stato affirms that the Public Administration, according 
to the current legal national regime established in the Environmental Code, 
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cannot impose onto the non-liable owner of a polluted land to adopt the 
securing procedures listed in art. 240 let. m) and p) after the discovery of 
contamination, in order to prevent further pollution risks and damages. The 
reason is that there are no specific rules which expressly justify this order. 
Therefore, the only requirements for the non-liable owner are the adoption of 
the preventive measures listed in art. 304 and the obligation to communicate 
the detected contamination to the competent authorities, in accordance with 
art. 245 pt. 2. Consequently, the adoption of secure procedures to deal with the 
emergency (established in art. 240 let. m) and of remedies to eliminate 
pollution sources (established in art. 240 let. p) could be ordered only to the 
effective contamination responsible. This thesis is confirmed by art. 250 of the 
Italian Environmental Code: if the responsible is not identified or does not 
execute the order or simply cannot, the Municipality has to fulfil these 
obligations.  
This means that the non-liable owner could be obliged to bear the 
costs for the area restore only after the primary intervention of Public 
Administration, under condition that this adopts the administrative measures 
in accordance with art. 253 pt. 3, as explained before.  
The Consiglio di Stato believes that this represents the fairest solution, 
also because the claim of objective liability is not relevant. As a matter of fact if 
the non-liable owner were directly obliged to adopt any useful measure to 
prevent an increasing contamination, he/she would be responsible not for an 
objective liability but for a “position liability”, that is a liability depending on 
his/her position as owner. In other words, while the objective liability does not 
require a negligent or intentional behaviour and depends only on the cause and 
effect relationship, the “position liability” cannot be related neither to the 
subjective nor to the objective aspect, because the contamination is completely 
independent from any owners’ activity.  
Although the Consiglio di Stato expresses its own opinion on this 
matter, uncertainty still remains. For this reason the highest Italian 
Administrative Court decides to raise a question of preliminary ruling to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) about the compatibility of artt. 244, 245, 253 
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of the Italian Environmental Code with EU law. Specifically, the Court wishes 
to know if the European principles on the question – in particular the “polluter 
pays” principle, the precautionary principle, the preventive action principle and 
the priority rectification of damages at source principle (listed in art. 191, par. 
2, Treaty on the Functioning of European Union) – hinder the application of 
the previous Italian rules, which do not permit the Public Administration to 
order the non-liable owner the urgent adoption of measures to prevent an 
increasing contamination. In other words, the Consiglio di Stato needs this 
preliminary question to be solved, in order to be able to pronounce the final 
judgement: the ECJ is of course the only appropriate institutional body to 
establish the exact interpretation and meaning of European environmental 
principles and their relationship with Italian environmental rules. Obviously 
the Consiglio di Stato also explains its main reasons to raise the question to the 
ECJ.  
First of all, in relation to the “polluter pays” principle the uncertainty 
regards the opportunity of internalising the costs to bear to restore the polluted 
area. Internalising means to avoid that the community bears the remedy costs: 
it is preferable to request payments to the land owner, even if he/she is not 
responsible at all. In this way the “polluter pays” principle would allow to 
demand him/her the damage restoration: not only to save public funds, but 
also because the owner is considered the best subject to control the risks. 
Following this line, the owner should accept advantages and disadvantages 
deriving from the land property, especially if there is a business activity. 
Therefore the owner cannot be obliged to adopt emergency measures only 
under condition that he/she furnishes the proof that pollution has been caused 
by third parties5.  
Secondly, the precautionary principle and the preventive action 
principle legitimate an anticipatory environmental safeguard. The former 
permits the adoption of pre-emptive strategies even though contamination is 
not effective and there is no any certainty that it will be: risks are partly 
unknown. The latter intends to prevent damages deriving from risks already 
                                                   
5 In accordance with art. 8 par. 3 let. a, Directive No. 2004/35/EU. 
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known and scientifically proven. The sense of both principles clearly permits 
the intervention of public bodies also in case of doubtful scientific situations: 
as a matter of fact a preventive protection is necessary to avoid risks of 
irreversible damages. For this reason the Consiglio di Stato admits that the 
same sense is referred not only if the damage is uncertain, but also if the 
responsible of an effective pollution is still unknown. Consequently both the 
precautionary principle and the preventive action principle would allow to 
order the non-liable owner to urgently adopt any necessary remedy listed in art. 
240 of the Italian Environmental Code, in order to prevent the increasing 
contamination just because he/she is in the best position for doing it. 
Finally, there are some doubts related to the priority rectification of 
damages at source principle, which demands that damages must be limited 
after the pollution as quickly as possible. In case it is impossible to identify the 
real responsible, the owner could be reasonably supposed to be the closest 
person to pollution sources and consequently the only one who can restore the 
area immediately. 
Although the Consiglio di Stato underlines the reasons of its 
uncertainty on the question, it asserts once more that the non-liable owner 
could not be obliged neither to adopt any necessary measure to prevent 
increasing contamination nor to restore the area, and that the European 
environmental principles do not hinder the application of Italian rules. This 
opinion is supported by a similar previous case law: ECJ, Grand Chamber, 9 
March 2010, C-378/08. In this circumstance the European Court affirmed that 
the “polluter pays” principle excludes that the owner must bear the remedy 
costs for a polluted area if he/she has not any kind of responsibility for the 
contamination. In other words he/she must respond only in case of 
contribution to the damage: therefore the cause and effect relationship is an 
essential element to establish him/her liability6. Moreover this relationship 
should be demonstrated by the competent public body, which must investigate 
to prove it. Therefore it is not acceptable that the non-liable owner is claimed 
with priority to restore the area only because of his/her land property.  
                                                   
6 A similar pronounce is ECJ, 24 of June 2008, C-188/07. 
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Anyway, the Consiglio di Stato does not mean to absolutely prohibit 
the forced adoption of necessary measures to subjects who are not effective 
responsible, because it would contrast with the final goal of ensuring a high 
level of environmental safeguard. The “polluter pays” principle is not supposed 
to limit protection, but it seems to prevent that liability is always independent 
from the cause and effect relationship. For this reason a correct balance 
between environmental safeguard and personal economic interests is necessary: 
the non-liable owner could be involved in the remedy works only as a last 
resort. Considering this point of view, in its final analysis the Consiglio di Stato 
believes that the European environmental principles do not definitely exclude a 
liability totally separated from the cause and effect relationship; but at the same 
time they do not impose it. For this reason the Italian legislator is legitimately 
free to establish if the non-liable land owner could be obliged or not to adopt 
emergency and/or remedy measures. 
In conclusion, although the Consiglio di Stato has expressed its own 
opinion on the issue, it raises a question of preliminary ruling, in order to have 
a definite answer on the matter from the ECJ. For this reason the Italian judges 
require on one hand the exact interpretation of European environmental 
principles listed in art. 191 par. 2 TFEU and in art. 1 Directive No. 
2004/35/EU; on the other, if these principles hinder the application of art. 
244, 245, 253 of the Italian Environmental Code, which do not permit to 
impose the non-liable owner of a polluted land neither to urgently adopt any 
necessary measure to prevent an increasing contamination, nor to restore the 
area as soon as possible. 
At this time, the ECJ has not pronounced the final judgement yet7. 
                                                   
7 It is still possible to monitor the evolution of the judicial issue, because the action 
was registered as case ECJ, C-534/2013.  
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ACCESS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DECISIONS REGARDING 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE VIEW OF 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
 
Piergiorgio Novaro 
 
 
 
CONTENTS: 1. – Introduction. 2. – The Århus Convention and Its 
Implementation in EU Environmental Law. 3. – Limits of Legal Standing 
Requirements. 4. – A Special Status of Environmental NGOs. 5. – A More 
Extensive Application of the EIA Directive. 6. – Awards of Costs for the 
Unsuccessful Claimant. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
Access to judicial review in environmental matters represents even 
today one of the main and most disputed topics within the European 
environmental debate. Yet recently, the EU Environment Action Programme 
to 2020 indicates it as a priority objective owing to maximize the benefits of 
Union environmental legislation by improving implementation. Under § 62, 
«Union citizens will have effective access to justice in environmental matters 
and effective legal protection, in line with the Aarhus Convention and 
developments brought about by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and 
recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union»1. 
Although in the European Union all present regulations on access to 
judicial review regarding environmental matters are ultimately based on the 
principles set forth by the Århus Convention of 1998, so far the EU 
environmental law has proceeded just to a partial implementation of those 
                                                   
1 Decision no. 1386/2013/EU of 20 November 2013 on a General Union Environment 
Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our planet’, §§ 62, 65 (e) and (v). 
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provisions2. The most complete of which lies in the field of assessment of the 
effects of certain projects on the environment by mean of the so called EU 
Public Participation Directive.   
Furthermore, as recognized in the same Environment Action 
Programme, the Court of Justice has been playing an extremely important role 
in the definition of a more detailed application of the provisions set by the 
mentioned directive. Besides, the general opinion among the scholars is that 
the emerging seam of case law on the matter is relevant to the entire the 
spectrum of EU legislation on access to environmental justice, not simply 
confined to provisions derived from the legislative provision, given the 
similarity of wording and function of access to justice3.  
In order to place the discussion in context, the first part of this 
contribution focuses on the legal background. It gives a brief overview of the 
tenets of the Århus Convention and it analyses the steep path of its 
implementation in the  EU environmental law framework.  
Afterwards, the second part concentrates on the ECJ case law on the 
matter. In particular, it highlights three main problems the Court had dealt 
with. The first problem regards the limits of standing requirements as well as 
the special legal status the regulatory framework entitles environmental NGOs 
with. The second problem concerns the extension of the object of the review 
gradually reached by the same Court. The third and final problem involves the 
delicate question of awarding legal costs in the light of the principle of wide 
access to justice. 
 
 
 
                                                   
2 Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and 
access to justice in environmental matters done at Aarhus, Denmark, on 25 June 1998. 
It is primarily considered as a regional agreement, because it has been adopted within 
the United Nations Commission for Europe. Nevertheless, the Convention has been 
ratified to date by 46 European and Asian Countries plus the European Union. 
3 M. HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, EU Implementation of the Aarhus Convention’s Third Pillar: 
Back to the Future over Access to Environmental Justice? – Part 2, EELR 2014, 155.  
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2. The Århus Convention and Its Implementation in EU Environmental 
Law. 
 
As already mentioned, the entire EU regulatory framework on access to 
judicial review in environmental matters is grounded on the Århus Convention. 
Ambitious objective of the Convention is to set the basis for an exhaustive 
system of rights for the public concerned with the overall environmental 
protection process. For that reason, it rests on three pillars: I. Access to 
information, II. Public participation in decision-making, III. Access to justice. 
Having regard to the latter, it holds the principle of wide access to 
justice. As the same Preamble states it, the Parties must strive to render 
effective judicial mechanisms accessible to the public, including organizations.  
In this perspective, article 2 gives a broad definition of the public 
concerned with the environmental protection process as any natural or legal 
person affected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest to challenge 
any of those decisions4.  
Plus, article 9 provides for a general access to a review procedure 
before a court of law or other independent and impartial body against a large 
span of administrative decisions relating to information or activities affecting 
the environment. In that regard, the Convention sets two requirements. On 
one hand, the decision may be final, that is to say it excludes the possibility of 
further appeal or the period for lodging an appeal has expired. On the other, 
such a decision may be binding on public authorities.  
At the same time, under article 9(3) each Party shall ensure that, where 
they meet the criteria, if any, laid down in its national law members of the 
public have access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts 
and omissions by private persons and public authorities which contravene 
provisions of its national law relating to the environment. The provision leaves 
wide discretion on contracting parties as to set locus standi requirements, 
                                                   
4 V. REDENHOFF, The Aarhus Convention and its implementation for the ‘Institutions’ of the 
European Community, RECIEL 11(3) 2002, 344, « the term the public is not used in the 
sense of public sphere or forum, but rather as the sum total of all of society’s potential 
actors».    
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whereas it does not require the parties to establish a general citizen’s right of 
action or actio popularis to enforce environmental law5. 
At European Union level, in 2003 European Institutions make an initial 
attempt to generally implement the Convention’s third pillar by proposing a 
directive on access to justice in environmental matters6. According to its 
explanatory memorandum, the draft directive pursuits a double objective. On 
one hand, the aim is to give a general implementation of the Convention 
capable of transversal application across EU environmental regulations. On the 
other, the aim is to eliminate shortcomings due to scarce financial private 
interest in enforcing environmental law7.  
Nonetheless, the proposal has never come into force, given that a 
substantial majority of Member States deem such an instrument as an excessive 
intrusion in the organization of judicial procedures before national courts, 
exclusive competence of each State under the principle of subsidiarity8. 
Up to date, the most advanced example of implementation is certainly 
Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and 
private projects on the environment (the EIA Directive)9. It codifies in a single 
act all previous regulations on environmental impact assessment in the light of 
the tenets of the Århus Convention. 
In particular, article 1 reproduces exactly the broad definition of the 
‘public concerned’ already found in article 2 of the Convention.  
On the other hand, article 11 leaves to national law the task to ensure 
that members of the public have access to a review before a court of law. In 
order to fully implement the Directive, such an access must turn out: on one 
hand, adequate and effective; on the other, fair equitable timely and not 
                                                   
5 M. HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, EU Implementation of the Aarhus Convention’s Third Pillar: 
Back to the Future over Access to Environmental Justice? – Part 1, EELR 2014, 105.  
6 COM(2003) 624 final, Commission proposal for a Directive on access to justice in environmental 
matters. 
7 COM(2003) 624 final, Explanatory Memorandum, § 1.1. 
8 L. KRÄMER, EU Environmental Law, London, 2012, 113.  
9  As amended by Directive 2014/52/EU of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 
2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the 
environment.   
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prohibitively expensive. Moreover, the article at issue extends the scope of the 
regulatory framework by giving the right to challenge both substantive or 
procedural legality of decision, acts as well as omissions. 
With regard to the legal standing requirements, the Directive gives an 
alternative. In order to appeal an administrative decision, the claimant may 
prove to have a sufficient interest or to maintain an impairment of a right. 
What is considered as sufficient interest or impairment is left to national law. 
 
3. Limits of Legal Standing Requirements. 
 
Locus standi requirements appear to differ conspicuously among 
national systems, some of them adopts extensive regimes whilst others require 
more restrictive conditions10. In fact, the limited access of the public to 
challenge decisions which do not concern them directly or individually is a 
cornerstone of the efficacy of administrative action in public law theory, aimed 
essentially to avoid a judicial control of executive or judicial choices11. 
In the recent case C-72/12 Altrip the Court rules on the extent of 
discretion imposing limitations to locus standi at national level12. 
The dispute concerns an action for annulment brought before a 
German administrative court by a group of owners and tenants of land against 
a regional authority’s decision approving a project of construction activity. The 
applicants then claims the EIA as inadequate. 
In that regard, the relevant national act of legislation establishes the 
right to bring action against a decision only in the case of lack of EIA, whilst it 
does not apply in the case of a mere irregularity in that assessment. 
For this reason, the referring court raises the question if a provision in 
such terms is compatible with the aforementioned article 11, under which the 
                                                   
10 B. DETTE, Access to Justice in Environmental Matters: a Fundamental Right, in M. ONIDA 
(ed. by), Europe and the Environment: Legal Essays in Honour of Ludwig Kramer, Groningen, 
2004, 11. 
11 A. S. MATHIESEN, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in EC Case 
Law: the Case of Certain Plans and Programmes, EELR 2003,  48.   
12 ECJ 7 November 2013 Altrip, C-72/12.  
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public has a right of action against the substantial or procedural legality of 
decisions on the matter. 
As a consequence of the previous problem is the correct interpretation 
of the ‘impairment of a right’ condition. More specifically, the problem is 
whether that condition implies an ex post justification that the decision would 
have reached a different conclusion without the procedural irregularity. 
The ECJ reckons that no restriction at all of the pleas in question may 
be found in the provision set by article 11 of EIA Directive. What’s more, in 
the opinion of the Court excluding applicability of the mentioned provisions in 
cases where, having been carried out, an EIA is vitiated by defects would 
render largely nugatory the provisions of the EIA Directive relating to public 
participation13. 
In other words, the ECJ clearly states that Member States have wide 
discretion in shaping conditions for access to judicial review in environmental 
matters according to their legal systems. However, standing requirements set 
forth by the EIA Directive, read in the light of the principle of wide access to 
justice, provide a minimum level of protection of the right to trigger action, 
below which Member States are not allowed to stray. 
Consistent with the same tenet the solution to the second problem 
given by the Court. That is to say, what exactly constitutes ‘impairment of a 
right’ is to be fixed by each national law, according to the general principle of 
wide access to justice.  
Under article 11 Member States are entitled to lay down detailed 
procedural rules owing to protect effectively the right above. 
To that end, the Court gives two considerations. On one hand, since 
Member States are empowered to implement a right established by EU law, 
but not precisely defined, two more general principles apply: principle of 
equivalence and principle of effectiveness. That is to say, national law may 
grant the same procedural rights as provided for domestic actions and the 
exercise of those rights may not be impossible or excessively difficult14. On the 
                                                   
13 Ibidem, §37. 
14 Ibidem, §45. 
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other, the Court recognizes that the same article 11 gives Member States a 
significant degree of discretion and it opens to the possibility that some 
procedural defects may not be considered by national systems as impairment 
of a right. 
In consequence thereof, it could be admissible a rule excluding from 
the application of the EIA Directive those procedural defects that do not alter 
the final decision. 
By the way, such a rule is theoretically admissible only if and insofar it 
is for the national court to prove that the final decision would not have been 
different, given the circumstances of the case. In order to do so, the national 
court may reach the conclusion in the light of the condition of causality and on 
the basis of evidence provided by the competent authority or the same 
developer of the assessed project. 
In any case the burden of proof may fall on the claimant. Otherwise 
that rule would be in breach of the principle of effectiveness as well as the 
principle of wide access to justice, seeing as it would be excessively difficult for 
the claimant to safeguard its right.     
 
4. The Special Status of Environmental NGOs. 
 
In the light of the general objectives set by the Århus Convention, 
NGOs promoting environmental protection appear to play a special role in 
rendering its provisions effective. The Convention explicitly requires the States 
to ensure an active and constructive participation of NGOs in the 
environmental protection process. In particular, the contracting States must 
ensure that requirements for NGOs to participate in that process are not 
overly burdensome or politically motivated15. In addition, the Parties may set 
requirements for NGOs under national law consistent with the Convention’s 
                                                   
15 UNECE, The Aarhus Convention: an implementation guide, New York and Geneva, 2000, 
40. 
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principle of non discrimination and avoidance of technical and financial 
barriers on registration16. 
Article 3(4) on general provisions demands each Party to provide for 
an appropriate recognition and support to organizations promoting 
environmental protection. According to the Convention’s implementation 
guide, such a recognition and support run throughout the regulatory scheme in 
question. Articles 2, 5, 6 and 9(2) all together establish a special status for 
environmental NGOs17.  
Moreover, such provisions are undoubtedly a huge accomplishment for 
the purpose of facilitating NGOs access to judicial review in environmental 
matters. 
Previously, the ECJ interpreted very strictly standing requirements 
under article 230 of the EC Treaty (now article 263 TFEU). As well known, 
art. 263 TFEU entitles the ECJ to review the legality of acts of bodies, offices 
or agencies of the Union. In order to do so any natural or legal person may 
institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of 
direct and individual concern to them, under the conditions laid down in the 
first and second paragraphs. 
In the famous Greenpeace case of 1998 the Court claimed the 
organization not entitled to bring action, just because of the lack of direct and 
individual interest18. 
The case regarded the consent given by the Spanish authorities to the 
building of two power stations in the Canary Islands. The project was financed 
by the European Commission, but it lacked of a proper environmental impact 
assessment. Greenpeace brought action against the decision before the Spanish 
Courts, and at the same time before the ECJ for the annulment of the 
Commission decision on funding.    
In the view of the ECJ an environmental NGO is an association 
formed for the protection of the collective interests of a category of persons 
                                                   
16 Ibidem, 41.  
17 Ibidem, 44. 
18 ECJ 2 April 1998 Greenpeace and Others v Commission, C-321/95. 
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and it is therefore not entitled to bring an action for annulment where its 
members may not do so individually. According to the ECJ thus those NGOs 
could not be considered directly and individually concerned by a measure 
affecting the general interest of that category, since they were qualified as mere 
representative bodies19. 
On the contrary, consistent with the objectives of the Århus 
Convention, the EIA Directive provides a presumption of interest for 
environmental NGOs. Precisely, article 11(3) states that NGOs promoting 
environmental protection and meeting any requirements under national law 
shall be deemed to have interest. In other words, Member States have no 
discretion in determining whether an environmental NGO has locus standi or 
not. 
In consequence thereof, the new regulatory scheme confers 
environmental NGOs an autonomous interest to challenge the decisions at 
issue merely because of its own legal qualification and irrespectively of the 
individual interest of their members.  
Nonetheless, problems may arise when Member States set further 
requirements in order to qualify an organization as an environmental NGO 
within the scope of the Directive. As some scholars reckon it, the major 
criticism of this approach is just the wide margin of discretion Member States 
ultimately have in providing for broad or narrow recognition of environmental 
NGOs20 21. 
The ECJ dealt with this important aspect of the legal standing problem 
in case C-263/08 Djurgården22.  
                                                   
19 Ibidem, § 29. 
20 M. HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, EU Implementation of the Aarhus Convention’s Third Pillar: 
Back to the Future over Access to Environmental Justice? – Part 2, EELR 2014,  153. 
21 For instance, in Italy standing requirements are established by the Environmental 
code, legislative decree no. 156/2006. In principle, any environmental NGO must 
seek ministerial recognition, which is granted under the following conditions: (a) it 
operates at national level or at least in 5 regions, (b) it has democratic internal rules, (c) 
it pursues objectives of environmental protection, (d) it is continuously active. 
22 ECJ 15 October 2009 Djurgården, C-263/08. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SURVEY 2014 
 133 
133 
The dispute concerned a contract for the construction of a tunnel 
concluded by the Municipality of Stockholm and an electric company. The 
NGO took no part in the proceeding, but instead it brought action against the 
relevant decision given by the Municipality on the basis of an EIA. The claim 
was to be held inadmissible by the National Court since in breach of a 
condition established by the Swedish Environmental Act. That is a rule of a 
minimum of 2000 members for an association to bring an appeal. 
As a consequence, the National Court refers two questions to the 
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. Firstly, if participation in the decision-
making procedure is condition for access to judicial review. Secondly, if the 
condition of a minimum number of members is consistent with the principles 
of the Directive. 
With reference to the earlier, the point is if an organization has a right 
to judicially challenge an administrative decision even in cases where it has 
previously refused the opportunity to express its views during the 
environmental impact assessment proceedings.  
In that regard, the Court gives a positive response. Participation in the 
decision-making proceeding is separate from and has different purpose of a 
legal review. Therefore, it has no effect on the conditions for access. The first 
seeks development of consent through an administrative decision. The second 
aims to verify judicially whether the decision adopted at the end of that 
procedure is legitimate or not. 
Otherwise, any contrary interpretation would be in breach of the right 
of access established by the same article 11.  
With reference to the latter, the Court claims that such a condition is in 
principle legitimate for the purpose of ensuring that an association in fact 
exists and it is active. 
Nevertheless, according to the Court a condition that allows exclusively 
regional or national organizations to challenge a decision may run counter the 
objectives of the EIA Directive. The Directive concerns also projects limited 
in size, which locally based organizations are better placed to deal with.  
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In the reasoning of the judges the Swedish provision brings two 
negative consequences. First, large associations entitled to trigger the action 
may not have an interest in small-scale projects. Second, they would be likely to 
receive numerous request by local organizations, so that they would have to 
select those requests on the basis of criteria not subject to review.     
However, it is for the national Court to verify if the specific condition 
aims to nullify the objective of widening the access to justice. In that regard it 
has to be borne in mind that in case C-240/09 Lesoochranárske Zoskupenie the 
ECJ already stated that it is for the National Court to interpret its national law 
in a way which, to the fullest extent possible, is consistent with the objectives 
laid down in article 9(3) of the Århus convention23. 
On another occasion, case C-115/09 Arnsberg, the Court specifies the 
limits of national procedural law in determining conditions for access of 
environmental NGOs to judicial review24. 
The dispute regards a preliminary decision issued by the Arnsberg 
District Administration (North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany) in the context of 
the environmental impact assessment for construction and operation of a coal-
fired power station. A local environmental NGO brings appeal before the 
regional Administrative Court for the annulment of that decision. 
Under the domestic law, the right of action accorded to non-
governmental organisations is comparable with that provided for under the 
general rules of administrative procedural law governing actions for annulment. 
That is to say, an action challenging an administrative measure may be 
admissible only if the administrative decision affects the claimant’s individual 
public law rights. 
The point is if the aforementioned regulatory scheme precludes 
national legislations to prevent NGOs promoting environmental protection 
from relying before the courts, on the infringement of a rule which protects 
only the interests of the general public and not the interests of individuals. 
                                                   
23 ECJ 8 March 2011 Lesoochranárske Zoskupenie, C-240/09. 
24 ECJ 11 May 2011 Arnsberg, C-115/09.  
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In that regard, the Court held that although the national legislature is 
entitled to confine to individual public-law rights the rights whose 
infringement may be relied on by an individual in legal proceedings, such a 
limitation cannot be applied to environmental protection organisations without 
disregarding the tenets of the EIA Directive25. Id est, in the opinion of the 
Court a domestic legislation providing those organisations with equal rights as 
individuals is contrary to the objective of giving the public concerned wide 
access to justice in the light of the principle of effectiveness26. 
Afterwards, the ECJ considers the provision at article 11(3) of direct 
application. In line with precedent case law, where a Member State has failed to 
implement the directive into domestic law before the expiring date or it has 
failed to implement the directive correctly, national courts may apply directly 
those provisions of a directive who are unconditional and sufficiently precise27.  
 
5. A More Extensive Application of the EIA Directive. 
 
In the Boxus and others case, the Grand Chamber ruled on the scope of 
the Directive28. 
In this case, appeals against six authorizations concerning installations 
at the Brussels Airport are pending before the Belgian Conseil d’État (High 
Administrative Court), when the Walloon Parliament validates them by 
legislative act for «overriding reasons in the general interest»29. Hence, the 
defendants argue that as a legislative act replaces those controversial decisions 
the referring Court is deprived ipso facto of its jurisdiction in favour of the 
                                                   
25 Ibidem, § 45. 
26 In addition, the Court come to the conclusion that «the concept of ‘impairment of a 
right’ cannot depend on conditions which only other physical or legal persons can 
fulfill, such as the condition of being a more or less close neighbour of an installation 
or of suffering in one way or another the effects of the installation’s operation», ECJ 
11 May 2011 Arnsberg, C-115/09 § 47. 
27 ECJ 12 February 2009 Cobelfret, C-138/07 § 58.  
28 ECJ 18 October 2011 Boxus and others, Joined Cases C-128/09 to C-131/09, C-
134/09 and C-135/09. 
29 Precisely, a decree of the Walloon Parliament. ECJ 18 October 2011 Boxus and 
others, § 11. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SURVEY 2014 
 136 
136 
Belgian Cour Consitutionelle (Constitutional Court), the only judicial body 
competent to annul legislative acts. 
For that reason, the Conseil d’État decides to refer concurrently several 
questions to the Cour Consitutionelle about the constitutionality of that decree 
and to the ECJ about the application of the EIA Directive. 
The point here is may exclude the application of the Directive an act of 
legislation merely ‘ratifying’ an administrative decision? 
In fact, under article 11(3) the public concerned may challenge the 
substantive or procedural legality of decisions issued by public authorities. It is 
of utmost importance, thus to correctly understand what should be considered 
as a public authority within the overall regulatory framework at issue.  
Once more, the first step is to look at the tenets of the Århus 
Convention. Pursuant to article 2(2), the definition of public authority does not 
include bodies or institutions acting in a judicial or legislative capacity30 . 
According to the Convention Implementation Guide, such an exclusion is due 
to «the fundamentally different character of decision-making either in a 
legislative capacity, where elected representatives are more directly accountable 
to the public through the election process, or in a judicial capacity, where 
tribunals must apply the law impartially and professionally without regard to 
public opinion»31. 
Consistently, Recital (22) and article 1(4) of the EIA Directive exclude 
its application to those projects the details of which are adopted by a specific 
act of national legislation. The ratio here appears to be that the information and 
participation goals of the regulation in question are supposedly achieved 
through the legislative process. 
The Court gives a strict interpretation of those provisions. It claims 
that a project adopted by a legislative act is excluded from the Directive’s 
                                                   
30 UNECE, The Aarhus Convention: an implementation guide, New York and Geneva, 2000, 
32, « The definition of public authority is important in defining the scope of the 
Convention. While clearly not meant to apply to legislative or judicial activities, it is 
nevertheless intended to apply to a whole range of executive or governmental 
activities, including activities that are linked to legislative processes ». 
31 UNECE, The Aarhus Convention: an implementation guide, New York and Geneva, 2000, 
34. 
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ambit only if and insofar the objectives of the Directive are effectively achieved 
by the legislative process.  
More precisely, the ECJ infers two distinct conditions from the 
mentioned provisions. 
Firstly, the project must be adopted by a specific legislative act, under 
each national constitutional system. By the way, in order to be excluded from 
the application of the EIA Directive, it must show the same characteristics of a 
consent given by an ordinary administrative decision: most of all, to grant the 
right to carry out a determined project.  
In addition, such a project must have a sufficient level of detail, so that 
all the elements of the project likely to have an impact on the environment are 
taken into consideration. Otherwise, if the legislative act does not include the 
elements necessary to assess the environmental impact of the project or if the 
adoption of other measures is needed in order for the developer to proceed 
with the project, the latter cannot be considered as adopted by legislative act 
under article 1(4) of the Directive32. 
Secondly, the Directive provides that a project undergoes an 
environmental impact assessment before consent is given. That assessment 
requires information held by the project developer as well as other people 
concerned, in addition to the information gathered by the competent authority. 
In particular, there is a minimum of information that only the developer itself 
may provide, such as the description of the project under Annex IV. 
Having said that, the Court recognizes that under the regulatory 
scheme at issue the legislative procedure for the approval of a project could be 
theoretically split into two different proceedings, considered as a whole. In 
other words, the EIA Directive does not preclude national legislatures to adopt 
the final legislative act, on the basis of the information gathered by 
administrative decision33. 
In the opinion of the Court, the mere existence of such an 
administrative procedure is not sufficient to contravene the provisions in 
                                                   
32 ECJ 18 October 2011 Boxus and others, § 40. 
33 Ibidem, § 44.  
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analysis. However, « a legislative act which does no more than simply ‘ratify’ a 
pre-existing administrative act, by merely referring to overriding reasons in the 
general interest without a substantive legislative process which enabling those 
conditions to be fulfilled having first been commenced, cannot be regarded as 
a specific legislative act » for the purpose of the EIA Directive34.  
In conclusion, a mere validation by a legislative act of a previous 
administrative decision does not prevent the national Court to review it. In any 
case, it is for the national Court to decide on the subsistence of those 
conditions. 
Besides, it follows from the above a more general duty on Member 
States. Consistent with their procedural autonomy the Court demand Member 
States to provide for a review procedure before a Court of law or other 
impartial body those acts which do not fulfil the aforementioned conditions. 
 
6. Awards of Costs for the Unsuccessful Claimant. 
 
In case C-260/11 Edwards, the ECJ rules on the correct application of 
article 11(4) of EIA Directive. Under that provision, Member States shall 
ensure that review procedure are «fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively 
expensive»35. 
The dispute in the main proceeding regards a decision issued by the 
English Environmental Agency. Two claimants bring action against an 
administrative approval of waste incineration activity, based on lack of EIA. 
Whilst the action is dismissed both on first instance and on appeal, the 
question of the awards of costs is brought before the Supreme Court and, 
afterwards, it is referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. 
In more general terms, as recalled by the same National Court, in a 
previous case the ECJ has already held that the mentioned article does not 
prevent the national courts from making an order for costs36. On this basis 
                                                   
34 Ibidem, § 45. 
35 ECJ 11 April 2013 Edwards, C-260/11. 
36 Ibidem § 25. See ECJ 16 July 2009 Commission v. Ireland, C-427/07, § 92 « the 
procedures … must not be prohibitively expensive. That covers only the costs arising 
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thus the referring Court raises two subsequent questions: primarily, how 
national courts should approach the issue of awarding costs to the 
unsuccessful claimant and, secondarily, if the ‘not prohibitively expensive’ 
requirement implies an objective approach or a subjective approach. 
 In the opinion of the Court the mentioned requirement must be read 
in accordance with the general principle of wide access to justice and the 
principle of equality.  
The earlier requires that the prohibitive nature of costs is to be 
intended as a whole, that is to say as covering all the costs effectively borne by 
the party37.  
The latter expresses the need for a uniform interpretation of the 
European Union law, so that the assessment is not to be left to national 
legislations. In fact, consistent with settled case law of the Grand Chamber, 
each European law provision not expressly referring to national law requires a 
uniform application within all the European Union territory38. 
In this perspective, the requirement at issue is interpreted seeking a 
balance between the private interest in pursuing judicial review and the public 
interest in protecting the environment. The first compels a sustainable financial 
burden in order not to prevent the subject to defend his right before a court of 
law. The second, on the opposite, seeks to prevent an abuse of judicial review 
to the detriment of public environmental protection activity.   
Moreover, having regard to the criteria aimed to assess the costs, the 
Court of Justice adopts an intermediate solution. It leaves to national 
legislation the primary task to ensure effective judicial review without excessive 
costs in the field of environmental law, consistent with the already stated 
principle. By the way, the Court gives a hint of how those criteria should be. It 
identifies a double criteria for the assessment of costs. On one hand the 
                                                                                                                                 
from participation in such procedures. Such a condition does not prevent the courts 
from making an order for costs provided that the amount of those costs complies 
with that requirement ». 
37 Ibidem, § 28.  
38 See ECJ 14 February 2012 Flachglas Torgau, C-240/09, § 37 and ECJ 9 September 
2003 Monsanto Agricoltura Italia and Others, C-236/01, § 72. 
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assessment should be carried out on the basis of the financial situation of the 
unsuccessful claimant, on the other it should be carried out on the basis of an 
objective analysis of the overall cost of the judicial proceeding. Provided that 
those criteria are met, thus, such costs «neither exceed the financial resources 
of the person concerned, nor appear, in any event, to be objectively 
unreasonable».  
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1. The Case Referred to the Court. 
 
Case C-72/12 Altrip is of the utmost importance for the solution of 
one of the major problems regarding access to justice against decisions based 
on environmental impact assessment in the European regulatory framework1. 
More precisely, the Court rules on the extent of discretion Directive 
2011/92/EU leaves to Member States in imposing limitations to locus standi at 
national level. 
The dispute concerns an action for annulment brought before a 
German administrative court by a group of owners and tenants of land against 
a regional authority’s decision approving a project of construction activity. The 
applicants claim the relevant EIA as inadequate for the purpose of authorizing 
such an activity. 
In that regard, German legislation establishes the right to bring action 
against such a decision only in the case of lack of EIA, whilst it does not apply 
in the case of a mere irregularity in that assessment. In other words, according 
to the German law on the matter the public concerned may have interest to 
challenge those decisions only and insofar there is a complete absence of EIA, 
                                                   
1 ECJ 7 November 2013 Altrip, C-72/12.  
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while if an assessment has been carried out – no matter if incomplete or 
irregular – it is not for third parties to bring action before a court of  law. 
For this reason, the referring court raises the question if a provision in 
such terms is compatible with the overall European regulatory scheme, under 
which members of the public have a right of action against the substantial or 
the procedural legality of decisions on the matter. 
 
2. The Legal Background. 
 
The EU regulatory framework on access to judicial review in 
environmental matters is grounded on the third pillar of Århus Convention, 
regarding access to justice2. This pillar establishes a set of  regulations under 
the general principle of wide access to justice.  
That is clearly recognized by the same Preamble, where it declares the 
Parties must strive to render effective judicial mechanisms accessible to the 
public, including organizations.  
In this perspective, article 2 gives a broad definition of the public 
concerned with the environmental protection process as any natural or legal 
person affected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest to challenge 
any of those decisions3.  
Moreover, article 9 provides for a general access to a review procedure 
before a court of law or other independent and impartial body against a large 
span of administrative decisions relating to information or activities affecting 
the environment. In that regard, the Convention sets two requirements. On 
one hand, the decision may be final, that is to say it excludes the possibility of 
                                                   
2 Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and 
access to justice in environmental matters done at Aarhus, Denmark, on 25 June 1998. 
It is primarily considered as a regional agreement, because it has been adopted within 
the United Nations Commission for Europe. Nevertheless, the Convention has been 
ratified to date by 46 European and Asian Countries plus the European Union. 
3 V. REDENHOFF, The Aarhus Convention and its implementation for the ‘Institutions’ of the 
European Community, RECIEL 11(3) 2002, 344, «the term the public is not used in the 
sense of public sphere or forum, but rather as the sum total of all of society’s potential 
actors».    
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further appeal or the period for lodging an appeal has expired. On the other, 
such a decision may be binding on public authorities.  
At the same time, under article 9(3) each Party shall ensure that, where 
they meet the criteria, if any, laid down in its national law members of the 
public have access to administrative or judicial procedures for the purpose of 
challenging acts and omissions by private persons and public authorities which 
contravene provisions of its national law relating to the environment. The 
provision leaves wide discretion on the contracting parties as to set locus standi 
requirements, whereas it does not require the parties to establish a general 
citizen’s right of action or actio popularis to enforce environmental law4. 
At European Union level, Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of 
the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (the EIA 
Directive) is certainly the most advanced implementation of the Århus 
Convention 5 . It codifies in a single act all previous regulations on 
environmental impact assessment in the light of the tenets provided by it. 
In particular, article 1 reproduces exactly the broad definition of the 
‘public concerned’ already found in article 2 of the Convention.  
On the other hand, article 11 leaves to national law the task to ensure 
that members of the public have access to a review before a court of law. In 
order to fully implement the Directive, such an access must turn out: on one 
hand, adequate and effective; on the other, fair equitable timely and not 
prohibitively expensive. Moreover, the article at issue extends the scope of the 
regulatory framework by giving the right to challenge both substantive or 
procedural legality of decision, acts as well as omissions. 
With regard to the legal standing requirements, the Directive gives an 
alternative. In order to appeal an administrative decision, the claimant may 
prove to have a sufficient interest or to maintain an impairment of a right. 
What is considered as sufficient interest or impairment is left to national law. 
                                                   
4 M. HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, EU Implementation of the Aarhus Convention’s Third Pillar: 
Back to the Future over Access to Environmental Justice? – Part 1, EELR 2014, 105.  
5  As amended by Directive 2014/52/EU of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 
2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the 
environment.   
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3. Legal Standing Requirements. 
 
As previously stated, article 11 of the EIA Directive gives a good 
degree of discretion to Member States in order to specify legal standing 
requirements consistently with national regulations on judicial review.  
Under those circumstances, locus standi requirements appear to differ 
conspicuously among national systems: some of them adopts extensive regimes 
whilst others require more restrictive conditions6. In fact, limited access of the 
public to challenge decisions which do not concern them directly or 
individually is a cornerstone of the efficacy of administrative action in public 
law theory, aimed essentially to avoid a judicial control of executive or judicial 
choices7. 
In consequence thereof, it becomes of the utmost importance to 
correctly balance, on one hand, the traditional public law approach as 
described above and, on the other, the aforementioned principle of wide access 
to justice set forth by the EIA Directive. 
In the light of the foregoing, the referring court expresses some doubts 
about the lawfulness of the German provision at issue. That is to say, if a 
provision limiting the right of action in those circumstances where an EIA has 
not been carried out correctly transposes the EU provision allowing to 
challenge the legality of decisions vitiated by procedural irregularities8.   
The solution given by the Court of Justice appears to favour mostly the 
latter to the detriment of the traditional approach. Actually, the Court gives a 
very extensive interpretation of the principle of wide access to justice, since it 
                                                   
6 B. DETTE, Access to Justice in Environmental Matters: a Fundamental Right, in M. ONIDA 
(ed. by), Europe and the Environment: Legal Essays in Honour of Ludwig Kramer, Groningen, 
2004, 11. 
7 A. S. MATHIESEN, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in EC Case 
Law: the Case of Certain Plans and Programmes, EELR 2003,  48.   
8 ECJ 7 November 2013 Altrip, C-72/12, § 19. 
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reckons that no restriction at all of the pleas in question may be found in the 
provision set by article 11 of the EIA Directive.  
Conversely, in the opinion of the Court excluding applicability of the 
mentioned provisions in cases where, having been carried out, an EIA is 
vitiated by defects would render largely nugatory the provisions of the EIA 
Directive relating to public participation9. 
The position of the Judges on the point seems perfectly in line with the 
overall ratio of the EIA Directive. The provision in question must be read thus 
in conjunction with the other articles of the directive.  
The ultimate objective of the regulatory framework at issue is to 
promote and to facilitate public participation in the environmental decision-
making process as well as, more generally, in the environmental protection 
process. Having said that, it is quite obvious that a fundamental part of such a 
process is the possibility for third parties equally interested in the 
environmental process to challenge before a court of law or other 
administrative body the legality of decision capable of having a negative impact 
on that process.  
On the contrary, the contested national provision narrows unjustifiably 
the access to justice. It is hard to understand why the public concerned should 
be able to challenge a decision took without a previous EIA, but not those 
decisions based on an EIA supposedly irregular. In this case, it should be 
considered a decision made on illegitimate evaluations as excluded by any 
review, so that such an outcome would be clearly in breach of the general 
principle of public law in the European Union.   
In conclusion, the Court of Justice clearly states that Member States 
have wide discretion in shaping conditions for access to judicial review in 
environmental matters according to their legal systems. However, standing 
requirements set forth by the EIA Directive, read in the light of the principle 
of wide access to justice, provide a minimum level of protection of the right to 
trigger action, below which Member States are not allowed to stray. 
 
                                                   
9 Ibidem, §37. 
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4. A More Stringent Definition of Impairment of a Right. 
 
Following the above, the correct interpretation of the ‘impairment of a 
right’ condition becomes central to the solution of the problem at issue. 
In particular, article 11(1) of the EIA Directive requires Member States 
to ensure that members of the public concerned have access to a review 
procedure before a court of law under the following alternative conditions: (a) 
having sufficient interest, or (b) maintaining the impairment of a right. 
Whether those conditions are met is to be established in accordance with the 
relevant national legal system. As a consequence, under article 11 Member 
States are entitled to lay down detailed procedural rules owing to ensure an 
effective access to justice. 
As described above, the German procedural rules on environmental 
matters opts for the condition of impairment of a right subordinate to a more 
stringent circumstance of absolute lack of environmental impact assessment. 
In addition to the previous problem, another question now arises 
according to the referring court. That is, whether the condition of impairment 
of a right implies an ex post justification that the decision would have reached a 
different conclusion without the procedural irregularity. 
Consistent with the tenet above, the solution to the second problem 
given by the European Court of Justice. In  the Judge's opinion, what exactly 
constitutes ‘impairment of a right’ is to be fixed by each national law, according 
to the general principle of wide access to justice.  
To that end, the referred Court gives two considerations.  
On one hand, since Member States are empowered to implement a 
right established by EU law, but not precisely defined, two more general 
principles apply: principle of equivalence and principle of effectiveness. Under 
the earlier, national law may grant the same procedural rights as provided for 
domestic actions, so that in any case a right grant by EU law may have less 
protection means before a national court of law. Under the latter, Member 
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States may ensure the exercise of those rights is not impossible or excessively 
difficult10.  
On the other, the Court recognizes that the same article 11 gives 
Member States a significant degree of discretion and it opens to the possibility 
that some procedural defects may not be considered by national systems as an 
impairment of a right. By this way of reasoning, no provisions in the EIA 
Directive preclude Member States to admit a rule excluding from the 
application of the same Directive those procedural defects that do not alter the 
final decision. 
Given that a rule allowing the mentioned ex post justification is 
consistent with the EU regulatory scheme, that conclusion imposes to 
determine which subject should bear the burden of proof. 
In fact, such a rule is theoretically admissible only if and insofar it is for 
the national court to prove that the final decision would not have been 
different, given the circumstances of the case. In order to do so, the national 
court may reach the conclusion in the light of the condition of causality and on 
the basis of evidence provided by the competent authority or the same 
developer of the assessed project. 
In any case the burden of proof may fall on the claimant. Otherwise 
that rule would be in breach of the principle of effectiveness as well as the 
principle of wide access to justice, seeing as it would be excessively difficult for 
the claimant to safeguard its right.  
To sum up, the interpretation given by the Court of Justice of the 
‘impairment of a right’ condition seems to  protect adequately the right to 
challenge an administrative decision before a court of law in the light of the 
tenets and the provisions, respectively, of the Århus Convention and the EIA 
Directive. It declares unlawful a national rule that precludes to review the 
irregularity of an EIA. 
At the same time, it is in line with the discretion given to the Member 
States in order to  implement those EU conditions for access in accordance 
with national procedural rules. In that regard, the Court choice on burden of 
                                                   
10 Ibidem, §45. 
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proof reflects a highly accurate balance between the need to guarantee that 
discretion and the effectiveness of the right given to the public concerned.  
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1. Introduction. 
 
The protection of the environment is a dynamic issue which includes 
various topics like human rights, right to information and public participation, 
access to justice and effective remedies, international principles like the 
environmental impact assessment, the polluter-pay principle, etc. The 
environment itself is an integrated whole, requiring an integrated scheme of 
regulatory protection. The right to a healthy and quality environment has now 
its own standing within the «third generation» human rights and this 
confluence of human rights and environmental law has been reinforced by 
international conventions, national constitutions and other legal provisions2.  
                                                   
1 Paragraphs 1-2-3-4-5.3-6 have been written by Daniela Cavallini; paragraphs 5-5.1-
5.2 have been written by Bartolomeo Cappellina.  
2  The “third generation” human rights integrate the «first generation» (civil and 
political rights) and the “second generation” human rights (social, economic, cultural 
rights). The 1972 Stockholm declaration of the UN Conference on the human 
environment states that: «Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and 
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The quality of the environment, moreover, is often seen as in conflict 
with more traditional socio-economic values, including personal property 
rights, employment, economic development and growth. Very different sets of 
values, laws and expectations actually confront in this field and need to find a 
balance: economic growth should not overwhelm nature conservation but, at 
the same time, it is needed to support a higher and healthier standard of living 
around the world3. Environmental law has become very complex and it often 
relies on very complicated and conflicting technical and economical evidence, 
based on the ability to predict short-term and long-term outcomes. 
In the past 30 years the EU and international organizations have 
adopted many measures to improve the quality of the environment and the 
quality of life. The regulatory apparatus is now huge, burdensome and 
sometimes overlapping. Member States, on their turn, are required to properly 
implement the legislation they have signed up to. Lack of knowledge, of 
relevant skills and information with regard to environmental regulation is one 
of the principal causes that hinder effective implementation, development and 
enforcement of environmental law4. So, one of the new challenges is to 
effectively implement this massive legislation. 
Other measures, moreover, can be useful for the protection of the 
environment. In the EU context, for example, the cooperation between 
national authorities and the European Commission is facilitated by a 
«Technical Platform for cooperation on the environment». It aims at bringing 
together practitioners from local and regional administrations in the EU, 
experts, stakeholders, EU officials, as well as other interested members. Its 
work is mainly carried out through meetings5.  
                                                                                                                                 
adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity 
and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the 
environment for present and future generations […]» (Principle 1). 
3 G. PRING - C. PRING, Specialized environmental courts and tribunals at the confluence of human 
rights and the environment, 2009, available at http://www.law.du.edu/documents/ect-
study/ORIL-Article-FINAL.pdf (last visited December 2014). 
4 R. MACRORY - M. WOODS, Modernising environmental justice. Regulation and the role of an 
environmental tribunal, University College, London, 2003, 6. 
5 The Technical Platform is a new forum set up by the Committee of the Regions’ 
Commission for Environment, Climate Change and Energy (ENVE) and the 
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The EU «Network for the implementation and enforcement of 
environmental law» (IMPEL) is another network of environmental authorities 
that provides a framework for policy makers, environmental inspectors and 
enforcement officers to exchange ideas and encourage the development of 
enforcement structures and best practices6. Similar objectives are pursued also 
by the EU «Forum of judges for the environment», which helps judges to 
improve their knowledge about environmental law7. Environmental matters are 
dealt with by arbitration and mediation bodies as well. The Permanent court of 
arbitration, for example, is an intergovernmental organization of over 100 
member States. It has developed a “unified forum” for arbitrating 
environmental and natural resources disputes8.  
The role of national authorities (parliaments, governments, 
administrative authorities, regional and local bodies) is crucial to ensure 
effective implementation and enforcement of environmental legislation. It is 
up to national courts, however, to enforce on a daily basis the rights and 
obligations deriving from environmental laws. In some countries 
Constitutional courts may decide on important matters concerning the 
environment as well.  
Being aware of this, the European Commission promoted an important 
survey in the member States on the implementation of articles 9.3 and 9.4 of 
the Aarhus Convention (concerning access to justice and effective remedies in 
environmental matters). The final documents were uploaded in 2013 on the 
Commission’s website and they consist of a summary report and of 28 national 
                                                                                                                                 
Directorate-General for the Environment of the European Commission. It was 
launched on the 5th December 2012 to foster dialogue on local and regional problems 
and solutions in the application of EU environment law 
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/platform_en.htm).  
6 Most of the work within IMPEL is done through projects. Currently it has 47 
members from 33 countries including all EU Member States, the former Republic of 
Macedonia, Turkey, Iceland, Switzerland and Norway (http://impel.eu/). 
7 The Forum was created in Paris on February 28th, 2004, to increase the awareness of 
judges of the key role of the judicial function in the effectiveness of sustainable 
development. Its work is carried out through meetings and annual conferences 
(http://www.eufje.org/). 
8 http://www.pca-cpa.org. 
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reports provided for by the member States9. These documents are important 
sources to understand how environmental justice is carried out in Europe and 
which barriers and difficulties may hinder the full implementation of the 
Aarhus Convention’s obligations. The reports, in fact, focus on some crucial 
aspects regarding the effectiveness of environmental protection like standing 
requirements (who is entitled to bring a claim to the court to protect the 
environment?), effective remedies, such as injunctive relief or other forms of 
inhibition of dangerous activities while the legal action is pending, procedural 
costs and other potential barriers to effective access to justice. For all these 
reasons, the 2013 study on the implementation of articles 9.3 and 9.4 of the 
Aarhus Convention deserves high attention, maximum visibility and broad 
dissemination beyond Europe, as an important reference tool to discuss and 
improve access to justice in environmental matters10.  
On the basis of the above mentioned documents, the current paper will 
provide some examples about the organisation of environmental justice in the 
EU member States. A few case-studies have been selected to represent the 
main trends. Conversely, it will deal neither with the substantive regulations 
and principles on environmental protection, nor with the decision-making 
procedures of political authorities. Some preliminary remarks will be devoted 
to the Aarhus Convention and to the debate on courts’ specialization.    
 
                                                   
9 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/studies.htm. See also the former reports 
of 2007 (Milieu Ltd, Summary Report on the inventory of EU Member States’ measures on access 
to justice in environmental matters, Brussels, 2007, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/studies.htm, last visited December 2014) 
and of 2012 (J. DARPÖ, Synthesis report of the study on the Implementation of Articles 9.3 and 
9.4 of the Aarhus Convention in 17 of the Member States of the European Union, 2012, available 
at http://www.jandarpo.se/inenglish.asp, last visited December 2014).  
10 Further important studies are available on the matter. See for example the UN 
report on «Possible initiatives on access to justice in environmental matters and their 
socio-economic implications», 2013; the Case Law of the Aarhus Convention 
Compliance Committee 2004-2011; D. SHELTON - A. KISS, Judicial Handbook on 
Environmental Law, United Nations Environment Programme (Unep), Hertfordshire, 
UK, 2005; Y. EPSTEIN, Access to justice: remedies, 2011, available at 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/a.to.j/AnalyticalStudies/Remedies_
ReportYE_100311.pdf (last visited December 2014).   
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2. Access to Justice According to the Aarhus Convention. 
 
The Aarhus Convention (1998) establishes a number of rights of the 
public (individuals and associations) with regard to the environment. More 
precisely, it sets out basic standards on information, public participation in 
decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters11. The parties 
to the Convention are required to make the necessary provisions so that public 
authorities (at national, regional or local level) will contribute these rights to 
become effective.  
The Aarhus Convention focuses on three areas (“pillars”) concerning: 
1) the right of everyone to receive environmental information that is held by 
public authorities (“access to environmental information”)12; 2) the right of the 
public to participate in environmental decision-making («public participation in 
environmental decision-making»)13; 3) the right of the public to challenge 
public decisions that have been made without respecting the two 
aforementioned rights or environmental law in general («access to justice»). 
Access to justice is better sketched out in article 9. This article has a 
twofold meaning: on the one side it guarantees the effectiveness of the first 
two pillars: if the provisions of the two pillars are breached, access to justice 
must be provided (article 9.1 and 9.2)14. On the other side, it provides for more 
                                                   
11  The (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (hereafter Aarhus 
Convention) was adopted on June 25th, 1998, in the Danish city of Aarhus. It entered 
into force on the 30th of October 2001, and on the 17th of February 2005 it was 
ratified also by the European Commission 
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/). 
12 This can include information on the state of the environment, on policies or 
measures taken, on the state of human health and safety where this can be affected by 
the state of the environment. Additionally, public authorities are obliged to actively 
disseminate environmental information in their possession. 
13 «Arrangements have to be made by public authorities to enable the public affected 
and non-governmental organisations to comment on, for example, proposals for 
projects affecting the environment, or plans and programmes relating to the 
environment, being these comments taken into due account in decision-making and 
being information provided on the final decisions and the reasons for it».  
14 «Any person who considers that his or her request for information […] has been 
ignored, wrongfully refused, inadequately answered, or otherwise not dealt with in 
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general criteria to be set out in national legislation to allow members of the 
public to access judicial or administrative procedures in environmental matters 
(article 9.3). Article 9.3 basically upholds the application of national 
environmental law: in case of violation of such law by private persons or public 
authorities the members of the public shall have the opportunity to access 
judicial or administrative procedures15. These procedures, moreover, must be 
fair, equitable and timely; they must offer sufficient and effective remedies, 
including injunctive relief, and must not imply prohibitive costs; the decisions 
are given or recorded in writing and are publicly accessible (art. 9.4). These are 
minimum quality standards to be met in all the procedures and remedies16. 
Finally, the public shall be given information on access to administrative and 
judicial review procedures and appropriate assistance mechanisms shall be 
established to remove or reduce barriers to access to justice (article 9.5).  
Article 9 basically stresses the role of the public in protecting the 
environment by guaranteeing, inter alia, legal actions in front of national courts. 
Aarhus ideas, in general, breaks with the traditions of Western Europe societies 
and the belief in public authorities as being the sole defenders of 
                                                                                                                                 
accordance with the provisions of the Convention has access to a review procedure 
before a court of law or another independent and impartial body established by law 
(article 9.1). Members of the public concerned (a) having a sufficient interest or, 
alternatively, (b) maintaining impairment of a right, where the administrative 
procedural law of a Party requires this as a precondition, have access to a review 
procedure before a court of law or another independent and impartial body 
established by law to challenge the substantive and procedural legality of any decision» 
(article 9.2). 
15  «In addition and without prejudice to the review procedures referred to in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 above, each Party shall ensure that, where they meet the criteria, if 
any, laid down in its national law, members of the public have access to administrative 
or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public 
authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relating to the 
environment» (article 9.3). 
16  Aarhus Convention, Implementation guide, available at 
ttp://www.unece.org/env/pp/implementation_guide.html (last visited December 
2014). 
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environmental interests17. Increasing attention to participatory elements in 
international environmental policy and law had already been paid by the 1992 
Rio Declaration (United Nations Declaration on Environment and 
Development), which also guarantees effective access to judicial and 
administrative proceedings, including redress and remedies (article 10). 
In 2003 the European Commission proposed three Directives to 
implement the three pillars of the Aarhus Convention. While two Directives 
were adopted as regards access to information and public participation in 
decision-making (Directives 2003/4/EC and 2003/35/EC), no actions were 
undertaken to implement the third pillar (access to justice)18. Such Directive 
appeared to be very complicated, due to the variety of the systems in which it 
should be implemented19. Since then the European Court of Justice has started 
to develop an extensive case-law on access to justice in environmental matters, 
filling - to some extent - the gap left by EU legislation. National courts have 
generally embraced this case law, by giving effect to the rulings of the 
European Court of Justice in domestic cases. The European Commission itself 
observed that: «the Court of Justice has confirmed recently that national courts 
must interpret access to justice rules in a way which is compliant with the 
Aaruhs Convention»20.  
Actually, each pillar of the Aarhus Convention provides access to 
justice rules. The review procedure may concern both the substantive and the 
procedural legality of a decision, act or omission. It does not exclude the 
possibility of a preliminary review procedure before an administrative 
authority, nor does it affect the requirement of exhausting administrative 
review procedures prior to recourse to courts, where such requirement exists. 
                                                   
17  J. DARPÖ, Justice through Environmental Courts? Lessons Learned from the Swedish 
Experience, 2007, available at http://www.jandarpo.se/inenglish.asp, 9-10 (last visited 
December 2014). 
18 The Directive proposal remained pending, see COM (2003)624 of October 24th, 
2003. 
19 M. WIKLUND - J. DARPÖ, Access to justice in French environmental law, Vårterminen, 
2011, available at 
http://www.jandarpo.se/upload/Wiklund,%20M_Access%20to%20Justice%20in%20
French%20Environmental%20Law.pdf (last visited December 2014). 
20 COM (2012)95 of March 7th, 2012. 
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Standing requirements (like «sufficient interest» or «impairment of a right») 
shall be determined by national law, in accordance with the Convention, to 
give the public concerned «wide access to justice». To this end, the interest of 
non-governmental organizations promoting environmental protection and 
meeting any requirements under national law (see article 2, par. 5 of the 
Convention) shall be deemed sufficient. The Convention finally remains vague 
in prescribing available remedies and costs21. Potential barriers to access to 
justice may relate to: financial barriers, strict limitation on standing, difficulty in 
obtaining legal counsel, unclear review procedures, lack of awareness within 
the review body and weak enforcement of judgements22.  
Reconsideration and administrative review are alternative mechanisms 
to court review. They can be faster and less expensive (but also less effective). 
Reconsideration means that the same body goes over the decision once again 
to ensure its accuracy. Administrative review is generally carried out by a higher 
administrative body than the one that made the original decision. Usually, after 
administrative review the applicant still has the opportunity to bring the case to 
the court. In some countries, moreover, the Ombudsman (a public officer in 
charge of solving disputes fairly and quickly) works as an independent and 
impartial review body for violations of administrative law against citizens. 
Depending on how it is structured within the national appeal system, the 
Ombudsman may or may not fully meet the criteria under article 923.  
Access to justice is also regulated by other international provisions. 
Even though the different provisions are formally independent, they can 
influence each other, on a general or specific level. Environmental decisions, 
for example, invariably involve «civil rights and obligations» within the 
meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Therefore, somewhere the appeal route has to include a court or another 
«independent and impartial» tribunal and a «fair trial», which implies the right 
to request a public hearing before that body. The decision of the court must be 
                                                   
21 J. EBBESSON (ed.), Access to justice in environmental matters in the EU, Kluwer law 
international, The Hague (The Netherlands), 2002, 13. 
22 Aarhus Convention, Implementation guide. 
23 Aarhus Convention, Implementation guide.  
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binding, prohibiting the government or other authorities to have it set aside24. 
The EU Directive 2004/35/CE on environmental liability also prescribes that 
member States shall designate the authority responsible for fulfilling the duties 
provided for by the Directive (art. 11). Natural or legal persons shall be entitled 
to submit to the competent authority any observations relating to 
environmental damage and to request to take actions, on conditions that: a) 
they are affected or are likely to be affected by environmental damage, or b) 
they have a sufficient interest in environmental decision making relating to the 
damage, or, alternatively, c) they allege the impairment of a right, where 
administrative procedural law of the member State requires this as 
precondition (art. 12). The above mentioned persons shall have access to a 
court or other independent and impartial public body competent to review the 
procedural and substantive legality of the decisions, acts or failure to act of the 
competent authority under the directive (art. 13).     
 
3. Peculiar Features of Environmental Justice. 
 
The different sets of values, laws and expectations concerning 
environmental protection mirror in environmental justice, which is usually 
featured by a high degree of complexity and by the strong impact of judicial 
decisions on the political, economic and social order.  
In particular, environmental justice is usually marked by the complexity 
of the technical/scientific questions involved (such as pathways of exposure to 
pollution, effects of chemicals on human health, etc.). The nature of the 
science involved is often characterised by uncertainties and the judge has to 
rely on very complicated and conflicting technical evidence, based on the 
ability to predict short term and long term outcomes25.  
                                                   
24  J. DARPÖ, Justice through Environmental Courts? Lessons Learned from the Swedish 
Experience, 2007, available at http://www.jandarpo.se/inenglish.asp (last visited 
December 2014). 
25 Environmental issues can range from very technically complex issues to more 
simple issues, such as neighbourhood noise nuisance. R. MACRORY - M. WOODS, 
Modernising environmental justice. Regulation and the role of an environmental tribunal, University 
College, London, 2003, 18. 
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Environmental protection is also featured by the overlapping of possible 
remedies (administrative, civil and criminal) as well as interests and values (public 
and private). Somehow, it is beyond the traditional dichotomy private/public 
because it often implies collective, diffuse and fragmented interests 26 . 
Therefore, there can be different appeal routes against 
decisions/acts/behaviours violating environmental laws and they can address 
civil, criminal or administrative jurisdictions. Appeals may concern disputes 
between private parties or between the citizen (an individual or a company) 
and the State, in the form of central government, local government or a 
specialised agency. In some cases the pattern can be very complicated, with 
more than one appellate body involved27.     
The complexity also comes from the international and European regulatory 
dimension. The massive and increasing network of environmental legislation, 
soft law, international treaties, rulings of international courts led to the 
emerging of fundamental principles (like the polluter-pays principle, procedural 
transparency, sustainable development) with which the judges should become 
familiar 28 . Not all the appeals in the environmental field explicitly raise 
supranational issues, the competent bodies, however, need to be fully aware of 
the international dimension and the underlying objectives of international 
regulation. 
Even more than in other matters, the environmental field is 
characterised by a strong imbalance of power between actors29. Large organisations 
with great experience in permit-procedures and trials for damages, vast 
resources and all kinds of technical, economic and legal expertise can confront 
with individual litigants or small organizations with little financial resources 
                                                   
26 J. EBBESSON (ed.), Access to justice in environmental matters in the EU, Kluwer law 
international, The Hague (The Netherlands), 2002, 4. 
27 R. MACRORY - M. WOODS, Modernising environmental justice. Regulation and the role of an 
environmental tribunal, University College, London, 2003, 12-20. 
28 Ibidem. 
29  J. DARPÖ, Justice through Environmental Courts? Lessons Learned from the Swedish 
Experience, 2007, available at http://www.jandarpo.se/inenglish.asp (last visited 
December 2014).  
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and often little access to legal or scientific advice. The work of non-
governmental organisations is still generally based on voluntary effort. 
Access to justice is also influenced by environmental decision-making 
activity and public participation. Usually, the decisions concerning an activity 
or installation are made in different phases: large activities often comprise 
several administrative decisions from planning to the actual permit. In the early 
stage neither the stakeholders nor the concerned interests can be clearly 
identified30. Therefore, the position of the public is «affected by disintegrated 
decision-making and a multilevel approach, which sometimes makes it very difficult 
to file an appeal against an early decision»31. 
Finally, standing and remedies (including injunctive relief to avoid 
irreparable damage while legal action is pending) are crucial aspects of 
environmental justice.  
Standing (i.e. entitlement to file a case) can be very open or very 
restricted, thus influencing access to justice (it is generally known that «the fish 
can’t go to court»). On the one side, important subjects with a real stake (like 
the poor, indigenous people, NGOs, etc.) or important public values (such as 
endanger species, climate change, etc.) should not be excluded. On the other 
side, frivolous lawsuits should be prevented to safeguard the court’s efficiency 
(the judge, for example, could be given authority to dismiss the case or 
penalize improper filings32). Providing standing for environmental NGOs, 
                                                   
30 In Sweden, for example, the Government first decides the permissibility of some 
larger projects (infra-structures, mines and such) and that decision is binding for the 
subsequent permit procedure. The Government’s decision is taken at such an early 
stage that stakeholders cannot be identified yet; consequently, they are de facto deprived 
of the power to launch a judicial review on the initial decision. This state of affairs 
seems to be incompatible with both the ECHR and the Aarhus Convention (J. 
DARPÖ, Justice through Environmental Courts? Lessons Learned from the Swedish Experience, 
2007, available at http://www.jandarpo.se/inenglish.asp, 9-10, last visited December 
2014). 
31 Ibidem. The interests of the public concerned should be included as early as possible 
in the decision-making activity. 
32 G. PRING - C. PRING, Greening justice. Creating and improving environmental courts and 
tribunals, The Access Initiative (TAI) report, 2009, available at 
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/ect-study/greening-justice-book.pdf (last visited 
December 2014), 33. 
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whose lawyers are familiar with courts and procedures, or providing «actio 
popularis» can increase access to justice, while providing standing only to 
«concerned parties» may narrow it. Reducing too much the filing of claims can 
be counter-productive, as it might lead to loss of public confidence and social 
unrest33. Standing, therefore, can be a possible barrier to the public’s access to 
environmental justice. The Aarhus Convention leaves room for national 
divergences, although within the spirit of the Convention34. The attitude of the 
courts differs from one country to another. In some Member States the courts 
take a lead position in trying to improve access to justice for the public 
concerned. In others, the courts give a more conservative interpretation of 
individual «rights» and have been quite reluctant to widen access to justice «on 
behalf of the environment». 
As far as remedies are concerned, the ultimate objective of any 
administrative or judicial appeal is to obtain a remedy for a transgression of 
law. Under the Aarhus Convention, the parties must ensure that the review 
bodies provide «adequate and effective» remedies, including injunctive relief. 
Injunctive relief avoids the occurring of irreparable damages before the judicial 
process has run its course. The procedure should be easily available and 
speedy35. When irreversible damage has already occurred, the remedy often 
takes the form of criminal sanction or monetary compensation, even though 
compensation in such cases is often inadequate. When damages may still 
happen and the violation is continuing, the court (or other body) may issue an 
order to stop the violation or undertake certain actions, like maintaining the 
status quo or restore the situation to an earlier condition. This remedy is called 
«injunctive relief» or «interim relief» and it can be crucial in environmental 
cases to avoid imminent threats to human health and the environment36.  
 
                                                   
33 Ibidem. 
34 Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide.  
35 G. PRING - C. PRING, Specialized environmental courts and tribunals at the confluence of 
human rights and the environment, 2009, available at 
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/ect-study/ORIL-Article-FINAL.pdf (last visited 
December 2014). 
36 Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide.  
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4. The Role of the Judiciary and the Debate on Specialist Judges.  
 
Adjudication in environmental disputes often requires specific skill, 
competence and expertise about procedural solutions and techniques. In such 
disputes both the legislation and the technical, natural and scientific issues can 
be extremely complicated. The system must also be effective: if environmental 
law, policies and regulations are not implemented the environmental protection 
is basically vain. Thus, a multilevel approach is necessary: on the one hand, 
public institutions and agencies, private companies and individuals are 
primarily responsible for the application of environmental laws. On the other 
hand, when a violation has occurred, the enforcement of environmental rights 
ultimately depends on the role of the judiciary. The judiciary is crucial for the 
interpretation and the enforcement of environmental laws, including the 
decision on how to balance private and public interests or conflicting public 
interests. For all these reasons, environmental judges need to be properly 
equipped with adequate skills and expertise. The creation of specialised 
courts/court divisions can be very helpful to improve the processing of cases 
that are very complex and/or require special expertise beyond the law. 
Specialization can therefore «improve the quality of the decisions both for 
litigants and the society»37 and enhance the effectiveness of environmental 
protection. Judicial specialization generally means that judges have special 
knowledge and expertise in a particular area of the law which, by its particular 
nature, requires a special treatment, possibly even separately form the rest of 
the cases38.   
                                                   
37 D. B. ROTTMAN, Does effective therapeutic jurisprudence require specialized courts (and do 
specialized courts imply specialist judges?), 2000, available at 
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/cr37/cr37-1/CR9Rottman.pdf (last visited December 
2014). 
38  H. GRAMCKOW - B. WALSH, Developing Specialized Court Services. International 
Experiences and Lessons Learned, in Justice&development, working paper series, 
24/2013, 1; F. CARPI, Specialization of judges as an efficiency factor in civil justice, in Recent 
trends in economy and efficiency of civil procedure, Materials of International Conference, 
Vilnius, 2013, 9. 
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Specialist judges or specialised courts are common phenomena in EU 
member States in different fields (tax law, family law, intellectual property law, 
economic and financial law, competition law, etc.). Depending on the legal and 
organizational framework, specialisation can be reached either through 
specialist courts, which are separate from the general organization of the 
judiciary, or specialist chambers which are part of the general judicial system. 
Specialist courts or chambers may include lay judges (usually they represent a 
group of interests, e.g. employers or employees; landlords and tenants, or they 
have a specific expertise in the concerned matter). Professional judges may also 
become specialist judges by several means: experience gained as a specialist 
lawyer before appointment; specialist work performed as a judge; specific 
training. The decisional levels can be at one, two, or all three stages from trial 
to the Supreme Court. Actually, the expertise provided by a specialized court is 
more crucial at the first instance trial, whereas some flexibility should be 
guaranteed at the appellate level, to avoid that a too narrow group of specialist 
judges can be in the position to impose their view in a certain field39.  
The benefits of specialization, in a general perspective, are stressed in 
several studies40 and they are usually referred to: 
- efficiency: specialization can reduce decisional time; it allows 
the court to adapt to frequent changes in the law; it can reduce the backlog of 
the ordinary courts; of course, specialization is only possible when the courts 
and the workload reach a sufficient volume, smaller courts may find it 
impossible to set up specialist chambers;  
                                                   
39 Opinion no. 15 on the specialization of judges, adopted by the Consultative council 
of European judges (Ccje), 2012. 
40 G. PRING - C. PRING, Specialized environmental courts and tribunals at the confluence of 
human rights and the environment, 2009; D.J. GOELZ, China’s environmental problems: is a 
specialized court the solution?, 2009, available at http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-
law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/522/18PacRimLPolyJ155.pdf (last visited December 
2014); H. GRAMCKOW - B. WALSH, Developing Specialized Court Services. International 
Experiences and Lessons Learned, in Justice&development, working paper series, 
24/2013; E. MAK, Balancing Territoriality and Functionality: Specialization as a Tool for 
Reforming Jurisdiction in the Netherlands, France and Germany, International Journal for Court 
Administration, 2008, available at http://www.iaca.ws/files/LWB-Elaine_Mak.pdf (last 
visited December 2014); Opinion no. 15 on the specialization of judges, 2012.    
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- expertise: specialization provides more professionalism 
(legislation is often vague and ambiguous and it is often made of sectorial 
provisions); it improves the quality of judicial decisions and therefore the 
courts’ authority; expertise is improved by the repetition of cases; continuous 
education is also necessary; 
- uniformity: specialization can increase consistency in the case-
law and legal certainty (inconsistency, as we know, usually leads to the 
proliferation of litigation); it brings coherence to the system, thus enhancing 
public trust in the courts; it prevents forum-shopping (i.e. parties picking 
forum they think more likely to give them a favourable judgement); 
- access to justice: a specialized court will provide a clearly 
identified forum for citizens to address their claims; it increases public 
awareness about environmental rights; 
- public confidence and visibility: specialized courts increase 
public confidence in the government’s policies/commitment and in the courts’ 
role by having a visible, transparent, effective, expert decisional body;  
- accountability: potential review by independent specialized 
courts encourages Government agencies or branch (like 
Ministries/Departments of the Environment) to be fair and transparent in 
their decision-making; the Government itself can become more accountable 
when particular conflicts are overseen by independent specialist courts;  
- problem-solving approach: judicial specialization and expertise 
can allow more flexible ways to solve disputes than the traditional process and 
the strict legalistic adjudication, including ADR, enforcement options, 
innovative solutions, collaborative planning, etc.; 
- clear statistics: comprehensive statistics are possible and easier, 
if specialized cases are separated from the rest. 
Some risks and dangers are also linked to specialization and should be 
prevented. Specialization, in fact, can lead to excessive isolation of specialist 
judges from the general body of judges, to fragmentation of law and 
procedure, to possible pressure on specialist judges. Specialist judges may be 
seen as an élite group of judges and they can be exposed to pressure from 
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parties, interested groups or State powers. Special interests can more easily 
influence and control a small court than the general court system. Moreover, 
the impression of an excessive proximity among judges, lawyers and 
prosecutors, all of them specializing in the same field, can undermine the image 
of judicial independence and impartiality. This can increase also the risk of 
corruption 41 . Specialized courts may also require extra costs (due to 
voluminous files, length of trials and judgements, the need of staff, space, and 
training) and cause public confusion if their competence is not clear enough or 
is too fragmented.  
Another important question concerns the status of specialist judges and 
their position in the judicial system. Specialized courts, like all judges, shall 
meet the requirements of international conventions, like judicial independence 
and impartiality, due process, right to a fair hearing and to a final decision 
within reasonable time. Independence is mainly fostered by an unbiased 
judicial selection process, the protection of judges from political pressure or 
punitive consequences for their decisions and the institutional separation from 
the agency whose decisions are being reviewed. Specialized judges should 
benefit from adequate human, organizational and material resources to 
perform their work, without detriment to other courts, and they should be 
entitled to change court or specialization during their career, or even to move 
from specialist to generalist duties (or vice-versa)42. The principle of equal status 
for generalist and specialist judges should apply also to salary. Conversely, the 
creation of different judicial bodies (with separate budgets) according to a 
particular specialization could result in different judges being subject to 
different rules in different organisations. Separate hierarchies may complicate 
judicial administration and access to justice43.   
                                                   
41  H. GRAMCKOW - B. WALSH, Developing Specialized Court Services. International 
Experiences and Lessons Learned, in Justice&development, working paper series, 
24/2013, 8. 
42 Where the expected caseload for specialist courts is small in comparison to other 
courts, resources and technologies can be developed and used collectively by several 
specialist courts or by all courts, Opinion no. 15 on the specialization of judges (2012). 
43 Opinion no. 15 on the specialization of judges (2012). 
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As far as environmental justice is concerned, in most European 
countries environmental cases fall within the competence of administrative 
courts (see par. 5). The institution of administrative courts is a form of 
specialization that can be well represented by the German court system, which 
includes five separate specialized jurisdictions (civil and criminal, 
administrative, financial, labour and social) each having its own hierarchy of 
appeal courts. Administrative courts, however, usually are competent for a 
large number of cases ranging from public contracts to environmental cases 
and the latter are often handled in the same way as all the other «administrative 
cases». In Italy, for example, the specialization of judges in the environmental 
field is quite new and it is mainly achieved on a personal basis, meaning that it 
often comes either from the personal experience gained in the daily work as a 
judge, or from specific training in environmental matters (if any and if the 
judge is willing to participate), or from personal interest in environmental 
protection. This means that some judges may have environmental specialist 
knowledge, while others do not, thus being the specialization of the judge «a 
matter of chance». Specialization is also improved by the use of 
experts/technicians who are appointed by the courts or the parties. As peritus 
peritorum (i.e. the expert among the experts) the judge is responsible for the 
final decision but sometimes, due to the complexity of the evaluation, the 
judgment seems to be too much dependent on the expert’s opinion. A stronger 
form of specialization can be found in those countries where autonomous 
environmental courts exist. An interesting example is offered by Sweden (see 
par. 5.3).  
 
5. Overview of the Existing Models and Practices of Environmental 
Justice: Administrative and Judicial Appeal in Environmental Matters. 
 
In the following paragraphs, the analysis will focus on the different 
procedures in environmental matters that characterize the European countries. 
Considering the difficulties that an in-depth analysis of each country would 
represent, we decided to outline three procedural models that acceptably 
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resume the various existing proceedings in the European scenario. In order to 
describe more broadly the principal aspects and features that characterize each 
model, the description of a case study for each of them will be envisaged.  
First, a common trait that involve almost all European countries in 
terms of procedures in environmental matters exists44. While the way in which 
judicial proceedings start varies between countries, all European citizens 
dispose of a national authority towards which they can report the actions or 
decisions supposedly endangering the environment, without much difference 
in the prerequisites and procedures involved. Notably, this authority belongs to 
the administration. Therefore, the first way to challenge a decision of an 
administrative authority (i.e., central authorities, local authorities, public officers 
and establishments, privates exerting a public authority’s prerogatives) is to 
resort that decision to the hierarchical superior to the one that issued the 
decision or to an administrative authority responsible for the supervision of 
administrative decisions in environmental matters, if any. This form of appeal 
– in some countries called hierarchical and non-contentious appeal in order to 
distinguish it from the typically contentious judicial proceedings – permits to a 
citizen believing that his/her right or legitimate interest have been wronged by 
an administrative decision to challenge that decision to a superior authority in 
the administration45. The number and type of administrative bodies entitled to 
receive appeals vary among countries, but normally they involve from one to 
                                                   
44 The current analysis is mainly based on the information and data provided for by 
the studies: Milieu Ltd., Summary Report on the inventory of EU Member States’ measures on 
access to justice in environmental matters, Brussels, 2007 and J. DARPÖ, Effective Justice? 
Synthesis report of the study on the Implementation of Articles 9.3 and 9.4 of the Aarhus 
Convention in the Member States of the European Union, 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/synthesis%20report%20on%20access
%20to%20justice.pdf (last visited December 2014). 
45 Milieu Ltd., Summary Report on the inventory of EU Member States’ measures on access to 
justice in environmental matters, Brussels, 2007, 5. Some countries are provided with 
administrative authorities specialized in the domain of environmental protection and 
natural resources administration such as the Environmental Appeal Board and the 
Nature Appeal Board in Denmark, or, in the disputes concerning administrative acts 
and omissions, the Administrative Dispute Commissions in Lithuania. However, the 
majority of countries simply refers to the hierarchical superior to the authority that 
issued the non-definitive decision as the responsible body for receiving appeals. 
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three authorities constituted on a local, provincial/regional and national basis, 
specialized in matters such as planning, waste management, water and air 
disposal, and environmental protection.  
Moreover, in some countries46, an appeal to administrative bodies is 
necessary before involving judicial authorities on the contested decision. 
Finally, in general terms, the administrative procedures in environmental 
matters do not differ from the general ones in other administrative subjects. 
For example, when challenging not acts, but omissions of the administration, 
an implicit or explicit refusal to act of the administrative body concerned need 
to be evident before resorting to the superior administrative bodies or to 
courts47. 
Besides the administrative appeal, another alternative route exists in 
some countries. The figure of the Ombudsman, while common to all 
countries, has very different functions depending on the country analysed. In 
some EU Member States (Austria, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Spain and Sweden), the Ombudsman offers an alternative way to 
appeal the decisions of administrative authorities. Following the forefather 
Swedish model, «a complaint to the Parliamentary Ombudsmen can be made 
by anybody who feels that he or she or someone else has been treated wrongly 
or unjustly by a public authority or an official employed by the civil service or 
local government»48. Generally speaking, the Ombudsman has the capacity to 
conduct investigations and express leading opinions and recommendations to 
the administrative authority or public official under investigation, that anyway 
do not qualify it as an effective remedy according to Article 9.4 of the Aarhus 
Convention49. In most European countries, in fact, the Ombudsman has the 
                                                   
46 Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia. 
47 Milieu Ltd., Summary Report on the inventory of EU Member States’ measures on access to 
justice in environmental matters, Brussels, 2007, 5. 
48  Source: site of the Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsmen, 
http://www.jo.se/en/How-to-complain/. 
49 J. DARPÖ, Effective Justice? Synthesis report of the study on the Implementation of Articles 9.3 
and 9.4 of the Aarhus Convention in the Member States of the European Union, 2013, available 
at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/synthesis%20report%20on%20access
%20to%20justice.pdf (last visited December 2014), 22. 
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power to issue non-legally binding opinions to the administration. Only in 
limited cases, the Ombudsman can initiate legal proceeding in either civil, 
criminal or administrative courts for misuse of power or misadministration and 
therefore, it may effectively challenge the decisions of administrative bodies in 
environmental matters. 
Finally, the third way of contesting a decision in environmental matters 
is judicial appeal/review. The challenges before court can involve four possible 
jurisdictions depending on the institutional architecture of the judicial system 
in the country, and on the type of violation brought to the court. The four 
types of jurisdictions are: the civil and criminal courts (that we will treat 
together in the forthcoming paragraph); the administrative courts, where the 
majority of cases relapses 50 , and finally, the specialized jurisdiction in 
environmental matters, normally a branch either of the administrative or the 
civil judiciary, with few examples in the European scenario. 
As stated at the beginning, we will illustrate the main appeal routes in 
environmental matters relating each of them to a case study that well 
represents the main stages of the proceeding. For the civil and criminal 
proceedings, we will take into consideration the case of Ireland51 and Spain. 
Ireland is an example of the common law model, where administrative cases 
are dealt with in ordinary courts. Spain is traditionally part of the civil law 
family and, therefore, it is characterised by the separation between civil and 
administrative jurisdictions. Yet, while being environmental matters essentially 
treated in the administrative jurisdiction, the criminal action seems to be more 
significant than in the European civil law homologues. In fact, the European 
countries normally provide for criminal prosecution only for very serious 
                                                   
50 In this matter too, the traditional split between civil law and common law countries 
directly influences the possibility of finding or not an administrative jurisdiction in the 
country.  
51 The UK would have proved a better case, but consequently to the introduction of 
an Administrative Court in 2000, most cases related to environmental issues now 
follow the path of the administrative specialized jurisdiction. This introduction 
partially answered the shared belief: «private civil law remedies are not an adequate 
form of resolving environmental disputes» (P. STOOKES, Civil law aspects of environmental 
justice, Environmental Law Foundation, London, 2003). 
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violations of the law, while Spain presents a slightly expanded number of 
crimes related to the protection of the environment. Secondly, with regard to 
administrative courts, France, the ancestor of the civil law model, will be the 
focus of the analysis. Finally, we will overview the specific characteristics of the 
Swedish environmental court system as an example of a specialized jurisdiction 
in environmental matters. 
 
5.1. Judicial Proceedings Before Civil and Criminal Courts. 
 
The treatment of environmental cases in civil and criminal courts is 
common to almost all European countries when the violation concerns civil 
obligations (e.g., a litigation on noise pollution between neighbours) or 
constitutes a crime (such as environmental disaster or voluntary water 
contamination). However, in a reduced number of European countries – the 
common law countries52 and a bunch of other limited exceptions like Spain – 
the role of civil and criminal courts as responsible for adjudicating on 
environmental law breaks is more important than elsewhere. Notably, in 
common law legal tradition there is no separation between civil and 
administrative jurisdiction. Consequently, in common law countries all the 
cases that civil law countries allocate to administrative courts tend to relapse on 
the ordinary ones, which cover both civil and criminal jurisdictions. Thus, 
environmental cases are mainly adjudicated by ordinary courts.  
Ireland53, after adopting an act imposing that judges should take notice 
of the Aarhus Convention when deciding cases involving the environment54, 
                                                   
52 The European countries traditionally linked to common law tradition are UK, 
Ireland and Malta. However, following the institution of an administrative court in 
England and Wales in 2000, the UK has partially departed from its traditional model.  
53 Most of the information comes from the Ireland’s national report elaborated by the 
cited Milieu Ltd. in 2007, afterwards updated by prof. Ryall in 2012, and from the 
website of the Citizens Information Board, a public service information agency of the 
Irish administration: 
http://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/environment/environmental_law/judicial_revi
ew_in_planning_and_environmental_matters.html (last visited December 2014).  
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gave effect to some of the Aarhus Convention provisions through the 
Environment Act (2011), and finally, ratified the Convention in 2012 reaching 
all other EU Member States. The Irish environmental law framework provides 
many different legal procedures to access the justice system. Most of them are 
in regulatory codes that set the different means through which legal persons 
(including NGOs) can challenge an act that is esteemed to break 
environmental law55. The regulatory codes are composed of acts issued by 
various authorities, both at local and national level, in different sectors such as 
planning and development (2000), waste management (1996), IPPC licence 
(1992), water (1977) and air pollution (1987). They also provide for the 
institution of an Environment Protection Agency (1992). The Protection of the 
Environment Act of 2003 and the Environment Act of 2011 amended and 
harmonised all these acts and contextually introduced Aarhus provisions in the 
Irish law framework. Moreover, some decisions of the courts concerning their 
application have further clarified the ways of access to environmental justice.  
Local authorities - like planning, waste and water authorities - are 
granted responsibilities both for decision-making and enforcement. Besides 
them, there are two national administrative bodies. The first one (the 
Environmental Protection Agency) oversights local authorities and it is the 
competent authority in environmental liability matters; moreover, it is 
responsible for overall policies concerning the environment like IPPC; waste; 
waste water discharges; GMOs; emissions trading, volatile organic compounds; 
and dumping at sea. The second one (An Board Pleanála) is the appellate body 
for the decisions concerning planning activities and represents the only 
administrative appeal route available in the Irish legal framework. The 
decisions of the planning board can be appealed by way of judicial review56. 
                                                                                                                                 
54 M. VELICOGNA, Electronic access to justice: from theory to practice and back, in Droit et 
cultures, 2011, vol. 61, n. 1, Dossier: Technologies, Droit et Justice. 
55 Milieu IE, Measures on access to justice in environmental matters – Country report for 
Ireland, Brussels, 2007, 9. 
56 As a general rule, when an administrative appeal is specifically provided for by the 
legislation (so, for example, a right of appeal to An Board Pleanála), it must be 
exhausted before going to courts. 
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In Ireland, there are no specialist administrative courts or 
environmental courts. The structure of the court system presents a first level of 
Circuit and District Courts that have local and limited jurisdiction. On a 
second stage, there is a High Court working both as national first instance 
court of general jurisdiction and appellate court for the judgements taken at the 
local level. At the top of the system, there is a Supreme Court as court of final 
appeal. A parallel structure exists in criminal matters. The Court of Criminal 
Appeal hears claims in criminal matters from the Circuit Courts and the High 
Courts. The appeal varies widely depending on the case: in some situations it is 
on point of law only, in other situations, it can allow for a full re-hearing on the 
merits. In some others, finally, both avenues are open57.  
Cases involving environmental matters are managed by ordinary (civil 
or criminal) courts. The decision to admit a complaint is taken on a case-by-
case basis by the relative court. Any party of the proceeding who disagrees with 
any aspect of the judge’s decision can lodge an appeal to the superior court. 
Finally, the Supreme Court can be resorted only on point of law, after either 
the authorization by the High Court or the leave granted by the Supreme Court 
itself. The local courts’ judgements can be appealed to the High Court on the 
merits, with a right to a full re-hearing.  
The challenges to the decisions (or omissions) by public authorities can 
be presented to local courts or directly to the High Court by individuals or 
associations. The High Court reviews the legality of the contested decision and 
not the substance of it, as it is not entitled to interfere with administrative 
decisions (for example on the grounds that it would have raised different 
conclusions from the facts). The substance of a planning or environmental 
decision may be challenged only “indirectly”, if the decision is deemed 
“unreasonable or irrational”. It is rare, however, for the Court to annul a 
decision on the grounds of “unreasonableness or irrationality” (these criteria 
have been interpreted narrowly by the Court). The admissibility of the 
challenges is subject to some principles that relate to the verification of the 
                                                   
57 Milieu IE, Measures on access to justice in environmental matters – Country report for 
Ireland, Brussels, 2007, 14-15. 
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lawfulness in the decision-making process and/or to the demonstration of a 
sufficient interest (in practice, liberally interpreted as a wide interest for the 
public). If they abide with some pre-requisites, NGOs could even stand before 
court without demonstrating a sufficient interest58. The High Court may then 
quash the decision (certiorari), or even order the decision-maker, who was 
obliged to make a decision but has failed or refused to do so, to actually take 
specific steps (mandamus). Finally, an order of prohibition to take specific steps 
may also be granted in appropriate circumstances. Other possible judgements 
include recommendations, injunctions or an award of damages, when such 
instruments may apply to the case.  
The costs of the legal procedures are not fixed and they depend on the 
type of procedure required and on the costs of solicitors and barristers (they 
notably have different fees)59. As a general rule, each party bears its own costs. 
However, in particular situations, some costs may be charged on the applicant 
or on the defendant where the court considers doing so. Moreover, Ireland has 
gradually introduced a number of statutory provisions to satisfy the obligation 
arising under the Aarhus Convention and EU environmental law concerning 
affordable legal costs. Despite these efforts, some potential barriers to access 
to justice remain in consideration of the very limited extent to which legal aid is 
guaranteed (a “merits test” is also prescribed: notably, the applicant must have 
reasonable ground to proceed and good probability of success)60.  
In conclusion, Ireland does not provide any special way of access to 
justice that separates environmental matters from other administrative, civil or 
criminal issues. However, it recognises a broad legal standing right, opening it 
to NGOs and other legal persons without any limit, but the capacity to support 
the costs of the procedure and to demonstrate a sufficient interest. The 
environmental cases follow the common path of ordinary proceedings and 
                                                   
58 A. RYALL, Study on the Implementation of Articles 9.3 and 9.4 of the Aarhus Convention in 
17 of the Member States of the European Union, Ireland, 2012, 24-25. 
59 For example, obtaining an injunction relief of a decision could require the deposit 
of a significant sum as caution for the subject affected by the suspension. 
60 A. RYALL, Study on the Implementation of Articles 9.3 and 9.4 of the Aarhus Convention in 
17 of the Member States of the European Union, Ireland, 2012, 34-39. 
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they dispose of two possible appeals: to the High Court and, on point of law, 
to the Supreme Court. However, Ireland has only recently ratified the Aarhus 
Convention. The interpretation of the new rules by the courts and some new 
legislation will probably modify this picture towards a more thorough 
implementation of Article 9(3) and 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention. 
As far as Spain is concerned, the right to «enjoy an environment 
suitable for the development of the person, as well as the duty to preserve it» is 
written in article 45 of the Spanish Constitution and obliges public authorities 
to commit towards a rational use of natural resources for the protection and 
improvement of the quality of life. The constitutional provision relies first on 
collective solidarity, and then on criminal or, where applicable, administrative 
sanctions as instruments to enforce this right or punish its violation. 
Notwithstanding, the Constitutional Court has excluded the right to enjoy a 
healthy environment from the subjective rights, in consideration of its position 
in the Constitution among the «guiding principles of policy» and not in the part 
concerning the fundamental rights61. Therefore, its violation cannot give rise to 
the special procedure (amparo) that permits to resort the Constitutional Court 
in presence of a breach of a constitutionally recognised fundamental right. On 
the contrary, the right to a healthy environment has been recognized as a 
«legitimate interest» of the citizen and, therefore, it grants the right of standing 
to every single person whose interest has been damaged. It also compels the 
decision-makers and the administration to take it into account in their 
decisions.  
The scope of environmental law has been established by article 18 of 
the Law 27/2006, concerning the implementation of the Aarhus Convention in 
Spain. This article not only explicitly indicates the areas of interest of 
environmental law62, but it also establishes the specific standing rules for 
                                                   
61  A. M. MORENO MOLINA, Study on aspects of access to justice in relation to EU 
environmental law – the situation in Spain, 2012, 2, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/studies.htm (last visited December 2014).  
62 Respectively: (a) water protection; (b) noise protection; (c) soil protection; (d) 
atmospheric pollution; (e) town and county planning and land use; (f) nature 
conservation and biological diversity; (g) mountains and forest management; (h) waste 
management; (i) chemicals including biocides and pesticides; (j) biotechnology; (k) 
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environmental associations to facilitate access to justice, for both 
administrative appeal and judicial review63. The law recognises that associations 
meeting certain criteria can challenge actions and omissions by public 
authorities even without showing an interest or the violation of a right, and 
they can benefit from legal aid if they fulfil the conditions for it. Moreover, in 
some specific matters64, legislation has included the instrument of actio popularis, 
permitting to a single legal person to address the court in the interest of public 
order.  
The administrative appeal established in Spanish regulations provides 
those typical instruments already outlined in the paragraphs above and, in 
particular, appeal before the hierarchical superior authority. If no hierarchical 
superior authority exists, the appeal can be presented to the same authority that 
issued the decision. In any case, the possibilities of administrative appeal must 
be exhausted before going to court. Therefore, administrative appeal and 
judicial review cannot be employed concurrently, the former must always 
precede the latter. 
The Spanish court system has a very complicated structure. At the top 
is located a Supreme Court with jurisdiction over the whole country and 
organised in five chambers (civil, criminal, administrative, social and military). 
Other two courts are constituted on a national basis – the Central Court (first 
instance) and the National Audience (appellate court) – for matters of national 
relevance such as smuggling and terrorism, and for violations committed by 
central administration. A similar system of courts is constituted at regional level 
in each Comunidad Autonoma (there are 17 Autonomous Communities). Every 
CA presents at the bottom a number of local audiences (civil and criminal) and 
courts (with specialized divisions in administrative, commercial, family, gender, 
                                                                                                                                 
other emission, discharges and releases in the environment; (l) environmental impact 
assessment; (m) access to information, public participation in decision-making and 
access to justice in environmental matters; (n) any other area established by the 
legislation (Milieu, 2007). 
63 Milieu ES, Measures on access to justice in environmental matters – Country report for 
Spain, Brussels, 2007, 1. 
64 Land use planning act, Coastal waters act and Law for the protection of Flora and 
Fauna in national parks. 
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juvenile and social matters). At the top, there is a Superior Court of Justice as 
appellate court for violations committed in the territory of the CA.  
The institutional structure provides three ways of access to courts in 
environmental matters that reflect the traditional organisation of civil law 
countries: appeal to ordinary courts – administrative or civil divisions – and 
criminal prosecution. Particular attention is devoted to criminal prosecution 
and to judicial review before the administrative divisions.  
In Spain a criminal procedure can be initiated not only for violations 
committed by privates or public officers, but also in relation to other violations 
that in most European countries are considered misdemeanours. In particular, 
three articles of the Criminal Code (Art. 320, 322 and 329) provide for a 
criminal liability of the administration for misuse of power in matter of land-
use planning, national heritages and licences for polluting activities. This 
misuse of power must result in concessions granted despite manifestly illegal 
situations or in the omission to report a violation of the provisions regulating 
these activities65. The path in criminal courts depends on the level at which the 
crime has been committed. When an individual or a local authority is involved 
in a supposed criminal offence, the proceeding will follow the regional route 
from local audiences to the Superior Court of Justice and eventually the 
Supreme Court in their criminal branches. On the contrary, when national 
administration is implicated, the first instance competent court is the National 
Audience. A possible appeal to the Supreme Court is then available. 
Access to administrative courts (rectius administrative divisions within 
the ordinary courts) is granted to those «legal and natural persons claiming to 
have a right or a legitimate interest» which results adversely affected by the 
administrative decision, or the lack of it (general rule on standing). Legal 
standing is open to legal persons that can prove the violation of an interest 
covered by the objective of the association, which clearly may include NGOs 
acting in the protection of the environment. It also comprises actio popularis, 
which frees the recurrent from the burden of proving the violation of an 
                                                   
65 Milieu ES, Measures on access to justice in environmental matters – Country report for 
Spain, Brussels, 2007, 22. 
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interest 66 . Even if judicial control is limited to the “legality” of the 
administrative action, the powers of the judges are large. In fact, they can not 
only annul the administrative decision, but also: recognize an individual 
situation or right; order the agency to do or to cease doing something; order 
the agency to compensate the applicant for the damages suffered.    
As stated before, access to courts in environmental matters seems to 
meet the provisions established by the Aarhus Convention. However, 
counterbalancing barriers exist as to the costs connected with the procedure, 
especially in the case in which an interim relief is demanded67. Likewise, an 
important barrier is the unbearable length of judicial procedures – a common 
problem to the whole Spanish judicial system – which indirectly makes access 
to court for minor cases (i.e. disputes where economic or value interests are 
not extremely relevant) not convenient. Additionally, direct access to criminal 
courts is banned for individuals and NGOs, who may only intervene at the 
preliminary stages, by way of reporting the criminal breaches to the public 
prosecutor´s office, that will then represent the public or offended interests in 
the proceeding68. 
Spain provides a reinforced protection of the right to a healthy 
environment allowing applicants to complain against various illegal acts or 
                                                   
66 After Law 27/2006, an «actio popularis» has been established in favour of «non-profit, 
legal persons» as long as they meet certain requirements: (a) two years of activity, prior 
to the judicial challenge; (b) they have environmental protection as their founding 
goal; (c) their activity takes place within in a geographical area, which coincides with 
the territory where the contested decision has been taken. However, if an NGO does 
not meet such criteria, it may still invoke the general standing grounds established in 
the 1998 General law on Administrative Justice (A.M. MORENO MOLINA, Study on 
aspects of access to justice in relation to EU environmental law – the situation in Spain, 2012, 13-
15). 
67 Ibidem. The injunction relief instrument exists in Spanish administrative law. The 
claimant must convince the judge that, if the project is not stopped, or the license not 
suspended, the environment will suffer a serious and irreversible damage. The courts, 
on the other hand, have to make a balance between the possible public costs and the 
benefits of issuing a motion to stop or suspend a project or plan, before eventually 
granting it. Moreover, in case of potential damages coming from the injunction the 
court may impose on the plaintiff a warranty for the potential damage. 
68  A. M. MORENO MOLINA, Study on aspects of access to justice in relation to EU 
environmental law – the situation in Spain, 2012, 10-18. 
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omissions committed by the administration before the prosecutor’s office. 
However, data show that, even if prosecutors specialized in environmental 
protection have been established in many areas, nowadays the number of cases 
that reaches criminal courts is very limited69. Anyway, this factual data do not 
change the general framework that, matching broad standing rights (actio 
popularis for NGOs, legal aid) and multiple appeal routes established by law, 
configures the Spanish system as one with the most extensive environmental 
protection through law and courts among EU countries. Removing the 
structural limits towards a timely and effective judicial system represents the 
main challenge to further improve access to justice in environmental matters. 
 
5.2. Judicial Appeal Before Administrative Courts. 
 
In most European countries environmental cases fall within the 
competence of administrative courts. A strict regulation of environmental 
matters by the State implies that most acts that can be dangerous for the 
environment involve in some ways the powers of the public administration. 
The validity of a decision/act by a public authority can be reviewed before the 
administrative courts, which usually deal with disputes between private parties 
and public authorities. The country we have selected to represent this model is 
France.  
While environmental issues have crossed the threshold of codes and 
laws only in relatively recent times, the institutionalization of specialized 
administrative courts is deep-rooted in European civil law countries and saw its 
debut in the French post-revolutionary judicial organisation, spreading 
afterwards all over Europe in the Napoleonic era. Nowadays, most of the acts 
concerning the environment are by law subject to approval or control of the 
administration and therefore, the review of these acts is conferred to 
administrative courts. 
                                                   
69  A. M. MORENO MOLINA, Study on aspects of access to justice in relation to EU 
environmental law – the situation in Spain, 2012, 5. 
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In France, the most important reference in the topic is the Charter for 
the Environment attached to the French Constitution in 2005. This Charter 
establishes the duty for each citizen to participate in the preservation of the 
environment. The Charter abides also by two of the three pillars of the Aarhus 
Convention (access to information and public participation), but omits to 
discipline access to justice in environmental matters. Besides the Charter, all 
the provisions connected with the preservation and the protection of the 
environment are collected in the Environmental Code. In most cases, the law 
applicable to environmental justice is the general procedural law in 
administrative matters, which can be found in the Code of Administrative 
Justice. Other laws of general application concern the citizens’ rights and legal 
aid. They are completed by procedural provisions included in environmental 
acts, such as Law 95/101 (Title IV, on the associations for environmental 
protection), Law 76/663 on facilities, Law 76/629 on nature protection and 
Law 83/630 on public investigation and protection of the environment. Other 
Codes, such as the Code for Urbanism, the Code for Forestry or the General 
Code for Territorial Communities, include provisions relevant for the 
protection of the environment as well. Finally, case law is an important source 
regarding access to justice in environmental matters either70. 
As almost all the EU Member States, France has both an administrative 
and a judicial way of appeal against administrative decisions concerning the 
environment. Decisions taken by the administration can be challenged in first 
instance to the same authority that held the decision (recours gracieux) or to the 
hierarchical superior to that authority (recours hiérarchique). The latter can be 
lodged directly after the contested decision or following the non-contentious 
appeal. In cases related to the environment, no preliminary filing of an 
administrative appeal is demanded before recurring to court. However, the law 
and regulation increasingly requires the preliminary filing of an administrative 
appeal (so called “obligatory prior administrative appeal”) in order to stop the 
explosive growth of litigation. The French administrative framework regarding 
                                                   
70 Milieu FR, Measures on access to justice in environmental matters – Country report for 
France, Brussels, 2007, 13 and ff. 
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environmental matters has four levels of government (national, regional, 
provincial, municipal). At the top, at national level, there is the Ministry of 
Ecology, Sustainable Development and Land Use Planning (MEDAD), which 
is responsible for policies regarding water, nature, air and waste. In this 
context, it supervises two decentralised regional directorates: the DRIRE (24 
Directions Régional de l’Industrie, de la Recherche et de l’Environnement), which is 
competent for classified facilities, air pollution, waste and major industrial risks, 
and the DIREN (26 Directions Régional de l’Environnement), responsible for the 
enforcement of laws relating to nature, natural sites and landscapes. The 
MEDAD supervises other central authorities such as water agencies, national 
parks, the National institute of Industrial Environment and Risk, and, in 
partnership with other Ministries, the National Hunting and Wildlife Office 
and the Agency for Environment and Energy Management. The third level of 
implementation of national policies is the département (county), where a number 
of local ministry agencies operate under control of the departmental Prefect. 
Finally, the Mayor and the municipality are responsible with some general 
police and policy powers over water supplies, waste management and 
pollution, as well as for local zoning plans and building permits. Thus, an 
appeal against a decision taken by an administrative authority follows the same 
line of hierarchy from the bottom to the top of the French administration, 
depending on the level at which the contested decision has been issued. The 
right of appeal against an administrative decision is open to all parties having 
an interest in challenging the decision. The interest is defined by the rights, 
obligations and duties created by the decision. This can include any person, 
natural or legal, including associations and NGOs, with the only limit that they 
can prove a direct interest.  
Besides administrative appeal, acts and omissions of public authorities 
in the exercise of their public mission can be challenged, directly or following 
administrative appeal, before administrative courts71.  
The structure of the French judicial system presents two branches (and 
various specialized jurisdictions): the ordinary courts, with civil and criminal 
                                                   
71 Ibidem. 
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competence, and the administrative courts 72 . The ordinary courts are 
composed of three courts of first instance (civil jurisdiction): the proximity 
judge (Juge de proximité), the Court of Instance (Tribunal d’Instance), the Court of 
Great Instance (Tribunal de Grande Instance), depending on the type and value of 
the case. In the criminal jurisdiction, the first instance courts are: the Police 
courts (Tribunal de Police), the Correctional courts (Cour Correctionnelle) and the 
Assize Courts, depending on the gravity of the offence committed. Both 
systems refer then to an Appeal Court (Cour d’Appel) with chambers specialised 
in civil and criminal jurisdiction. Then, the final appeal is provided by the 
Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation), but only on point of law. The administrative 
courts are organised on three levels with Administrative Tribunals at the 
bottom, an Administrative Court of Appeal (Cour Administrative d’Appel) at the 
intermediate level, and a Supreme Court for final appeals (Conseil d’Etat) at the 
top. The Conseil d’Etat judges on point of law on the appeals against decisions 
from lower courts and on merits, as court of unique instance, for contestation 
related to acts issued by the most important public authorities (e.g. presidential 
or prime ministerial decrees). 
As said before, the majority of environmental cases follows the path of 
judicial review before administrative courts. The procedure is written and 
inquisitorial (i.e. led by the judge), and contradictory (i.e., based on a dialogue 
between the parties)73. Four types of actions are available: illegality proceedings, 
full review, interpretation proceedings and repression proceedings. In 
environmental matters the most important are the illegality proceeding – the 
judge can annul the decision for illegality and, in some cases but not 
sistematically, compel the authority to issue a new decision – and the full 
review, in which the judge can annul the decision, but also pronounce on 
damages and even rewrite the act if he/she estimates so. Each proceedings has 
                                                   
72 Other minor specialised courts exist in the civil order. For completion, they are: the 
Conseil des Prud’hommes (for labour cases), the Tribunal des Affaires de Sécurité Sociale (for 
social security matters), the Tribunal de Commerce (for trade issues) and the Tribunal 
Paritaire des Baux ruraux (for land tenure issues). Source: https://www.justice.gouv.fr  
73 Milieu FR, Measures on access to justice in environmental matters – Country report for 
France, Brussels, 2007, 24. 
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its own principles and standing rules. For the illegality one, every natural or 
legal person can be admitted on two conditions. First, the contested decision 
should be an administrative act that can possibly damage the claimant’s 
material or moral interests. Secondly, the interest of the claimant has to be 
proved personal and pertinent (i.e. sufficient for the annulment of the decision; 
if the decision is individual, the person to whom the decision is addressed is 
automatically granted legal standing)74. Generally speaking, the case law shows 
that the interpretation of these principles is quite broad and the admission of 
appeals for the protection of collective interests is permitted too75. The full 
review proceeding is linked by the Environmental code to classified facilities, 
i.e., authorisations and refusals of permits, specific prescriptions, administrative 
sanctions and similar acts. Both the person who asked for the authorisation, 
the user of the facility and natural or legal persons (interested municipalities or 
associations of municipalities) can address the administrative court. In general, 
only individuals can apply for damages, while associations can be admitted to 
this application only if the appealed illegal act obstructs the association’s 
objectives76. Further appeal can be presented to the Administrative Court of 
Appeal and eventually to the Conseil d’Etat, on points of law.  
The appeal (both administrative appeal and judicial review) has no 
suspensive effect; however a suspension of the appealed decision (référé-
suspension) could be disposed by the judge for summary procedures either when 
the decision’s execution would cause the claimant grave and immediate 
prejudice or when the legality of the decision raises serious doubts. An appeal 
against the decision of the judge for summary procedures can be presented to 
the Conseil d’Etat within 15 days after the decision is taken.  
No formal barriers exist in the right of appeal. However, a potential 
limit could be represented by the costs of the procedure, which are essentially 
                                                   
74 A third limit is established for associations representing a collective interest. To be 
accepted, they should exercise their statutory activities in the geographical area of 
interest. Moreover, they should exist since three years and their statute should be 
connected with the protection of the environment endangered. 
75 J. MAKOWIAK, Study on factual aspects of access to justice in relation to EU environmental law, 
national report, France, 2012, 8-11. 
76 Ibidem. 
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made of lawyers and experts fees. A small fee is required to initiate the 
procedure and broad legal aid coverage is granted for claimants whose financial 
resources fall under certain thresholds according to the law77. Associations 
could be granted legal aid only in «exceptional cases». 
In conclusion, France recognises the protection of the environment as 
a crucial sector necessitating a specialised structure of administration and a 
specific legal framework, principally enclosed in the Environmental Code. 
However, France does not provide a special way of adjudicating environmental 
cases, conferring most of them to the traditional administrative courts. This 
choice characterises most of European countries, including Italy, Germany and 
Spain. Access to justice in environmental matters is quite broad, with a 
potential limit represented by costs related to the proceedings (lawyers and 
experts), especially for small associations and NGOs. 
 
5.3. Judicial Review Before Specialised Environmental Courts. 
 
Sweden is a peculiar example in the European context as 
environmental cases are allocated to specific «environmental courts». The 
Swedish judicial system is composed of ordinary courts (48 district courts, 6 
courts of appeal and the Supreme Court) and administrative courts (12 county 
administrative courts, 4 administrative courts of appeal and the Supreme 
Administrative Court) 78 . The administrative courts hear cases concerning 
disputes between individuals and administrative authorities, for example tax 
cases and social insurance cases. They decide on the merits and have the 
authority to replace the appealed decision with a new one (so called 
«reformatory procedure»). The ordinary courts deal with criminal cases, civil 
cases and a number of non-contentious matters. In 1999, specialized courts 
were established for environmental matters: five Environmental courts and 
one Environmental Court of Appeal. They are divisions within the ordinary 
                                                   
77 Milieu FR, Measures on access to justice in environmental matters – Country report for 
France, Brussels, 2007, 22-23. 
78 http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/16/65/79/c2777e20.pdf. 
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courts, but they «essentially act as administrative courts for environmental 
cases», meaning that they usually review decisions of the administrative 
authorities79.  
In 1999, Sweden adopted an Environmental Code, which harmonised 
the general rules and principles in the field. The Code applies to all human 
activities that might harm the environment80. It reflects EU environmental laws 
and its core subject is administrative law (regarding the power of 
environmental authorities to regulate any activity or measure that entails a risk 
for men or the environment), but it also contains private elements, such as 
provisions concerning compensation for damages. Despite the Code, certain 
activities have regulations on their own, like planning and building issues (see 
the 2010 Planning and Building Act), infrastructure installations (i.e. railroads 
and highways), mining, forestry, fauna (within the hunting law). 
Environmental decision-making activity is split among different levels 
of government. At the local level, the Municipalities and the Local 
environmental boards act as supervisory authorities. The former issue plans 
and permits under the Planning and Building Act, the latter are political bodies, 
independent from the government, in charge of applying environmental law. 
In addition, the County administrative boards are entrusted with supervision 
concerning water-related activities and larger industrial activities; they issue 
permits for dangerous activities, landfills, chemical activities, waste transpor-
tation and disposal. Moreover, the Environmental Courts issue permits for 
installations and activities involving a substantial environmental impact and for 
all kinds of water operations. In such a role, they perform «administrative» 
                                                   
79  J. DARPÖ, Sweden, 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/access_studies.htm (last visited December 
2014). The Environmental courts replaced the National Licensing board for 
environmental protection and the Water courts. 
80  See: http://www.government.se/sb/d/3704. The Code contains both general 
environmental principles and specific provisions about environmental quality, 
environmental impact assessments, nature protection, flora and fauna, genetically 
modified organisms, chemicals and waste. Specific water operations, industrial 
undertakings and other hazardous activities are subject to permit or notification 
requirements. J. DARPÖ, Summary report on the inventory of EU member States’ measures on 
access to justice in environmental matters, Milieu, 2007, Environmental law and policy. 
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functions 81 . Other authorities are located at national level, like the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Chemicals Agency, the National Board 
of Health and Welfare, the National Transport Administration and Geological 
Survey of Sweden, the Swedish Forest Agency. Some larger projects (nuclear 
activities, major infrastructural projects and wind farms) require a preliminary 
governmental decision on «permissibility» before a permit can be granted. 
Both the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Chancellor of Justice 
ensure that public authorities comply with laws and other statutes. They have a 
disciplinary function and operate through opinions and – rarely – prosecution 
for administrative misconduct82. The Ombudsman cannot intervene in an 
individual case and therefore it is not regarded as an effective remedy 
according to the Aarhus Convention. It can only examine a case after it has 
been decided and the scrutiny is limited to the handling of the case. However, 
his/her opinions have great importance.  
Environmental justice is provided both by Environmental courts and 
by administrative courts (for example, according to the Local Government Act, 
some municipal statutes and decisions can be challenged through a «legality-
control» procedure in the administrative courts by any member of the 
municipality). The main appeal route, however, is represented by the 
Environmental courts. Their competence covers all kinds of decisions 
pursuant to the Environmental Code and the Planning and Building Act. They 
are also competent in cases concerning damages and private actions against 
dangerous activities83. 
                                                   
81 Ibidem. 
82 In the Enköping case (Stockholm Court of Appeal), 6 politicians were prosecuted for 
administrative misconduct for not having fulfilled their supervisory responsibilities as 
members of the local environmental board. They were convicted for refraining from 
deciding to issue sanctions fees and notifying the Attorney General of suspected 
environmental crimes in a number of cases involving local enterprises (J. DARPÖ, 
Justice through Environmental Courts? Lessons Learned from the Swedish Experience, 2007, 
available at http://www.jandarpo.se/inenglish.asp, last visited December 2014). 
83 Persons who have suffered bodily injury, material damage or pecuniary loss can 
bring a claim in the Environmental Court. They can also ask the court to order the 
operator of an activity to undertake precautionary measures or to stop the activity. As 
far as criminal justice is concerned, the public has very limited access to criminal 
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The first-instance Environmental courts are divisions within five 
ordinary district courts, but their jurisdiction is regional. They consist of one 
professional judge, one environmental technician and two expert members 
nominated by industry and national public authorities. Thanks to its 
composition, the court is well equipped with experts/technicians. The 
procedure is reformatory: the contested decision can be challenged on the full-
merits and it may be replaced by the judgement. This kind of appeal is 
extensive in comparison to the «cassatory procedure», in which only the legality 
of the decision can be reviewed and the court cannot replace the estimation of 
the competent authority84. The Environmental court of appeal is composed of 
three professional judges and one technician. All members of the courts have 
an equal vote. The experts in Environmental courts are supposed to provide 
their experience of municipal, industrial operations or public environment 
supervision in all stages of the proceedings and in all levels of the jurisdiction 
(except in the Supreme Court). 
Cases starting with a decision by a public authority (so called 
«administrative cases») may be brought to the Environmental Court and finally 
to the Environmental Court of Appeal (in rare occasions the Court of appeal 
allows for an appeal to the Supreme Court). Cases starting in the 
Environmental Court can be appealed to the Environmental Court of Appeal 
and ultimately to the Supreme Court. Leave of appeal is required to bring an 
appeal both to the Environmental Court of Appeal and to the Supreme Court.  
The creation of Environmental courts has enhanced consistency in the 
environmental case-law, since all type of cases are dealt with by five courts: 
permits, supervisory decisions, all kinds of charges, enforcement, cost recovery 
and damages. Too many routes of appeal usually have a constraining effect on 
the possibilities to challenge environmental decisions and they also lead to 
                                                                                                                                 
courts, as the power to prosecute is the prerogative of the Attorney General. It is 
possible to file an administrative complaint to higher authority on a decision not to 
prosecute, but this is rarely done (J. DARPÖ, Sweden, 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/access_studies.htm, last visited December 
2014). 
84  J. DARPÖ, Justice through Environmental Courts? Lessons Learned from the Swedish 
Experience, 2007, available at http://www.jandarpo.se/inenglish.asp. 
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divergences in the case law. Moreover, the expertise of the deciding body can 
avoid weaker parties becoming entirely dependent on private technical 
consultants and lawyers. The consistency is further granted by the role of the 
Environmental court of appeal and the mechanism of leave. The Court of 
appeal opens the door to almost 25% of appeal cases (out of 300 per year), 
whereas the Supreme Court allows only five or six cases per year. Almost 80% 
of all cases are «administrative cases» that cannot go to the Supreme Court. 
The Court of appeal also hears about 130 cases per year that do not require 
leave85. 
The environmental procedure is easily accessible for the public, first of 
all because it is free of charge. No costs have to be paid by the parties: no court 
fees, no obligation to pay the opponent’s costs, no witness or expert’s fees (the 
responsibility to investigate the case follows the «ex officio-principle» and lies 
with the administration and the environmental courts, which both have 
technicians participating in the decision making activity). On the other hand, 
when applicants want to be represented by counsels or use experts of their 
own, they will have to bear the relative costs, which cannot be remunerated 
from the losing opponent. Although there is no obligation to use lawyers in 
court – not even in the environmental Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court 
– sometimes it is necessary to protect one’s interests effectively86. 
According to the Environmental Code, appeals can be made by anyone 
who is «concerned by the decision or judgment if it affects him or her 
adversely». Other definitions are used in environmental legislation relating to 
«an interest which is protected by the law» or even «rights that have been 
infringed»87. In concrete, the courts’ attitude is quite generous and decisive 
factors to appeal permit decisions are the distance to the activity, the nature of 
                                                   
85 Ibidem. 
86  J. DARPÖ, Sweden, 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/access_studies.htm (last visited December 
2014). 
87 This is true also for administrative omissions. According to a basic principle of 
administrative procedure, all parties that are affected by an administrative decision and 
its preparation are able to participate and – consequently – to appeal the final 
outcome.  
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the emissions (discharged substances) and their likely effects. Mere public 
interests, however, do not suffice for individual standing88. Standing is also 
granted to non-profit associations whose purpose according to their statutes is 
to promote nature conservation, environmental protection or outdoor 
recreation interests. Such NGOs, in addition, must have been active for at least 
3 years in Sweden and must have at least 100 members or show otherwise that 
they have «support from the public»89. The courts’ interpretation of standing 
requirements for NGOs has been quite restrictive. The most common appeals 
made by environmental NGOs have been concerning permits to industrial 
installations and water works, exemptions to species and habitats protection, 
shore protection90.   
As a general rule, a permit cannot be utilized until the possibility of 
appeal has passed. Accordingly, an appeal has suspensive effect on a permit 
decision. However, such decisions are often combined with a «go-ahead 
decision» allowing the applicant to start his/her activity. If a go-ahead decision 
has been granted, the public concerned can ask the court for an injunction. 
Such «inhibition» shall be granted when the prospects for the success of the 
                                                   
88 Standing, for example, has been granted to «each person who may suffer any 
damage or nuisance from an activity, if the risk of such an impact concerns a legally 
protected interest and is not merely theoretical or insignificant» or to «individuals 
living 5 km away from an incineration plant and thus at risk of being affected by air 
pollution». If a permit concerns water operations such as a marina, neighbours who 
will be affected by the road traffic to the marina are allowed to appeal. See the case-
law reported by J. DARPÖ, Sweden, 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/access_studies.htm (last visited December 
2014). 
89  The possibility for NGOs to appeal environmental decisions was originally 
established in the 1999 Environmental Code, although then the numeric criterion was 
2.000 members. Due to the judgment by the CJEU in the DLV case (C-263/09), the 
legislation was reformed in 2010.  
90 Groups and NGOs also have a right of civil action according to the Act on Group 
Action (2002). A private person representing the interest of a group can initiate a 
group action. Non-profit associations that according to their statutes are defending 
the interests of nature conservation, environment protection or associations of 
professionals within the fishing, agricultural, or forestry sector can initiate an NGO 
action. 
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appeal are good, but also if the appellant has a legitimate interest in having the 
decision scrutinized by the court or there are vital interests at stake91.  
Access to justice seems to be very open in Sweden: the environmental 
courts are a clearly identified forum for citizens to address their claims; they are 
intended to provide expertise and professionalism; the procedure is free of 
charge and follows the “reformatory model”; the consistency of the case law is 
guaranteed by the system. The restrictive interpretation by the courts of 
standing requirements (especially for NGOs) seems to be the only barrier to 
access to justice, even though the European Court of justice has recently 
contributed to mitigate it.   
 
6. Final Remarks. 
 
The study promoted by the European Commission on the 
implementation of articles 9.3 and 9.4 of the Aarhus Convention has the merit 
of having adopted a shared, universal language to describe different legal and 
judicial systems that, in many circumstances, cannot easily «communicate». 
Since the national procedures in environmental justice, the courts’ organization 
and the domestic case-law are very specific and diversified, the comparison is 
extremely difficult or risks to result in a superficial analysis. The papers 
provided by the countries, on the contrary, are a good compromise between 
synthesis and details, general framework and concrete examples, focusing on 
the most important issues concerning access to justice in environmental 
matters. They certainly provide the appropriate knowledge that is necessary to 
design any future directive or reform under EU legislation aiming at 
harmonizing access to justice in the environmental sector. But they can also 
simply serve as an important reference tool for any person (practitioner, 
scholar, professor) trying to explore the concrete functioning of environmental 
justice, with particular reference to proceedings and remedies. The picture can 
                                                   
91  J. DARPÖ, Sweden, 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/access_studies.htm (last visited December 
2014). 
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be integrated by other reports and documents concerning specific aspects of 
environmental justice, like, for example: Possible initiatives on access to justice 
in environmental matters and their socio-economic implications (2013); the 
Case Law of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee 2004-2011; 
Access to justice: remedies (2011); Paper on Costs in Environmental 
Procedure (2011); Study on environmental complaint-handling and mediation 
mechanisms at national level (2013)92.  
In all the countries analysed, environmental law and justice are 
recognized as a specialized area of law which deserves growing attention. 
Notwithstanding, only few countries devote to environmental justice 
specialized courts, with separate and exclusive jurisdiction in the field. In most 
countries, on the contrary, environmental cases are dealt with by single judges 
or panels sitting in the administrative courts, which usually hear a large amount 
of disputes concerning the public administration and the citizens. The 
procedure is the same used for the majority of the cases, with few adaptations. 
The specialization, therefore, generally refers to single judges or panels and is 
mainly achieved, on an individual basis, through the daily work in 
environmental matters or through specific training (if present and if the judge 
is willing to participate). External experts can be appointed by the courts or the 
parties as well. This is a very flexible solution because the number of judges 
devoted to environmental cases can vary according to the volume of the 
caseload and no particular organizational efforts or costs are required. Thus, 
for the moment, environmental courts (in the strong sense of word, meaning 
specific and specialized courts in environmental matters) are not a common 
phenomenon in Europe, being environmental cases generally allocated to the 
existing administrative courts.  
Due to the different political and judicial systems and the various 
mechanisms that can open or limit access to justice, it is difficult to assess the 
overall capacity of a single country to effectively implement the Aarhus 
                                                   
92  Most of them are available at http://www.unece.org/environmental-
policy/treaties/public-participation/aarhus-
convention/envpptfwg/envppatoj/analytical-studies.html (last visited December 
2014). 
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convention’s obligations. Nor can we easily understand which appeal route is 
more effective for the protection of the environment. In some cases, for 
example, the administrative appeal (the hierarchical appeal, for example) is 
described as a successful procedure, with low costs, simple rules and timely 
procedure, whereas, in others, it is considered not effective and the decision of 
an external and impartial court has to be preferred. The powers of the court, 
moreover, can vary a lot (depending also on the institutional principle of the 
separation of powers), as the court in some countries can fully replace the 
decision of the administration, while in others it can not, being the 
administration the only responsible for the decision on the merits. This can 
have a strong impact on the quick and effective protection of the environment. 
The national reports give more information about the effectiveness of the 
different procedures, but a comprehensive assessment is still very challenging.   
Anyway, what we can due, on the basis of the 2013 study, is to deal 
with the weak aspects of environmental justice, with the possible barriers and 
obstacles that in each country - directly or indirectly – may hinder or simply 
dissuade people from going to court. Most of them are recurring themes, since 
they are common to several countries. The excessive length of judicial review is 
the main obstacle to access to justice: it not only leads to a general reluctance 
to bring disputes before the courts (especially for minor cases), but it also 
frustrates the purpose of judicial review and of the final decision, which, unless 
interim measures are adopted, risks to become useless, vain. Other identified 
barriers are: the excessive costs of the procedure (included the costs for 
lawyers and for experts), the strict interpretation of standing requirements 
(above all to the detriment of minor organizations and NGOs), the strict 
criteria to obtain injunctive relief, the complexity of environmental law and the 
poor resources for legal aid.  
A common debate on these issues can foster new solutions, ideas and 
remedies to be adopted in the different countries. Each country can find 
inspiration looking at other experiences. National judges and prosecutors 
should be involved as well, offering their experience and expertise in the field. 
Reducing the existing barriers to access to environmental justice is the first step 
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to raise the level of environmental protection in Europe, regardless of new 
possible European directives or reforms. 
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ANALYSIS ON THE JUDICIAL PRACTICE OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY IN CHINESE TORT LAW 
 
Li Yixian 
 
 
 
CONTENTS: 1. – Brief of the Case. 2. – Comments. 2.1. – Environmental 
Pollution Cases in Tort Law. 2.2. – Determination of Causal Connection. 2.3. – 
Liability for Contractors. 2.4. – The Principle of Liability. 
 
 
 
1. Brief of the Case. 
 
On September 21, 2010, Du Zengshen brought a lawsuit against Yubo 
Company and China Railway 12th Bureau in the Court of Yuzhou, claiming that 
a reconstruction project of the defendants caused an economic loss to his 
poultry farm.1 Yushen poultry farm was established by the plaintiff in 1994. 
After years of development, it became one of the primary poultry farms in 
Yuzhou city. In 2010, a project reconstructing Yubo railway was carried out by 
Yubo Company and China Railway 12th Bureau. The field of the project was 
only 300 meters from the poultry farm. During the reconstruction, trucks and 
tractors continually passed by the poultry farm, making much noise, raising 
clouds of dust, and having their lights glaring down directly on the chicken 
house. Without taking any preventive measure, a large number of breeding 
hens died, the productivity of eggs declined and the residual egg rates 
increased. Therefore, the plaintiff requested Yubo Company and China 
Railway 12th Bureau to stop their infringing act immediately, compensate for 
                                                   
1 Du Zengshen vs Henan Yubo Company and China Railway 12th Bureau Group Co., Ltd 
(2014),   	  2004   00094   11/ June 2014, available at 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/ (last visited October 2014). 
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his direct economic loss of ¥750,000 and repay the relocation expenses 
accompanied with the indirect loss of ¥2,824,274. 
Arguing that there was no tortious act and the relocation of the poultry 
farm was not necessary, China Railway 12th Bureau refused to pay for the 
economic loss suffered by the plaintiff and asked the court to overrule the 
request.2  Meanwhile, Yubo Company presented two reasons to reject the 
claims: the description of the facts was false and the causal connection between 
its conduct and the loss of poultry farm did not exist.   
In the proceedings, the Court of Yuzhou confirmed the following 
facts: the Yushen poultry farm, with an annual output of 280 tons and 32,000 
livestock, was a well-developed farm run by Du Zengshen. For years, the 
poultry farm was identified by the Animal Husbandry Bureau of Henan 
province as one of pollution-free agricultural production bases. In June 2010, 
Yubo Company and China Railway 12th Bureau started the reconstruction 
project of Yubo railway. The building site located only 290 meters from the 
poultry farm. During June 21-23, 2010, trucks and tractors for the 
reconstruction project constantly passed by the poultry farm. According to the 
production record presented by the plaintiff, a lot of chickens showed 
depression and stressed behavior. Meanwhile, the productivity of eggs reduced 
and the death rate of the chickens increased. After taking a scene investigation, 
the Yuzhou Animal Disease Control and Prevention Center drew the 
conclusion from the anatomy of the dead chickens that: the mass mortality of 
the chickens was caused by the stressed reactions and the complications caused 
by the hard light and the noisy and dusty environment. Finally, the court 
confirmed that the reduction of the productivity, the increasing of the residual 
eggs and the depression symptoms of the chickens resulted in a direct 
economic loss of ¥ 603,726.06. In the meanwhile, according to an appraisal 
report issued by Bordon Assets Appraisal Co., Ltd., the relocation costs of the 
poultry farm was ¥ 2,824,274. 
                                                   
2 China Railway 12th Bureau Group Co., Ltd is a wholly-owned subsidiary of China 
Railway Investments Group with a monopolization of using resources and large 
amount of profits. 
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The court of first instance thus confirmed that as the consequences of 
the activities carried out by the defendants during the reconstruction project, a 
large amount of chickens died, the productivity of eggs reduced and the rate of 
residual eggs increased. According to the investigation of local authority, there 
was a causal connection between the reconstruction project of the railway and 
the mass mortality and sickness of the chicken. Thus, the defendants should be 
responsible for the damage suffered by the plaintiff. 
As regards to the evidence presented by the plaintiff, although the 
production record was made by the workers of the poultry farm, as it was 
impossible for a third party to predict the occurrence of the tortious event and 
present an objective and accurate record, the court accepted the production 
record as valid and effective evidence. In calculating the amount of damages, 
the court held that the plaintiff’s request of ¥ 750,000 surpassed the amount of 
the real loss and confirmed the actual damages amounted to ¥ 603,726.   
In addition, the court confirmed that, the poultry farm was qualified as 
one of pollution-free eggs production bases in the city. According to the 
provisions of the “Quality Standards of the Poultry Farm Environment” issued 
by the Department of Agriculture of China, the area less than or equal to 500 
meters to the yard of livestock farms shall be deemed as a protective area 
protected against any external contamination. Meanwhile, according to the 
“Measures for the Examination of Animal Epidemic Prevention”, the 
reasonable distance between livestock farms and main traffic routes such as 
roads and railways is more than 500 meters. In this case, the railway was only 
290 meters from the avian farm. It meant that the location of the railway 
reconstruction project did not conform to the standards issued by the 
Department of Agriculture, and it was necessary for the plaintiff to relocate his 
poultry farm. According to the assessment of Xuchang Boda Assets Appraisal 
Company, the costs of the relocation of the poultry farm were ¥ 2,824,274. On 
December 29, 2011, the court of Yuzhou decided that China Railway 12th 
Bureau should pay for the loss amounting to ¥ 603,726 , and Yubo Company 
should pay the relocation fees of the poultry farm amounting to ¥ 2,824,274.   
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China Railway 12th Bureau appealed against the judgment of the local 
court to the People’s Intermediate Court of Xuchang，claiming that the 
procedure of the first instance was illegal, the ascertainment of the fact was 
unclear and the law was incorrectly applied. The appellant asserted that, 
according to a contract concluded by it with the local government and some 
residents of the village, the delivery work was assigned to the local government 
and other contractors. China Railway 12th Bureau claimed that even if the fact 
of environmental pollution was confirmed, the responsible party should be the 
local government or contractors who were in charge of concrete transport 
works.  
Yubo Company also appealed to the Intermediate Court on the basis of 
two reasons: firstly, there was a mistake in the recognition of the legal 
relationship in the first instance judgment. According to the theory of tort 
liability, it was necessary to prove the causation between the tortious act and 
the damage in constructing the tort liability. In this case, to support his 
allegation, the plaintiff should prove that the pollutants discharged by the 
defendants were unsanitary and unsafe and the discharging act caused the 
damage. However, the plaintiff did not present any evidence to prove the 
existence of the causal connection between the act and the damage. Secondly, 
the old Yubo railway was built over 40 years ago and kept working until 2009. 
Obviously, the existence of the railway was earlier than the poultry farm which 
was built in 1994. Moreover, the poultry farm was situated near several villages 
and driveways where cars and trucks frequently passed by in the past. Besides, 
there was a vast expanse of cultivated land near the poultry farm and the noises 
produced by the farming machines for harvesting the crops can be clearly 
heard from the poultry farm. However, the plaintiff had never complained 
about the negative effects of such a noisy environment. 
Consequently, Yubo Company claimed that the judge of first instance 
made mistakes in the judgment and requested the judgment to be rescinded 
according to the law. Du Zengshen replied that the facts were clearly 
ascertained and the law was correctly applied in the first instance judgment, so 
the appeal shall be rejected and the first instance judgment shall be sustained. 
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The Intermediate People’s Court of Xuchang held that the fact was 
clearly ascertained by the court of first instance and the procedure of the first 
instance was lawfulbecause the allocation of liabilities was based on a 
reasonable consideration depending on the different roles played by the two 
appellants. According to Article 41 of Environmental Protection Law of the 
PRC, «a person that caused an environmental pollution hazard shall have the 
obligation to eliminate it and make compensation to the individual that 
suffered direct loss». Although the delivery work of the reconstruction project 
was not executed directly by China Railway 12th Bureau, the appellant could 
not be free from an obligation or liability based on the contract between the 
appellant and the person in charge of the delivery work. 
In accordance with Article 23 of the Law on Prevention and Control of 
Pollution From Environmental Noise, «every project under construction, 
renovation or expansion must conform to the regulations of the State 
governing environmental protection. Where a construction project might cause 
environmental noise pollution, the person undertaking the project must 
prepare an environmental impact statement which includes the measures it 
takes to prevent and control such pollution, and submit it, following the 
procedures prescribed by the State, to the competent administrative 
department for environmental protection for approval. The environmental 
impact statement shall include the comments and suggestions of the units and 
residents in the place where the construction project is located»3. In the present 
case, Yubo Company did not obtain an effective approval from the 
environmental protection office; neither did it take the local residents’ 
suggestions. Actually, the noise standards made by the environmental 
protection office were usually used to decide the liability of the polluter. 
According to the tort law, where any damage was caused to other people by 
environmental pollution, the polluter shall assume the tort liability. According 
to the documents submitted by the anti-epidemic station of Yuzhou, since the 
                                                   
3 The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Pollution 
From Environmental Noise was adopted at the 22nd Meeting of the standing 
Committee of the Tenth National people’s Congress in 1997. 
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reconstructed railway located less than 300 meters from the poultry farm, it 
was impossible for the environment of the poultry farm to meet the 
environmental quality standards and the requirements for animal epidemic 
prevention set by the Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Administrative 
Department under the State Council. In order to obtain the animal epidemic 
prevention certification, the relocation of the poultry farm was inevitable. As 
managers and beneficiaries of Yubo railway, the two appellants should be 
responsible for the pollution damages caused by their reconstruction activities.  
On July 6, 2012, the Intermediate Court of Xuchang decided with the 
n.156 judgment that: since the facts were clearly ascertained and the law was 
correctly applied in the judgment of the first instance, the appeal was rejected 
and the first instance judgment was sustained.   
Yubo Company appealed to the High Court of Henan province and 
presented the petition for a retrial. On February 7, the High Court of Henan 
Province made a decision (n.01796, 2012) which specified the Intermediate 
Court of Xuchang to conduct a trial de novo.  
In the retrial, the Intermediate Court confirmed that the facts 
ascertained in the first and second instances were correct. Besides, the court 
ascertained the following facts: the narrow railway from Xuchang to Yuzhou 
built in 1964 was under the charge of Xuchang railway sub-administration of 
the Henan Railway Bureau. During the reform of the state-owned enterprises,4 
Xuchang railway sub-administration was transferred to Henan Zhonghang 
Railway Development Co.Ltd. In 2009, Henan Zhonghang Company and 
Henan Luozhoujie Highway Co.Ltd. jointly established Yubo Company and 
started a reconstruction project to the narrow railway from Xuchang to 
Yuzhou. During the reconstruction, the location of the new railway was moved 
200 meters to south due to the abandonment of old railway bridge. The 
reconstruction project of Yubo railway was finally completed in June, 2013. 
Yushen Poultry Farm was established in Chuhe Village, Yuzhou City in 1994, 
                                                   
4  As China’s market economic system continuously developed, the reform and 
restructuring of state-owned enterprises had entered a practical stage. The process of 
reform was under a long and complicate process, the reform of the Xuchang railway 
sub-administration was completed during 2002 to 2008 in the present case. 
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and suspended its business in 2011. Through the forensic assessment in the 
first instance, the relocation fee of the poultry farm was about ¥ 2,824,274.   
The Intermediate Court of Xuchang confirmed the fact that, as one of 
key projects of Xuchang city, the reconstruction program of Xuyu narrow 
railway had obtained a qualified environmental impact assessment report from 
the local environmental protection departments. However, the content of the 
report only referred to an area within a radius of 120 meters to the railway. 
After the construction of the new railway bridge, the railway was less than 300 
meters to the poultry farm. The position change of the new railway directly led 
to a change of the neighboring environment of the farm, and finally made the 
relocation of the poultry farm unavoidable. As a result, the existence of the 
damage was an undeniable fact. According to the principle of fair and 
reasonable, as a benefited party from the management of the new railway, 
Yubo Company should be responsible for the relocation costs and pay 
economic compensation to Du Zengshen.  
On October 15, 2013, the judicial committee of the Intermediate Court 
made a decision (n.17, 2013) which upheld the judgment of the first trial and 
changed the relocation fee to ¥2,471,764.   
Not satisfied with the verdict, Yubo company made an appeal to the 
high court of Henan Province, claiming that the first instance judgment was 
based on unclear facts, since Du Zengshen had not proved that there was a 
causal connection between the tortious activities and his economic loss, and it 
is improper to apply the Tort Liability Law of PRC in such an environmental 
pollution case.  
In the retrial, the high court held that the key problem of the case was 
the casual connection between the act of the two appellants and the loss of the 
poultry farm. Although at the beginning, the reconstruction project had already 
obtained an official approval from the environmental protection department, 
considering the special requirement of the railway industry, the removal of the 
location of the railway bridge had actually changed the neighboring 
environment of the poultry farm. So there was a necessary causal connection 
between the act of reconstruction and the economic loss of the poultry farm. 
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As to the applying of the law, the high court held that it was proper for the 
first instance judgment to apply the regulations of tort law in the case: 
according to Article 65- Article 68 of the Tort Liability Law of PRC, if any 
harm was caused by environmental pollution, the polluter should assume the 
compensational liability.  
To conclude, the High Court of Henan Province held that the facts 
were clearly ascertained and the law and regulations were correctly applied in 
the first instance judgment. On July 11, 2014, according to the provisions of 
Chinese civil procedure law, the court made the final decision which sustained 
the decision of the Xuchang Intermediate Court.  
 
2. Comments. 
 
2.1. Environmental Pollution Cases and the Tort Law.  
  
In this case, the appellant claimed that judges should exclude the 
applications of the provisions of the Tort Liability Law in environmental 
pollution cases. The high court of Henan province disagreed to his allegation 
and rejected his appeal. Although the value of environmental protection is 
generally proclaimed by public laws, further protections provided for the 
victims’ interests in environmental pollution cases are accomplished by 
applying tort law in practice.  
Different from public laws, the essential character of private law is to 
regulate the relationship between individuals by balancing private interests, and 
the fundamental function of tort law is to protect legal interests from the 
interference of tortious acts. Therefore, where individual rights and interests 
are infringed by an environmental polluting activity, the victim can file an 
action in the court and request for protecting his private interests according to 
the tort law. Undoubtedly, the case of Du Zengshen v.Yubo Company and China 
Railway 12th Bureau (2014) referred to the problem of environmental protection 
to individuals in private law, so the application of the Tort Liability Law in this 
case was reasonable and necessary.  
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As a law concentrated on comprehensive protection of individual rights 
and interests, the Tort Liability Law of PRC was passed by the twelfth session 
of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National People’s Congress in 
2009, and came into force on July 1, 2010. In the part of special provisions of 
Tort Liability Law of PRC, seven types of liabilities were regulated under 
universal principles including the liability of environmental pollution.  
With respect to environmental hazards, the Tort Liability Law of PRC 
provides that where pollution causes injury, the defendant shall bear tort 
liability. Undoubtedly, the provision of Tort Liability Law has broadened the 
previous environmental regulations where the liability was primarily based on 
the violation of environmental laws. 
On April 24, 2014, the Environment Protection Law of the People’s 
Republic of China was revised by the PRC Government,5 which imposes 
stricter obligations on enterprises regarding pollution prevention and control. 
The legislative reform in the field of environmental law has a significant 
meaning to the development of environment law of China. On one hand, the 
Environment Protection Law provides severe penalties to the polluters from 
the sight of public interest; on the other hand, the application of Tort Liability 
Law in practice could offer individual victims a comprehensive and effective 
protection through the system of compensation from the environmental 
pollution activities.   
 
2.2. Determination of Causal Connection.   
 
The problem of causality in the law is always highly scientific and 
complicate. In tort law, the problem of causal connection is not a matter of 
fact but a legal issue, for which its essence is to determine the establishment 
and the scope of liability.  
                                                   
5 The Revised Law will come into force on January 1, 2015 and apply to almost every 
article of the current law. With regard to public policy, the Revised Law specifies that 
the Government shall support the development of the environment industry and shall 
encourage enterprises to take environmental protection measures. Furthermore, the 
Revised Law allows for environment public-interest litigation.   
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In civil law countriesthe adequacy theory of cause is widely accepted 
in determining the existence of the causal connection between the tortious 
activities and the damage.6 However, the complexity of real life determines that 
there is no single and simple way in practice to resolve all issues of causality, 
especially in certain fields.  
In consideration of the nature of environmental pollution activities, a 
special rule of “causal connection presumption” was adopted by Chinese 
legislators. Concretely speaking, according to the Tort Liability Law, where any 
dispute arises over an environmental pollution, the polluter shall assume the 
burden to prove that he should not be liable or his liability could be mitigated 
under certain circumstances as provided for by law or to prove that there is no 
causation between his conduct and the harm. Where the conductor cannot 
prove that the damage is not caused by his conducts, the causal relationship 
between the infringer’s act and the damage shall be presumed as exist, and the 
conductor shall be liable for the damage in these cases. In terms of the 
comparative law, most European civil law countries also adopt special rule of 
the causality presumption in the environmental pollution cases. 
The presumption of causal connection has a justification: in most 
environmental pollution cases, it usually takes a long time for the victims to 
realize the existence of their damage; and in order to provide a valid evidence 
of the necessary causal connection between the tortious act and the damage, 
the victims often need to acquire adequate scientific knowledge and 
instruments. Furthermore, even with the modern science and techniques, the 
necessary causal connection between the act and the damage is hard to be 
determined in many cases.  
Therefore, in order to alleviate the victim’s burden of proof and 
provide more comprehensive protection to the victim in environmental 
                                                   
6 The “relative causation theory” was proposed by Professor Johame Von Kries in 
1980’ from the University of Freiburg. Based on the theory, on the one hand, there 
shall be an indispensable “conditional relationship” between the acts and the damages 
(the “but for” test in common law), and on the other hand, the causal connection 
itself must have sufficiency, which means the connection between the acts and 
damages are correspondence with a social commonsense. 
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pollution cases, the legislator of the Tort Liability Law adopted the rule of 
“causal connection presumption”. 
Besides, in determining the existence of the causal relation, the judges 
usually adopt the policy consideration in practice. The acceptance of the policy 
consideration means that the judge may consider several important factors in 
the decision-making process. For instance, whether the tortfeasor committed 
his conduct deliberately or the interests and rights involved are worth good 
protection. Where the infringed rights and interests are extremely important, it 
is possible for the judge to presume the existence of necessary causal 
connection between the act and the damage.  
In this case, the defendants of the first instance claimed that the 
plaintiff did not present adequate evidence to prove the existence of necessary 
causal connection between the reconstruction activities and the economic loss 
of the farm. On this issue, the judge in the first instance applied the provision 
of Article 66 of the Tort Liability Law, based on which «the polluter shall 
assume the burden to prove that it should not be liable or its liability could be 
mitigated under certain circumstances as provided for by law or to prove that 
there is no causation between its conduct and the harm»7. 
 
2.3. Liability for Contractors in Tort. 
  
The independent contractor’s right of immunity was individualized as 
an interesting topic in this case. In the second trial, China Railway 12th Bureau 
defended that he should not assume any liability, since the concrete transport 
work was executed by local residents during the reconstruction process, and he 
acted only as the principal of the contract for service, not as an employer. 
Instead of answering the appellant’s question directly, the judge quoted the 
provision of Chinese Civil Procedure Law to reject his claim: «in 
environmental pollution case, the conductor should burden the proof of the 
causal relationship between the conduct and the damage». Actually, the claim 
                                                   
7 Available at http://www.doc88.com/p-5456119434729.html (last visited October 
2014). 
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of appellant concerned the question of differences between the contract of 
service and the one for service.  
Compared with other types of contracts, the recognition of the 
contract agreement is a matter more frequently dealt with in the field of 
vicarious liability. Generally speaking, the doctrines and case-law definitely 
exclude the application of vicarious liability in the contract agreement, since 
the autonomy status of the contractor is deemed to be a direct antithesis of the 
relationship of employment. However, such exclusion does not mean that the 
principal will be exempted from every tort liability for damage caused by the 
contractor. When the contractor simply executes the orders of the principal 
and behaves as a nudus minister who carries out specific directives without 
possibility of making a choice, the principal should be directly liable for all the 
torts committed during the execution of the work.  
Generally speaking, the term “employment” means a person who 
contracts for services of an independent contractor. Different from the 
employee, the contractor in contract agreement has his own autonomy in the 
execution of the task--this is the key issue which leads to the exclusion of 
vicarious liability in this field. In other words, the identification of contract 
agreement itself could be seen as an exclusion of the application of vicarious 
liability8. 
According to the contract concluded by the two parties, when the 
workers had total freedom to organize the work and determine their working 
hour, manner and place without any interference from the corporation, the 
workers are independent contractors and the principal will be exempted from 
any liability, since the contract had established full autonomy for the transport 
workers. In this case, although the appellant (China Railway 12th Bureau) 
                                                   
8 However, the autonomy on this matter is understood with different meanings. For 
example, some judges consider that the autonomy means that the contractor carries 
on activities with his own organization and instruments; some emphasize the fact that 
the contactor behaves in his own way in the execution of the work; some bring 
forward that the autonomy should derive from the operating activities carried out on 
the contractor’s own risk which is inherent to the execution of the work, etc. Under 
certain circumstance, it is still a difficult task for judges to distinguish the status of an 
independent contractor from an employee. 
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entrusted the tasks as a part of reconstruction process to a group of transport 
workers, the workers carried out the work in a fixed time and route under the 
surveillance of the appellant. Under such a consideration, the rule of 
independent contractor could not be applied in the case, and the appellant 
could not be exempted from the liability.  
 
2.4. The Principle of Liability. 
 
The axiom “no liability without fault” is a principle widely applied in 
the law. In the field of penal law, it is accepted as a general standard for the 
imputation of penal liability9. Such a principle may not be considered as a 
dominant rule in the field of civil liability, although from the traditional point 
of view, the expression of civil liability is always evoked with the idea of 
culpability10. In considering the nature and function of the civil liability, the 
concept of civil liability corresponds to a legal situation by which a subject 
receives compensation of the damage produced by others according to the 
normative criterion of imputation. From this point, the objection of the civil 
liability law is to provide possible protection to the victims in the tortious 
event, so the indemnification of the damage is deemed as instrumental for the 
distribution of the loss suffered by the victim.  
The Tort Liability Law of PRC provides the general clause of fault 
liability and no-fault liability and concrete regulations of special types of tort 
liabilities, including the vicarious liability for the conduct of others (Article 34-
                                                   
9 It is confirmed that the penal sanction to the crime will only be initiated when the 
conductor committed his activity with a conscience and will, and the sanction towards 
the felony requires the presence of a willful misconduct, whereas concerns the 
misdemeanor offense, the subjective element indifferently assume the willful 
misconduct and the negligence. Consequently, in the field of penal liability, a subject 
will be responsible only when his conduct is culpable. 
10 The reason for the different positions of the fault principle in civil law and in penal 
law is that the two liabilities are established on different foundations, the former is to 
compensate the damages, whereas the latter is to provide necessary sanction. Since the 
foundation of civil liability is not always and necessarily connected with the 
reprehensibility of the conduct, it is not surprising that the principle of fault is not the 
dominant standard for the imputation.  
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Article 35), the liability for motor vehicle traffic accident (Article 48-Article 
53), the liability for environmental pollution (Article 65-Article 68), the liability 
for ultrahazardous activity(Article 48-Article 53) and the liability for harm 
caused by domestic animal(Article 78-Article 84), etc. Therefore, the China 
legal system of civil liability can be characterized by a double-tracked model 
which is established on the basis of fault liability (Article 6) and no-fault 
liability (Article 7). Besides, liability without fault is also proclaimed by some 
special law statutes, such as the Law of Environmental Protection and the Law 
of Road Traffic Safety11. 
At first glance, the Chinese model of liability seems similar to the 
Italian double-tracked model which distinguishes the objective liability from 
the subjective one. It is well know that the double-tracked model of civil 
liability system are usually based on deep understandings of the essence of civil 
liability which means to transfer the damage from the victim to some others 
according to the criterion either of fault or of risk. However, through 
observations to the development of Chinese tort liability system, many scholars 
pointed out that the “double-tracked model” of China tort law is actually based 
on a summary of the past experiences of applying the fragmented legislations 
on tort liability12. It is not a result of the deliberation of the essence of civil 
liability. The existence of no-fault liability in environmental pollution case is 
explained by the legal doctrine as a natural result of an industrialized society13.  
In tort law, the polluter might be held liable even if his act has 
complied with the relative requirements of the environmental law. In this case, 
the appellant claimed that their reconstruction work did not produce an 
excessive noise based on the required noise standard made by the local 
environmental protection office. Actually, the noise standards issued by the 
environmental protection office were only used to control the discharge of 
                                                   
11  It should be noted that all these statutes provide no-fault liability without 
considering the foundation of these liabilities and the possible conflicts among them. 
12 See L. WANG (
)Y. ZHOU ( ), et.al., Textbook on the Tort Liability Law 
of China, The People’s Court Press, 2010, 120-180. 
13 Actually, one of the most serious problems of Chinese tort law is that the legal 
doctrine is yet to be further developed in order to explain, direct and act as a part of 
the law.  
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pollutants. What’s more, the appellant of the case did not obtain an effective 
approval from competent environmental protection department, neither listen 
to the comments and suggestions of the units and residents in the place where 
the construction project was located. Consequently, the judge of the first 
instance made his decision according to the provision of the Tort Liability 
Law: «any damage has been caused to others by environmental pollution, the 
polluter shall assume the tort liability» 
In this case, in explaining the reasons why the two defendants should 
be liable for the victim’s loss, the court’s reference of the concept  
“beneficiaries” implied that the judges considered the foundation of liability on 
the basis of the “risk and profit” theory with an exploitation of the old legal 
maxim cuis comoda eius et incommoda14. According to the theory, the conductor 
should be held liable for the risks involved in his productive activities. In other 
words, since the two defendants expanded their businesses and profit 
expectations through the reconstruction project, they should burden both the 
negative and positive consequences derived from such activities. Finally, the 
judge held that the two appellants should be liable for their environmental 
pollution activities, considering that the enterprises should take on the risks 
they created and from which they benefitted. 
 
                                                   
14 The meaning of this Latin maxim is that the party which profits from a situation, 
should also burden the results of such a situation (chi trae vantaggio da una situazione, deve 
sopportarne anche i pesi). Such a principle indicates that the liability should be assumed by 
the one who had benefited from the activity. J. STEELE, Tort law: Text, Cases, and 
Materials, Oxford, 2007, 563 and ff. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
Environmental protection non-governmental organizations (hereinafter 
as “ENGOs”) in China are mainly divided into four types: ENGOs established 
and sponsored by governments, such as China Society of Environmental 
Science, All-China Environmental Federation (ACEF), China Environmental 
Protection Foundation, Environmental Volunteers Association of Liaoning 
Province; ENGOs established by the public, such as Friend of Nature, Earth 
Village, Environmental Volunteers Group, Saunders Gull Protection 
Association in Panjin City; ENGOs established by the students, including the 
internal environmental groups at universities; China office of foreign or 
international NGOs such as World Nature Foundation1. In the past decades, 
China ENGOs have developed largely 2  and played an important role in 
                                                   
1 ACEF, Report on the status quo of the development of China Environmental Protection 
Organizations, in Environmental Protection(in Chinese), vol.10, 2006. 
2 According to Ministry of Civil Affairs of China, compared with 2011, in 2012 there 
were 6816 social organizations on environmental protection (increased by 6.3%) and 
1065 private non-enterprises units on environmental and ecological protection 
(increased by 10.1%), totally 7887 ENGOs in 2012. See The Development of Social Service 
in 2012 Statistical Bulletin, available at 
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improving the consciousness of the public about their environmental rights, 
supervising and publicizing the illegal discharge of pollutants by the industries, 
enhancing the disclosure of environmental information from the 
environmental protection administrative agencies (hereinafter as “EPA”)3. The 
standing of ENGOs in environmental public interest litigation takes a long 
period of time to be recognized by Chinese environmental law though.   
The first version of China Environmental Protection Law (hereinafter 
as “CEPL”) was adopted in 1989, which prescribes that «(A)ll units and 
individuals shall have the obligation to protect the environment and shall have 
the right to report on or file charges against units or individuals that cause 
pollution or damage to the environment»4. This general provision conforms to 
the framework nature of the CEPL and has been always quoted as the legal 
basis of standing of units or citizens in environmental public interest litigation5. 
However, this provision does not provide an explicit legal basis for the 
standing of an ENGO in an environmental public litigation6.  
The revised China Civil Procedure Law (CCPL), which took effect in 
January 2013, prescribes in its article 55 that «(W)here environment is polluted, 
the lawful rights and interests of a throng of consumers are infringed upon, or 
other acts impairing the public interest are committed, the organs stipulated by 
                                                                                                                                 
http://cws.mca.gov.cn/article/tjbg/201306/20130600474746.shtml, 19 June 2013 
(last visited September 2014). 
3 For the discussion on the roles of the ENGOs, see, for example, Z. JU, Status Quo 
and future development problems of ENGOs, in Environmental Protection and Circular Economy 
(in Chinese), vol.7, 2011, 71-73; Q. ZHOU, Characteristics of the activities of ENGOs in 
recent years, in Environmental Education (in Chinese), vol. 2, 2011.  
4 Article 6, China Environmental Protection Law (1989). It was adopted and took 
effect on 26 December 1989. Both Chinese and English version of this law can be 
found in 
http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=fzcsKL23McRWIKVN4Zyjf7fzRvTym0rECX4m
wds6Hg_TYIpBQ-1JjQ0OgANqpNdiMEBOnF7BsKEMWbyXVjAM-P6puZOf-
_6DYK_TwhNFSdy (last visited September 2014). 
5 This can be reflected in the following case. Actually this always happened to the 
environmental cases brought by the ENGOs before the adoption of the new CEPL. 
For the examples of the cases, see note 15 below.  
6 This provision is further discussed in the third section of this article. 
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law and relevant organizations may bring actions to the people’s court»7. This 
provision can be regarded to offer a legal basis for the establishment of a civil 
public interest system and a solution to the problem of the qualification of the 
plaintiff although it explicitly deprives individuals of their right of action. 
Regarding the scope of the organizations which could have the right of action8, 
it is suggested that such organizations should meet the following requirements: 
a. Lawfully registered non-profit environmental protection organization or 
consumers association; b. Specializing in environmental protection or 
consumers’ rights protection in practice for public interest for long time in 
accordance with its rules; c. Possessing more than 10 full-time technical and 
legal staff for the protection of environment or consumers’ rights; d. The 
litigation the organization filed should conform with its aim, scope of its 
service and its professional scope listed by its rule 9 . According to this 
suggestion, however, few environmental protection organizations could be 
qualified as the plaintiff of environmental public interest litigation since many 
ENGOs possess less or none of legal staff10. Moreover, due to the too general 
provision of the revised CCPL, none of the cases brought by the ACEF in 
                                                   
7 Article 55, Civil Procedure of Law of People’s Republic of China, amended on 31 
August 2012. The English version can be found on 
http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=M14auuwHD20NajTOScPaPGIhazyhxBhHnuc9E
VQaN4MG4GEPB7BjqtQNrTl5DpxSemFuuS_LK0zGp-
WIEe_wRxdm7itRPjBWMH68a7Up2JW (last visited September 2014). 
8 “The organs by law” currently according to the China Civil Procedure Law are only 
the organs with marine environment supervision and management power in 
accordance with the provisions of Marine Environmental Protection Law of China. 
Marine Environmental Protection Law of China, Article 90.2.  
9 G. MINZHI, Understanding and application of civil public interest litigation, People’s Court 
Newspaper, 7 December 2012, available at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2012/12/id/799020.shtml (last visited 
September 2014). This is always considered as the interpretation of the Supreme 
Court about this issue in China. 
10 According to the investigation, in China, 76.1% of ENGOs have no fixed financial 
sources, 22.5% raised little fund, 81.5% had the fund lower than 50,000RMB. Due to 
financial shortage, more than 60% ENGOs could not afford their own office space, 
43.9% of full-time staff in ENGOs rarely have wages and 72.5% ENGOs have no 
capacity to provide welfare such as unemployment, medical insurance for their 
employees. ACEF, Report on Status Quo of China Environmental Protection Organizations, in 
Environmental Protection, vol.10, 2006.   
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2013 after the come-into-force of the CCPL(2012) was accepted by the court 
as a result11. 
As a response to the revision of the CCPL, CEPL, which started its 
revision since 2011, in article 48 of the second review of its draft publicized in 
August 2013 prescribes that “(T)o the behaviors that damage the public 
interest including the pollution of the environment, destruction of the ecology, 
All-China Environmental Federation (ACEF) and such associations at 
provincial level may file an action to the court.” This provision confines the 
standing of the environmental public interest litigation to the ACEF or its 
divisions at provincial level, which was questioned by many experts and 
organizations as the special provision of the ACEF12. As such, the third review 
of the draft CEPL in October 2013 stipulates that the organization to have the 
right to sue shall be « at national level with good reputation, specializing in 
non-profit environmental protection activities for 5 years consecutively and 
having been registered at civil administrative department».  
The newly revised China Environmental Protection Law, which was 
approved on 24 April 2014 and will take effect since 1 January 2015, accepted 
the provision of the CCPL (2012) on this issue. Its article 58 stipulates the 
requirements for an ENGO to sue against the polluter to the court. 
Article 58 The organizations that may bring a lawsuit to the court 
against the activities which have caused pollution to the environment, 
destruction of the ecology and/or damage to public interest shall meet the 
following requirements: 
(a) registered in accordance with the law in the districts and municipal 
people's governments above the civil affairs department; 
                                                   
11 After the effective date of the CCPL, ACEF filed 7 lawsuits relating to water 
pollution by Weifang Legang food Ltd., environmental tort of Housing Security and 
Urban Construction Management Bureau in Yuanping City, Shanxi Province, water 
pollution by Shuangqing Barium sulfate Co. Ltd.of Chongqing City, water pollution by 
Jinyuan Mining Co. Ltd.in Lingbao County, water pollution by Tiangong Biological 
Engineering Co. Ltd. In Hainan Province, water pollution by Luoniu Mountain Pig 
Breeding Co. Ltd. In Hainan Province, environmental administrative illegality of State 
Bureau of Oceanography.          
12 Q. XIE, Environmental Public Interest Litigation to be formally ice-broken, in Focus Monthly 
(in Chinese), 18.   
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(b) specializing in environmental protection activities on behalf of public 
interest for five consecutive years with no illegal records.  
Proceedings of the social organizations shall not reap economic 
benefits through litigation. 
It should be noted that besides other improvements13, public interest 
litigation is prescribed in law for the first time. However, this provision still 
could not ensure the standing of many ENGOs because of the registration 
requirement – many ENGOs in China are not registered at civil administrative 
department14.  
Whilst the influence of the new CEPL has not yet been manifested, the 
shortcomings of the environmental protection law in China did not prevent 
the ENGOs from participating in environmental public interest litigation 
based on national law and local regulations 15 . The case of All-China 
                                                   
13 The newly revised China Environmental Protection Law established several new 
systems or measures, compared with its first version. For instance, this law for the 
first time set up the red line for ecological protection (art.29), continuous penalty 
counted by day to the polluter (art.59), early warning mechanism of public monitoring 
of environmental pollution (art.47), power of supervision department to seal and/or 
detain the equipment of the polluter enterprises (art.25) and the introduction of 
permit management system (art.45).     
14  According to China Regulation on the registration management of social 
organizations (CRRMSO), establishing a social organization shall have appropriate 
competent department. But for China grass ENGOs and foreign ENGOs, it is not 
easy for them to find their competent department. Besides, the CRRMSO also 
regulates that a social organization at national level shall have more than 100,000 RMB 
available for their activities, a local organization shall have at least 30,000 RMB activity 
fund, and a social organization shall have more than 50 individual members, which 
seems too restrictive to public interest and non-profit EMGOs. Thus, many ENGOs 
could not register at civil administrative department but industrial and commercial 
administrative department. Only a few (approximately 23.3%) were registered at civil 
administration department. Notably, the newly publicized Interpretation on related 
application problems regarding the judgment of environmental civil public interest litigation by the 
Supreme Court of China (draft) issued on 30th September2014 further clarifies in its article 
2 the types of social organization that may be entitled to file an environmental public 
interest litigation, including ENGOs registered at civil affairs department and 
foundation. For the Interpretation, see 
http://www.lawxp.com/statute/s1755731.html (last visited October 2014). 
15 From 1995 to 2012, there have been 53 cases for public interest, among which 8 
cases were filed or co-filed by the ENGOs, including the case to be discussed at the 
second section of this article. The other 7 cases are ACEF vs. Jiangyin Port Container 
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Environmental Federation, Guiyang Public Environmental Education Center vs. Guiyang 
A paper mill sentenced by Qingzhen People’s court which established the first 
environmental protection tribunal in China is one of the most representative 
cases in which ENGOs could play an important role. This case is discussed 
below as an example to illustrate the influence of the new CEPL could have 
and challenges the new law would face in the future practice. 
 
2. The Case. 
 
All-China Environmental Federation (hereinafter as “ACEF”), together 
with Guiyang Public Environmental Education Center (hereinafter as 
“GPEEC”), brought an action against Guiyang A paper mill (hereinafter as “A 
mill”) about water pollution in 2010. The applicants alleged that A mill shall 
stop the discharge of industrial waste water so as to eliminate the damage to its 
down stream Nanming River and Wu River, pay them reasonable fee such as 
lawyers fee 10,000RMB and bear the legal fare16. The defendant admitted the 
fact of the discharge and is willing to bear the liability, but explained that it 
discharged waste water only because its equipment broke down which led to its 
inability to dispose the waste water.   
In this case, the defendant A mill situated the bank of the downstream 
of Nanming River, Guiyang City. According to the discharge permit issued by 
the local EPA, A mill is not allowed to discharge waste water. However, since 
2003 the defendant has been always fined and mandated to modify during the 
limited period by the local EPA several times because of its secrete illegal 
                                                                                                                                 
Co. Ltd. Of Jiangsu City (2009), ACEF vs.Land and Resources Administration Agency 
of Qingzhen City (2009), Qujing EPA, Friend of Nature, Green Volunteers 
Association of Chongqing City vs. Luliang Peaceful Technology Co. Ltd.(2011), 
ACEF vs.Xiuwen County EPA (2011), ACEF, Guiyang Public Environmental 
Education Center vs. Haoyiduo Milk Products Co. Ltd.(2012), ACEF vs. Dayakou 
Coal mine of Zhazuo, Xiuwen County(2012), and ACEF vs.Hui Mountain Scenic 
Region Management Committee (2012).      
16 All-China Environmental Federation, Guiyang Public Environmental Education Center vs. 
Guiyang A Paper Mill, in Z. JUN (editor), Selected Cases regarding Ecological Protection in 
Guiyang, Renmin Courts Publishing, July 2013, 7-16.  
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discharging industrial waste water into the Nanming River17. As such, to ensure 
its zero discharge of industrial waste water, the defendant promised to the local 
EPA that it would close its industry itself if the direct discharge of waste water 
into Nanming River occurs in the future.  
Nevertheless, the defendant did not keep its promise. It was found by 
the plaintiff and the court that the defendant’s illegal discharge activities 
continued. At daytime, the defendant pumped the sewage generated during the 
day into the reservoir and stored it there temporarily. In the evening from 6pm 
into 7am the next day, the sewage was introduced into the cave through 
concealed trench and then directly discharged into the Nanming River. 
According to the technology report and the legal representative of the 
defendant, by this way, the defendant discharged the industrial waste water into 
the Nanming River by 600 tons per day. The sample report of the waste water, 
inspected by Guiyang Municipal Environmental Monitor Center, showed that 
the ammonia nitrogen content in the waste water is 8.2 mg / L, chemical 
oxygen demand of 967 mg / L, the chromaticity is 200 times, biochemical 
oxygen demand of 330 mg / L. All these data seriously exceeded the national 
discharge standards. 
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had breached the relevant 
provisions of China Environmental Protection Law as well as China Water 
Pollution Prevention and Control Law since it discharged waste water without 
discharge permit and its discharged sewage substantially exceeded the national 
permitted standards, which resulted in the severe pollution to the Nanming 
River and damaged public environmental right of Guiyang citizens. On behalf 
of environmental public interest, the plaintiff filed the action to the court. 
 
 
 
                                                   
17 For instance, in November 2003, the defendant was ordered to correct its illegal 
activities within certain period; in March 2004, it was fined 1000RMB due to its 
circulating water tank leakage and un-use of boiler desulfurization facilities; in March 
2005, the defendant was fined again 9000RMB because of its illegal discharge of waste 
water into Nanming River. Ibid, 9.   
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3. The Sentence. 
 
Based on the facts and evidences, the court sentenced that the 
defendant breached the law, namely, article XX.1 & XX.3 of China Water 
Pollution Prevention and Control Law 18 , which stipulates that pollution 
discharge permission license system is established, any enterprises or 
institutions without such license or in breach of provisions relating to such 
license are prohibited to discharge waste water or sewage into the water body. 
As such, the defendant shall obtain pollution discharge permission license in 
order to discharge the sewage or industrial waste water. However, the license 
the defendant obtained only allows it to discharge SO2 and smoke dust, 
excluding the sewage.  
The court further sentenced that the defendant also breached article 
XXII.2 of China Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law, which provides 
that it is prohibited to discharge water pollutants through kangaroo 
underground pipes or other ways in order to avoid supervision, and the 
defendant shall bear the civil liability for damage to the Nanming River, stop 
discharging sewage and eliminate such damage. The defendant argued that it 
discharged waste water because its equipment was broken. This was rejected by 
the court who believed that the equipment should be fixed within reasonable 
period but the evidences showed that the defendant kept illegally discharging 
waste water for long period of time, which had seriously polluted Nanming 
River and damaged the environment and public interest. 
The court thus sentenced that the defendant shall stop discharging 
waste water to the Nanming River, eliminate the damage, pay the lawyers’ fee 
RMB 10,000 pre-paid by the ACEF and the testing fee RMB 1,500 pre-paid by 
the Guiyang Municipal Two-lakes-one-reservoir Foundation within 10 days 
since the effective date of the judgment, and bear the case acceptance fee 
RMB60.  
                                                   
18 It was amended for the third time in 2008. Its English version can be found at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=39&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&Sear
chCKeyword= (last visited on 25 December 2014) 
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As far as the standing of the plaintiff is concerned, the court 
respectively quoted provisions of CEPL (1989) and Guiyang Municipal Regulation 
on Promoting Ecological Civilization Construction. According to article 6 of 
CEPL(1989) which stipulates that any organization and individuals have the 
obligation to protect the environment and are entitled to impeach and accuse 
any units or individuals who polluted or damage the environment, the court 
judged that filing a public interest litigation by the units against the polluter is 
one way of realizing such right. Also, article 23 of Guiyang Municipal Regulation 
on Promoting Ecological Civilization Construction provides that ENGOs may bring a 
lawsuit in accordance with the law against the pollution of the environment 
and/or destruction of resources and request the relevant liable bodies to stop 
the infringement, remove the obstruction, eliminate the dangers, reinstate the 
damaged environment, and so on.  
Based on these provisions, the court sentenced that the plaintiffs, 
namely, the ACEF and GPEEC are both legally registered environmental 
protection organizations and the public interest litigation brought by the 
plaintiffs, on behalf of injured public environmental right wherever there are 
no specific victims, is one way of exercising the right of supervision and 
complaint in accordance with the law and regulations, which reflected that the 
environmental protection organizations and units are participating in the 
environmental management, supervising the implementation of environmental 
protection law, pushing the environmental protection and thus playing a 
positive role.  
If this case is only based on article 6 of the CEPL (1989), it should be 
noted that this article does not explicitly provide a legal basis for an 
environmental NGO to gain the standing in a public interest litigation. 
Moreover, before the come-into-force of the CCPL(2012), the plaintiff could 
only bring a lawsuit to a court when his own interest or right was infringed. 
Thus, according to the CCPL before 2013 when its revision came into force, it 
is hard to conclude that an ENGO could have the standing to file an action 
against the polluter directly on behalf of public interest. The only legal basis for 
the standing of the plaintiff in this case is the local regulation, which explicitly 
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prescribes the right of an ENGO to file an environmental public interest 
litigation and largely expanded the scope of such ENGOs.  
Should the case be judged after the effective date of the CEPL(2013), it 
has to be noted that in this case, only the ACEF is qualified to bring the 
lawsuit to the court because the GPEEC, although registered at the civil 
administration department, was only founded in March 2010, which does not 
meet the requirements prescribed in the CEPL (2013). Also, such NGOs as 
the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (CLAPV) that have rich 
experience in environmental litigation acting on behalf of the victims for the 
public interest could not gain the standing according to the new CEPL19. In 
fact, regardless of the limited number of the ENGOs registered at civil 
administration department, it is reported only 30% of the investigated ENGOs 
expressed their willingness to use public interest litigation as the utmost means 
of safeguarding environmental rights and less than 14% of the surveyed 
ENGOs had such experience in participating in environmental public interest 
litigation20. Reasons behind include the insufficient capacity of filing an action 
due to limited or none full-time legal staff and high cost due to time-
consuming process21. In China, many ENGOs especially purely grass-root 
ENGOs are not quite familiar with China environmental protection law and 
could not participate in the legislation for environmental protection in China. 
All these factors largely limited the number of the ENGOs that are qualified to 
bring an environmental lawsuit to a court for the public interest.  
                                                   
19 Such ENGOs as the CLAPV that has rich experience in environmental public 
interest litigation are quite few in China though. The CLAPV is registered at China 
University of Political Science and Law. For the information of the CLAPV, see 
www.clapv.org. 
20 W. SHEKUN, Survey Report on the roles of ENGOs in environmental public interest litigation, 
January 2014, 10-11. This project has been funded by the ACEF and Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC).  
21 For the problem of limited or lacking of legal staff and the shortage of financial 
support, see supra note 10. Also, the survey found that 48% of the surveyed ENGOs 
have no professional legal unit and apart from several ENGOs, most of the 
investigated ENGOs have very low capacity to organize and bring a lawsuit to the 
court. On the other hand, only 4% of the surveyed ENGOs could afford the cost of 
environmental public interest litigation. Ibid, 11-12.  
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4. Conclusion. 
 
In March 2010, Guiyang Municipal Regulation on Promoting Ecological 
Civilization Construction took effect, which clearly mentioned public interest 
litigation for the first time. Meanwhile, Guiyang Municipal Intermediate 
People's Court and Qingzhen Municipal People’s Court together published 
Implementation advice on the environmental public interest litigation to promote the ecological 
civilization construction, which clarifies that any citizen, legal person and other 
organizations are entitled to supervise, report and accuse the activities that 
caused pollution to the environment and have the right to require the 
environmental protection administration to conduct timely investigation22. This 
case discussed in this article is the first public interest litigation accepted by the 
court based on the provisions of Guiyang Municipal Regulation on Promoting 
Ecological Civilization Construction since its effect, according to which the court 
confirmed the standing of the environmental protection organizations.  
Compared with the CEPL (2013), these regulations enlarged and 
specified the scope of the standing of ENGOs, which largely facilitated the 
acceptance of the environmental public interest litigation brought by the 
ENGOs. The local practice showed that environmental public interest cases 
could be relatively easily accepted and paid much attention to in the regions 
where the regulations clarified the standing of the ENGOs23. On the other 
side, however, the new CEPL set too many limitations about the scope of the 
ENGOs that could bring an environmental lawsuit on behalf of the public 
interest24. Considering the urgent demand for protecting and reinstating the 
                                                   
22 Implementation advice on the environmental public interest litigation to promote 
the ecological civilization construction, Article 7. Its Article 12 also clearly put forward 
that in public interest litigation cases, the litigation fee could be postponed or freed, 
expert testimony verdict could be accepted, the expenses for testing or monitoring 
could be pre-paid or funded by the environmental protection foundation, and other 
new measures.      
23  These regions include several provinces such as Guizhou province, Yunnan 
Province and Jiangsu Province. These provinces normally established environmental 
tribunals at different level and possess better environment compared with other 
provinces. 
24 See the discussions in section 1 Introduction and section 3 Sentence.  
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deteriorating environment in China, several improvements should be made in 
order to facilitate more ENGOs to participate in the environmental public 
interest litigation. For instance, for more ENGOs to meet the first requirement 
about the standing of the ENGOs prescribed in the new CEPL, some changes 
have to be made to the Regulation on Registration Management of Social Organizations 
and Interim Regulation on Registration Management of Private non-profit Enterprises, 
which should clarify the competent authority of the ENGOs especially the 
grass-root ENGOs so that more ENGOs could register at civil administration 
department 25 . Also, to enhance the capacity of ENGOs in filing an 
environmental public interest litigation, besides the training of more ENGOs 
staff on China environmental protection law, borrowing the practice in this 
case, public environmental fund, the expenditure of which can be supervised 
by the ENGOs, could be established by the court or the competent authority 
for the reinstatement of the environment and solve the problem of the high 
cost of such litigation26.     
    
 
 
 
                                                   
25  The current Regulation on Registration Management of Social Organizations 
stipulates that to be registered at the civil administration department, the social 
organization shall be approved by its competent authority. However, so far rare 
competent authority can be found because of no explicit related regulations. 
26 This could also solve the problem of who would accept the compensation for 
damage to the environment through environmental public interest litigation. 
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THE SOLID WASTES CASE AND CHINESE JURIDICAL  
PRACTICE OF THE CAUSATION PRESUMPTION 
 
Lun Bai 
 
 
 
CONTENTS: 1. – Preface. 2. – A Typical Environmental Tort Case. 2.1. – 
Facts of the Case.   – 2.2. – First Instance of the Case. 2.3. – Appellate 
Instance of the Case. 3. – Comments on this Case. 3.1. – The Causation 
Between the Infringement Act and the Harm. 3.2. – Victim’s Proprietary 
Interests. 3.3. – Other Issues. 4. – Conclusion. 
 
 
 
1. Preface. 
 
Along with the contemporary development of the legal pluralism in the 
private sectors, environmental protection is generally considered as a social 
need pursued by the civil law, especially the law of torts. In China, in order to 
make the tort law instrumental in protecting the environment, the 
environmental tort is distinguished from the other torts in applying special 
rules such as the no-fault liability and the causation presumption. More 
specifically, the Tort Liability Law of China proclaimed in Article 65 and 66 
that where any harm is caused by environmental pollution, the polluter shall 
assume the tort liability; where any dispute arises over an environmental 
pollution incident, the polluter shall assume the burden to prove that he should 
not be liable or its liability could be mitigated under certain circumstances as 
provided by law or to prove that there is no causation between his conduct and 
the harm. According to these provisions, the polluter is liable for the damage 
from which his neighbor suffers if his conduct has contributed to the caused 
damage, and the burden of proving the causation between the infringement act 
and the damage is shifted from the victim to the polluter. 
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In an optimal situation, proper applications of these provisions in 
environmental tort cases would develop the traditional tort law into a green 
one. That is to say, the value of environmental protection would be effectively 
embedded into a pluralistic law of torts. Ideally, in such a pluralistic legal 
system, the value of environmental protection should be in harmony with 
other values pursued by the law, especially the needs of economic 
development. However, in current legal practice, it is still questionable whether 
or not the applications of these provisions can achieve the goal of 
environmental protection. For instance, although the Tort Liability Law of 
China explicitly proclaimed the rule of shifting the burden of proving causation 
to the defendant, different readings of this rule are still found in concrete cases. 
The problematic applications of the law make it difficult to accomplish the 
goal.  
In order to realize the legislative aim of the environmental tort norms, 
a fundamental question to ponder over is how the mechanism of the causation 
presumption has applied in environmental tort cases. Divergent answers to the 
nature of causation in the law may lead to different results in the legal practice.   
  
2. A Typical Environmental Tort Case. 
 
2.1. Facts of the Case. 
 
The case Lizhen Zhang vs. Qiyun Zhan (2014)1 was a typical example 
of applying the aforementioned norms in environmental tort cases. On 
October 8, 2003, Yanming Yang concluded a contract of the right to the 
contracted management of land2 with the Villagers' Committee of Black Village 
                                                   
1  (2014)          2  , 9 January 2014, available at 
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=pfnl&Gid=120711656&keyword=%
e5%bc%a0%e4%b8%bd%e7%8f%8d&EncodingName=&Search_Mode=accurate 
(last visited October 2014 )  
2 The right to the contracted management of land provided in Article 125 of the Real 
Rights Law refers to the holder’s right to possess, use and seek proceeds from the 
cultivation land, wood land and grassland, etc. under the contracted management 
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(Hongta District, Yuxi City, Yunnan). The key contents of the agreement are 
as follows: 1) Yanming Yang obtained the right to the contracted management 
of the 21.5 mus of land located in the South Ditch Area near the Rainbow 
Road, mainly for plant seedling and breeding; 2) the contract was valid for 15 
years; 3) the contract fee was ¥800 per mu every year. In 2005, Yanming Yang 
subcontracted a part of the land to Qiyun Zhan (the defendant), and an air-
brick workshop was built on the subcontracted land. In 2010, Yanming Yang 
subcontracted another 10 mus of the land on the south of the air-brick 
workshop to Lizhen Zhang (the plaintiff). The latter used the land to build 
rose cultivation greenhouses. The ground of the rose cultivation greenhouses 
lay lower than that of the air-brick workshop. 
In the afternoon of July 12, 2013, a heavy rain flooded Lizhen Zhang’s 
rose cultivation greenhouses and 95% of her roses withered. Believing that the 
fading of her roses was caused by the solid wastes such as cements, stone 
powder and coke powder produced by the air-bricks workshop and washed 
into the rose field by the rain, Lizhen Zhang brought a lawsuit of 
environmental tort against Qiyun Zhan in the local court for the damages of 
¥50,000 on October 9, 2013. On February 26, 2014, she modified the litigious 
claims increasing the amount of the damages to ¥1,497,408 and adding a 
request for restoring the original condition of the rose cultivation field. Qiyun 
Zhan replied that his business did not cause any pollution and requested the 
plaintiff’s claims to be overruled. In the proceedings, by the consent of both 
parties, the Justice Department of Technology of the local Court 
commissioned Yunnan Qiansheng Judicial Expertise Center (the center) to 
prove the causal relation between the solid wastes and the harm. On February 
18, the center submitted the report indicating that the commission could not 
be completed because of technical reasons. 
In calculating the damages, the court approved that Lizhen Zhang’s 
rose cultivation field had a total area of 7.24 mus. After being flooded, 95 
percent of the plaintiff’s roses withered to various degrees. Under normal 
                                                                                                                                 
thereof, and have the right to engage in planting, forestry, stockbreeding or other 
agricultural production activities. 
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circumstances, every mu would yield 12,000 buds of rose. According to the 
documents provided by Kunming International Flower Auction Trading 
Center Co., Ltd., the average price of the plaintiff’s roses was ¥1.41/bud 
during August 6 - August 12, 2013. Accordingly, the total price of such a 
quantity of these kinds of roses was ¥122,500. Deducted the amount that the 
plaintiff already gained in August which equaled to ¥8,758.62, the damages 
amounted to ¥113,741.38. 
 
2.2. First Instance of the Case. 
 
The court of first instance held that the plaintiff’s claims were lacking 
in supporting evidence and thus unsupportable.  
According to the court, the decision of this case was made according to 
the following legal provisions: 1) Article 65 and 66 of the Tort Liability Law of 
China; 2) Article 64. Para. 1 of the Civil Procedure Law which specifies that a 
party shall have the responsibility to provide evidence in support of its own 
propositions; 3) Article 2 of the «some Provisions of the Supreme People's 
Court on Evidence in Civil Procedures»3 which prescribes that the parties 
concerned shall be responsible for producing evidences to prove the facts on 
which their own allegations are based and the facts on which the allegations of 
the other party are refuted. Where a party cannot produce evidence or the 
evidence produced cannot support the facts on which allegations are based, the 
party concerned that bears the burden of proof should undertake unfavorable 
consequences; 4) Article 4. Para1(3) of the document above which proclaimed 
that in a compensation lawsuit for damage caused by environmental pollution 
the infringing party shall be responsible for producing evidence to prove the 
existence of exemptions of liabilities as provided in laws or that there is no 
causal relations between his act and the consequences.  
In deciding this case, the court noted that the plaintiff, asserting that 
the solid wastes produced by the defendant’s air-brick workshop had caused 
                                                   
3 It is a judicial interpretation made by the Supreme People's Court which has the 
same effect as the law in China. 
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her damage, could not produce any material evidence to prove the causation 
between the solid wastes and the roses’ fading away. Although it is prescribed 
by the law that the burden of proving the causal relations was shifted to the 
defendant, the court believed that proving the causation is still a professional 
issue that shall be answered by experts. When it came out that the question was 
scientifically unanswerable and thus the reasons why the roses withered 
remained unknowable, the court decided against the plaintiff and overruled all 
her claims since the facts on which her claims were based were not proved. 
 
2.3. Appellate Instance of the Case. 
 
Lizhen Zhang was not satisfied with the decision of the trial court and 
made an appeal to the intermediate court of Yuxi City. The case was heard by 
the intermediate court on August 12, 2014. In the appellate procedure, Lizhen 
Zhang claimed to rescind the judgment of the trial court, asked for damages 
amounting to ¥1,497,408.00 and requested for the restoration of the original 
state of her rose cultivation field. The reasons given by the appellant are listed 
as follows: 1) the trial court made obvious mistakes of fact. The court pointed 
out that the appellant failed to provide evidence to prove that the solid wastes 
produced by the air-brick workshop were washed by the rain to the rose 
cultivation field. However, it is an order of the nature that water flows 
downwards. Besides, the oral testimony provided in the first trial proved that 
the appellant had dug a drainage ditch between the workshop and her rose 
field but the ditch was later destroyed by the appellee. 2) The court misapplied 
the norms specified in Article 66 of the Tort Liability Law. The provision 
should be interpreted as a presumption of causation. According to the 
provision, if the appellee cannot provide evidence to prove that there are no 
causal relations between his conduct and the harm, the causation shall be 
deemed as existent. The same rule is proclaimed by Article 4. Para1(3) of the 
“Some Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Evidence”.         
In interpreting Article 65 and 66 of the Tort Law and other legal 
provisions concerned, the appellate court stated that where any harm is caused 
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by environmental pollution, according to the tort law, the polluter shall 
undertake tort liabilities, including removal of endangerment, compensation of 
damage, restoration to the original condition, and etc. The liability for 
environmental pollution is individualized since the principle of no-fault liability 
is fixed by the legislator. Where any dispute arises over an environmental 
pollution incident, the polluter shall assume the burden to prove that he should 
not be liable or his liability could be mitigated under certain circumstances as 
provided by law or to prove that there is no causation between his conduct and 
the harm. To trigger the shift of the burden of proof, the plaintiff has to 
provide initial evidence to prove the probability of the causal relation between 
the conduct of the defendant and the harm caused. Besides, the parties can 
resort to an expert testimony to prove the facts on which their allegations are 
based. If the application is made by the parties, they can jointly decide a judicial 
expert center or, when the consent is not made, the court can designate a 
judicial expert center for them. 
In this case, Lizhen Zhang, the appellant, believing that the solid wastes 
produced by the appellee have caused her losses, claimed in the appellate court 
for the damage compensation. The defendant refused the claims and asserted 
that no causation existed between his conduct and the damage consequences. 
On commission of the trial court, an expert testimony has been carried out and 
finished without result for technical reasons. Different from the trial court, 
under such circumstances, considering that the expert testimony is not the only 
form of evidence, the appellate court believed that the case could be decided 
on the bases of the facts ascertained by the court and «the order of nature or 
basic common sense».  
According to the court, the affirmed facts of the case are as follows: 
Lizhen Zhang’s roses were flooded in water for 2 hours after the heavy rain in 
the afternoon at 6 o’clock, July 12, 2013. Three day after the rain, 95% of the 
roses began to show symptoms of fading. The main materials used in making 
air-bricks were cement and sand. In consideration of that the rose garden was 
situated lower than the air-brick workshop and the lack of any drainage device 
between them, the solid wastes on the ground of the workshop were 
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undoubtedly washed into the rose cultivation field on that rainy day. The 
experts’ verbal evidence confirmed that the fading of the roses would have 
been caused by a variety of reasons. Among those reasons the flood from the 
heavy rain may play the primary role and the pollution of the solid wastes 
generated by the workshop might play the role as a secondary cause. In a 
normal situation, the roses will not wither merely because of being flooded if 
the rose seedlings are healthy and the roses are properly treated after being 
drowned, such as drainage, pruning, medicine, and etc. 
The evidence produced by the appellee could not exclude the 
possibility of the existence of the causation between the solid wastes produced 
by the air-brick workshop and the roses’ fading. In absence of the expert 
proof, “basic common sense” could be used as a form of evidence to prove 
the causation. Therefore, the trial court’s decision against Lizhen Zhang and its 
reasons were unsupported. The appellant’s claims should not have been 
completely overruled. However, the solid wastes washed into the rose field and 
the lack of the drainage device between the workshop and the rose cultivation 
greenhouses were to be regarded only as secondary causes for the harmful 
consequence, so the claim for damages was only partly supported. More 
specifically, only 20% of the total loss was supported at last. 
Additionally, the appellant’s claim for restitution was not supported as 
the continuing harmful consequence caused by the solid wastes was not 
proved.  
According to the reasons above-mentioned and the provisions of 
Article 170. Para.1(2) of the Civil Procedure Law of China and Article 65, 
Article 66 and Article 67 of the Tort Liability Law of China, the appellate court 
decided to rescind the original judgment and asked the appellee to pay the 
damages of ¥22,748.28 to the appellant within 30 days from the effective date 
of this judgment. Other claims were overruled. 
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3. Comments on This Case. 
 
The victim advanced two claims in this case: the claim for damages is 
based on Article 65 and 66 of the Tort Liability Law of China; the claim for 
restoring the victim’s land’s original situation could be based on the Tort Law 
and the Real Rights Law. The two issues will be discussed respectively as 
follows. 
 
3.1. The Causation Between the Infringement Act and the Harm. 
 
As regards to the claim for damages, the focus of the dispute lay in the 
interpretation of Article 66 of the Tort Liability Law of China which 
proclaimed that the polluter shall assume the burden to prove that there is no 
causation  between his conduct and the harm.  
As far as the court of first instance is concerned, the court did not 
interpret the norm contained in Article 66 of the Tort Law as a presumption of 
causation. On the contrary, the court believed that the defendant’s conduct 
should be proved as the “necessary cause” of the damage in constructing the 
defendant’s tort liability, no matter who assumed the burden to prove the 
causation. Therefore, although the defendant could not prove that there was 
no causation between his conduct and the harm, the court has sought advice 
from the experts to prove the causation. As long as even the experts could not 
prove any factual causal relations between the defendant’s act and the harm, 
the court decided to reject the plaintiff’s claim.  
As the appellant pointed out, the trial court misapplied the law. The 
court did not interpret the norm provided by Article 66 as a presumption of 
causation. According to the court, although the burden of proof was shifted to 
the defendant at the beginning of the trial, it would finally make the decision 
on the basis of experts’ proof. Obviously, such an interpretation of the law 
makes little sense, because the meaning of Article 66 is to allow the judge to 
presume the existence of the causation where no evidence to the contrary 
exists. But it is worthy for us to pay attention to the reasons given by the court 
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in the judgment: the court believed that only experts might have the ability to 
prove the factual causation in many environmental tort cases since it is usually 
very difficult to be proved for technical reasons. If the causation is scientifically 
unable to be proved, the court will decide against the plaintiff as there is no 
causation between the conduct and the harm. The court’s tendency to confuse 
causation in the law with the factual one is rather obvious in its reasoning.  
The appellate court had a different idea on the plaintiff’s claim for 
damages. It expressed in the judgment that «considering that expert testimony 
is not the only form of evidence, the case can be decided on the basis of the 
facts ascertained by the court and the order of nature or the basic common 
sense». Although the appellate court did support at least a part of the 
appellant’s claims on the basis of the causation presumption, its judgment is 
still questionable in many aspects. Without reckoning the percentage of 
damages supported by the court which will be discussed later in the paper, the 
reason for the court’s rejection of the victim’s claim for restitution seems hard 
to understand as it was obviously in conflict with its attitude to the claim for 
damages. Actually, the two claims did have the same factual basis. From the 
judgment it can be seen that, on one hand the rule of causation presumption 
was applied in supporting the victim’s claim for damages; on the other hand 
the same rule was very quickly forgotten by the same court – as the court said, 
since the continuing harmful consequence caused by the solid wastes was not 
proved, the claim for restitution was denied. The court’s self-contradictory 
attitude towards the two claims reflected its ambiguity in its attitude to the 
issue of causation. 
It is likely that the appellate court actually tended to support the trial 
court’s idea on causation: as a rule, the “but-for rule” must be carried out in 
proving the causation between the injurious act and the harm in order to 
support the victim’s claims, no matter on whom the burden of proof is 
imposed by the law. The court has wavered in deciding to support the claim 
for damages, but it came immediately back to the idea of “but-for rule” in 
dealing with the claim for restitution. Even in supporting the claim for 
damages, the reasons given by the court were somehow vague: it was 
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expressed in the judgment that the causation was identified in this case because 
«expert testimony is not the only evidence for proving the causation» once the 
experts failed to prove the factual causation, the causation could still be 
identified by «the order of nature or basic common sense». The court’s logic 
was erroneous firstly because of its confusion about the relation between the 
expert testimony and «the order of nature or basic common sense». First, since 
experts were supposed to make their final reports exactly on the basis of «the 
order of nature», the court would not confirm «the order of nature» unknown 
to the experts. Second, strictly speaking, the dispute arose exactly because there 
was no «common sense» that could help resolve the problem of causation. All 
the evidence in this case could only prove a certain degree of probability of 
causation. On this point, the function of «common sense» is not very different 
from that of the judicial expertise.  
The court’s logic is questionable secondly because that it did not tell 
the real reason for its identification of the causation in this case. In fact, 
“common sense” does have its special role to play in proving causal 
connections, as it is a condition for shifting the burden of proof. The victim 
may use “common sense” to prove the probability of causation and to trigger 
the shift of the burden of proof. Therefore, the causation was proved in this 
case not because “common sense” could be regarded as a substitute for the 
judicial expertise in proving the factual causation, but because all these 
evidence, including the judicial expertise and “common sense”, have proved 
the probability of causation which was enough to construct tort liability in 
environmental tort cases. In a word, the reason for the causation presumption 
did not lie in the function of “the common sense”, but in the evaluation of the 
legislator. 
It appears that the appellate court also tended to simply equalize 
causation in the law with factual one. In fact, such a misunderstanding of 
causal relations in the tort law is quite normal in China. In the 1980s and 
1990s, a very outdated theory of “necessary cause” was generally accepted by 
Chinese civil jurists. According to the theory, the term of causation is used in 
the law to indicate the “inherent, essential and necessary” connection between 
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the infringement act and the harm. Moreover, a cause is distinguished from a 
condition as the latter is used to indicate the “external, occasional” connection 
between the act and the harm. As a result, the external and occasional 
condition of the harm is excluded from the range of causes in the traditional 
Chinese law of torts. Apparently, the “necessary cause theory” confounds 
causation in the law with the one in Marxist philosophy4. Modern theories of 
causation in the law have been gradually introduced into China since the end 
of last century, and it is nowadays generally accepted by Chinese civil jurists 
that causation in the law is actually based on legal policies5. In interpreting the 
rule of the causation presumption provided by Article 66 of the Tort Liability 
Law, Chinese jurists generally note that the causation in the environmental tort 
cases is different from that in other cases, since the former can be proved by 
the judge’s “common sense” or “life experiences”6. Such causation is rather 
subjective. However, the impact of the old theory of “necessary cause” 
considering causation as a matter of fact can still be found in the juridical 
practices. Although the rule of the causation presumption is supposed to be 
applied in environmental tort cases, the courts still tend to confuse causation in 
the law with the factual one. 
The situation may be explained at least partly by the outdated 
understanding of the function of civil liability: the wrongdoer is to be punished 
for his wrongdoing through the law of torts. 7In fact, in the traditional model 
of tort law, “civil wrong” is established as a core element of civil liabilities. 
                                                   
4 On the traditional theory of “necessary cause”, see X. CHENG ( ), The Tort 
Liability Law, Law Press China, 181-182; X. CHENG, The Causation in the Tort Liability 
for the False Statements in the Security Market, Cited from the website 
http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=13794 (last visited November 
2014).   
5 See X. CHENG, The Tort Liability Law, 176-178; L. WANG (
), Y. ZHOU
 et al., The Tort Liability Law of China, The People’s Court Press 2010, 255-257.  
6 L. WANG, Y. ZHOU, et al., Ibid, 253-255. 
7  Actually, the punitive function of the tort law is explicitly proclaimed by the 
legislator in Article 1 of the Tort Liability Law of China in spite of many civil jurists’ 
opposition. See X. CHENG, The Tort Liability Law, 22; see also the Civil Law Office of 
the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress of China ed., The Legislative Backgrounds and Ideas of the Tort Liability 
Law, Law Press China 2010, 43, 111. 
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Such conception is deeply rooted in the traditional idea of identifying 
compensation with sanction of civil wrong (punitive justice model). It is 
generally said that there are two bases in this model: the first one is that the 
compensation for damage is the only general form of civil remedies. 
Consequently, it becomes a general pattern of the remedies for any civil 
wrongdoing which is to be punished. The second one is the widely 
acknowledged ethical principle that civil liabilities should be assumed by the 
person whose wrongdoing has caused the damage. The wrongful act thus 
becomes an element of the culpability8.   
In the punitive justice model of tort law, the function of civil liability is 
to find the person whose act has caused the damage (the wrongdoer) and let 
him burden the damage suffered by the victim. This cannot only explain why 
the principle of fault liability becomes the only criterion of imputation in the 
traditional tort law, but also explain the general misunderstanding of causation 
as a matter of fact: the liable person of torts must be the one who has caused 
the harm; and he is going to be punished by the law because of his 
wrongdoing. We can find the same logic in the judgments of the courts: if the 
causal connection between Qiyun Zhan’s conduct and the damage were not 
proved as a matter of fact, the court would hesitate to make him liable for the 
damage suffered by the victim9.  
The modern civil law scholars believe that the function of civil liability 
is not to find the real actor whose conduct has caused the damage, but to fix 
certain criteria by which the burden of damage can be shifted from the victim 
to some others (restorative justice model), and the criteria are to be fixed on 
the basis of certain legal values protected by the law.10 In a normal situation, 
everyone lives at his own risk. But if the risk or damage is involved in another 
person’s conduct, it may violate corrective justice if the victim is not 
                                                   
8 C. SALVI, La Responsabilità Civile, Giuffrè Editore, Milano, 1998, 4-5. 
9 As mentioned above, the appellate court rejected the appellant’s claim for restitution 
because there was no evidence to prove that the harmful effect was caused by the 
solid wastes.  
10 See S. RODOTÀ,  Il Problema della Responsabilità Civile, Giuffrè Editore, Milano, 1967, 
73-78. 
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compensated by that person. However, the foundation of civil liability is not 
always and necessarily connected with the reprehensibility of an act, and the 
principle of fault is not necessary to be the dominant standard for imputation.  
With the same logic, the function of causation is not to find the real 
person who causes the damage, but to shift the burden of loss from the victim 
to the one who deserves it from the legal point of view. This liable person may 
be but not necessary the one who actually causes the harm. That is exactly the 
basis and starting point of the civil liability for the environmental infringement. 
Obviously, the causation here is normative rather than factual11. 
  
3.2. Victim’s Proprietary Interests. 
 
Generally speaking, the environmental tort is concerned with the 
unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land, or of some 
rights over or in connection with that land12. It is generally believed that this 
definition illustrates one of the primary distinctions between the environmental 
tort and other torts, in that the civil liability imposed by the law is directed 
towards protecting proprietary interests rather than controlling an individual’s 
conduct13. This conclusion might be questionable if the contemporary law of 
torts is concerned, but it does reveal a very important distinction between the 
punitive justice model and the restorative justice model of tort law.  
In the case discussed above, if the court had based its reasoning on the 
restorative justice model, it would have paid more attention to protecting the 
proprietary interests of the victim rather than finding the real causes of the 
harm. Consequently, it would not have neglected that the case also involved 
the application of the Real Rights Law of China. The related provisions of the 
Real Rights Law are as follows: Article 92 provides that where the right holder 
                                                   
11 It is notable that some jurists believe that the activities for proving factual causation 
are also value-oriented. See W. MALONE, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, in Stan. L. Rev., 
1956, 9, 60-62, in C. CHEN (  ), The Causation and the Damages, Peking University 
Press 2006, 42-47.  
12 S. BELL, D. MCGILIVRAY, etc., Environmental Law, 8th ed., Oxford University Press, 
2013, 360-361. 
13 Ibid, 360. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SURVEY 2014 
 
234 
of a realty has to use a neighboring realty by virtue of using water, drainage, 
passage or laying pipelines, and etc., he shall make more efforts to avoid 
causing any damage to the right holder of the neighboring realty; He shall 
make corresponding compensations in case any damage is caused. Article 35 
proclaimed that in case a real right is under obstruction or may be obstructed, 
the right holder may require the removing of the impediment or the 
termination of the danger. Article 36 stipulates that in case a realty or chattel is 
damaged, the right holder may require the repairing, remaking, changing or the 
restoration of the original state. Article 37 indicates that in case the 
infringement upon a real right causes losses to the right holder, the right holder 
may require the compensation for the losses or the assuming of any other civil 
liability. Article 38 provides that the ways for protecting real right as prescribed 
in the present Law may apply either independently or jointly in light of the 
specific situation of an injury of real right.  
In this case, the victim’s claim for restitution of the land’s original state 
could have been very well supported by these provisions of the Real Rights 
Law without the need to prove the existence of any damage. However, neither 
did the trial court nor the appellate court even mention the provisions of the 
Real Rights Law in their judgments. Their neglecting of the Real Rights Law 
reflects the profound effects of the punitive model of torts in the courts. 
Actually, the courts focused nearly all their attention on finding the real 
reasons for the damage; while the demand to have the proprietary interests 
protected was somehow overlooked by them.    
 
3.3. Other Issues. 
 
In considering that protecting property rights can normally have the 
incidental effect of providing a general benefit to the wider community by 
achieving improvements in environmental quality14, the courts’ neglecting of 
the Real Rights Law also implied that they ignored the value of environmental 
protection. In its essence, a green tort law means that the principles of the 
                                                   
14 Ibid., 360-361. 
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environmental law can be used to interpret the provisions contained in the tort 
law. The new Environmental Protection Law of China 2014 proclaimed in 
Art.5 the significant principle of precaution. Technically, the reason for the 
causation presumption in environmental tort cases could be very well 
explained by this principle, since precaution is exactly based on the probability 
of danger involved in certain activities. In practice, it is quite normal in 
environmental tort cases that proving the causation is technically difficult and 
very costly. The infringement acts in these cases use to be broad, continuous 
and hidden, and the harmful consequences might appear only after a long 
period. In some cases, it is even impossible to find the causes of the harm 
under the condition of modern techniques. Under such circumstances, it 
would be unreasonable to ask the victim to produce evidence concerning 
causation to support their claims. Thus it can be seen that the presumption of 
causation is a rather useful legal technique to prevent the possible damage, and 
it is an inherent requirement of the principle of precaution provided by 
Article.5 of the Environmental Protection Law. 
Finally, the appellate court did not clarify in the judgment why the 
victim’s claim for damages was only partly supported and how the percentage 
(20%) was calculated. In fact, even though the dominant legal theories and 
practices upon causation in the Tort Liability Law of China do not distinguish 
legal causation from factual one, nor do them distinguish the causation for 
limiting the tort liability from the one for constructing tort liability, it is 
generally accepted that if a person’s conduct has materially increased the 
probability of the harm, or the harm is predictable, or the conduct is generally 
regarded as adequate to cause the harm, he should be liable for the harm if 
there is no excuse for him to mitigate his responsibility. As ascertained during 
the action, roses generally will not wither only because of being flooded if the 
rose seedlings are healthy and the roses are properly treated after being 
drowned.  Common sense tells us that the solid wastes produced in making air-
blocks increased the probability of doing harm to the roses, and the result was 
predictable as the victim had dug the drainage ditch between the workshop and 
her rose field to avoid the harm. Besides, there was not a third party involved 
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in causing the damage. All these facts were in conflict with the court’s 
judgment that the solid wastes were merely the secondary cause of the damage. 
On the contrary, if the victim could have proved that her seedlings were 
healthy and proper measures were done after the rain, it would be reasonable 
to deem the solid wastes washed into the rose cultivation field as an adequate 
cause for the caused damage. As a result, the defendant/appellee should be 
liable for all the damage suffered by the victim. 
 
4. Conclusion. 
 
Accordingly, the profound influence of the traditional punitive model 
of the tort law and of the Chinese “necessary-cause theory” of 1980s to many 
of Chinese courts has constructed an obstacle for the environmental tort 
norms to function properly. To a certain extent this is due to the deficiency of 
Chinese civil law studies on the function of civil liability and on causation in 
the law.  
In fact, in many environmental tort cases, the liability for 
environmental infringements is attributed to the defendant not because his 
conduct has materially caused the damage, but because his business involves a 
risk of pollution. Identification of the causation for constructing polluters’ tort 
liability is not a value-free activity. It is carried out on the basis of normative 
values predefined by the legislator.  
In addition, all the laws of a country should be regarded as a uniform 
system in logic as well as in values. Remedies for infringement of proprietary 
interests concerning a person’s use or enjoyment of land in private sectors can 
be found in the tort law as well as in the real rights law; moreover, although 
not functioning as legal sources in private litigations, some principles 
proclaimed by public laws, such as the principle of precaution provided by the 
Environmental Protection Law, might still be useful in interpreting specific 
legal rules of private laws. Such a legal reasoning is in practice to be done on 
the basis of an internal system of the law which is made of principles and 
values protected by the legal order of a country.       
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THE CASE OF THE ILVA PLANT IN TARANTO: HOW TO FIND 
THE PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN THE SAFEGUARD OF 
HEALTH AND THE PROTECTION OF THE ECONOMY? 
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Government’s Intervention: the “Save Ilva” Decree. 6. – The Judiciary’s 
Reactions: the Issue of Constitutionality. 7. – Concluding Remarks and 
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1. Introduction. 
 
The criminal proceedings initiated in relation to the activities of Ilva, a 
steel plant operating in Taranto, Italy, can be considered of interest in the field 
of environmental criminal justice in the light of the various relevant problems 
they aroused, both of legal and political nature. The first issue regards the need 
to strike a fair balance between contrasting principles, both equally recognized 
by law. On the one side, there is the health of the population of an entire city, 
under threat because of the pollution of the air produced by the steel plant; on 
the other, there is the economy of a town almost entirely based on that 
factory’s activity, which can be irremediably undermined in case its production 
is considerably reduced. This has inevitably led to a clash between the need to 
protect the citizens’ health and the need to preserve the economy of a region.  
The second issue concerns which subject is better placed to adopt the 
necessary decision and find the proper balance in the prevention of 
environmental crimes. Is it up to the judiciary to decide, or to the 
Government? This case shows that, sometimes, when the executive refrains 
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from acting for many years, the intervention of the judiciary appears to be the 
only solution left. At the same time, the action of the judiciary lacks the 
necessary flexibility and thus risks bearing irremediable side effects on the 
system’s economy. This is especially true in a legal system, like the Italian 
criminal justice system, which is strictly ruled by the legality principle, where 
the judiciary is independent from the executive and is subject only to the law1. 
This case indeed allows us to consider the complex interplay between 
these different subjects in the prevention of environmental crimes, and the 
inevitable interlacing of the traditional function of criminal justice, consisting 
in the establishment of crimes and liabilities, with aspects of management and 
administration of complex situations that involve different and hardly 
appeasable interests, yet all deserving consideration.  
 
2. What is Ilva? 
 
Ilva S.p.a. is located in Taranto, a city in southern Italy, and is the 
biggest steel plant in Europe. In December 2013 Ilva S.p.a. employed about 
sixteen thousands workers2. It was built in 1961 and until 1995 it was owned 
by the State3, but then it was sold to a private company, the Riva Group, who 
still presently owns it. 
Since the beginning, however, the activities of Ilva had given rise to 
concerns of pollution and environmental dangers. As soon as July 1997, the 
Government declared Ilva an area of high danger of environmental crisis, and 
in 1998 Taranto was classified as a site of national interest that needed 
                                                   
1 Article 101 paragraph 2 of the Constitution states that «judges are subject only to the 
law», and article 104 provides that «the judiciary constitutes an autonomous order, 
independent from any other power». See M. CAIANIELLO, The Italian Public 
Prosecutor:  An Inquisitorial Figure in Adversarial Proceedings?, in E. Luna, M. Wade 
(editors), Transnational Perspectives on Prosecutorial Power, Oxford Un. Press, 2012, 250 
and ff.; G. ILLUMINATI, The Role of the Public Prosecutor in the Italian System, in J. Peter, P. 
Tak (editors), Tasks and Powers of the Prosecution Services in the EU Member States, Wolf 
Legal Publishers, 2004, vol. I, 308–10. 
2 See www.gruppoilva.com (last visited July 2014). 
3 At the time it was called Italsider. 
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reclamation, as it was found that the mortality rates for lung and bladder 
cancer were higher than the average in the region4.  
The continuing situation of pollution in the area of Taranto led the 
judicial authorities to open a criminal investigation in the end of the 90’s, 
which then ended in 2005 with the conviction of several managers of Ilva for 
emission of big quantities of mineral dusts and dioxin and omission of any 
actions for preventing it5. 
However, the already alarming environmental and sanitary situation 
kept on escalating over the years: various studies reported high rates of cancer 
mortality in the area, cases of presence of dioxin in mother’s milk, and the 
killing of thousands of livestock. The mayor of Taranto even ordered the 
temporary closing of public gardens in a part of the city, due to the presence of 
dioxin in the grass. Such studies established that the cause of the pollution 
were the harmful emissions coming from the plant of Ilva, that in 2008 was 
established to produce quantities of dioxin that were eleven times higher than 
the maximum level permitted at global level6. 
In this worrying scenario, on 4 August 2011, the Ministry of the 
Environment, after five years of preliminary discussions and controls, released 
to Ilva the first so-called “A.I.A.” or “Autorizzazione Integrata Ambientale”, 
an integrated environmental authorisation regulated by the Italian Code of the 
environment7.  
The A.I.A. is an administrative authorization required for the exercise 
of certain industrial plants (such as, for example, chemical implants, metal 
production plants, waste management plants) whose activities have a potential 
negative impact on the environment. The authorization, in particular, sets out 
requirements and obligations to be met in order to ensure compliance with the 
                                                   
4  See report of the «Parliamentary inquest commission on the illicit activities 
connected to the cycle of waste» with regards to the Region of Puglia, approved on 17 
October 2012. 
5 See Cass. Pen., sez. III, n. 38936, Riva, in Giust. Pen., 2006, 545. 
6 See, G. ARCONZO, Note critiche sul “decreto legge ad Ilvam”, tra legislazione provvedimentale, 
riserva di funzione giurisdizionale e dovere di repressione e prevenzione dei reati, in Dir. pen. cont., 
2013, no. 1, 16 and ff. 
7 See section 29 sexies of the legislative decree no. 152 of 2006. 
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so-called «integrated pollution prevention and control principles»8 and avoid or 
minimise as far as possible the detrimental effects of the productive activity on 
the environment and reach a higher level of environmental protection.  
To this end, the A.I.A. prescribes the adoption of the best possible 
techniques and practices in relation to the specific activities involved, and is 
released by the relevant authorities only upon adoption of such techniques9. 
For example, the A.I.A. sets the maximum values of emissions of polluting 
substances and the requirements of control of such emissions to which the 
plant must adapt in order to operate lawfully. 
 
3. Criminal Proceedings for Damages to Environment and Health. 
 
In this context of environmental danger, in 2010 the judicial authorities 
opened new criminal investigations into the activities of Ilva for crimes against 
the public safety upon charges of environmental disaster10 . Such charges 
concerned the poisoning of substances fit for human consumption and the 
negligent omission of precautionary measures safeguarding the health of the 
workers on their work place. According to the prosecution, these conducts had 
been continuing since 1995 and had been committed through emissions of 
harmful dusts and gases in the atmosphere.  
Although all these crimes are qualified by law as “abstract 
endangerment crimes”, which means that the described conducts are 
punishable for the simple endangerment of the public safety, even if they do 
not cause any effective harm, the prosecution claimed that in the instant case 
                                                   
8 Such principles were first introduced by Directive 96/61/CE and are now finally 
regulated by Directive 2010/75/UE, the industrial emissions directive. 
9 The A.I.A. is normally issued by the Regions, but for the biggest plants, such as Ilva, 
it is released by the Ministry of the Environment, see section 7, paragraph 4 bis and 4 
ter of the code of the environment. It needs to be renovated every five years. 
10 In fact, section 434 of the criminal code punishes “disasters” in general that 
endanger public safety, but the case-law has hold that also environmental disasters fall 
into this provision. However, the Italian Parliament is now examining a draft law (n. 
1345 of 26 February 2014) that introduces the specific crime of “environmental 
disaster”. 
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the activities of Ilva have also produced a concrete and significant harm to the 
environment and health of the population11.  
The elements collected during the investigations were then hold as 
sufficient to support the charges and therefore on 7 March 2014 the 
prosecutor asked the judge of the preliminary investigations for the leave to 
prosecute fifty individuals, among which the managers of Ilva, the directors of 
the plants, the owners, but also political and administrative authorities, and 
three companies, for criminal conspiracy aimed at environmental disaster12.  
The Ilva case is also of interest because it is the first time that some 
preventive measures available against legal persons under the specific 
legislation on criminal liability of legal entities have been applied for the 
prosecution of environmental crimes13. In fact, the Directive 2008/99/EC on 
environmental protection through criminal law was implemented in Italy 
through the Legislative Decree no. 121 of 2011 that extended legal entities’ 
criminal liability also to environmental crimes, not previously foreseen by 
Italian legislation.  
The most striking aspect of this case is what happened before the 
opening of the prosecution and during the investigation phase, through the 
adoption of judicial measures for the prevention of future and further 
environmental damages. 
 
                                                   
11 See, D. PULITANÒ, Fra giustizia penale e gestione amministrativa: riflessioni a margine del caso 
Ilva, in Dir. pen. cont., 2013, no. 1, 44 and ff. 
12  Indeed, in Italy, even though the prosecutor has the constitutional power to 
prosecute, he needs to request the authorization to the judge of the preliminary 
investigations, who must assess in an adversarial hearing whether the prosecution is 
founded prima facie (section 416 of the code of criminal procedure). It is a form of 
guarantee of impartiality of the prosecution. See, G. ILLUMINATI, Italy, in T. Vander 
Beken, M. Kilchling (editors), The role of the public prosecutor in the European criminal justice 
system, 2000, 113 and ff. 
13 Namely, the seizure of the equivalent of the proceeds of the crime foreseen by 
section 19 and 53 of legislative decree no. 231 of 2001, adopted on 22 May 2013; see, 
L. GABRIELE, Caso Ilva: il d.lgs. n. 231 del 2001, il problema occupazionale ed i poteri del 
giudice penale, available at http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/materia/5-/-/-/2668-
caso_ilva__il_d_lgs__n__231_del_2001__il_problema_occupazionale_ed_i_poteri_de
l_giudice_penale/ (last visited September 2014). 
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4. The Seizure Order. 
 
In July 2012, the prosecutor filed a request for the preventive seizure of 
a significant part of the plant of Ilva, which was then disposed by the judge for 
preliminary investigations on 25 July 201214.  Indeed, the data collected during 
the investigations, notably two independent expert reports, a chemical-
environmental one and a medical-epidemiologic one, established that the 
dangerous polluting emissions were coming from the plants of Ilva. 
According to the law, such preventive measure is aimed at stopping the 
prosecution of an alleged criminal activity when two conditions are met: firstly, 
there must be a reasonable suspicion of existence of a crime, and secondly, a 
danger that, pending criminal proceedings, the protected good would be 
further damaged. To this end, the seizure order stated that «the outcomes of 
the inquiry denounce the existence of a situation of sanitary and environmental 
emergency, caused by the polluting emissions diffused by the plant Ilva 
S.p.a.»15.  
The crucial aspect of the seizure order was that it prohibited the use of 
the seized plants and that it accordingly appointed four custodians for Ilva, 
assigning them the task to «immediately carry out the technical and security 
procedures for the interruption of the production and the complete arrest of 
the plants», thus prohibiting the continuation of any productive activity.  
In substance, the seizure of the plants without any possibility of their 
use was ordered on the ground that the continuing of the productive activity 
would have worsen the environmental pollution already ascertained by the 
expert tests and would have caused further damages to the health of the 
population. However, in order to stop an alleged criminal activity that harmed 
                                                   
14 The preventive seizure is regulated by section 321 of the code of criminal procedure 
and it’s a preventive measure that can be adopted by the Judge for preliminary 
investigations upon request of the Prosecutor «when there is a danger that the 
availability of a good related to a crime could worsen or protract the consequences of 
a crime or facilitate the commission of other crimes». 
15  The judicial order of preventive seizure is available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/106494971/Decreto-Di-Sequestro-Preventivo (last 
visited September 2014). 
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environment and public health, such preventive measure affected, on the other 
hand, the administration and management of that plant, thus potentially 
jeopardising its production and employment. 
For this reason, the CEO of Ilva lodged an appeal against the seizure 
order in front of the “Tribunale del Riesame”, the provincial court competent 
to re-examine the lawfulness of already adopted preventive measures such as 
seizures16. By a judgment of 7 August 2012, the court rejected the appeal and 
upheld the seizure order, stressing that «the harmful emissions are still 
ongoing».  
However, the court was not convinced that the complete arrest of the 
plants was the only way for attaining the termination of the harmful emissions. 
Therefore, it afforded to the appointed custodians, under the prosecutor’s 
supervision, the task of assessing and deciding what were the better strategies 
to reach such goal, according to the best practices available. In substance, the 
court afforded more decision-making power to the custodian, nevertheless 
maintaining the prohibition of using the plants for productive ends, an 
objective which might have been feasible only in the future, after the complete 
end of the harmful emissions. 
Notwithstanding the seizure order and the ban of using the plants, Ilva 
continued in the production, while the custodians adopted some prescriptive 
measures in order to reduce the level of polluting emissions and the workers 
organized major strikes and manifestations against the seizure and its negative 
impact on the productive activities. 
The Government, on its side, reacted to what was held as an «activism 
of the judges in industrial politics, which was creating a confusion of roles»17 
announcing that the Minister of the Environment would proceed to the 
revision of the A.I.A. afforded to Ilva in 2011. This means an update of the 
prescriptions of the old A.I.A. and the introduction of new and stricter ones, in 
order to reduce the level of the harmful emission caused by the productive 
                                                   
16 See, section 322 and 324 of the code of criminal procedure. 
17 See the statements of the Vice-secretary to the Presidence of the Committee of 
Ministers, in R. GIOVANNINI, Ilva, il Governo ricorre alla Consulta, in La Stampa, 14 
August 2012. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SURVEY 2014 
 245 
245 
activity of Ilva. In particular, the Government announced that, in the new 
authorization, it would introduce all the stricter prescriptions provided in the 
judicial seizure order, apart from the requirement of total arrest of the plants18. 
 On 27 October 2012 the revised A.I.A. was published: it provided that 
Ilva was authorized to carry on in the production only in so far as it complied 
with all the new provisions contained in it. Such provisions were very similar to 
those contained in the judicial seizure order. In addition, they also imposed to 
Ilva the adoption of the best practices for the production of steel and iron 
outlined in decision no. 2012/135/UE of 28 February 2012 of the European 
Commission, even though this had not yet entered into force. However, their 
implementation timing was significantly wider from what was ordered through 
the seizure: while the judicial order imposed the immediate adoption of all 
such measures, the revised A.I.A. provided for deadlines ranging from six to 
thirty-six months19. 
In November 2012 Ilva presented to the Government an operational 
project for the implementation of the new A.I.A., though specifying that it 
could not carry out such plan as long as the plants were under seizure and not 
available to Ilva. Therefore, on 20 November 2012, Ilva filed before the Court 
of Taranto a request for the release of the plants from seizure, maintaining that 
an eventual refusal would have lead to the definitive closing of the plant. This 
led to new strikes of the workers of all the plants of the Riva Group and to 
demonstrations in the whole country20. 
Only a few days after, on 26 November 2012, while such request was 
still pending, the judge for the preliminary investigations of Taranto issued a 
new seizure order, this time affecting the articles produced by Ilva after the 
seizure of the plants in July. According to the judge, such products were the 
«fruits of an unlawful activity» and a criminal asset, as they had been produced 
                                                   
18 V. PICCOLILLO, L’Ilva: per la bonifica pronti 146 milioni. Nuovo appello ai giudici, in 
Corriere della Sera, 18 August 2012. 
19 The complete text of the A.I.A. is available at http://aia.minambiente.it/Ilva.aspx 
(last visited September 2014). 
20 For an in-depth reconstruction of the facts, see G. ARCONZO, Note critiche sul “decreto 
legge ad Ilvam”, supra note 6. 
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after the judicial seizure banning the use of the plants for productive ends. 
Therefore such products could be seized on the basis of the second paragraph 
of section 321 of the code of criminal procedure, which provides for the 
possibility to seize the proceeds of crime in the view of a future confiscation. 
In front of this further measure, Ilva reacted announcing the termination of all 
its productive activities and the closing of the plant of Taranto as well as of all 
the other plants that were supplied by such plant. 
On 30 November 2012, the judge for the preliminary investigations 
rejected Ilva’s request for the release the plants from seizure. He specified that 
«the revision of the A.I.A. does not prove that the situation of serious and 
actual danger in front of which the seizure had been order has come to an 
end», on the grounds that «the deadlines for the implementation of the 
measures provided with the A.I.A. are conflicting with the urgent needs of 
protection of the local population and workers» and that «the A.I.A. does not 
take into the due consideration the currency of the danger and seriousness of 
the consequences on the health and the environment attributable to the 
harmful emissions coming from the steel plant». 
It appears, therefore, that the judges took a proactive action for an 
immediate safeguard of the environment and health of the population of 
Taranto, overlooking however the negative implications that this decision 
could have had on the economy and employment in the area. Such 
determination is perfectly understandable and legitimate, as in a judicial system 
strictly ruled by the legality principle as the Italian criminal one, the judges are 
called to take into consideration only the interests protected by the criminal 
law provisions they are applying, which in the present case were the 
environment and public health21. The prosecutors and the judges should not 
worry about the further side effects that their decision may entail on other 
relevant interest that, to the contrary, are not protected by those criminal 
                                                   
21 These indeed, are the interests protected by the criminal provisions punishing 
environmental disaster and the other charges upon which the prosecution started, see 
above paragraph 3. 
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provisions, such as the production and employment levels22. However, from a 
more general perspective, it is clear that the protection of employment and 
economy are nevertheless important interests that deserve some kind of 
consideration, even if not on the judges’ part. 
 
5. The Government’s Intervention: the “Save Ilva” Decree. 
 
On the same day the Government decided to take action through the 
adoption of law decree no. 207 of 2012, which, although containing general 
provisions applicable also to future cases, was expressly aimed at ensuring the 
prosecution of the productive activities of Ilva, and was therefore called the 
“save Ilva” decree. It entered into force on 3 December 2012 and was then 
converted into law by the Parliament with the law of 24 December 2012, no. 
23123.  
In particular, the Government acknowledged that the continuation of 
the productive activities of Ilva represented a «strategic priority of national 
interest», on the grounds of the needs of protection of the environment and 
health, but also on the need to preserve the levels of employment and public 
safety 24 . In this perspective, it considered that the revised A.I.A. indeed 
ensured the immediate execution of measures aimed at the protection of health 
and environment, as well as provided further and gradual measures of 
intervention directed at the progressive recovery of the plants. For those 
reasons, the Government held that it was extraordinarily necessary and urgent 
to enable the Ministry of Environment to authorize the continuation of the 
productive activities of an industrial plant of national strategic interest for a 
                                                   
22 To this regard, L. GABRIELE, Il caso Ilva: il d.lgs. n. 231 del 2001, supra note 13, who 
maintains that criminal law practitioners always focus on an individual dimension, not 
only when criminal liability comes into play, but also when considering the effects of 
judges’ decisions. 
23  Decreto legge 3 dicembre 2012 n. 207, Disposizioni urgenti a tutela della salute, 
dell’ambiente e dei livelli di occupazione in caso di crisi di stabilimenti industriali di interesse 
strategico nazionale, in Gazzetta Ufficiale, 3 December 2012, no. 282. 
24 See, Preamble of law decree no. 207 of 2012. 
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limited period of time whenever there is an absolute need of ensuring 
employment and production through the revision of it’s A.I.A25. 
But how did the Government decide to handle this emergency 
situation in an effort to satisfy all the opposite needs and interest? Through the 
adoption of such law, politics have burst into a scene in which the judiciary 
had already intervened, in order to adequately protect also the other interests at 
stake, completely neglected by the judges who were required to strictly apply 
criminal law protecting public safety. 
When taking a look at the content of the law decree, section 1 provides 
that the Government can individuate which are the «plants of strategic national 
interest», a new juridical category that can operate only for plants employing at 
least more than two hundreds workers for at least one year. Only for such 
plants, when there is an absolute need of ensuring employment and 
production, the Ministry of the Environment, when revising the A.I.A., can 
authorize the prosecution of its activities for no longer than thirty-six months 
provided all the A.I.A. provisions are respected 26 . Furthermore, such 
authorization can be issued even in cases when judicial authorities have already 
issued seizure orders affecting the goods and facilities of the business. It is 
indeed specified that seizures orders do not hinder the continuation of the 
activities27. At the same time, however, the law introduces stricter controls on 
the protraction of the activities: heavy pecuniary sanctions are foreseen in case 
the company does not comply with the provisions of the A.I.A. and the 
Ministry of Environment has the duty to report to the Parliament on the state 
of compliance to the provisions of A.I.A. every six months28.  
While such provisions have an abstract and general nature, section 3 of 
the law decree is devoted to apply the abovementioned provisions to the 
specific case of Ilva, thus making the decree an individually tailored law. 
                                                   
25 See, Preamble of law decree no. 207 of 2012. 
26 Section 1, paragraph 1 of law decree no. 207 of 2012. 
27 Section 1, paragraph 4 of law decree no. 207 of 2012. This provision clearly 
legitimates ex post what has already occurred in fact, stating that when there is a 
conflict between the A.I.A. and the seizure order, it is the A.I.A. that prevails. 
28 Section 1, paragraph 2 and 5 of law decree no. 207 of 2012. 
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Namely, it defines Ilva as a plant of strategic national interest and it 
acknowledges that the revised A.I.A. of October 2012 contains the 
requirements aimed at ensuring the continuation of its activities. It is thus clear 
how this provision contrasts and frustrates the effects of the seizure order 
previously adopted, precluding that it may hinder the productive activities of 
Ilva. Not only, but the law decree also expressly states that Ilva is authorized to 
continue in its activities in so far as it complies with the provision of the 
A.I.A., and calls for the facilities of the plants to be made available to Ilva. 
Finally, it authorizes the company to sell its products, thus depriving of its 
effects also the second seizure order adopted by the judicial authorities29.  
Certainly, such provisions also had the indirect effect of removing the 
custodian appointed for the management of Ilva by the seizure order. Indeed, 
paragraph 4 of section 3 appoints an independent Commissioner with no 
coercive powers, who is charged with the monitoring and supervision of the 
implementation and respect of the A.I.A. provision on the part of Ilva and 
refers to the Government on any problematic issues, while suggesting 
measures for their solution30. 
It is clear that the crucial aspect of this piece of legislation is that it has 
directly influenced the exercise of the judiciary function, frustrating the effects 
of the orders already adopted by the judge of the preliminary investigations: 
this appears to be its main objective31. In fact, the adoption of such law decree 
uncovered the existence of a latent conflict between the different powers – 
judicial and political-administrative - who both claim exclusive competence in 
coping with such complex situations and in operating the necessary balance 
between the opposing interests involved32.  They both support two opposite 
                                                   
29 Section 3, paragraph 3 of law decree no. 207 of 2012. 
30 Section 3, paragraph 4 and 6 of law decree no. 207 of 2012. 
31 In this sense, G. AZZARITI, Decreto Ilva: auspicabile l’intervento della Corte costituzionale, in 
http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/area/3-societa/-/-/1928-
decreto_ilva__auspicabile_l_intervento_della_corte_costituzionale/ (last visited 
September 2014). 
32 In this sense, also F. VIGANÒ, Il caso ILVA (e molto altro) nel nuovo numero della Rivista 
trimestrale, in Dir. pen. cont., 2013, no. 1, 1 and ff; and, R. BIN, Giurisdizione o 
amministrazione, chi deve prevenire i reati ambientali?, in Giur. Cost., 2013, n. 3, 1505 and ff. 
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models of intervention: on the one side, there is the judiciary, who holds itself 
entitled to set an ultimate limit to the political powers of balancing core values 
in the name of overriding fundamental rights such as life and health of the 
population that claim protection even against the decisions of the majority. On 
the other, the “save Ilva” law outlines a completely opposite approach, centred 
on the administrative powers of regulation. 
 
6. The Judiciary’s Reactions: the Issue of Constitutionality. 
 
Following the publication of the law decree, on 5 December 2012 the 
prosecutors of Taranto did not revoke the seizure order, but solely conceded 
to Ilva the availability of its plants, and refused to release from seizure the 
products of Ilva, holding that the law decree could not have any retroactive 
effects33. Not only, but they also raised a “conflict of attributions” claim in 
front of the Constitutional Court34. This having been declared inadmissible, on 
15 and 21 January 2013 both the “Tribunale del riesame” and the judge for the 
preliminary investigations of Taranto questioned the constitutionality of the 
provisions of the law decree in front of the Constitutional Court35. This referral 
gave the Court the opportunity to clarify, somehow, whether there are any 
constitutional imperatives that demand or exclude one type of intervention or 
the other in the prevention of environmental crimes. The judgment of the 
Constitutional Court was released on 9 May 2013 and it rejected all the 
arguments submitted by the applicants, therefore declaring the compatibility 
                                                   
33 See G. ARCONZO, Note critiche sul “decreto legge ad Ilvam”, supra note 6. 
34 Pursuant to article 134 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court is competent to 
judge on “conflict of attributions”, i.e. claims brought by one of the State’s powers 
against an act of another power when it is argued that the last one has intruded the 
other power’s sphere of competence. 
35 In the Italian legal system there is no right to individual petition before the 
Constitutional court, but only when a judicial authority during a judicial proceeding 
has a «not manifestly ill-founded doubt» that a law provisions he needs to apply for 
solving the case may not be in conformity with the Constitution, he has to refer the 
issue to the Constitutional court, who will then decide (section 23 of law no. 87 of 
1953). If the Court declares that the law provision is unconstitutional, the law 
provision is abolished with a general effect (article 136 of the Constitution). 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SURVEY 2014 
 251 
251 
with the Constitution of the provisions contained in the “save Ilva” law36. But 
let’s consider what the most important arguments in this perspective were. 
The first and most substantive issue submitted by the judges was that 
the solution adopted by the law had completely neglected the fundamental 
rights to health and to a healthy environment, enshrined in Article 32 of the 
Constitution, in favour of the protection of the economy and employment, 
protected by Articles 41 and 4 of the Constitution. The law, therefore, was 
conflicting with the hierarchy of values imposed by the Constitution, where – 
in the judges’ view – the right to health has a primary role, overriding all the 
other rights37.  
The Court, however, observed that there is no such strict hierarchy 
among constitutional values, but that all of them are on the same level, with 
the consequence that there is no absolute constitutional right that must always 
prevail. To the contrary the legislator must always ponder the different 
constitutional values involved in a particular situation in order to find a 
reasonable equilibrium38. In this perspective, the “save Ilva” law has sought to 
find such equilibrium through a reasonable balance of all the rights involved, in 
order to avoid a very serious employment crisis, while bearing in mind at the 
same time the need to protect the environment and the health of the people 
living in the area39. 
Other complaints regarded, furthermore, more procedural aspects. The 
judges claimed that the law allows a company to continue its productive 
activity for thirty-six months even though such activity constitutes a crime. 
Therefore, this quashing of the effects of any judicial preventive measure, even 
future, which attempts at preventing harmful effects in front of a continuing 
illicit activity, constitutes an “expropriation” of the judicial function. Indeed, 
the judicial authorities in such cases are deprived of any means to prevent the 
criminal activities implied with the prosecution of the production in order to 
protect the interest safeguarded by criminal law. In the judges’ view, the 
                                                   
36 Constitutional Court, judgment of 9 May 2013, no. 85. 
37 Constitutional Court, judgment of 9 May 2013, no. 85, paragraph 1.2. 
38 Constitutional Court, judgment of 9 May 2013, no. 85, paragraph 9. 
39 Constitutional Court, judgment of 9 May 2013, no. 85, paragraph 10.3. 
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legislator would be acting as a sort of superior instance judge, who can bring to 
nothing the decisions of the judges, thus creating a sort of absolute impunity 
from criminal laws, both substantial and procedural. This would represent a 
violation of the principles of separation of the functions (implicit in Articles 
102 and 104 of the Constitution) and would be in contrast with the 
constitutional duty of punishment of crimes, established by Article 112 of the 
Constitution40.  
The Court however, has considered such objection ill-founded. 
According to the Court, the law does not introduce any immunity and does not 
hamper the investigations in any way; on the contrary it strengthens the 
controls on the polluting activity. Therefore, what was unlawful before is still 
unlawful now and still can be prosecuted. The only effect of the law on this 
issue is avoiding that seizure orders, current or future, may prevent the 
prosecution of the productive activity. Hence the constitutionally relevant 
power and duty of the prosecutor to punish crimes is not hampered, but 
simply needs to be exercised in accordance to the new law, which provides that 
the activity carried on in compliance with the provisions and conditions of the 
revised A.I.A. is to be considered lawful, on the grounds that this 
administrative act has introduced a path of environmental recovery, inspired to 
the balancing of all the interests involved41. On the other hand, the Court held 
that the law has not intruded into the competence area constitutionally 
reserved to the judiciary and therefore no violation of the principle of 
separation of functions has been found. Indeed, Article 112 of the 
Constitution reserves to the judiciary – better, the prosecutor – the power and 
duty to investigate and prosecute criminal offences, which is the duty to 
establish the commission of criminal offences and their liability. The Ilva law 
however did not intrude in this function, as it did not bear any effect, directly 
or indirectly, on the ongoing proceedings aimed at ascribing the responsibilities 
for the alleged criminal offences and their outcomes42. To the contrary, it had 
                                                   
40 Constitutional Court, judgment of 9 May 2013, no. 85, paragraph 1.2 and 1.4. 
41 Constitutional Court, judgment of 9 May 2013, no. 85, paragraph 8.1. 
42 Constitutional Court, judgment of 9 May 2013, no. 85, paragraph 12.5 
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effects only on the preventive measures adopted by the prosecutors: a 
preventive measure which was not aiming at ensuring evidence for the 
forthcoming proceedings, so that it did not have any impact on the outcomes 
of such proceedings. Indeed, the affected preventive measure was aimed solely 
at thwarting a worsening of the consequences of the offence and the 
commission of other crimes and this activity is not included in the area 
constitutionally reserved to the judiciary43 . The judiciary always needs to 
exercise this power in accordance to the law, also when the law changes, as in 
the present case, and considers that the activity is unlawful. In this sense, the 
“save Ilva” law has introduced a «waiver» to the ordinary regulation of seizure 
orders provided by section 321 of the code of criminal procedure: it provides 
that, with regards to plants of strategic national interest, when the A.I.A. is 
revised, seizure orders cannot forbid the use of the seized premises as long as 
the A.I.A. provisions are complied with, out of the consideration that such 
activity is now lawful44.  
This implies that it is to the legislator, and therefore to the 
administration, to regulate environmentally dangerous activities, and not to the 
judiciary, whose preventive measures must adapt to such decisions. Therefore, 
according to the decision of the Constitutional Court, on 15 May 2013 the 
Judge for the preliminary investigations of Taranto released from seizure the 
products of Ilva. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks and Considerations. 
 
The outcomes of the Constitutional Court’s decision, and more in 
general the whole Ilva case, allow us two kinds of considerations.  
First of all, what role can the judiciary play in the fight against 
environmental crime in a State governed by the rule of law? It seems that the 
role of the judicial authorities, especially in a field such as the environmental 
one, can no longer be confined to the traditional one of establishment and 
                                                   
43 Constitutional Court, judgment of 9 May 2013, no. 85, paragraph 12.6. 
44 D. PULITANÒ, Fra giustizia penale e gestione amministrativa, supra note 11. 
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prosecution of already committed criminal offences. It appears clearly that this 
is no longer the case. Judges are invested – by the law itself – of preventive 
functions, of proactive instruments in defence of particular rights and interests 
against the dangers that threaten them, even before they have turned into 
actual damages. From a procedural perspective, it is again the law itself that 
assigns to prosecutors the possibility to adopt several preventive measures that 
are exclusively aimed at the prevention of other crimes and at the thwarting or 
confining the further and more serious consequences of the crimes. This was 
exactly the case with the preventive seizure targeting Ilva.  
In this field, more than others, criminal law is conceived as an 
instrument of preventive protection of fundamental rights, rather than a simple 
reaction against damages already produced45. This entails, on the one side, what 
can be perceived as a sort of «loss of impartiality» of the judicial authorities, in 
a way that brings them closer to the the tasks of the administration. Indeed, 
despite the fact that the administration’s activity, according to the general 
principles of the Italian system, must operate impartially, its impartiality is 
much different from that of the judiciary, as the former is required to operate 
proactively in the pursuit of the public good. In a similar way, the judiciary in 
the Ilva case were no longer simply applying the law being above all interests 
involved, but they were, to the contrary, pursuing the protection of the 
endangered fundamental right, that is the health and the environment, thus 
assuming public functions of prevention46. When judicial measures are aimed 
at the social defence from dangers, there is some kind of «repressive finalism» 
that alters the normal structure of criminal proceedings47. Certainly, this entails 
on a procedural level that criminal proceedings are no longer exclusively 
oriented to the discovery of already committed crimes, but are also aimed at 
preventing future crimes or at least restraining the harmful effects of the 
crimes committed, a function which is gaining increasingly in importance. And 
this observation entails a twofold implication.  
                                                   
45 F. VIGANÒ, Il caso ILVA (e molto altro), supra note 31. 
46 R. BIN, Giurisdizione o amministrazione, supra note 31. 
47 D. PULITANÒ, Fra giustizia penale e gestione amministrativa, supra note 11. 
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Firstly, this should bring about a change in our way of understanding 
this preventive phase and the role of the judge in it48. At least in such phase, it 
can no longer be true, as we have mentioned before, that judges are not 
required to take into consideration the other different interests involved that 
may be affected by the strict application of criminal law provisions. Indeed, 
recent case-law has acknowledged that, «when adopting a seizure order of big 
firms and businesses, the judge can take into consideration also other needs, as 
the production or the employment, and he can accordingly appoint as a 
custodian of the seized goods also a manager of the business itself, who will 
have the power to manage the business according to the directives coming 
from the judge»49. Such conclusion shows how vital it is that the judge takes 
into consideration all conflicting interests when adopting preventive measures, 
especially since they are usually only temporary measures, which can be very 
afflictive. This means, however, that some kind of discretional activity is 
demanded from the judge, which brings his function even more close to the 
typical role of the administration50.   
In such a way it is inevitable – and this is the second implication - that 
the judiciary will enter into an area and a function which traditionally belongs 
to the executive and the Government. Indeed, all these activities are placed in a 
border area between the judiciary function and the administrative and political 
function, where the exact borders remain uncertain, especially when the 
interests at stake are of collective nature like in the environmental field51.  
The main issue, therefore, is finding the borderline between the role of 
the judicial and the one of the political authorities in appreciating the future 
effects of a dangerous activity. In this quest, one should start from the 
                                                   
48 Such phase, indeed, is situated at the crossing between the judiciary function and 
the management of current problems, where the prevention of crimes is only one of 
them. In this sense, D. PULITANÒ, Fra giustizia penale e gestione amministrativa, supra note 
11. 
49 Cass. pen., sez. III, 6 October 2010, judgment no. 35801. 
50 Such opinion is shared by L. GABRIELE, Il caso Ilva: il d.lgs. n. 231 del 2001, supra note 
13; and F. VIGANÒ, Il caso ILVA (e molto altro), supra note 31. 
51 V. ONIDA, Un conflitto fra poteri sotto la veste di questione di costituzionalità: amministrazione 
e giurisdizione per la tutela dell’ambiente. Note a Corte costituzionale, sentenza n. 85 del 2013, in 
Riv. Ass. Ita. Cost., 2013, no. 3. 
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consideration that the connection with a criminal offence, while entitling a 
judicial authorities’ intervention in an area that on the contrary would be 
reserved to the administration, does not afford to the judiciary the monopoly 
on the powers and duties of intervention52.  
From this case, a possible solution comes into light: a judicial 
preventive measure may be conceivable as long as it anticipates the definition 
of a critical situation linked to a crime, which will then be definitively set and 
regulated in a general way by the competent administrative authorities. Indeed, 
it cannot be accepted that this discretionary evaluation on the future risks of an 
activity may be taken at last from a judicial authority: this, exactly to the 
contrary of what had been argued by the judges before the Constitutional 
court, would be in breach of the separation of powers53. 
A last consideration, however, is needed. In many cases, and the Ilva 
one is only the most serious example, the above considerations are impaired by 
the fact that there often is a general inertia and inactivity on the part of the 
administrative authorities in relation to the controls on the environmental 
conditions, as these often omit to take any effective action.  
Unfortunately, this appears to be the case in Italy, where there has been 
a general lack of efficiency in the governance of the territory and environment 
over the years on the part of the authorities, which is now coming to the 
surface, thanks to several applications pending before the European Court of 
Human Rights, also in relation to the Ilva case54.  
As a consequence, the recourse to judicial intervention and protection 
appears to be inevitable as the only possible remedy to call the administrative 
authorities back to order, exactly as happened in the Ilva case55. This however 
                                                   
52 D. PULITANÒ, Fra giustizia penale e gestione amministrativa, supra note 11. 
53 V. ONIDA, Un conflitto fra poteri sotto la veste di questione di costituzionalità, supra note 50. 
54 Reference is made here to Smaltini v. Italy, application no. 43961/09. Several other 
applications have been lodged in relation to the State’s omission of taking any 
preventive measures for the prevention of environmental disasters (i.e, Viviani and 
others v. Italy, application no. 9713/13, on the danger of an eruption of the Vesuvio 
volcano in Naples and many others complaints on the so-called “Terra dei fuochi” in 
southern Italy).  
55 V. ONIDA, Un conflitto fra poteri sotto la veste di questione di costituzionalità, supra note 50. 
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is suggestive of a pathological situation, and cannot be regarded as the ordinary 
and ideal situation. But on the other hand, it is striking that in the end this 
“judiciary activism” has in effect encouraged the long required response from 
the administrative authorities. Perhaps, after all and although not meant to be 
so, criminal law and criminal proceedings have become in the practice effective 
tools, which indirectly act upon the administration’s inactivity. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SURVEY 2014 
 258 
258 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Law 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SURVEY 2014 
 259 
259 
WHALING IN THE ANTARCTIC: THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES ACCORDING TO THE ICJ IN 
THE 2014 AUSTRALIAN VS JAPAN CASE 
 
Francesco Cunsolo 
 
 
 
CONTENTS: 1. – A Brief History. 1.1 – From the International Convention 
for Regulation of Whaling (1946) to the Implementation of Japan’s Whaling 
Research Programs. 1.2 – The Application Before the International Court of 
Justice (2010). 2. – The Court’s Judgment, Between Scientific and Juridical 
Matters. 2.1 – A Mere Problem of Delimitation Area? 2.2 – The New Standard 
of Review Introduced by the Court. 3. – Final Considerations: an Audacious 
Judgment. 
 
 
 
1. A Brief History. 
 
1.1. From the International Convention for Regulation of Whaling (1946) 
to the Implementation of Japan’s Whaling Research Programs. 
 
The protection of whales from over-exploitation, and their 
conservation for their own safeguard, are tasks that have employed the 
international community for over one hundred years. The importance and 
sensitivity of this matter brought to the sign in 1946 of the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), an international 
environmental agreement established in order «[...] to provide for the proper 
conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development 
of whale industry»1. The main objectives of the Convention are the safeguard 
                                                   
1 International Convention for the Protection of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, Washington, 
available at https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3607&k=, and also in UNTS, 
1953, vol. 161, pp. 72-111. 
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of the great natural resources represented by the whale stocks for future 
generations, and the establishment of «[...] a system of international regulation 
for the whale fisheries to ensure proper and effective conservation and 
development of whale stocks [...]»2; in order to achieve these objectives, the 
Convention established the International Whaling Commission (IWC), a global 
intergovernmental body charged with the conservation of whales and the 
management of whaling. The Commission performs its tasks by making 
revisions to the Schedule that accomplishes the text of the Convention, and 
entrusting the governments parties, after accurate evaluations and exams, the 
right to carry out scientific research which involves killing of whales. 
Since its birth, the works of the Commission have always been very 
intense, especially regarding the contest between two different approaches to 
the matter: whaling states and anti-whaling states, limited whaling and no 
whaling. Australia and Japan, both members of the ICRW, are two important 
leading figures of these schools of thought, with a longstanding dispute behind 
them. In 1982 the IWC adopted the so-called “zero catch quota” amendment 
to the Schedule, which was a moratorium on commercial whaling. This 
amendment encountered the opposition of Japan, the pro whaling state, which 
lodged an objection under Article V of the ICRW 3 , thus rendering the 
amendment inapplicable to Japan. Later, due to pressure from United States, 
which threatened to punish Japan by cutting Japanese fishing in the U.S. 
exclusive economic zone, Japan withdrew its objection and stopped 
commercial whaling at the end of 1987. In the same year, Japan started its 
whale research program conducted in the Antarctic Ocean: this program was 
                                                   
2 Id. at § 1. 
3 International Convention for the Protection of Whaling, art. 5 par. 3: «3. Each of 
such amendments shall become effective with respect to the Contracting 
Governments ninety days following notification of the amendment by the 
Commission to each of the Contracting Governments, except that (a) if any 
Government presents to the Commission objection to any amendment prior to the 
expiration of this ninety-day period, the amendment shall not become effective with 
respect to any of the Governments for an additional ninety days; [...] (c) thereafter, the 
amendment shall become effective with respect to all Contracting Governments 
which have not presented objection but shall not become effective with respect to any 
Government which has so objected until such date as the objection is withdrawn». 
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called “JARPA”, and was based on special permits that granted Japan to 
conduct whale researches in the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary, a protected 
zone surrounding the continent of Antarctica, created by the IWC with an 
amendment to the Schedule on 1994; in this maritime zone commercial 
whaling is prohibited, regardless of the conservation status of whale stocks. 
This amendment encountered the objection of Japan with regard to minke 
whales, but not humpback or fin whales (two of the most threatened whale’s 
species). Anyway, the JARPA whaling program, which covered an eighteen 
years period from 1987 to 2005, was introduced by Japan for purposes of 
scientific research, so under the protection and application of Article VIII4 of 
the ICRW; this article «[...] provides that despite anything else in the 
Convention (including the moratorium), a party may issue a “special permit” 
authorizing whaling for “scientific research”, subject to such conditions as the 
party “thinks fit” [...]»5. Under the JARPA whaling program, in the period of its 
implementation, over 6800 Antarctic minke whales were taken; these were 
numbers that received a lot of criticisms from Australia and warnings from 
IWC, which showed concerns about the fact that «[...] more than 6,800 
Antarctic minke whales (Balaenoptera bonaerensis) have been killed in Antarctic 
waters under the 18 years of JARPA, compared with a total of 840 whales 
killed globally by Japan for scientific research in the 31 year period prior to the 
moratorium [...]»6. In 2003, the Commission adopted a resolution asking Japan 
                                                   
4 ICRW, art. 8 par. 1: «1. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention any 
Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing 
that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research subject to 
such restrictions as to number and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting 
Government thinks fit, and the killing, taking, and treating of whales in accordance 
with the provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the operation of this 
Convention. Each Contracting Government shall report at once to the Commission 
all such authorizations which it has granted. Each Contracting Government may at 
any time revoke any such special permit which it has granted». 
5 D. K. ANTON, Dispute Concerning Japan’s JARPA II Program of “Scientific Whaling” 
(Australia v. Japan), in ASIL Insights, available at 
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/14/issue/20/dispute-concerning-
japan%E2%80%99s-jarpa-ii-program-%E2%80%9Cscientific-
whaling%E2%80%9D#_edn1, vol. 14, 20, July 2010 (last visited December 2014). 
6 IWC, Resolution on JARPA II, 2005-1 (2005), available at 
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to halt JARPA, or at least to ensure that the whaling program was limited to 
non-lethal research7. In 2005 introduced the second phase of JARPA’s whaling 
program, under the name of JARPA II. The new program provided a more 
intensive annual take of minke whales (bringing the annual sampling size to a 
maximum of 850 minke whales, with an allowance of ±10%), and introduced 
the possibility to adopt lethal methods (which implied the death of the sample) 
for the study of humpback and fin whales. In 2005 and 2007, IWC adopted 
two further resolutions expressing concern about the special permit system 
introduced by Japan, as well as skepticism about the scientific objectives of 
JARPA II. With the 2005 resolution IWC invited Japan not to proceed with 
lethal whaling under JARPA II8, and then to interrupt the lethal aspects of 
JARPA II conducted in the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary9. Despite these 
warnings, Japan decided to continue with its scientific research whaling.  
 
1.2. The Application Before the International Court of Justice (2010). 
 
On May 31 2010, Australia, a longtime opponent to Japan’s whaling 
activities, presented its application before the International Court of Justice10, 
reporting that the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program 
under Special Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA II) was a «[...] breach of 
obligations assumed by Japan under the International Convention for the 
                                                                                                                                 
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=2080&search=%21collection72&order_
by=relevance&sort=DESC&offset=0&archive=0&k=&curpos=5 (last visited 
December 2014). 
7 IWC, Resolution on Southern Hemisphere Minke Whales and Special Permit Whaling, 2003-3 
(2003), available at 
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=2078&search=%21collection72&order_
by=relevance&sort=DESC&offset=0&archive=0&k=&curpos=7 (last visited 
December 2014). 
8 See supra note 6. 
9   IWC, Resolution on JARPA, 2007-1 (2007), available at 
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=2082&search=%21collection72&order_
by=relevance&sort=DESC&offset=0&archive=0&k=&curpos=3 (last visited 
December 2014). 
10 Whaling in the Antarctic - Australia v. Japan (Application instituting proceedings), ICJ, 
31.05.2010, no. 148. 
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Regulation of Whaling, as well as its other international obligations for the 
preservation of marine mammals and the marine environment»11. Speaking 
about the “other international obligations”, Australia was referring to the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES, 1973), and 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD, 1992). The content of the claim 
stated what we have already described in the precedent paragraph, but is useful 
to reaffirm in some critical points, regarding the moratorium on whaling for 
commercial purpose, the institution of the Southern Ocean Sanctuary, and the 
objection of Japan to both of the initiatives: «in 1982 the IWC adopted under 
Article V (l) (e) of the ICRW a “moratorium” on whaling for commercial 
purposes, fixing the maximum catch of whales to be taken in any one season at 
zero. This was brought into effect by the addition of paragraph 10 (e) to the 
Schedule to the ICRW [...]. Japan objected to paragraph 10 (e) within the 
prescribed period but subsequently withdrew its objection. In 1994 the IWC 
adopted under Article V (l) (c) of the ICRW the Southern Ocean Sanctuary. 
This was brought into effect by the addition of paragraph 7 (b) of the Schedule 
to the ICRW which provides that: “commercial whaling, whether by pelagic 
operations or from land stations, is prohibited in a region designated as the 
Southern Ocean Sanctuary. [...] This prohibition applies irrespective of the 
conservation status of baleen and toothed whale stocks in this Sanctuary [...]”. 
Japan objected to paragraph 7 (b) within the prescribed period in relation to 
Antarctic minke whale stocks and has not subsequently withdrawn its 
objection»12. 
Therefore, considering the binding provisions of the Schedule to the 
ICRW, Japan was obliged to refrain from killing all whale stocks for 
commercial purposes [paragraph 10 (e)], and to refrain from commercial 
whaling in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary for all whale stocks other than minke 
whale stocks [paragraph 7 (b)]. Furthermore «in accordance with Article 26 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and with customary 
                                                   
11 Id. at § 2. 
12 Id. at § 5, 6. 
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international law, Japan is obliged to perform those obligations in good faith»13. 
According to the application presented by Australia, «[...] Japan ostensibly 
ceased whaling for commercial purposes. But at virtually the same time Japan 
launched the “Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the 
Antarctic” (“JARPA I”) which it purported to justify by reference to Article 
VIII of the ICRW, under which a Contracting Government may issue special 
permits to its nationals authorizing that national to “kill, take and treat whales 
for the purposes of scientific research […]”»14. The application also described in detail 
the development of JARPA and JARPA II, specifying the growing catches of 
minke whales, and the fact that whale meat caught over the years, since the 
introduction of the first JARPA program, had been sold commercially in 
Japan. 
These were the alleged violations reported by Australia through its 
application. Four years later, the International Court of Justice pronounced its 
judgment on the case. 
 
2. The Court’s Judgment, Between Scientific and Juridical Matters. 
 
2.1 A Mere Problem of Delimitation Area? 
 
As we know, «on 31 May 2010 Australia filed in the Registry of the 
Court an Application instituting proceedings against Japan in respect of a 
dispute concerning “Japan’s continued pursuit of a large-scale program of 
whaling under the Second Phase of its Japanese Whale Research Program 
under Special Permit in the Antarctic (‘JARPA II’), in breach of obligations 
assumed by Japan under the International obligations for the preservation of 
marine mammals and the marine environment”»15. Australia invoked as the 
basis for the jurisdiction of the Court the declarations made by Australia on 22 
March 2002 and by Japan on 9 July 2007, according to Article 36, paragraph 2, 
                                                   
13 Id. at § 8. 
14 Id. at § 9. 
15 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), ICJ 31.03.2014, no. 
148, § 1. 
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of the Statute of the Court16, recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court as 
compulsory ipso facto, and without any special agreement. Later, on November 
2012, New Zealand filed in the Registry of the Court a Declaration of 
Intervention in the case, stating its decision to intervene as a non-party in the 
proceeding brought by Australia against Japan. Both Australia and Japan 
accepted New Zealand’s Declaration of Intervention. In addition to the claims 
expressed in its application, and regarding the alleged violations of its 
international obligations committed by Japan in implementing the JARPA II 
program in the Southern Ocean, Australia requested the Court to declare that 
«[...] JARPA II is not a program for purposes of scientific research within the 
meaning of Article VIII of the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling. Further, the Court is requested to adjudge and declare that Japan 
shall: 
a) refrain from authorizing or implementing any special permit 
whaling which is not for purposes of scientific research within the meaning of 
Article VIII; 
b) cease with immediate effect the implementation of JARPA II; 
and 
c) revoke any authorization, permit or license that allows the 
implementation of JARPA II»17. 
On its side, Japan asked the Court to reject the claims of Australia, 
maintaining that its activities were lawful because the special permits were 
issued for “purposes of scientific research”, as provided by Article VIII of the 
ICRW. Secondly, Japan contested the jurisdiction of the Court because, in its 
declaration of recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction, Australia excluded it with 
                                                   
16 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 1945, art. 36, par. 2: «2. The states 
parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as 
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state 
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes 
concerning: a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international law; c. the 
existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an 
international obligation; d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the 
breach of an international obligation.» 
17 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), ICJ 31.03.2014, no. 
148, § 24. 
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regard to «[...] any dispute concerning or relating to the delimitation of 
maritime zones, including the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and 
the continental shelf, or arising out of, concerning, or relating to the 
exploitation of any disputed area of or adjacent to any such maritime zone 
pending its delimitation»18. According to Japan, the dispute submitted by 
Australia regarding JARPA II related to the exploitation of a maritime zone 
claimed by Australia itself, or of an area adjacent to such zone. Japan 
maintained that «[...] this would be the case under Australia’s characterization 
of JARPA II as a programme for the commercial exploitation of whales, as 
well as under Japan’s own characterization of JARPA II as a scientific research 
programme, given that the research conducted under JARPA II is “an element 
of the process leading to exploitation”»19. For this reason, Japan sustained that 
the dispute submitted by Australia with regard to JARPA II fell within 
Australia’s reservation (b), with the consequence to exclude the Court’s 
jurisdiction. The Court recalled that «[...] when interpreting a declaration 
accepting its compulsory jurisdiction, it “must seek the interpretation which is 
in harmony with a natural and reasonable way of reading text, having due 
regard to the intention” of the declaring State»20. In this case, according to the 
interpretation given by the Court, the reservation (b) must be read in the light 
of “delimitation of maritime zones”, which is the “key word” of the 
reservation, which then regards only disputes concerning delimitation matters. 
The second part of the reservation (“arising out, concerning, or relating to the 
exploitation of any disputed area”) is strictly connected to the first (“maritime 
delimitation”), and should be read in that key. 
The dispute submitted by Australia regarding JARPA II involved the 
exploitation of an area which was not the subject of a dispute relating the 
                                                   
18 Declaration Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory (Australia), 
March 22, 2002, reservation (b). 
19 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), ICJ 31.03.2014, no. 
148, § 32.  
20 Id. at § 36, recalling the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary 
Objection, Judgment I.C.J. Reports 1952, § 104. 
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delimitation of that area, or of an area adjacent to it. For this reason the Court 
rejected Japan’s objection to the Court’s jurisdiction. 
 
2.2. The New Standard of Review Introduced by the Court. 
 
Then the judgment of the Court moved on the interpretation of Article 
VIII, paragraph 1, of the ICRW, in order to establish the compliance of the 
JARPA II program, and in general Japan’s conduct. The Court noted that «[...] 
Article VIII is an integral part of the Convention. It therefore has to be 
interpreted in light of the object and purpose of the Convention and taking 
into account other provisions of the Convention, including the Schedule. 
However, since Article VIII, paragraph 1, specifies that “killing, taking, and 
treating of whales in accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be 
exempt from the operation of this Convention”, whaling conducted under a 
special permit which meets the conditions of Article VIII is not subject to the 
obligations under the Schedule concerning the moratorium on the catching of 
whales for commercial purposes, the prohibition of commercial whaling in the 
Southern Ocean Sanctuary and the moratorium relating to factory ships»21. 
Then the Court analyzed the relationship between Article VIII and the object 
and purposes of the Convention. Considering the preamble of the ICRW, 
which pursues the purpose to ensure an effective conservation of whaling, and 
at the same time to allow their sustainable exploitation, the Court noted that 
programs for purposes of scientific research fall outside of these objectives, 
because they should pursue different aims from conservation or sustainable 
exploitation of whale stocks. These programs for purposes of scientific 
research, like JARPA II, should foster scientific knowledge. «This is also 
reflected in the Guidelines issued by the IWC for the review of scientific 
permit proposals by the Scientific Committee. In particular, the 
Guidelines initially applicable to JARPA II, Annex Y, referred not only 
to programmes that “contribute information essential for rational management 
of the stock” or those that are relevant 
                                                   
21 Id. at § 55. 
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for “conduct[ing] the comprehensive assessment” of the moratorium 
on commercial whaling, but also those responding to “other critically 
important research needs”»22. 
With regard to the issuance of special permits, Japan maintained that, 
according to Article VIII, the State of nationality of the person or entity 
requesting a special permit for purposes of scientific research is the only State 
competent to issue a permit. So, according to the interpretation given by Japan 
to Article VIII, the issuance of special permits enjoys discretion. On the other 
hand, both Australia and New Zealand affirmed that «the requirements for 
granting a special permit set out in the Convention provide a standard of an 
objective nature to which the State of nationality has to conform»23. The Court 
recognized that Article VIII gives discretion to a State to reject the request for 
a special permit, or to indicate the conditions under which the permit will be 
granted. However, the State’s discretion is not sufficient for granting a special 
permit regarding killing, taking and treating whales for purposes of scientific 
research. A standard of review is necessary, which means to determine some 
evaluation criteria in order to judge the good discretion of the State.  
In order to review the grant of a special permit authorizing the killing, 
taking and treating of whales, the Court opted to take into account two 
aspects:  
1. to assess if the program under which these activities occurred 
involved scientific research; 
2. to find out «[...] if the killing, taking and treating of whales is 
“for purposes of” scientific research by examining whether, in the use of lethal 
methods, the programme’s design and implementation are reasonable in 
relation to achieving its stated objectives»24. 
Considering that the dispute between Australia and Japan arose from a 
State party to the ICRW (Japan) to grant special permits under Article VIII of 
the Convention, the standard of review introduced by the Court needed to 
                                                   
22 Id. at § 58. 
23 Id. at § 60. 
24  Id. at § 67. 
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consider on which objective basis  the authorizing State had granted the special 
permits. The Court specified it wasn’t a matter of scientific or whaling policy; it 
was just to determine if the special permits granted in relation to JARPA II fell 
under the scope of Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention. 
In order to make the standard of review effective, and to find out if 
Article VIII had been respected, the Court tried to specify the meaning of the 
phrase “for purposes of scientific research”, starting from the premise that the 
two elements - “scientific research” and “for purposes of” - have different 
meaning and characteristics, but still closely related, which means they need to 
be read together. The Court noted that the term “scientific research” is not 
defined in the Convention, so it considered the definition given by one of the 
scientific experts called by Australia: « Australia, relying primarily on the views 
of one of the scientific experts that it called, Mr. Mangel, maintains that 
scientific research (in the context of the Convention) has four essential 
characteristics: defined and achievable objectives (questions or hypotheses) 
that aim to contribute to knowledge important to the conservation and 
management of stocks; “appropriate methods”, including the use of lethal 
methods only where the objectives of the research cannot be achieved by any 
other means; peer review; and the avoidance of adverse effects on stock»25. 
Anyway the Court wasn’t convinced by the four criteria advanced by Australia, 
stating that these elements just reflected the opinion of one expert regarding 
the implementation of a well-conceived scientific research, but they were 
useless for the interpretation of the term used in the Convention. However, 
the Court seemed unable to find out an alternative definition, or different 
criteria, of the term “scientific research”, preferring to focus its attention on 
the term “for purposes of”. «In order to ascertain, in particular, whether a 
programme’s use of lethal methods is “for purposes of” scientific research, the 
Court considers whether the elements of such a programme’s design and 
implementation are reasonable in relation to its stated research objectives. As 
shown by the arguments of the Parties, these elements may include: decisions 
regarding the use of lethal methods; the scale of the programme’s use of lethal 
                                                   
25 Id. at § 74. 
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sampling; the methodology used to select sample sizes; a comparison of the 
target sample sizes and the actual take; the time frame associated with a 
programme; the programme’s scientific output; and the degree to which a 
programme co-ordinates its activities with related research projects»26. 
That being so, the Court stated the JARPA II could be characterized as 
“scientific research”. Anyway, in order to confirm its compliance with Article 
VIII, paragraph 1, of the ICRW, it was necessary to judge if its design and 
implementation were reasonable with regard to achieving the program’s stated 
research objectives. First of all, comparing the Research Plans in JARPA II and 
JARPA, its predecessor program, the Court noted a considerable overlap 
between the two program’ subjects, objectives, and used methods; this aspect 
casted many doubts relating to the argument presented by Japan, regarding 
alleged “new features” of JARPA II which imposed a significant increase in the 
minke whale sample size, and the introduction of lethal sampling for two 
additional species (fin whales and humpback whales). 
Moreover, the Court noted some weaknesses in JARPA II, and in the 
explanations presented by Japan: for example, the Court observed that Japan 
had launched JARPA II without waiting for the final review of JARPA by the 
Scientific Committee, a body established by the International Whaling 
Commission created under the Convention, whose task is to analyze the results 
of research conducted under special permits, and to review on special permits 
before any issuance by State parties. In addition, «after an extensive 
examination of the determination of species-specific sample sizes, the Court 
notes that the evidence relating to JARPA II provides scant analysis and 
justification for the underlying decisions that generate the overall sample size, 
raising further concerns about whether the design of JARPA II is reasonable in 
relation to achieving its stated research objectives»27. Lastly, the Court found 
out other aspects that raised doubts about its nature as a program for purposes 
of scientific research, like its open-ended time frame, its limited scientific 
                                                   
26 Id. at § 88. 
27 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), Press Release 
(unofficial), ICJ 31.03.2014, No. 2014/14, § 3. 
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output, and the lack of cooperation between JARPA II and the other 
researching program operating in the Antarctic Ocean. 
«Taken as a whole, the Court considers that JARPA II involves 
activities that can broadly be characterized as scientific research, but that “the 
evidence does not establish that the programme’s design and implementation 
are reasonable in relation to achieving its stated objectives”. The Court 
concludes that the special permits granted by Japan for the killing, taking and 
treating of whales in connection with JARPA II are not “for purposes of 
scientific research” pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention»28. 
In light of this conclusion, the Court found that Japan had breached several 
provisions of the Schedule to the Convention: the moratorium on commercial 
whaling in the period during which it had set zero catch limits for minke 
whales, fin whales and humpback whales under JARPA II29; the factory ship 
moratorium over the seasons during which fin whales were taken, killed or 
treated under JARPA II30; the prohibition of commercial whaling in the 
Southern Ocean Sanctuary in the period during which JARPA II was 
implemented 31 . Regarding the alleged violation of paragraph 30 of the 
Schedule32, the Court stated that JARPA II Research Plan had fulfilled all the 
information specified by that provision, meeting the requirements of paragraph 
30. 
Therefore, the Court ordered Japan to terminate all aspects of JARPA 
II, revoking any authorization still in use, permit or licence to kill, take or treat 
whales in relation to JARPA II, and stopping from granting any further 
permits under Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention, in pursuance of 
that program. 
                                                   
28 Id. at § 3. 
29 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Schedule (as amended by 
the Commission at the 64th Annual Meeting Panama City, Panama, July 2012), 
paragraph 7 (b). 
30 Id. at paragraph 10 (d). 
31 Id at. paragraph 10 (e). 
32 ICRW, Schedule, paragraph 30: «A Contracting Government shall provide the 
Secretary to the International Whaling Commission with proposed scientific permits 
before they are issued and in sufficient time to allow the Scientific Committee to 
review and comment on them». 
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3. Final Considerations: an Audacious Judgment. 
 
The final judgment of the International Court of Justice on the case 
“Whaling in the Antarctic” between Australia and Japan represents an 
important progress and an historic moment in the jurisprudence of the ICJ on 
environmental disputes, for several reasons. The most important step forward 
regards the approach to environmental controversies, based on the 
introduction of an efficient method in order to face the scientific aspects of the 
dispute: in this specific case, the Court had the merit to have found and applied 
a way to use the experts’ opinions presented by the parties in order to clarify 
the judges’ understandings. Thank to this method, the Court was able to 
identify «[...] an analytical approach that distinguishes the judge’s role from the 
scientist’s, respecting both»33. This important contribute given by the Court’s 
judgment finds its raison d’etre in the use of the concept of “standard of 
review”, an instrument often used by other international tribunals (especially in 
the range of protection of human rights - by the European Court of Human 
Rights, for example), but that had never received much attention by the ICJ, 
until now. The notion of “standard of review” is a little bit evanescent, even 
because «[...] is rarely determined by the relevant legal provisions (e.g. a treaty 
constituting  a particular court), and it remains a task of a specific court or 
tribunal to develop an  appropriate methodology»34; it can be defined «[...] the 
nature and intensity of review by a [international] court or tribunal of decisions 
[or other actions] taken by [national] governmental authority» 35 . «The 
applicable standard of review may concern either factual determinations (e.g. 
                                                   
33 C.R. PAYNE, Australia v. Japan: ICJ Halts Antarctic Whaling, in ASIL Insights, available 
at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/9/australia-v-japan-icj-halts-
antarctic-whaling, vol. 18, 9, April 2014 (last visited December 2014). 
34 Standard of Review in International Courts and Tribunals: Rethinking the Fragmentation and 
Constitutionalization of International Law, 26-27 October 2012 - a workshop sponsored by 
COST Action IS1003, International Law Between Constitutionalization and 
Fragmentation, and University of Seville, Faculty of Law. 
35 J. BOHANES, N. LOCKHART, Standard of review in WTO law, in The Oxford handbook of 
international law, 2009, 378-436. 
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deciding whether a national measure is supported by sufficient scientific 
evidence) or political and legal determinations made at the national level (e.g. 
whether a measure is necessary to attain specific objective). Consequently, 
standard of review determines the extent of discretionary powers enjoyed by 
national authorities in making certain determinations»36. In the light of these 
definitions, it’s clear that “standard of review” is not a defined instrument, but 
a method, or approach, to a specific matter; and it’s an approach that finds its 
own characteristics on the basis of the practice. This specific case regarding the 
Japan’s whaling program in the Antarctic Ocean, and the consequent 
controversy, was the first historical occasion for the International Court of 
Justice to find and apply an adequate “standard of review” to an environmental 
dispute; and the new approach developed by the Court involved all the 
elements necessary to find an effective “standard of review”. The first, and 
maybe most important of these elements, was the International Convention for 
the Regulation of Whaling, and the interpretation that the Court gave to Article 
VIII, regarding in particular the meaning of the phrase “for purposes of 
scientific research”. In this sense, the text of the Article VIII wasn’t very 
helpful, not only with respect to the meaning of the term “scientific research”, 
but also because it doesn’t specify which organ is designated (the State, the 
Court, the control organs established by the Convention?) to determine the 
existence of an interest of scientific nature, in order to identify its 
constitutional elements and their relevance for a judgment regarding the 
compliance of the grant of permits to conventional law. 
The Court declared that, in order to prove the existence of an interest 
of scientific nature that justifies the coverage of Article VIII, it’s necessary to 
demonstrate not only that the whaling program pursues objectives of scientific 
research, but (most important) that the declared scientific interest on which the 
program is based is the only purpose pursued by the program; and that it 
doesn’t leave doubts about any other purposes (of commercial nature, for 
example) hidden behind an alleged “scientific interest”. 
                                                   
36 See supra note 34. 
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This is the reason that pushed the Court to pay much more attention to 
the phrase “for purposes of”, than to the term “scientific research”; because 
it’s the exclusive purpose of scientific interest to determine the application of 
Article VIII, paragraph 1. In order to gain, if not the assurance, at least the 
presumption that a whaling program is conducted for purposes of scientific 
research, the Court stated that the methods and the procedures on which the 
program is built don’t have to leave doubts about the centrality of the 
“scientific interest”, rather than different purposes that breach Article VIII. In 
this sense, the standard of review introduced by the Court is based not on an 
objective parameter, but takes into account the criterion of “reasonableness”. 
In fact, the Court says in its judgement: «To this end and in light of the 
applicable standard of review [...], the Court will examine whether the design 
and implementation of JARPA II are reasonable in relation to achieving the 
programme’s stated research objectives [...]»37. 
However, the standard of review of “reasonableness” found by the 
Court is weak under one aspect: it doesn’t solve the limits of the Article VIII, 
paragraph 1, which leaves to the discretion of the State party the possibility to 
grant special permits authorizing «[...] that national to kill, take and treat whales 
for purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number 
and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit 
[...]»38. 
So the Court solved the ambiguity of the Article VIII with another 
ambiguity: it’s still all up to the discretion (and the good faith) of the State. In 
this specific case, «[...] the Court considers that JARPA II involves activities 
that can broadly be characterized as scientific research [...], but that the 
evidence does not establish that the programme’s design and implementation 
are reasonable in relation to achieving its stated objectives. The Court 
concludes that the special permits granted by Japan for the killing, taking and 
treating of whales in connection with JARPA II are not “for purposes of 
                                                   
37 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), ICJ 31.03.2014, no. 
148, § 127. See also supra, notes 24, 26. 
38 ICRW, supra note 4. 
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scientific research” pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention»39. 
The Court came to this conclusion because it noted a big imbalance between 
the number of whales taken and the number of whales killed since the JARPA 
II program had started, which was in contrast with the “scientific purposes” 
declared in the program; and this is only concrete element on which the Court 
fundamentally based its conclusions. The consequence of this conclusion, in 
case Japan had declared to pursue with JARPA II different purposes (scientific 
research) than the real ones (commercial objectives), was the possibility that 
Japanese government had violated the principle pacta sunt servanda40. Aside from 
the fact that the good faith of the State, not the bad faith, should be presumed 
in the interpretation of the treaties (unless it is proved that the State has 
consciously breached its international obligations), this important aspect 
should have deserved more attention from the Court. 
We also must consider the dissenting opinion to the judgment of the 
Court expressed by judge Owada, who criticizes the role assumed by the Court 
with the introduction and application of a standard of review in this dispute, 
taking into account the scientific merits of the case rather than the legal issues. 
According to his words «the judgment nevertheless seems to dwell upon this 
distinction between “scientific research” and activities “for purposes of 
scientific research” with a view to establishing that an activity that may contain 
elements of “scientific research” cannot always be accepted as an activity “for 
purposes of scientific research”. To me such a distinction is so artificial that it 
loses any sense of reality when applied to a concrete situation. The Court 
should focus purely and simply on the issue of the scope of what constitutes 
activities “for purposes of scientific research” according to the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the phrase. On the question of what constitutes activities 
“for purposes of scientific research”, it must first of all be said in all frankness 
                                                   
39 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), ICJ 31.03.2014, no. 
148, § 227. 
40 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Vienna, art. 26: «Every 
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in 
good faith». Also art. 31: «1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary  meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose».
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that this Court, as a court of law, is not professionally qualified to give a 
scientifically meaningful answer, and should not try to pretend that it can, even 
though there may be certain elements in the concept that the Court may 
legitimately and usefully offer as salient from the viewpoint of legal analysis»41. 
Moreover, the element of “reasonableness” found by the Court as an objective 
condition necessary to determine if the activities conducted under JARPA and 
JARPA II programmes were congruent with the declared purposes of scientific 
research, is vague, because it’s hard to understand in which context this 
“reasonableness” must be judged: legal context, or scientific context? Speaking 
of legal context, the answer is the Convention itself, which leaves the point to 
the good faith of the Contracting Party that undertakes the research in 
question. On the other hand, regarding the scientific context, «[...] it would 
impossible for the Court to establish that certain activities are objectively 
reasonable or not, from a scientific point of view, without getting into a 
techno-scientific examination and assessment of the design and 
implementation of JARPA/JARPA II, a task which this Court could not and 
should not attempt to do»42. So, under a certain point of view, judge Owada 
doesn’t criticize the standard of review established by the Court, but the fact 
that the Court established a standard of review; and surely his arguments are 
correct, because the Court is a judicial institution designated to interpret and 
apply the provisions of the Convention from a legal point of view, and cannot 
interfere with the regulatory régime established by the Article VIII of the 
Convention, which leaves to the discretion (so the good faith) of the 
Contracting Party to determine how the scientific research should be designed 
and implemented in a given situation; and to the IWC and the Scientific 
Committee the task of carrying out the process of review and critical 
comments on the whaling activities conducted by the Contracting Party. In any 
case, speaking both of legal and scientific questions, everything brings back to 
the Convention. And this means a serious paradox for the Court, bound to its 
                                                   
41  Dissenting opinion of Judge Owada, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/148/18138.pdf, § 23, 24. 
42  Id. at § 25. 
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role of interpreter and applier of a Convention, with no other basis than the 
Convention itself.  
Anyway, despite its flaws and the questions arisen, the importance of 
this judgment is unmistakable, and represents a fundamental benchmark for 
future environmental disputes before the International Court of Justice. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
In the judgment C-260/11 of 11 April 2013 (Edwards et 
Pallikaropoulos)1, the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: 
Court of Justice or ECJ) ruled on a request of preliminary ruling concerning 
the interpretation of Article 9 (4) of the Aarhus Convention as implemented by 
the Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC2. 
                                                   
1 Court of Justice of the European Union, Judgment, Fourth Chamber, Case C-
260/11, Edwards and Pallikaropoulos, 11 April 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:221, not yet 
published, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=136149&pageIn
dex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=251440 (last visited 
September 2014). 
2 Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of 
certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ 1985 L 175, p.40). Council 
Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution 
prevention and control (OJ 1996 L 257, p. 26). Directive 2011/92/UE of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of 
the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ 2012 L 26, 
p.1) codified Directive 85/337. Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 15 January 2008 concerning integrated pollution prevention and 
control (OJ 2008 L 24, p.8) codified Directive 96/61. 
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Council Directive 85/337/EEC, of 27 June 1985, concerns the 
assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the 
environment. Council Directive 96/61/EC, of 24 September 1996, deals with 
integrated pollution prevention and control. 
The focal point of this case can be summarised as follows: «[h]ow 
much may judicial proceedings in an environmental matter cost?»3. 
The present essay focuses on the reasoning of the Court of Justice -
answering  that question. In particular, it aims to consider the notion of not 
«prohibitively expensive» judicial proceedings. 
 
2. The Facts of the Case. 
 
The present case originated following the decision of the United 
Kingdom Environment Agency approving the operation of cement works, 
including waste incineration.  
Mr Edwards applied for judicial review of this decision arguing, 
particularly, that the project had not been subjected to an environmental 
impact assessment. In the first degree of jurisdiction Mr Edwards was granted 
legal aid.  
At first instance, the application was dismissed. Mr Edwards appealed 
against this decision to the Court of Appeal and then he withdrew it. Mrs 
Pallikaropoulos was added as an appellant in the remainder of the proceedings.  
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and ordered Mrs 
Pallikaropoulos to bear her own costs and to pay the opposing parties’ costs. 
Mrs Pallikaropoulos then appealed to the House of Lords. At the 
outset of the proceedings she applied for a protective costs order4, by which 
                                                   
3 Advocate General Kokott, Opinion delivered on 18 October 2012 in Case C-260/11, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:645. 
4 A Protective costs order is an Order made at the outset of the proceedings in 
question which provides that the party applying for the Order shall, regardless of the 
outcome of the proceedings, either not be liable at all for the other party’s costs or be 
liable only for a fixed proportion thereof but if successful may be entitled to recover 
all or part of his costs from the other party. P. HAVERS, Protective costs orders. Fair play 
in action or a complainers’ charter? available at  
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she sought a cap on her liability for costs in that appeal5. The House of Lords 
refused her application. 
By decision of 16 April 2008, the House of Lords affirmed the decision 
of the Court of Appeal to dismiss the appeal and ordered Ms Pallikaroupolos 
to pay the entire costs of the appeal to the House of Lords. 
The jurisdiction of the House of Lords was transferred to the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom. In the context of those proceedings, the 
Supreme Court referred 5 questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary 
ruling. 
 
3. The Legal Issues. 
 
The Supreme Court asked to the Court of Justice the followings 
questions: 
«1) How should a national court approach the question of awards of 
costs against a member of the public who is an unsuccessful claimant in an 
environmental claim, having regard to the requirements of Article 9(4) of the 
Aarhus Convention, as implemented by Article 10a [of Directive 85/337] and 
Article 15a of [Directive 96/61]? 
2) Should the question whether the cost of the litigation is or is not 
“prohibitively expensive” within the meaning of Article 9(4) of the Aarhus 
Convention as implemented by [those] directives be decided on an objective 
basis […], or should it be decided on a subjective basis […] or upon some 
combination of these two bases?  
3) Or is this entirely a matter for the national law of the Member State 
subject only to achieving the result laid down by [those] directives, namely that 
the proceedings in question are not “prohibitively expensive”? 
                                                                                                                                 
http://www.1cor.com/1155/records/1212/PH%20public%20law%20handout.pdf, 
13 May 2009, (last visited September 2014). For more details on protective costs 
order, see, ex plurimis, A. ZUCKERMAN, New rules for costs capping orders: feeding the costs 
litigation frenzy?, in Civil Justice Quarterly, 28(3), 2009, 289 and ff. 
5 On the changes made to UK Civil Procedure Rules after April 2013, see O. W 
PEDERSEN, The Price is Right: Aarhus and Access to Justice, in Civil Justice Quarterly, 33 
(1), 2014, 13 and ff. 
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4) In considering whether proceedings are, or are not, “prohibitively 
expensive”, is it relevant that the claimant has not in fact been deterred from 
bringing or continuing with the proceedings?  
5) Is a different approach to these issues permissible at the stage of (i) 
an appeal or (ii) a second appeal from that which requires to be taken at first 
instance?»6. 
Thus, the Court of Justice was asked to interpret Article 9 (4) of the 
Aarhus Convention, as implemented by Article 10a of Directive 85/337 and by 
Article 15a of Directive 96/61. 
The Aarhus Convention (Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters) was set out by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE). It was adopted on 25 June 1998 and entered into force on 30 
October 20017.  
This Convention concerns the rights of the public with regard to the 
environment. It also imposes on Parties and public authorities some 
obligations. These rights and obligations refer to three main pillars: access to 
information, public participation and access to justice8. The first pillar concerns 
both the «”passive” or reactive aspect of access to information […], and the 
“active” aspect dealing with other obligation relating to providing 
                                                   
6  Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-260/11, Ibid., § 23. 
7 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, adopted on 25 June 1998, entered into 
force on 30 October 2001, UNITED NATIONS, Treaty Series, vol. 2161, p. 447. As of 
7 January 2014, there were 46 Parties to the Convention: Albania, Armenia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European Union, Finland, France, Georgia, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Tajikistan, 
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
8 L. LAVRYSEN, The Aarhus Convention: Between Environmental Protection and Human Rights, 
in P. Martens, M. Bossuyt et al.(editors), Liège, Strasbourg, Bruxelles: Parcours des Droits de 
l’Homme. Liber Amicorum Michel Melchior, Limal, 2010, 649 and ff. 
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environmental information» 9 . The second pillar provides minimum 
requirements for public participation in various categories of environmental 
decision-making. The third pillar focuses on the access to justice in different 
contexts regarding environmental matters10. 
The European Union (former European Community) signed the 
Aarhus Convention on 25 June 1998 and approved it on 17 February 2005, 
through the Council Decision 2005/370/EC11. 
Before its approval, the European Union adopted two directives 
(Council Directives 2003/4 and 2003/35) in order to render its legislation 
consistent with the Aarhus Convention with a view to its conclusion12.  
The Directive 2003/4/EC extended the access to environmental 
information and repealed Council Directive 90/313/ECC 13 . Thus, it 
implemented the first pillar of the Aarhus Convention (public access to 
information). 
The Directive 2003/35/EC was adopted to enforce the second and the 
third pillars of the Aarhus Convention (public participation in decision-making 
and access to justice). In particular, this Directive provided for provisions on 
access to justice within Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC. 
                                                   
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. As regards the Access to justice, see A. TANZI, E. FASOLI, L. IAPICHINO, La 
Convenzione di Aarhus e l’accesso alla giustizia in materia ambientale, Bologna, 2011. See also 
M. PALLEMAERTS, The Aarhus Convention at Ten: interactions and tensions between 
conventional international law and EU environmental law, Groningen, 2011. 
11 Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf of the 
European Community, of the Convention on access to information, public 
participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters (OJ 
2005 L 124, p.1). 
12 See Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council 
Directive 90/313/EEC (OJ L 41, p.26), Recital 5. Directive 2003/35/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 providing for public 
participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programs relating to the 
environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice 
Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC (OJ L 156, p.17), Recital 5.  
13 Council Directive 90/313/EEC of 7 June 1990 on the freedom of access to 
information on the environment, (OJ L 158, p. 56). 
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These last two mentioned directives above implement more specifically 
the article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention which requires that the review 
procedures, before a court of law or another independent and impartial body 
established by law, «shall provide adequate and effective remedies, including 
injunctive relief as appropriate, and be fair, equitable, timely and not 
prohibitively expensive […]». 
Similarly, Article 10a of the Directive 85/337 and Article 15a of the 
Directive 96/61 provide that review procedures «[…] shall be fair, equitable, 
timely and not prohibitively expensive». 
In particular, the British Supreme Court, in its reference for a 
preliminary ruling, did not limit its questions to the interpretation of a 
provision of an international convention ratified by the European Union. It 
also asked for the interpretation of the European Union instruments which 
had implemented this provision. 
Nevertheless, these provisions do not specify what a not «prohibitively 
expensive» procedure consists of.  Neither do they establish how the cost of 
judicial proceedings should be assessed vis-à-vis «prohibitively expensive» 
proceedings.  
Consequently, the Court was asked to clarify the meaning of the notion 
of not «prohibitively expensive» proceedings. It also had to  rule on the criteria 
which a national court may apply when deciding on costs arising from 
participation in judicial proceedings in environmental matters. 
 
4. The Assessment of the European Court of Justice. 
 
Firstly, the Court of Justice gave some precise indications on the extent 
of the requirement that the judicial procedures should not be «prohibitively 
expensive».  
Indeed, it stressed that this requirement applies to all the costs arising 
from participation in the judicial proceedings. 
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Secondly, as regards to the third question of the national court, the ECJ 
stated that the assessment in order to establish whether a procedure is 
«prohibitively expensive» cannot be a matter for national law alone. 
In this view, the Court of Justice highlighted that (wide) access to 
justice in environmental matters is an objective of the European Union 
legislature in order to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the 
environment. 
Then, the ECJ briefly analysed the other legal basis of the requirement 
that the preceding costs should be not «prohibitively expensive». 
Its exam is based on two main elements: the right to an effective 
remedy contained in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and the principle of effectiveness 14. 
In accordance with the principle of effectiveness, detailed procedural 
rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s right under European 
Union law must not make in practice impossible or excessively difficult to 
exercise rights conferred by the European Union.  
In its reasoning, the Court of Justice not only referred to EU rights and 
principles but it also evoked an international document. In fact, it mentioned 
the Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, published in 2000 by the 
UNECE. 
 
The Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide is intended as «a 
convenient non-legally binding and user-friendly reference tool to assist 
policymakers, legislators and public authorities in their daily work of 
                                                   
14 Article 47 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union provides: 
«Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated 
has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the 
conditions laid down in this Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have 
the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as 
such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice». 
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implementing the Convention […]» 15 . The Court recognised that this 
instrument is not binding. Nevertheless it used it in order to specify that the 
cost of bringing a challenge under the Aarhus Convention must not be so 
expensive as to prevent the public from seeking review in appropriate cases. 
The Court concluded that judicial proceedings should not be 
«prohibitively expensive», in the context of environmental matters, means that 
a person «should not be prevented from seeking, or pursuing a claim for, a 
review by the courts […] by reason of the financial burden that might arise as a 
result»16. 
Thus, the Court established the criteria that a national court  should 
take into account when called upon to make an order for costs or when 
required to state its views on a possible capping of the costs for which the 
unsuccessful party must be liable. The Court stated that the national court  has 
to take into account both the interest of the person defending her/ his rights 
and the public interest. 
Then, the Court tried to elaborate the criteria for assessing the 
requirement that the cost of the judicial proceeding be not «prohibitively 
expensive». Firstly, the Court stated that all the relevant provisions of national 
law have to be taken into account (i.e. national legal aid or costs protection 
regime). 
Secondly, the national courts have to consider both the personal 
interest and the public interest in protecting the environment. 
Thirdly, the assessment has to be based on two elements: the subjective 
financial situation of the person involved and the objective amount of the 
costs. Consequently, the costs cannot exceed the financial resources of the 
person involved and cannot appear to be objectively unreasonable. 
The Court of Justice elaborated on other elements to help the national 
court in this assessment. The latter  may also take into account, for example, 
«whether the claimant has a reasonable prospect of success, the importance of 
                                                   
15 Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, p. 9, available at 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/Publications/Aarhus_Implementati
on_Guide_interactive_eng.pdf (last visited September 2014). 
16 Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-260/11, Ibid., § 35. 
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what is at stake for the claimant and for the protection of the environment, the 
complexity of the relevant law and procedure, the potentiality frivolous nature 
of the claim […]»17. 
Finally, the Court stressed the fact that the applicant has not been 
deterred from asserting her/his claim is not sufficient to establish that the 
judicial proceeding is not «prohibitively expensive» for her/him. 
It also highlighted that this assessment cannot be conducted according 
to different criteria depending when the assessment is conducted (first-instance 
proceedings, appeal or second appeal). 
 
5. Comments on the Court’s Judgment. 
 
In this judgment, the Court clarified the meaning of not «prohibitively 
expensive» judicial procedures considering this notion as an autonomous 
concept of EU law18. The Court also gave some criteria in order to concretely 
help national courts to assess the requirement that the cost be not 
«prohibitively expensive».  
In the absence of such a notion in the text of the Article 9 of the 
Aarhus Convention and on the Directives 85/337 and 96/61, the Court based 
its interpretation on other legal basis.  
Thus, the general principle of effectiveness and Article 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights are used in the reasoning of the Court of 
Justice. 
The reference to the Charter demonstrates that it is an instrument of 
high and operative value. The right to an effective remedy contained in Article 
47 of the Charter is used to explain and to strengthen the provisions of the 
secondary law (Directive 85/337 and Directive 96/61). 
                                                   
17 Ibid., § 42, 43. 
18 A. BOUVERESSE, Notion de coût non prohibitif de la procédure, in Europe. Actualité du droit 
de l’Union européenne, 6, 2013, 39 and ff. On judgment C-260/11. See also F. GUELLA, 
Le connessioni tra diritto sostanziale e un ambiente salubre e diritto processuale a una tutela 
giurisdizionale effettiva, in Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo, 3, 2013, 1027 and ff. 
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In its interpretation, the Court also referred expressly to a non-binding 
international document, the Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide. 
In a previous judgment, C-182/10, the Court commented on the value 
of this document19. In this case, the referring court had asked to the Court of 
Justice whether article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention must be interpreted in 
accordance with the guidance in this Implementation Guide. 
The Court of Justice answered to this question stressing that the Guide 
may be regarded as an explanatory document, capable of being taken into 
consideration if appropriate among other relevant materials for the purpose of 
interpreting the Convention. 
Therefore, for the interpretation of the provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention, «it is permissible to take the Aarhus Convention Implementation 
Guide into consideration but that Guide has no binding force and does not 
have the normative effect of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention»20. 
 
6. Conclusion. 
 
As the Court stressed in its decision, this case is deeply based on the 
link between the access to justice and the improvement of environmental 
protection21. 
Thus, in order to improve this protection, the definition of the notion 
of not «prohibitively expensive» procedure is of fundamental importance. 
                                                   
19 Court of Justice of the European Union, Judgment, Fourth Chamber, C-182/10, 
Solvay and Others, 16 February 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:82, ECR I‑0000. In this sense, 
see also Court of Justice of the European Union, Judgment, Grand Chamber, C-
279/12, Fish Legal and Emily Shirley,19 December 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:853, § 38, 
not yet published, available at  
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=145904&pageIn
dex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=76012 (last visited 
September 2014) and Court of Justice of the European Union, Judgment, Grand 
Chamber, C-204/09, Flachglas Torgau, 14 February 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:71, § 35-
36, published in the electronic Reports of Cases (Court Reports - general) 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_106320/?rec=RG&jur=C&anchor=201202C00
13#201202C0013. 
20 Court of Justice of the European Union, Judgment, C-182/10, Ibid., § 28. 
21 Court of Justice of the European Union, Judgment, Case C-260/11, Ibid., § 32, 44. 
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Through its reasoning, the Court gave a concrete content to Article 9 
(4) of the Aarhus Convention, as implemented by the secondary law of the 
European Union, to ensure an effective protection of individuals’ rights. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
As it is known, the right to a safe and healthy environment does not 
enjoy legal recognition as a specific human right under general international 
law and is not found in pioneering human rights agreements. Nevertheless, 
since the adoption of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, the first document in 
international environmental law recognizing the right to a healthy 
environment, progress has been made towards the recognition of the relevance 
of the linkage between human rights and environmental protection and of the 
idea that the latter constitutes a necessary pre-requisite for the enjoyment of 
human rights. 
Besides some regional instruments directly establishing the right to a 
safe environment (e.g. Article 11 of the “Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights”, also known as “Protocol of San Salvador”1, 
                                                   
1 Additional Protocol to The American Convention on Human Rights in the area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”), adopted on 17 
November 1988 at San Salvador (El Salvador), entered into force on 16 November 
1999; OAS, TREATY SERIES, NO. 69. Article 11 (“Right to a Healthy 
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which expressly recognizes this right as an individual right, and Article 24 of 
the “African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights”2), in other regional 
systems it is possible to invoke indirectly the observance of standards of 
environmental protection as an essential precondition for the compliance with 
other fundamental rights explicitly recognized, as the right to property, the 
right to health and the right to life. In this vein, the European Court of Human 
Rights, the European Committee on Social Rights, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
and the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, have issued 
decisions in cases involving this subject. Furthermore, at the national level 
several countries include the right to a safe environment in their constitutions3.  
With the case of Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum 
Company v. Ecuador4, the theme of the right to a safe environment reaches an 
investment tribunal for the first time. Through the partial award of 17 
September 20135, an arbitral tribunal established under the auges of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) adds one piece to the  multi-forum 
saga involving, on the one hand, the Chevron Corporation and its subsidiary, 
the Texaco Petroleum Company (hereinafter:TexPet), responsible of 
environmental and human health damages resulting from its work in the 
western part of the Amazon River basin in 1970s and 1980s, and, on the other 
hand, the Republic of Ecuador.  Although other investor-state arbitrations 
                                                                                                                                 
Environment”): «1. Everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and 
to have access to basic public services. 2. The States Parties shall promote the 
protection, preservation, and improvement of the environment». 
2 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted on 27 June 1981 (“Banjul 
Charter”), entered into force on 21 October 1986, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 
5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) Article 24: «All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development». 
3 See D.R. BOYD, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, 
Human Rights, and the Environment, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
2012. 
4 See generally Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case No. 
2009-23, available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/257 (last visited December 2014). 
5 First Partial Award on Track I, Sep 17, 2013, Chevron Corporation and Texaco 
Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2009-23, available at  http://italaw.com/cases/257 (last visited December 2014). 
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have dealt with environmental issues, the uniqueness of the decision at stake is 
due to the fact that an arbitral tribunal, established to resolve investment 
dispute, is called to investigate a disposition of domestic law concerning the 
right to a healthy environment6. 
 The present work aims to stress the steps of the Chevron case and the 
most relevant aspects of this arbitral award, in particular, the restrictive 
interpretation provided by the Tribunal and the role of environmental rights in 
the field of investment-treaty arbitrations. 
 
2. The Factual and Legal Context of the Chevron Case. 
 
In order to understand the arbitral decision, it is necessary to outline 
the main steps of Chevron/Ecuador dispute7.  In 1993, a group of Ecuadorian 
indigenous people filed a class action lawsuit in US federal court against oil 
giant TexPet (Aguinda v. Texaco Inc.)8. The plaintiffs alleged that, between the 
1964 and 1992, Texaco’s oil operations led to massive environmental pollution 
and  caused  irreversible damages to the people living in proximity to oil fields 
                                                   
6  G. D’AGNONE, Il riconoscimento dei diritti umani nelle decisioni arbitrali in materia 
d’investimenti, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 8, 2014, 183-187. It is important to 
clarify that the lawsuit at stake is not totally focused on the interpretation of the right 
to a healthy environment which is just a secondary question, as we will see in next 
paragraphs. 
7 This overview is based on: C. GIORGIETTI,  Mass Tort claims in International Investment 
Proceedings: what are the lessons from the Ecuador-Chevron Dispute?, in Journal of International 
Law, 34, available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/5 (last visited 
December 2014);  G. D’AGNONE, Il riconoscimento dei diritti umani nelle decisioni arbitrali in 
materia d’investimenti, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2014, 8, 183-187.; L. 
LAMBERT, At the Crossroads of Environmental and Human Rights  standards: Aguinda v. 
Texaco. Using the alien tort claims act to hold multinational corporate violators of International 
Laws Accountable in U.S. Courts, in Journal of  Transnational Law and Policy, 10, 2000, 109-
132; E.C. BLACK, Litigation as a Tool  for Development: the Environment, Human Rights, and 
the Case of Texaco in Ecuador, in Journal of Public and International Affairs, 15, 2004, 142-
164; A. PIGRAU, The Texaco-Chevron Case in Ecuador: law and justice at the age of 
globalization, Revista catalana de dret ambiental, 5, 1, 2014, 1-43. See also the history of 
events prepared by the Arbitration Tribunal (Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, No. 2009-­23, Permanent Court 
of Arbitration, 27 february 2012, available at http://italaw.com/cases/257). 
8 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.,1994 WL 142006, (S.D.N.Y. 1994).  
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because of illegal  technologies used during drilling process resulting in the 
discharge of 19 billion gallons of toxic wastewaters into the area.  
In 2002, the US court dismissed the suit on the grounds of forum non 
conveniens’ argument and identified the Ecuadorean tribunals as a more 
appropriate venue for litigating that claims9. It is significant to note that in 
1999 the government of Ecuador enacted a new environmental statute – the 
1999 Environmental Management Act (EMA) 10 – that introduces a new 
regulation of remedies and environmental reparations in cases of violations of 
the right to a safe environment codified by Article 19, paragraph 2, of 
Ecuadorian Constitution11. Although the new law cannot be used to challenge 
pre-1999 conduct since it has no retroactive application, in 2003, the 
Ecuadorean claimants re-filed their class action against Texaco – acquired by 
the US oil company Chevron Corporation in  2001 – in Lago Agrio, Ecuador 
(Lago Agrio Litigation)12. On 14 February 2011, the judge issued a ruling 
whereby the giant Chevron-Texaco was ordered to pay $8.6 billion in damages 
and clean up costs, with this amount increasing to $18 billion if Chevron does 
not issue a public apology13. On 3 January 2012 a panel of temporary judges 
presiding the Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbios upheld the ruling 
against the Company14. Finally, on 12 November 2013, the Ecuador’s highest 
                                                   
9 See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Aguinda v. Texaco 
Inc., 303 F. 3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002). Forum non conveniens means “inconvenient forum.” In 
the Aguinda case, New York was determined to be an inconvenient forum to hold the 
trial when compared to Ecuador, where the plaintiffs live and where the events 
occurred.   
10 Ley No. 37. RO/ 245 de 30 de Julio de 1999, Environmental Management Act of 
1999 (Ley de Manejo Ambiental de 1999), Ecuador. 
11 Basically, the 1999 EMA purports to allow any Ecuadorean resident to file suit for 
environmental reparations on behalf of the collectivity. See History of Texaco and 
Chevron in Ecuador available at 
https://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/default.aspx  (last visited 
December 2014). 
12 Complaint, Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., No. 002-2003 ,Super. Ct. of Nueva Loja, 7 
May 2003, Ecuador. 
13 Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., No. 002-2003,Super. Ct. of Nueva Loja, 14 February 
2011, Ecuador. . 
14 Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., No. 002-2003, Provincial Just. Ct. of Sucumbíos, 3 
January, 2012, Ecuador. 
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Court confirmed the previous decision but reduced damages to $9.51 billion15. 
Since Chevron had no more assets in Ecuador, enforcing the ruling abroad 
became the purpose of Ecuadorian plaintiffs16. 
While the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs’ claims were being discussed in 
Ecuador’s courts, Chevron and TexPet filed the above-mentioned investor-
State dispute against Ecuador, (PCA Case No. 2009-23)17.  
In 2009, in fact, the Company and its subsidiary applied for an 
investment arbitration before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), in 
accordance to the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration at the PCA and the 
1993 Ecuador-U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty, entered into force in 1997 
(“BIT”)18. Essentially, Chevron aimed to oppose the ongoing Ecuadorean 
proceeding and to avoid enforceability of any coming Ecuadorean court’s 
judgement in the Lago Agrio litigation. The claimants argued that international 
law and its rights as a foreign investors were being violated by its treatment in 
the Ecuadorean courts, alleging that Ecuador violated the BIT and some 
1990’s written agreements between TexPet and Ecuador. In particular, 
Chevron asserted that the Ecuador’s obligations under investment agreements, 
– such as the positive obligation to provide claimants’ investment fair and 
equitable treatment19 and the duty to provide them with due process and 
effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights – had been violated by 
                                                   
15 National Court of Ecuador ,Ruling No.174-2012 of 12 November 2013. 
16 See generally M.A. GOMEZ, The Global Chase: Seeking the Recognition and the Enforcement 
of the Lago Agrio Judgment Outside of Ecuador, in Stanford Journal of Complex Litigation, 1, 
2013, 429-466. 
17 Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case No. 2009-23, 
available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/257. There are two arbitrations pending at 
the PCA between Chevron/Texaco and Ecuador: the first suit, filed in 2007, relates to 
issues of denial of justice, and in 2011 resulted in a final award of $96 million in favor 
of Chevron. The second, filed in 2009, is still pending. In addition, it is important to 
consider that the international investment arbitration places Chevron/Texaco in 
opposition to Ecuador and does not directly involve the plaintiffs in related domestic 
proceedings. 
18 Id. 
19 Article II (3) (a) of U.S.-Ecuador BIT («Investment shall at all times be accorded 
fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security and shall in no 
case be accorded treatment less than that required by international law»). 
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Ecuador20. Although the investment tribunal did not granted the full set of 
relief requested by Chevron, arbitral decisions were in favour of the Company 
and its subsidiary. During the pendency of the arbitral proceeding, the tribunal 
ordered Ecuador «to take all measures at its disposal to suspend or cause to be 
suspended the enforcement or recognition within and without Ecuador of any 
judgment against [Chevron] in the Lago Agrio case»21. By issuing four interim 
awards22, the Tribunal decided it had jurisdiction to proceed to the merits and 
pointed out that Ecuador had not complied with the order. The tribunal 
decided to adopt a “twin-track” procedure 23 : the first track concerns 
preliminary legal issues arising from the Settlement Agreement of 199524; the 
second addresses all extant issues which may be required to resolve the 
dispute25.  
The above-mentioned Partial Award of 17 September 2013, which will 
be analyzed in the next paragraph, affects the first track of the arbitral 
proceeding at issue.  
 
3. The Investment Tribunal’s Interpretation of the Right to a Safe 
Environment in the Partial Award of 17 September 2013. 
 
The Partial Award addresses the dispute concerning the legal 
interpretation and legal effect of an agreement signed by TexPet and Ecuador 
                                                   
20 Id. 
21 Order for Interim Measures of 9 February 2011, at 4, available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0167.pdf (last visited 
December 2014). 
22 First Interim Award on Interim Measures of 25 January 2012; Second Interim 
Award on Interim Measures of 16 February 2012; Third Interim Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 27 February 2012; Fourth Interim Award on Interim 
Measures of 25 January 2012; Fourth Interim Award on Interim Measures of 7 
February 2013. All of these awards are available at 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/268.  
23  Procedural Order no. 10, 9 April 2012, at 2, available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0913.pdf. 
24 The legal issues arising from the 1995 Settlement Agreement will be discussed in the 
next paragraph. 
25 See note 23, at 2. It is important to note that the arbitral proceeding is still pending. 
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in 1995, of which Chevron was not a signatory Party (N.B. Chevron acquired 
TexPet six years later) 26 . With this agreement entitled “Contract for 
Implementing on Environmental, Remedial, Work and Release from 
Obligations, Liability and Claims” (hereinafter: the 1995 Settlement 
Agreement), Texpet was required to conduct environmental remediation as 
well as as community development projects27. At the same time, Ecuador 
granted Texpet a complete release of all further claims, liabilities and 
obligations associated with Texpet’s operations in Ecuador, included causes of 
action under Article 19-2 of 1978 Ecuadorian Constitution28. In particular, 
Article 5-1 of 1995 Settlement Agreement provided that «the 
Government…shall hereby release, acquit and forever discharge TexPet […] 
of all […] claims […] against the Releases for Environmental Impact»29; Article 
5-2 clarified that the previous obligation covered «all claims, rights to claims, 
debts, liens, common or civil law or equitable causes of actions and penalties 
[…] including, but not limited to, causes of action under Article 19-2 of the 
Political Constitution of Ecuador»30. Therefore, on the one hand, TexPet had 
the right to be fully released and discharged from any claims for environmental 
impact arising from oilfield activities. On the other hand, Article 19-2 of 1978 
Ecuadorian Constitution codified the right to a healthy environment and the 
State’s duty to safeguard this right.  
The arbitral tribunal had to clarify the range of Ecuador’s obligations 
under the 1995 Settlement Agreement, or rather the range of the Respondent’s 
duty to guarantee Claimants against any sort of litigation and causes of action 
under Article 19-2 of Ecuadorian Constitution for environmental liability and 
damages31 . The arbitral tribunal had to decide whether or not the 1995 
Settlement Agreement establishing State’s obligation to refrain from taking any 
                                                   
26 See First Partial Award on Track I, supra note 5, “Part B: Principal documents” and 
“Appendix 1: The 1995 Settlement Agreement (Spanish version only)”, at 9. 
27 Id, at 10. 
28 Id., at 11. 
29 Id., at 12. 
30Id., 39. 
31 See also G. D’AGNONE, Il riconoscimento dei diritti umani nelle decisioni arbitrali in materia 
d’investimenti, supra note 6, 185. 
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legal action against Texaco – included lawsuits linked with the constitutional 
right to a healthy environment –constituted adequate legal instrument in order 
to outlaw claims for environmental damage, such as Lago Agrio Paintiffs 
claims. Moreover the Court had to settle whether or not Chevron, who was 
not a signatory party, could be considered a indirectly beneficiary (a 
“Releasee”) of the contractual rights fixed in the Agreement32. Regarding the 
last issue, the Tribunal pointed out that Chevron, as a parent company of 
TexPet, was a part of the agreement and thus could enjoy and enforce its 
contractual rights under Article 5 in the same way and to the same extent as 
TexPet33. 
Regarding the main issue, the Tribunal considered that Article 5 of 
1995 Settlement Agreement was intended to preclude the Respondent from 
itself making any claims against Chevron under Article 19-234. The Tribunal 
made a distinction between individual rights and diffuse (or collective) rights. 
Firstly, it was clarified that the release under the agreement did not encompass 
claims made by third persons in respect of their own individual rights separate 
form the Respondent35. A person must have the ability do dispose of claims in 
respect of its own individual rights and the State had no right to dispose of 
such an individual claim for personal harm. In Tribunal’s view, an individual 
claiming damages for personal harm remained free to do so, even where that 
person invoked Article 19-2 in support of an individual claim for damages in 
respect of personal harm, since the release in Article 5 did not amount to a 
settlement with erga omnes effects36. Secondly, the tribunal wondered whether or 
not «an individual could make a claim in respect of harm arising out of the 
alleged violation of a diffuse right under Article 19-2 of the Constitution 
without claiming to have suffered any personal harm»37. The Court highlighted 
that diffuse rights are indivisible entitlements that pertain to the community as 
                                                   
32 First Partial Award on Track I, supra note 5, at 36. 
33 Id. at 37. 
34 Id. at 37. 
35 Id. 
36 Id., 39,40,41,42. 
37 Id. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SURVEY 2014 
297 
 
297 
a whole, «such as the community’s collective right to live in a healthy and 
uncontaminated environment»38. In Court’s opinion, the right to a healthy 
environment established by Article 19-2 constituted «a diffuse and indivisible 
right because of the owner of that right was the entire community of 
Ecuadorian citizens»39. The Court pointed out that, even if Article 19-2 was 
not framed in terms that explicitly conferred any right of action, «it did confer 
a right to a pollution-free environment guaranteed by the State»40. Under 
domestic law as at the time when the 1995 Settlement agreement was executed, 
in the Tribunal’s view, «under the Ecuadorian law, only the State could bring a 
diffuse claim under Article 19-2 to safeguard the right of citizens to live in a 
environment free from contamination» 41 . Therefore, except for claims in 
respect of their own personal harms, individuals or group of individuals could 
not make a claim in respect of harm arising out of the alleged violation of a 
diffuse right under Article 19-2, because «only the State had the legal capacity 
to make and settle a diffuse claim under Article 19-2»42 as at 1995. As a result, 
the tribunal stated that any claim invoking the diffuse right to a safe 
environment on the basis of Article 19-2 of 1978 Ecuadorian Constitution 
against Chevron and Texaco was precluded by Article 5 of the 1995 Settlement 
Agreement43.  
 
 
 
                                                   
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 «The Tribunal considers that, as at 1995, such a claim by such an individual was not 
possible under Ecuadorian law, that cause of action being confined under Article 19.2 
to the Respondent alone»; id., at 42. 
43  «The Tribunal concludes that, under Ecuadorian law, Article 5 of the 1995 
Settlement Agreement and article IV of the Final Release preclude any claim by the 
Respondent against any Release invoking the diffuse constitutional right under Article 
19-2 of the Constitution, but that these releases also preclude any third person making 
a claim against a Releasee invoking the same diffuse constitutional right under Article 
19-2, not being a separate and different claim for personal harm (whether actual or 
threatened)»;  id, at 42-43. 
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4. Comment. 
 
Although the tribunal did not discuss the nature of Lago Agrio 
Litigation, some considerations have to be done about the restrictive 
interpretation of the right to a safe environment adopted by the investment 
tribunal.  From an international law prospective, as analyzed in the essay’s 
introduction, this interpretation seems to be in contrast with the current 
tendency to value the right to a safe environment as a human right. Even if this 
goal has not been reached yet, the investment tribunal could have read the 
constitutional right recognized by Article 19-2 of Ecuadorian constitution as an 
individual right 44 . Furthermore, even assuming the mentioned article 
establishes a diffuse right to live in a healthy and uncontaminated environment, 
it does not necessarily imply that the State is the only one allowed to exercise 
the right to bring a legal action asserting that kind of right. At the current stage 
of international law, the right to a safe environment should be considered a 
fundamental right that cannot be renounced by the State with erga omnes 
effects45. In addition, it is important to note that the international arbitration 
has only indirect effects in the context of tort claims for environmental 
damages. In the case at issue, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs are not part of the 
litigation and the arbitral proceeding cannot bring direct redress to them46. The 
partial award at issue shows the tension between the international investor-
state arbitration, which affects investor’s rights, and human rights, in particular 
the right to a safe environment. 
 
 
 
                                                   
44  G. D’AGNONE, Il riconoscimento dei diritti umani nelle decisioni arbitrali in materia 
d’investimenti, supra note 6, 186. 
45 Id. 
46 See C. GIORGIETTI,  Mass Tort claims in International Investment Proceedings: what are the 
lessons from the Ecuador-Chevron Dispute?, supra note 7, 791. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
The last few years have seen a surge of interest in foreign acquisition of 
land for agricultural use and natural resource exploitation in developing 
countries. Currently, these large-scale development projects can represent a 
threat to people’s livelihoods and ecological sustainability. Even though some 
of the land-lease agreements have provisions concerning projects of rural 
development, these deals are usually not written on equal terms between the 
investors and local communities. Indigenous peoples who live in the lands 
object of the investments often do not play any role in the decision-making 
process that led to their consent. On the contrary, from a sustainable 
development perspective, which is defined as the policy imperative to balance 
economic, environmental and social considerations so as to meet «the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
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their own need»1, foreign direct investments have to be high-quality ones 
improving local livelihoods while protecting the environment. 
Where indigenous and tribal peoples are involved, there has been 
growing tendency in International Law to recognize the free prior and 
informed consent. This principle, stated also in the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous People2, refers to the right of local communities 
to participate in decision making about issues impacting them. The right of 
indigenous people to be consulted about legal or administrative measures that 
will affect them directly has become a general principle of International Law 
and it is consistent with sustainable development. 
This was the matter of complaint in the case of Sarayaku indigenous 
community who was not consulted by the State of Ecuador when it granted oil 
concessions in the community’s ancestral lands. The complaint on the 
infringement of indigenous people’s free prior and informed consent by 
Ecuador was launched in April 2003 by the Association of the Kichwa People 
of Sarayaku (Tayjasaruta), the Centre for Economic and Social Rights (Centro 
de Derechos Económicos y Sociales) and the Centre for Justice and 
International Rights against the Republic of Ecuador. The decision of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued on 27th June 2012 delivered a 
landmark decision, finding international responsibility of Ecuador for having 
breached both domestic and international human right obligations by allowing 
an Argentine oil company to drill on indigenous land without consulting the 
resident community first. 
 
2. Facts of the Case and Arguments of the Parties. 
 
The Sarayaku Kichwa indigenous people are one of the twenty-eight 
ancestral communities to whom Ecuador awarded an undivided parcel of land 
                                                   
1 UN, “Report of the World Commission on environment and development: Our 
common future”, Annex to UN doc A/42/427, August 4, 1987, IV.1, available at 
http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm (last visited December 2014). 
2 United Nations, The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, 13 September 
2007. 
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in the Amazonian region along the Bobonaza River in 1992. Four years later, 
in 1996, Ecuador signed a contract with an Argentinean oil company 
(Compañia General de Combustibles, hereinafter the “CGC”) and the 
Empresa Estatal de Petróleos del Ecuador (PETROECUADOR) for oil 
exploration and exploitation on lands that included the ancestral territory of 
Sarayaku community. The 65% of the so called “Block 23” was within the 
Sarayaku lands. According to the contract, the CGC had the obligation to 
prepare an Environmental Impact Assessment3 and obtain all the permits 
needed. 
The seismic exploration phase started in 2002 when the EIA for 
seismic prospection was updated and approved. Between 2002 and 2003, in 
order to conduct seismic exploration, the CGC entered Sarayaku territory 
without consulting the community or obtaining its permission. The CGC’s 
activity in the ancestral lands created a situation of risk for the population, 
given that for a time they were prevented from practicing their traditional 
subsistence activities and their freedom of movement and cultural expression 
were curtailed. Actually, the Sarayaku People subsist on family-based collective 
farming, hunting, fishing and gathering within their territory, in accordance 
with their traditions and ancestral customs. Around 90% of their nutritional 
needs come from products obtained from their own land and the remaining 
10% come from outside the community. Furthermore, the CGC’s activity in 
the ancestral lands provoked negative consequences also on the environment: 
part of the Kausa Sawach, a sacred living rainforest for the Kichwa Peolple, was 
destroyed.  
For several months the CGC, protected by soldiers and private security 
guards who set up four military bases in Amazonia, carried out detonation, fell 
trees, buried approximately 1433 kg of high grade explosives in wells and 
polluted the environment with its activities. Several sacred sites for the 
community were destructed and the Kichwa People declared an “emergency”, 
                                                   
3  The Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) is a procedure that entails 
considerations of potentially harmful consequences of a planned activity on the 
environment, before authorizing the implementation of the project. 
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during which the community stopped its everyday economic, administrative 
and education activities for a period of 4 to 6 months. In order to protect the 
boundaries of its territory and prevent the entry of the CGC, the Sarayaku 
community organized six so-called “Peace and Life Camps” on the edges of 
the territory, each comprising 60 to 100 people, including men, women and 
young people. It was so claimed, and not refused by the State, that the 
members of the Sarayaku headed into the jungle to reach the camps set up on 
the borders of the territory, including children old enough to walk and 
pregnant women or those with babies. The only people who did not participate 
in this surveillance were the elderly, the sick and very young children (toddlers), 
who stayed in Sarayaku Center. During this period, the Community members 
lived in the jungle; the crops and food ran out and, during several months, the 
families survived exclusively on resources from the forest4. 
 
3. The Legal Issue. 
 
The Court had to determine whether the State of Ecuador adequately 
respected and guaranteed the rights of the Sarayaku People that were allegedly 
violated, in granting the contract of oil exploitation on their territory to a 
private company, in implementing the said contract and causing a series of 
related events5. The controversial issue was to understand the date on which 
the state’s obligation to consult with the indigenous people should have taken 
place. Even though the State acknowledged that it did not carry out prior 
consultations, it pointed out that the duty was introduced in 1998 or 1999 by 
the ratification of the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 
1696, two or three years after the contract with CGC. On the other hand, the 
petitioners and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights argued that 
                                                   
4 Kichwa Indigenous Community of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (ser. C) N. 245 (June 27, 2012), 28. 
5 Id, p. 34 
6  International Labour Organization, Convention n. 169, Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention, 27 June 1989. 
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the consultations should have begun from the moment of the contract’s  
stipulation. 
The representatives of the Sarayaku Community and the Commission  
argued that the failure to inform and consult about the project by the State 
constituted a violation of the right to property, in relation to the obligation to 
respect the right to freedom of thought and expression and political rights, 
enshrined in Article 217 of the American Convention, in relation to Articles 
1(1)8, 139, and 2310 thereof, to the detriment of the Community and its 
members. Furthermore, it was argued that the inability of the Sarayaku People 
to move freely within their own territory and their inability to leave it due to 
the military posts and the placement of explosives, all with the acquiescence 
and participation of the State agents, made the State responsible for the 
violation of the right to free movement, protected under Article 2211 of the 
                                                   
7 Article 21 of the American Convention establishes: «1. Everyone has the right to the 
use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment 
to the interest of society. 2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon 
payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in 
the cases and according to the forms established by law [...]». 
8 Article 1(1) of the American Convention establishes: «The States Parties to this 
Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to 
ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those 
rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, 
birth, or any other social condition». 
9 Article 13(1) of the American Convention states: «Everyone has the right to freedom 
of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice». 
10 Article 23 of the American Convention states: «1. Every citizen shall enjoy the 
following rights and opportunities: a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives [...]». 
11 Article 22 of the American Convention states: «1. Every person lawfully in the 
territory of a State Party has the right to move about in it, and to reside in it subject to 
the provisions of the law. 2. Every person has the right lo leave any country freely, 
including his own. 3. The exercise of the foregoing rights may be restricted only 
pursuant to a law to the extent necessary in a democratic society to prevent crime or 
to protect national security, public safety, public order, public morals, public health, or 
the rights or freedoms of others. 4. The exercise of the rights recognized in paragraph 
1 may also be restricted by law in designated zones for reasons of public interest [...]». 
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American Convention. Moreover, the petitioners denounced the violation of 
their right to life and to personal integrity recognized by Article 412 and 513 of 
the Convention, as long as the State had allowed the burial of explosives in 
their territory creating a permanent danger that threatens the life and survival 
of its members. 
While representatives of the Sarayaku Community and the Commission 
cited the American Convention on Human Rights and evolving international 
legal norms, Ecuador based its argument on the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties and the specific enunciation of the obligation to consult 
provided in ILO Convention n. 169.14 In particular, Ecuador pointed out that, 
having signed the contract for oil exploration with CGC in 1996, it was not 
obliged to initiate a consultation process, or obtain the free, prior and 
informed consent of the Sarayaku People, as long as it had not yet ratified the 
ILO Convention 169 and considering the fact that the Constitution at the time 
made no provision to that effect. It was added that, based on Article 28 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, this was a legally non-existent 
obligation for Ecuador. Actually, the State had adjudicated the territory to the 
Sarayaku People, but it would not be considered an unlimited property title. In 
fact, the State’s power to build roads or other infrastructure is not restricted 
and its institutions and Security Forces have free access to the territory to fulfill 
their constitutional obligations. Furthermore, Ecuador affirmed that 
underground natural resources belong to the State, which may exploit these 
without interference provided that it does so in accordance with environmental 
protection standards.15 
                                                   
12 Article 4.1 of the American Convention states: «Every person has the right to have 
his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the 
moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life». 
13 Article 5 of the American Convention states: «1. Every person has the right to have 
his physical, mental and moral integrity respected. 2. No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. All persons deprived of their 
liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person [...]». 
14 L. BRUNNER and K. QUINTANA, The Duty to Consult in the Inter.American System: Legal 
Standards after the Sarayaku, in ASIL Insights, 16, Issue 35, 2012. 
15 Kichwa Indigenous Community of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (ser. C) N. 245 (June 27, 2012) p. 35 
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4. The Decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights declared that the State, by 
failing to consult and guarantee the participation of the Sarayaku People on the 
execution of the project, was responsible for the violation of the right to 
communal property of the indigenous people, recognized in Article 21 of the 
Convention, in relation to the right to cultural identity, under the terms of 
Articles 1(1) and (2) thereof. Since the provisional measures to remove 
explosive material that constituted a serious risk to the life and the integrity of 
Sarayaku People were ordered in June 2005 and the State removed just a small 
part of it, Ecuador was considered responsible for having gravely put at risk 
the rights to life and physical integrity of the petitioners. For the foregoing 
reason, the Court recognized the violation of Article 4(1) and 5(1) of the 
American Convention, in relation to the obligation to guarantee the right to 
communal property, under the terms of Articles 1(1) and 21 thereof. Lastly, 
the Court found also the violation of Article 8(1)16 of the Convention for 
having the State not guaranteed an effective remedy to address the juridical 
situation infringed to detriment of the Sarayaku People. Consequently, the 
Court deemed appropriate to set the amount of US $1,250,000.00 for the 
Sarayaku People as compensation for non-pecuniary damages and US 
$90,000.00 as compensation for pecuniary damages. The State was ordered to 
neutralize, deactivate and completely remove the surface pentolite and the 
Court requested the consultation of the population Sarayaku appropriately in 
the decisions to be taken in the future, and the adoption of proper domestic 
legislation to give effect to the right to prior, free and informed consultation of 
indigenous peoples. 
 
                                                   
16 Article 8.1 of the American Convention states: «1. Every person has the right to a 
hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, 
independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the 
substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the 
determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature». 
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5. Considerations on the Sarayaku Decision. 
 
The sentence is landmark for several aspects. For instance, for the first 
time in the history of the Inter-American Court’s judicial practice, a delegation 
of Judges conducted a proceeding at the site of the events visiting the territory 
of the Sarayaku People. Furthermore, the judgment touches many aspects of 
interest, in particular recognizing the right of information and consultation. As 
a matter of fact, the Court   focused the origin of the obligation and then 
clarified the essential elements in order to consider a process of effective and 
proper consultation. The Court had, actually, seen the indigenous and tribal 
people’s right to effective participation in decision-making that concerns their 
territory as deriving from the right to property (Article 21 of American 
Convention and Article XXIII of the American Declaration of the Right and 
Duties of Man), the right to be free from discrimination and the right to 
partecipate in government (Article 23 of the American Convention). Moreover, 
the Court several times referred to ILO Convention n. 169 that had enshrined 
the rights of indigenous people to have a full realization of the human rights, 
including economic, social, and cultural rights, without discrimination, and to 
partecipate in decision-making when state actions may directly affect them.17 
Because various Member States of the Organization of American States had 
incorporated these standards into their domestic legislation and through there 
highest courts, the Court considered the obligation to consult «a general 
principle of International Law […] and an obligation that has been clearly 
recognized»18. 
Later, the Court «has established that in order to ensure effective 
participation by members of an indigenous community or people in 
development or investment plans within their territory, the State has the duty 
to consult the community in an active and informed manner, and in 
accordance with its customs and traditions, in the context of a continuous 
                                                   
17 ILO Convention N. 169, Article 2. 
18 Kichwa Indigenous Community of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (ser. C) N. 245 (June 27, 2012) para 164, 165, p. 48. 
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communication between the parties. Moreover, these consultations should be 
undertaken in good faith, through culturally appropriate procedures and must 
be aimed at reaching an agreement. Similarly, the indigenous people or 
community must be consulted in accordance with its own traditions, during the 
early stages of the development or investment plan, and not only when it is 
necessary to obtain the community’s approval. Also, the State must ensure that 
members of the community are aware of the potential benefits and risks so 
they can decide whether or not to accept the proposed development or 
investment plan. Finally, the consultation must take into account the traditional 
decision-making practices of the people or community» 19 . The Judges 
«emphasized  that the obligation to consult is the responsibility of the State, 
and therefore the planning and carrying out of the consultation process is not 
an obligation that can be avoided by delegating it to a private company or to 
third parties, much less delegating it to the same company that is interested in 
exploiting the resources in the territory of the community that is the subject of 
the consultation»20. In addition, the Court «has established that Environmental 
Impact Studies must be carried out in conformity with international standards 
and best practices, must respect the indigenous peoples’ traditions and culture 
and must be completed prior to the granting of the concession, given that one 
of the purposes for requiring such studies is to guarantee the right of 
indigenous people to be informed about all proposed projects in their 
territory»21. It is evident that all these requirements are completely absent in the 
Sarayaku case. Finally, referring to the date on which the state obligation to 
consult with began, the Court specified that «given that ILO Convention 169 
applies to the subsequent impacts and decisions stemming from oil projects, 
even though these had been contracted prior to its entry into force, it is clear 
that at least since May 1999 the State was under the obligation to guarantee the 
Sarayaku People’s right to prior consultation, in relation to their right to 
communal property and cultural identity, in order to ensure that the 
                                                   
19 Kichwa Indigenous Community of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (ser. C) N. 245 (June 27, 2012) para 177, p. 53. 
20 Id, para 187, p. 56. 
21 Id, para 206, p. 62. 
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implementation of the oil concession would not compromise their ancestral 
lands, livelihood or survival as an indigenous people»22. 
 
6. Implications for Future Cases and Relations with the Principle 
Sustainable Development. 
 
The Sarayaku sentence has far-reaching effects on state and non-state 
actors  in the Americas and beyond. Also referring to ongoing large-scale 
developments projects on indigenous lands in Americas, the landmark decision 
has shown how the state’s ratification of the American Convention could be a 
significant element in order to determine its obligation. As we have seen, 
another important factor will be the ratification of ILO Convention n. 169. 
Notwithstanding, in order to determine the state responsibility for indigenous’ 
rights to consultation, the ratification of the two conventions will not be 
determinative having the Court concluded that the obligation to consult is a 
general principle of International Law. 
The Court’s verdict has also large repercussions for the intense debate 
that has been raging in the last few years about the scope of the right to 
consultation and territorial rights of indigenous peoples. The Court’s 
jurisprudence that has concluded that the obligation to engage in consultations 
with indigenous communities has become a general principle of International 
Law will be persuasive beyond the American Courts. Its influence will reach 
not only worldwide Courts but also multinational corporations, whose 
transnational activities have always to deal with states’ duties. As a 
consequence of far-reaching impact of litigation such as the Sarayaku case, the 
evolution of international standards on duty to consult is significant for a wide 
range of actors23. 
The Sarayaku decision represents an important goal in achieving 
sustainable development. As a matter of fact, fair and high-quality investments 
                                                   
22 Id, para 175, p.52. 
23 L. BRUNNER and K. QUINTANA,The Duty to Consult in the Inter.American System: Legal 
Standards after the Sarayaku, in ASIL Insights, 16, 2012. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SURVEY 2014 
 
309 
that address social aspects minimizing negative impacts on people’s lives are 
considered by the scholars as the means in order to reach the Sustainable 
Development. In conclusion, investments on indigenous lands which are the 
results of genuine dialogue as a part of a participatory process with indigenous 
people are essential requirement for sustainable development. 
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IMPACT OF THE INVESTMENT TREATIES ON 
STATES’ ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: THE DISPUTE 
VATTENFALL V. GERMANY (II) 
 
Irene Pozzi 
 
 
 
CONTENTS: 1. – Introduction. 2. – Vattenfall v. Germany (II): Background 
on the Conflict. 3. – Legal Ground of the Dispute: Forecasts and 
Considerations. 4. – Vattenfall v. Germany (I): a Case Conducted with Greater 
Transparency.  
5. – Transparency of the Arbitration Proceeding According to the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules. 6. – Final Considerations. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
International investment treaties can have a significant impact on 
environmental policy and environmental regulation in the States parties to the 
treaties. As a matter of fact, investment treaties give individual investors or 
private entities the right of bringing claims against the host State for alleged 
violations of obligations under the treaty. In particular, investors from one 
State are enabled to sue regulatory measures that could have negative effects 
on their investment directly before international arbitration tribunals. 
Therefore, there is a constant tension between investor rights and public 
welfare interests, which should be carefully balanced by the arbitral tribunals. 
In order to present such issue as well as to shed light on some of the 
matters at stake, the present survey analyzes the new dispute Vattenfall v. 
Germany (II). 
The dispute was registered on May 2012, when a Swedish energy 
company, Vattenfall, filed a request for arbitration against Germany at the 
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International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
because of the Germany’s decision to abandon the use of nuclear energy. In 
spite of the great public interest arose by the dispute, especially from the 
perspective of sustainable development, the case has not been conducted with 
the greatest possible transparency and public scrutiny, at least until now. This 
survey provides the background on the conflict, trying to better understand 
this particular case as well as the investment law and policy it relies on. It also 
provides a comparison with the first 2009-2011 Vattenfall v. Germany 
arbitration that was conducted with greater transparency.  
 
2. Vattenfall V. Germany (II): Background on the Conflict.  
 
On 31 May 2012, Vattenfall, a Swedish energy company, submitted a 
request for arbitration against the Federal Republic of Germany. The dispute 
between Vattenfall and the German federal government initiated in response 
to Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear energy in the wake of the nuclear 
disaster in Fukushima. As a matter of fact, during the summer 2011, the 
German Parliament decided to abandon the use of nuclear energy by the year 
20221. Such decision2, however, was taken only few months after the German 
government lengthened permits for the operating lives of the older power 
plants beyond the deadline already set by the previous government3, so as to 
lead energy companies to further invest in that field4. 
                                                   
1 On 30 May 2011, the government decided to phase-out and close all reactors by 
2022. Subsequently, the German Bundestag (Parliament) passed the amendment of 
the Atomic Energy Act (AtG – ref. no. 17/6070) with a clear majority of 513 to 79 
votes and 8 abstentions at the end of June, and the Bundesrat vote on 8 July 
confirmed this. 
2 The Thirteenth Amendment to the Atomic Energy Act came into effect on August 
6, 2011. 
3 On 28th October 2010, the 11th amendment of the Atomic Energy Act, with the aim 
of extending the life span of nuclear energy plants, was passed with 308 to 289 by the 
lower house of German parliament. The content of this act was to extend the life span 
of 17 German nuclear reactors by approximately 12 years. The act came into law after 
it was signed by the President on 8th December 2010. See G. BENZOV, German 
parliament passes law to extend use of nuclear power. Deutsche Welle, 2010, available at 
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The new Atomic Energy Act disposed the immediate closure (August 
6, 2011) for the oldest of the 17 nuclear power plants (among others, 
Brunsbuttel and Krummel which are owned by Vattenfall). As for the 
remaining plants, on the other hand, it was established their gradual closure by 
2022.  
As, from Vattenfall’s point of view, the German government’s decision 
to abandon nuclear power had made the investment worthless and even 
destroyed the value of its assets, the Swedish company sued Germany. 
The claim has initiated before the World Bank’s International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under the terms of the Energy 
Charter Treaty. 
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 5  has the fundamental aim to 
strengthen the rule of law on energy issues by providing a set of rules to be 
observed by all the participating governments. In addition to that, it also offers 
a dispute settlement mechanism which allows investors to initiate a legal action 
direcly against states6 for alleged violations of obligations under the treaty, 
bypassing the domestic court system. In particular, investors from one State 
are enabled to sue for indirect expropriation of their property before an 
international tribunal, namely when the Host State’s government implements 
regulations or other activities that significantly diminish the value of 
investments. Therefore, such arbitration often involves challenges to regulatory 
measures that may consist – as in the present case – in decisions concerning 
the protection of environment, human health and safety. There is a permanent 
tension between investor rights and state right to regulate public welfare 
interests, which could potentially bring about the detriment of the latter. 
Indeed, even if public welfare interests may be considered in an arbitral 
                                                                                                                                 
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6162732,00.html (last visited September 
2014). 
4 Vattenfall said it invested 700 million euro as a consequence of the government’s 
plan to lengthen the operating lives of older plants. 
5 The Energy Charter Treaty is a multilateral treaty which was signed in December 
1994 and entered into legal force in April 1998. To date, it has been signed by fifty-
two states, the European Community and Euratom. 
6 Article 26: settlement of disputes between an investor and a contracting party. 
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decision, the investment treaties primarily aim to facilitate foreign direct 
investments safeguarding them against “political” risks and, consequently, 
focus almost exclusively on investor interests. In such a context, if the arbitral 
tribunal recognizes the breach of an investment protection standard, the state 
involved may be condemned to pay high amounts in compensation to the 
claimant. Besides, the final decision released by the arbitral tribunal constitutes 
the definitive and binding ruling on the case since there is not any appeal 
system. Thus, arbitrators have the power to give a binding decision on public 
interests issues following the challenge by a foreign investor of regulatory 
measures taken by a State. 
The impact of the investment treaties on states’ public policy is evident: 
the mere threat of a claim and a possible conviction to high payments might 
even restrain states on the adoption or implementation of regulatory measures 
to protect sensitive public interests, such as the environment.  
In the matter of the dispute at stake, notably, Vattenfall claims over 
euro 3.7 billion in compensation. However, as key documents concerning this 
case are not publicly available, the exact claims made by Vattenfall remain 
unknown7. Moreover, to this day, the Tribunal has issued a decision on 
jurisdiction which has not been made public8. However, it has to be in favour 
of the claimant since the case is still pending and proceeds to merits.  
 
3. Legal Ground of the Dispute: Forecasts and Considerations. 
 
It is likely that Vattenfall is suing the Federal Republic of Germany 
grounding primarily on the provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty for 
protection against expropriation without compensation (Article 13) 9 , the 
                                                   
7 On 20 December 2013 and 11 February 2014, the Tribunal issued Procedural Orders 
No. 2 and 3 concerning the confidentiality of documents. And even recently, i.e. on 27 
February 2014 and 18 March 2014, the tribunal issued Procedural Orders No. 4 and 5 
concerning the confidentiality of documents too. 
8 The Tribunal issued a decision on the respondent’s Rule 41(5) objections on 2 July 
2013. 
9 See ahead in the paragraph.  
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SURVEY 2014 
 
314 
obligation on fair and equitable treatment (Article 10)10, and also the umbrella 
clause (Article 10)11. One of the most significant provisions of the investment 
protection regime of the ECT is Article 13, which foresees the principle of full 
compensation following expropriation. According to the provision, 
«Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the area of any other 
Contracting Party shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to a 
measure or measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or 
expropriation». The article provides foreign investors for protection both 
against outright takings of investments by the host state and the various forms 
of indirect or creeping expropriation, such as regulations or confiscatory 
taxation that undermaines the value of the investment12. 
Notably, the ECT has not closely defined the concept of expropriation. 
As a consequence, it is not easy to predict whether the arbitral tribunal would 
qualify the new Atomic Energy Act as an indirect expropriation. In any case, 
even in the event that the Tribunal rejected the complaint concerning alleged 
expropriation as unfounded, Vattenfall might still be successful on the basis of 
the fair and equitable treatment provision. Article 10(1) of the ECT requires 
the contracting parties to maintain a favourable investment climate for 
investments by committing themselves «to accord at all times to Investments 
of Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment». The 
principle of “fair and equitable treatment”13 is a vague and flexible concept 
which has been interpreted very differently by arbitration tribunals. 
                                                   
10 See ahead in the paragraph. 
11 See ahead in the paragraph. 
12 C. Schreuer, The concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection 
Treaties, 20 May 2005, 1-39, available at 
www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf (last visited December 2014). 
13 For a detailed description of the concept of fair and equitable treatment, see: C. 
Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, in 6 Journal World Investment 
& Trade (2005); C. Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International 
Investment Law, OECD Working Papers on International Investment (2004) No. 3; B. 
Kingsbury and S. Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable 
Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law (2009), New York 
University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 146, retreived via: 
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/146/ last visited on 10th September 2014.  
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Nevertheless, tribunals applying the fair and equitable treatment standard 
usually find it to include principles such as the protection of legitimate investor 
expectations to the retention of a stable legal and business environment by the 
host state, the principle of due process, transparency, proportionality and the 
prohibition on arbitrariness14.  Pursuant to these interpretations, it is possible 
to give a more detail content to the concept of fair and equitable treatment. As 
to the present case, it is likely that the Swedish company will refer to its 
“legitimate expectations”, since it has invested some euro 700 million on the 
nuclear power plants Krummel and Brunsbuttel, basing on the legitimate 
expectation that the legal extension of the older power plants’ lives would 
remain in force. On the other hand, it may be observed that the Energy 
Charter Treaty does contain certain references to safeguard environment in its 
preamble, which the arbitral tribunal should take into account as well. In 
addition, Article 10(1) of the ECT includes the umbrella clause, so as to make 
the principle pacta sunt servanda an obligation of each Contracting Party15. 
Precisely, the article obliges each Contracting Party to «observe any obligations 
it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor of any 
other contracting party». In this way, a violation of such an obligation covered 
by Article 10(1) may constitute a breach of a Contracting Party’s obligation 
under the ECT. In other words, the umbrella clause is a general rule of 
contract compliance which, if invoked in an investor-state dispute settlement 
case, elevates a contractual or other public law obligation to the international 
level. As some states have seen this internationalization of all obligations a step 
too far, they did not give their consent to the automatic application of the 
                                                   
14 For instance, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7 MTD, Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. 
v. Chile (Malaysia/Chile BIT) (25 May 2004); ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 Metaclad 
Corporation v. Mexico (NAFTA) (30 August 2000); ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, 
Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States (Spain/Mexico BIT) 
(29 May 2003); ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina 
(United States/Argentina BIT) (12 May 2005).  
15 For a deeper analysis of the concept of “umbrella clause”, see: C. Yannaca-Small, 
Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements, OECD Working Papers on 
International Investment (2006) No. 3. 
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umbrella clause to investor-state dispute settlement 16 . Considered that 
Germany has not made such reservation, however, Vattenfall could invoke this 
clause. In particular, the company might argue that the lifetime extension of 
the older power plants agreed in September 2010 represents a German 
commitment to Vattenfall that, if not met, brings about a violation of the 
Energy Charter Treaty. Unfortunately, all the considerations above made are 
only hypothesis that, until the proceeding details remain confidential, will not 
be possible to verify.  
 
4. Vattenfall v. Germany (I): a Case Conducted with Greater 
Transparency. 
 
It is interesting to make a comparison between the dispute at issue and 
a previous case involving the same disputing parties, but conducted with 
greater transparency: the Vattenfall I dispute case. On 2 April 2009, Vattenfall 
AB, Vattenfall Europe AG and Vattenfall Europe Generation AG submitted a 
request for arbitration against the Federal Republic of Germany at the ICSID 
under the terms of the Energy Charter Treaty17. The challenge constitutes the 
first (known) investor-state arbitration procedure against Germany. At issue 
was the construction of a coal-fired power plant by Vattenfall along the banks 
of the Elbe River. In 2007, the City of Hamburg agreed to a provisional 
contract with the Swedish company for the realization of a new power plant. 
The terms of the contract depended on a final permit that was approved nearly 
one year later, when the Hamburg Environmental Authority issued a license 
including additional restrictions with regard to the volume of cooling water, 
temperature and oxygen levels on the power plant’s impact on the Elbe River. 
Such water use permit, according to Vattenfall, was extremely severe and 
clearly deviated from what had been agreed in the contract with the City of 
                                                   
16 Australia, Canada, Hungary and Norway have made the reservation in Annex IA 
that the last sentence of Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty (the umbrella 
clause) does not automatically apply to investor-state dispute settlement. 
17 Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG v. Federal 
Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6. 
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Hamburg. As a result, the corporation proceeded to file a compensation claim 
against Germany arguing that the permit breached the provisions set out in 
Chapter III of the Energy Charter Treaty. The case was settled on March 2011, 
with Germany agreeing to a weakened environmental license in favour of the 
company18. Unlike the pending Vattenfall dispute case, the proceeding details 
of the Vattenfall I have been made publicly accessible19. The different way of 
conducting the two proceedings under the profile of transparency probably 
depends on the circumstance that, while in Vattenfall I the parties have agreed 
upon the final resolution of the dispute20, the pending case is more conflicting 
and maybe still too far from an agreement. 
 
5. Transparency of the Arbitration Proceeding According to the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules. 
 
The different transparency standard of the two disputes at stake is 
possible because public disclosure of arbitration proceedings under the ICSID 
Rules closely depends on the  will of the parties. In order to better understand 
the extent to which the disputing parties are able to affect public openness of 
ICSID disputes, it is useful to provide an overview of the transparency 
standard ensured by the ICSID Arbitration Rules. First of all, the ICSID 
Administrative and Financial Regulations guarantee public knowledge of the 
very existence of ICSID cases, by requiring the Secretary-General to publish 
certain information about the disputes, once they are registered 21 . Such 
                                                   
18 See Roda Verheyen (2012, April 11th). Briefing Note: the Coal-fired Power Plant 
Hamburg-Moorburg, ICSID proceedings by Vattenfall under the Energy Charter 
Treaty and the result for environmental standards. 
19 Both the Request for Arbitration (30 March 2009) and the Award (11 March 2011) 
have been published and are currently available at 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/1148. 
20 Actually, On August 25, 2010, the parties signed an agreement for the final and 
binding resolution of their dispute and discontinuance of the proceedings. In February 
2011, after having fulfilled the conditions for a full settlement of the dispute 
established in the agreement, the parties requested the Tribunal to embody the terms 
of the agreement in an award on the basis of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
21 Artt. 22 – 23 of the ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulations. 
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obligation, however, does not include the request of arbitration itself, which 
might remain confidential. In the second place, an adequate transparency 
standard should permit to interested non disputing-parties the chance of 
attending, or at least observing, hearings. Although ICSID Arbitration Rules 
currently enable arbitral tribunals to open up hearings to additional categories 
of people, they also contemplate a veto power of the disputing parties over the 
attendance of hearings, so that the parties still may prevent open hearings22.  
In relation to public disclosure of the final award, then, the recent 
amendments to ICSID Rules23 have improved the openness of arbitration 
proceedings and ensure a minimum level of transparency. 
Actually, even if the consent of the disputing parties keeps on being 
necessary for making the award public, the ICSID Secretariat is currently under 
the obligation to publish “excerpts of the legal reasoning” supporting the 
award24.  
In addition, a satisfactory transparency standard has to be combined 
with public participation: when the proceedings involve issues of significant 
public interest, civil society should be enabled to collaborate with the arbitral 
tribunals. To this end, the institution of amicus curiae25 may represent the means 
for feeding the trial dialectics without burden the time of the dispute resolution 
process and the position of the parties. In particular, the possibility for amici 
curiae to submit a brief would bring additional factual and legal considerations 
related to important public interests (e.g. the environment), thus, expanding the 
scope of investment arbitration. Subsequently to the revision process of 2006, 
the ICSID Rules expressly empower tribunals to permit non-disputing parties 
to file written amicus curiae submissions26. Moreover, the amended provisions 
                                                   
22 Rule 32(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
23 The ICSID Rules were amended on 10 April 2006. 
24 Rule 48(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
25 For a deeper analysis of the concept of amicus curiae, see: E. BARONCINI, Società civile 
e sistema OMC di risoluzione delle controversie: gli Amici Curiae, in Organizzazione Mondiale del 
Commercio e Diritto della Comunità Europea nella Prospettiva della Risoluzione delle Controversie, 
Giuffrè, Milano, 2005, 79-80; and K.F. GOMEZ, Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in 
International Investment Arbitration: How to Draw the Line Favorably for the Public Interest, in 
Fordham International Law Journal, 4 June 2011, Vol. 35, 518-524. 
26 Rule 37 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
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include some procedural considerations as well as a non-exhaustive set of 
criteria to be considered by tribunals in deciding whether to allow the filing of 
such briefs27. Even though the ICSID Rules seem to ensure a satisfactory 
standard of public participation, they are still inadequate. Indeed, public 
participation without an exhaustive knowledge of the proceeding details risks 
to become meaningless.  
 
6. Final Considerations. 
 
Once verified that the ICSID Arbitration Rules are still far from the 
achievement of an adequate transparency standard, it is recommended that 
cases arising important public interests, like the one at issue, will be conducted 
with the greatest possible public scrutiny and transparency.  
In investor-state disputes, indeed, the arbitral tribunals are often 
required to balance conflicting sensitive interests: on the one hand, they have 
to consider the applicable investment treaty and guarantee foreign investors the 
due protection; on the other, especially when regulatory measures are at stake, 
they should assess the public interests involved and the impact their decision 
could have on the right of states to regulate.  
In pursuance of such a thorny task, transparency and public 
participation might function as the key for diminishing the tension between the 
investor rights and state right to regulate in the public interest. Transparency 
would permit the general public to be aware of the way by which their interests 
are appreciated and protected and, at the same time, public participation would 
permit tribunals to broaden their view and acquire a proper consideration of 
the non-economic interests involved. 
 
                                                   
27 Rule 37(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
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